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II. Abstract 
 
 
Compulsory licensing would offer Ghana a practical means to mitigate the high costs and 
shortages of medicines resulting from the failure of patentees to work their patented medicines 
locally. Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention as incorporated into Article 2 of TRIPS is 
consistent with Section 84 of the Indian Patents Act allows for the granting of compulsory 
licences to remedy failure to work. Where national laws permit, Article 31 of TRIPS allows 
the use of compulsory licences on any grounds subject to certain conditions. Although, the 
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health confirmed this position, there are contradictory 
opinions that the non-discrimination principle under Article 27(1) of TRIPS prohibits the 
granting of compulsory licences for failure to work. To the extent that Article 2 of TRIPS 
incorporates Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention provision, which is consistent with Section 
84, the question that arises is whether Section 84 is consistent with TRIPS. Therefore, the aim 
of this thesis is to draw on applicable sources of law in an attempt to examine the consistency 
of Section 84 with TRIPS. This work is based on the hypothesis that Section 84, which allows 
the granting of a compulsory licence provided that the patented invention has not been worked 
in the territory of India, is consistent with TRIPS and would therefore provide a suitable model 
for Ghana. This argument is enhanced by the fact that in 2012 India invoked Section 84 in 
granting a compulsory licence to Natco and to date the consistency of this decision with TRIPS 
remains unchallenged within the World Trade Organisation Dispute Settlement system. The 
overriding implication is that if India got away with this decision, then it is probable that Ghana 
could implement a model similar to Section 84 to obtain affordable medicines without any 
legal challenge. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Ghana’s Essential Medicines Need and the Legal Difficulties in using Compulsory 
Licensing 
 
1.1. Aim of the Chapter 
 
This chapter seeks to present the background of the study. It highlights Ghana’s need for 
essential medicines and the legal difficulties in using compulsory licensing to obtain an 
affordable supply for distribution. 
 
1.2.  Introduction to the Work 
 
Compulsory licensing, as an instrument of government policy,1 would offer Ghana, a country 
that is considerably burdened with diseases,2 a practical means to mitigate the high costs and 
shortages of essential medicines.3 Essential medicines per the definition by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) are those that ‘satisfy the priority health care needs of the population’ 
and ‘are intended to be available within the context of functioning health systems at all times 
in adequate amounts, in the appropriate dosage forms, with assured quality, and at a price the 
individual and the community can afford’.4 
 
However, the country faces legal difficulties in using the compulsory licensing instrument for 
that purpose. For example, in August 2000, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) threatened to take an 
Indian company the Chemical, Industrial and Pharmaceutical Laboratories (CIPLA) to court 
on the basis the company’s exportation of Duovir to a Ghanaian drug distributor (Healthcare 
                                                 
1 Jerome Reichman and Catherine Hasenzahl, ‘Non-Voluntary Licensing of Patented Inventions’ (UNCTAD-
ICTSD Issue Paper No. 5, 2004) 10, defining the term “Non-voluntary” or “Compulsory licensing” as the practice 
of governments allowing parties other than the original patentees to exploit patented products and processes. 
2 Country Statistics and Global Health Estimates (WHO and UN Partners). 
<http://www.who.int/countries/gha/en/> [Accessed Mar. 18, 2018]. Jullien Clare Cohen, Martha Gyansa-
Lutterodt, Kwasi Torpey, Esmail Laura, Greg Kurokawa, ‘TRIPS, the DOHA Declaration and Increasing Access 
to Medicines: Policy Options for Ghana’ (2005) 1 Globalization and Health 17, 5, stating that Ghana's major 
disease burden includes malaria, TB and HIV/AIDS. Eric Tenkorang and Vincent Kuuire, ‘Noncommunicable 
Diseases in Ghana: Does the Theory of Social Gradient in Health Hold?’ (2016) 46 Health Education and 
Behaviour 1 (Suppl.), 25-26. 
3 Karima Saleh, ‘The Health Sector in Ghana: A Comprehensive Assessment’ (World Bank, 2013) para. 102, 
finding that several facilities continued to report stock outs. ‘Let’s End Frequent Shortage of Medicines’ (Graphic 
Online, Tuesday, Aug. 26, 2014).  <http://www.graphic.com.gh/editorials/29516-let-s-end-frequent-shortage-of-
medicines.html> [Accessed Mar. 25, 2018]. 
4 See the Concept of Essential Medicines by the World Health. Available at: 
<https://www.who.int/medicines/services/essmedicines_def/en/> [Accessed Mar. 10, 2019]. 
 10 
Limited) violates its patent rights in Combivir.5 While it appears that this enterprise was purely 
a private commercial arrangement as opposed to a compulsory licence or parallel importation,6 
CIPLA ceased exports to Ghana, which caused shortages of Duovir in the country.7  
 
Moreover, in 2005, Ghana granted a compulsory licence for public non-commercial use,8 
however, this national measure was abandoned.9 Ghana’s failure to utilise the compulsory 
licensing instrument to obtain affordable medicines is due to the controversy surrounding the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO)10 Members’ right to grant compulsory licensing for 
pharmaceutical products under the TRIPS Agreement.11 Notably, the concept and practice of 
compulsory licences are not new, even in developed countries.12 This instrument has a long 
                                                 
5 Mark Schoofs, ‘Glaxo Attempts to Block Access to Generic AIDS Drugs in Ghana’ (The Wall Street Journal, 
Dec. 1, 2000). < http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB975628467266044917> [Accessed Mar. 13, 2017]. See 
Dr Yusuf Hamied, ‘CEO of CIPLA’s Letter to GSK’. <http://www.thebody.com/content/art1606.html> 
[Accessed Mar. 24, 2017]. 
6 Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement, Apr. 15, 1994. Annex 1 C Legal Instrument-Result of the Uruguay Round. 
Vol. 31, 13 I.L.M (1994) provides that ‘For the purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to 
the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion 
of intellectual property rights.’ See Keith Maskus, Parallel Imports in Pharmaceuticals: Implications for 
Competition and Prices in Developing Countries (Final Report to World Intellectual Property Organisation, 2001) 
2, defining parallel imports as goods produced genuinely under protection of a trademark, patent, or copyright, 
placed into circulation in one market, and then imported into a second market without the authorisation of the 
local owner of the IP right. note that with respect to the exhaustion of IP rights, Paragraph 5(d) of the World Trade 
Organisation, Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 
(2002), (adopted on Nov. 14, 2001) reads as follows:  
The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each Member free to establish its 
own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the MFN and national 
treatment provisions of Articles 3 and 4.1. 
7 Caroline Thomas, ‘Trade Policy and the Politics of Access to Drugs’ (2002) 23 Third World Quarterly 2, 258. 
8 Notification of Emergency and Issuance of Government Use Licence by Ghana (No. SD-110SF.3 Vol., 26 
October 2005). Available at: <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/Ghana.png> [Accessed Mar. 27, 2017]. James 
Love, ‘Recent Examples of Compulsory Licensing of Patents’ (Knowledge Ecology International, May 6, 2007). 
See also Brent Savoie, ‘Thailand’s Test: Compulsory Licensing in an Era of Epidemiologic Transition’ (2007) 48 
Virginia Journal of International Law 1, 237. Jamie Feldman, ‘Compulsory Licenses: The Dangers Behind the 
Current Practice’ (2009) 8 Journal of International Business and Law 1, 14. 
9 Emilie Cloatre, Pills for the Poorest: An Exploration of TRIPS and Access to Medication in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 53, finding that Ghana did not directly face significant political 
opposition at the time, although interestingly, this compulsory licensing was later made redundant by the 
regulations imposed by the Global Fund that now finances the procurement of AVRs in Ghana. 
10 The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, the Legal Texts: The 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 4 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 
(1994). 
11 Richard Epstein and Scott Kieff, ‘Questioning the Frequency and Wisdom of Compulsory Licensing for 
Pharmaceutical Patents’ (2011) 78 The University of Chicago Law Review 2, 92, claiming that efforts to justify 
compulsory licensing for pharmaceutical patents are simply not tenable because defenders fail, first, to understand 
the power of the background presumption against it. Cole Fauver, ‘Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United 
States: An Idea Whose Time Has Come’ (1987) 8 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 3, 676, 
explaining that compulsory licences reduce the inventor’s incentive to develop new technology. 
12 ibid. Fauver, 672, detailing Canada, Germany, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom as 
countries that have maintained local working requirements. 
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history and has remained a prominent feature of the general philosophy of patent regimes for 
over a century.13 It has become a common and integrated feature of most patent systems, even 
though it is not often put into practice.14 Many patent law regimes provide for the granting of 
compulsory licences in a variety of situations.15 Specific situations in which compulsory 
licences may be issued are set out in the legislation of each patent system.16  
 
Many justifications have been offered to account for this practice and they vary considerably 
between countries.17 Perhaps the most important and widespread use of compulsory licences 
by Members is as a remedy for patent-holder abuse, such as failure to work patented inventions 
over an extended period in the territory of the country that granted the patent.18 Consequently, 
in several countries, local working requirements are the basis for granting compulsory 
licences.19 For example, Section 84 of the Patents Act 1970 authorises the Controller General 
                                                 
13 Friedrich-Karl Beier, ‘Exclusive Rights, Statutory Licenses and Compulsory Licenses in Patent and Utility 
Model Law’ (1999) 30 International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law 3, 259-260, finding that 
most patent laws in developed countries permit compulsory licences, but stressing that actual grants of such 
licences remain rare. 
14 For example, compulsory licensing provisions were included in the first Commonwealth Patents Legislation of 
Australia [C1903A00021: No. 21 of 1903]. Part V-Titled: Section 87 - Working of Patents and Compulsory 
Licences. Belgium Patent Law (of Mar. 28, 1984, as last amended on Jan. 28, 1997) Article 31, 33 and 35 concerns 
compulsory licences. 
15 Carlos Correa, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for Developing 
Countries’ (Trade-Related Agenda, Development and Equity Working Papers 5: South Centre, October 1999) 10, 
discussing the grounds for granting compulsory licences including non-working and inadequate supply. Stephen 
Ladas, Patents, Trademarks, and Related Rights-National and International Protection (Harvard University 
Press, Vol. 1, 1975) 536, claiming that to meet public interests, even if a patent worked locally remains 
“unreasonably high prices”, or if, having licensed the product for local manufacture, the prices of the patented 
products are too high licensing can be granted. 
16 ‘Resource Book on TRIPS and Development: An Authoritative and Practical Guide to the TRIPS Agreement 
(UNCTAD–ICSTD Capacity Building Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development, 2005) para. 2.135, stating 
that compulsory licences are generally a matter of national law in confirmation of the Preamble of Article 31 of 
TRIPS, which in part reads: ‘Where the law of a Member allows for other use...’. 
17 Joseph Yosick, ‘Compulsory Patent Licensing for Efficient Use of Inventions’ (2001) 2001 University of Illinois 
Law Review 5, 1277. 
18 Michael Halewood, ‘Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working Requirements and Compulsory Licenses at 
International Law’ (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 2, 249. See Section 27 of the English Patents and Designs 
Act 1919 (9 & 10 Geo 5 c. 80) and Section 27(2)(a) as then revised read: 
If [at any time after the expiration of four years from the date of the patent] the patented 
invention [being one capable of being worked in the United Kingdom], is not being worked 
within the United Kingdom on a commercial scale, and no satisfactory reason can be given 
for such non-working. 
19 WIPO: Refusals to Licence IP Rights – A Comparative Note on Possible Approaches (WIPO, August 2013) 9, 
Box 2 explains that: 
The obligation to work the invention has two different meanings: generally, it means that the 
patent owner has the duty of making the patented product or the product made with the 
patented process available to potential consumers; specifically, it means that the patent owner 
is under the duty of supplying the national market with the patented product or the product 
made with the patented process that has been manufactured in the territory of the granting 
country. The second meaning is known as “the local working requirement.” It follows an 
industrial policy rationale, according to which patents are granted to promote the 
 12 
of Patents (Controller) to grant a compulsory licence20 at any time after the expiration of three 
years from the date of the granting of a patent, upon an application by any person interested, 
if, amongst other things, he is satisfied that the patented invention is not worked in the territory 
of India.21  
 
The Controller can also grant a compulsory licence if he is satisfied that the reasonable 
requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention have not been met.22 There is 
a further independent condition, on which the Controller can grant a compulsory licence, that 
is, where the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price.23 
Under Section 84(7)(e), one of the criteria for deciding the latter is ‘if the working of the 
patented invention in the territory of India on a commercial scale is being prevented or hindered 
by the importation from abroad of the patented article’.  
 
This use was provided for in the Paris Convention on Industrial Property 1883 (Paris 
Convention).24 However, this possibility is subject to conditions, as set out in Article 5(A)(4), 
which stipulates that: 
A compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of failure to work or 
insufficient working before the expiration of a period of four years from the date of 
filing of the patent application or three years from the date of the grant of the patent, 
whichever period expires last; it shall be refused if the patentee justifies his inaction 
by legitimate reasons. Such a compulsory licence shall be non-exclusive and shall 
not be transferable, even in the form of the grant of a sub-license, except with that 
part of the enterprise or goodwill which exploits such license. 
 
                                                 
establishment of domestic industries by means of imports of foreign technology, and local 
invention and innovation. According to this rationale, patents are not simply granted for 
promoting invention and innovation. Or, in other words, patents are granted to promote 
national, rather than foreign invention and innovation. 
Georg Bodenhausen, ‘Guide to the Application of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 
as Revised at Stockholm in 1967’ (WIPO Publication No. 611(E) BIRPI, 1969, WIPO Reprinted, 1991) 71, stating 
that importation or sale of the patented product, or of the article manufactured by a patented process, will not 
normally be regarded as “working” the patent. Halewood (n 18) 246. 
20 Sections 84(4) and 88: Powers of Controller in granting compulsory licences. [Act 39 of 1970 amended]. 
21 Section 84(c). 
22 Section 84(a). 
23 Section 84(b). 
24 Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883, 21 UST 1583, 828 
UNTS 305 (as revised). Article 5(A)(2) states that: 
Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures providing for the 
granting of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise 
of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work. 
For a detailed review of the relationship between the Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement see Ituku Elangi 
Botoy, ‘From the Paris Convention to the TRIPS Agreement’ (2004) 7 The Journal of World Intellectual Property 
1, 115-130. 
 13 
Remarkably, Article 5(A)(4) of the Paris Convention, which in part has a similar text to Section 
84, is incorporated into the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) under Article 2.25 Added to this, Section 5 of the TRIPS Agreement, inter alia, 
lays out a framework of substantive and procedural provisions that must be respected when a 
WTO Member intends to grant a compulsory licence. Although TRIPS does not directly refer 
to failure to work as the basis for granting a compulsory licence and the grounds on which a 
compulsory licence may be granted are not specified in the Agreement, when read alongside 
Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention and Article 2 of TRIPS, the allowance of such a 
compulsory licence is implied. 
 
Related to this is the fact that since the inception of the TRIPS Agreement some WTO Members 
have used or threatened to grant compulsory licences to obtain affordable medicines for the 
protection of public health.26 These include, but are not limited to, the United States (US) for 
Bayer’s antibiotic Ciprofloxacin,27 Brazil for Abbot’s Kaletra; Merck’s Efavirenz; and Roche’s 
Nelfinavir,28 and Thailand for Merck’s HIV/AIDS drug Efavirenz.29 The understanding is that 
when governments issue or threaten to grant compulsory licences, the result is often a sharp 
decrease in prices,30 a consensus reached by WTO Members during the Doha Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration) in recognition of concerns about 
the effects of patents on the prices of essential medicines.31 
 
                                                 
25 “The TRIPS Agreement” (n 6). 
26 Love (n 8) 12-18, providing examples of countries that have used or threatened to use compulsory licences. 
27 Divya Murthy, ‘The Future of Compulsory Licensing: Deciphering the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health’ (2002) 17 American University of International Law Review 6, 1314-1315. 
28 Jennifer Bjornberg, ‘Note’, ‘Brazil’s Recent Threat on Abbott’s Patent: Resolution or Retaliation?’ (2006) 27 
Northwester Journal of International Law & Business 1, 211. 
29 Thailand Issues Compulsory Licence for Patented AIDS Drug (2006) 10 Bridges: International Centre for 
Trade and Sustainable Development 42. Cynthia Ho, ‘Patent Breaking or Balancing?: Separating Strands of Fact 
from Fiction Under TRIPS’ (2009) 34 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 
2, 378. 
30 Sara Ford, ‘Compulsory Licensing Provisions under the TRIPS Agreement: Balancing Pills and Patents’ (1999) 
15 American University International Law Review 4, 946. 
31 “Doha Declaration” (n 6) para. 3. 
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Health is a fundamental human right recognised in numerous international instruments.32 
Importantly, the right to health includes access to essential medicines.33 Countries are 
individually,34 and through international assistance and cooperation obliged to fulfil the right 
to health obligations.35 Therefore, in fulfilment of the right to health obligations, the 
international community including the WTO expects that essential medicines shall be available 
at all times in adequate amounts and at a price that both individuals and the community can 
afford.36  
 
As emphasised by Paragraph 5(b) of the Doha Declaration, ‘Each Member has the right to grant 
compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are 
                                                 
32 for example, Article 25(1) the Universal Declaration on Human Rights [G.A. Res. 217A, at 25, U.N. GAOR, 
3d Sess., 67th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810, 1948] states that: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living 
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical 
care and necessary social services”. Also, Article 12(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights [G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, Dec. 16, 
1966] state parties recognise the “right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health”.  
33 Note that the implementation of the ICESCR is monitored by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and the Covenant is supplemented, at regular intervals, by authoritative comments. In its General Comment 
14, the Committee interprets the right to health, as defined in Article 12(1) of the Covenant, as an inclusive right 
of appropriate treatment of prevalent diseases, preferably at community level; and the provision of essential drugs. 
See the General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of the 
Covenant). (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Twenty Second Session, E/C.12/2000/4, Aug. 
11, 2000) para. 17. 
34 ibid. paras. 34-37, providing specific legal obligation on states to promote the right to health. See Duncan 
Matthews, ‘When Framing Meets Law: Using Human Rights as a Practical Instrument to Facilitate Access to 
Medicines in Developing Countries’ (2011) 3 The WIPO Journal 1, 126, citing Vincent v. Union of India, AIR 
[1987] SC 990 and pointing out that the Supreme Court of India had concluded that the right to health, including 
access to medical treatment, is a fundamental right. See also Hans Hogerzeil, Melanie Samson and Jaume Vidal 
Casanova, Ruling for Access Leading Court Cases in Developing Countries on Access to Essential Medicines as 
Part of the Fulfilment of the Right to Health (Geneva, World Health Organization Department of Essential Drugs 
and Medicines Policy, November 2004) 31-32, citing the Treatment Action Campaign, Dr Haron Sallojee and 
Children’s Rights Centre vs. RSA Ministry of Health High Court of South Africa, Transvaal Provincial Div., Dec. 
12, 2001 and Decision of the Constitutional Court [Case CCT 8/02, Jul. 5, 2002] in confirmation of access to 
medicines as a human right to health component. 
35 “General Comment No. 14” (33) para. 39, commenting that:  
To comply with their international obligations in relation to article 12, States parties 
have to respect the enjoyment of the right to health in other countries, and to prevent 
third parties from violating the right in other countries, if they are able to influence 
these third parties by way of legal or political means, in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations and applicable international law.  
36 It is important to note that under Paragraph 1 of the Doha Declaration the WTO recognised the gravity of the 
public health problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, and stressed under Paragraph 2 that  the TRIPS Agreement 
to be part of the wider national and international action to address these problems. Moreover, at Paragraph 3, the 
WTO Members recognised the concerns about IPRs’ effects on prices, and further agreed under Paragraph 4 that 
TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health, and, 
in particular, to promote access to medicines for all. See also Access to Medication in the Context of Pandemics 
such as HIV/AIDS (Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2001/33, UN Doc. E/CN.4/ Res/2001/33, Apr. 20, 
2001). See also Millennium Development Goal 8: Delivering on the Global Partnership for Achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals (UN MDG Gap Task Force Report, 2008) 35. 
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granted’.37 Furthermore, while reiterating their commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, the 
WTO Members agreed that it does not and should not prevent members from taking measures 
to protect public health.38 This means that where the law of a Member allows for any “Other 
Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder” as captioned in the title of Article 31 of TRIPS, 
the Agreement does not prevent such a Member from using those grounds.39 To the extent that, 
a WTO Member satisfies the substantive conditions and also follows the procedural 
requirements under Article 31 of TRIPS, such a Member can grant compulsory licences on any 
grounds including, failure to work. 
 
Under Article 31(b) of TRIPS, Members can circumvent the detailed procedural requirements 
in the case of a national emergency or other circumstance of extreme urgency. Unfortunately, 
Article 31 also imposes a condition that has rendered the provision essentially useless to many 
developing countries.40 Article 31(f) of TRIPS confines use to circumstances ‘predominantly 
for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorising such use’.41 Therefore, under 
this provision, a Member may grant a compulsory licence only to a domestic manufacturer.42 
This created a difficult situation, since the WTO Members that need affordable medicines the 
most were those without adequate pharmaceutical manufacturing capacities.43 
 
Accordingly, several developing countries were not able to use Article 31 of TRIPS to obtain 
affordable medicines.44 Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration recognised that WTO Members 
with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face 
difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.45 
The Members instructed the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this 
problem.46 Two years later, on 30 August 2003, the WTO General Council announced a 
                                                 
37 “Doha Declaration” (n 6) paras. 3 & 5(b). 
38 ibid. para. 4.  
39 The African Group claimed that: ‘Nothing in the TRIPS Agreement shall prevent Members from taking 
measures to protect public health’. See WTO Docs. (IP/C/W/312, WT/GC/W/450, Oct. 4, 2001) para. 1. This is 
one of the main points of contention during the preparatory work for the Doha Ministerial Council Meeting. 
40 Erin Anderson, ‘Unnecessary Deaths and Unnecessary Costs: Getting Patented Drugs to Patients Most in Need’ 
(2009) 29 Boston College Third World Law Journal 1, 96. 
41 Article 31(f) of TRIPS. 
42 id. 
43 Anderson (n 40) 96. 
44 id. 
45 “Doha Declaration” (n 6). 
46 id. 
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solution.47 The solution, in the form of an “interim waiver” sets out detailed formal conditions 
and procedural requirements on which both developed countries and developing countries 
seeking to use the system must respect.48 
 
On 6 December 2005, the TRIPS Agreement was amended taking into consideration the 30 
August 2003 “waiver” Decision.49 Nevertheless, the procedural requirements for the granting 
of compulsory licences under Article 31 of TRIPS are too complex and vague, while the formal 
substantive conditions developed by the Doha Solution that ought to be satisfied before 
granting compulsory licences are too burdensome, which further compounds the restrictions 
imposed by TRIPS.50 
 
Faced with the high cost and shortages of “sorafenib tosylate” (marketed as Nexavar),51 in 2012 
India followed the example of several WTO Members that have used or threatened to use 
compulsory licences to promote affordable medicines by invoking Section 84, which allows 
the granting of a compulsory licence provided that the patented invention has not been worked 
in the territory of India, and granted a compulsory licence to Natco Pharma Limited (an Indian 
generic manufacturer).52 While it appears on the face of it that the Controller correctly 
interpreted Section 84, some question the consistency of the decision with TRIPS.53 Central to 
                                                 
47 Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health — General 
Council Decision of 30 August 2003 (WT/L/540 and WT/L/540/Corr.1). See Decision Removes Final Patent 
Obstacle to Cheap Drug Imports (WTO News: 2003 Press Releases - Press/350/Rev.1, Aug. 30, 2003). Available 
at: <https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres03_e/pr350_e.htm> [Accessed Jun. 14, 2017]. 
48 Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health - General Council 
Chairman’s Statement (WTO Doc. JOB(03)/177 (Reproduced in the WTO Doc. WT/GC/M/82, Nov. 13, 2003). 
See Rojina Thapa, ‘Waiver Solution in Public Health and Pharmaceutical Domain under TRIPS’ (2011) 16 
Journal of Intellectual Property Rights 6, 473. 
49 Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement (World Trade Organisation, WT/L/641, Dec. 6, 2005). 
50 Brin Anderson, ‘Better Access to Medicines: Why Countries are Getting ―Tripped Up and Not Ratifying 
Article 31-Bis’ (2010) 1 Case Western Reserve Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet 2, 173-174. 
51 “Sorafenib Tosyalte” is a pharmaceutical therapeutic compound patented by Bayer Corporation marketed as 
Nexavar and is used in the treatment of advanced stages of kidney cancer (Renal Cell Carcinoma) and liver cancer 
(Hepatocellular carcinoma). It stops the growth of new blood vessels and impacting other cellular growth 
mechanisms, the drug can extend the life of a patient, the duration being between 6 months and 5 years. See The 
United States Food and Drugs Agency Approval for Sorafenib Tosylate. Available at: 
<http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/druginfo/fda-sorafenib-tosylate> [Accessed Mar. 28, 2018]. 
52 The Controller General of Patents and the Order: Mumbai-India (CLA No. 1 of 2011, Decision on Mar. 12, 
2012) <http://www.gnaipr.com/CaseLaws/Controller%20Order%20-%2012032012.pdf> [Accessed Mar. 19, 
2018]. 
53 Enrico Bonadio, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patents: The Bayer-Natco Case’ (2012) 34 European Intellectual 
Property Review 10, 720, stating the ruling might be a violation of Article 27(1) of TRIPS, which precludes India, 
as a Party to the Agreement, from discriminating between patented products that are imported and those that are 
locally produced. 
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this disagreement is the interpretation of certain substantive provisions within the TRIPS 
Agreement, arguably Articles 27 and 28.54  
 
Article 27(1) of TRIPS in part provides that patents shall be available for any inventions and 
patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of 
technology and whether the product is imported or locally produced.55 Moreover, Article 28 of 
TRIPS lays out the rights conferred on patent holders, namely, the exclusive right to make, use, 
offer for sale, sell, or import the patented goods or processes.56 The patent holder also has the 
exclusive right to assign, transfer or licence the patent.57 At face value, reading the contextual 
part of Article 27(1) of TRIPS alone would suggest that so long as the patented product or 
process is available in the local market, the use of the patent cannot be differentiated on the 
basis of its sourcing – whether it was manufactured within the country or imported.58  
 
Put differently, the argument that follows is that the importation of patents can satisfy local 
working either partially or fully,59 and for the sole reason that the domestic market is supplied, 
wholly or in part, by imports and not exclusively by local manufacturing.60 This viewpoint 
supports the contradictory claim that Article 27(1) of TRIPS subsequently redefined “working” 
to include the possibility that this can be adequately satisfied by importation,61 and local 
working as being made available in the country, including through imports, rather than through 
direct local manufacture in the territory of protection.62 As Halewood puts it, ‘”working” 
                                                 
54 Review of TRIPS, International Trade Daily News (BNA) (International Trade Reporter, Jun 9, 1999) D7, 
highlighting the controversy surrounding the interpretation of compulsory licensing after the inception of TRIPS. 
55 Part II, Section 5 of TRIPS - Standards concerning the availability, scope and use of Intellectual Property. 
Dispute Settlement: World Trade Organisation (The UNTCD UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.18, 2003) 19, para. 
2.6.3, interpreting Article 27(1). Nuno Pires de Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime of Patent Rights (Kluwer Law 
International, 2nd edn. 2005) 168, para. 27.5. 
56 ibid. Article 28(1) of UNCTAD: Dispute Settlement, para. 2.6.4, explaining that by way of contrast, Article 28 
does not expressly confer a right to “export” patented products, though since a product may need to be “made” or 
“sold” to be exported, it might be difficult to undertake export of a patented product without contravening one of 
the enumerated rights. 
57 Article 28(2). 
58 Paul Champ and Amir Attaran, ‘Patent Right and Local Working under the WTO TRIPS Agreement: An 
Analysis of the U.S. - Brazil Patent Dispute’ (2002) 27 Yale Journal of International Law 2, 367.  
59 Antony Taubman, A Practical Guide to Working with TRIPS (Oxford University Press, 2011) 104. 
60 id. 
61 Kim Jordan, ‘International Application of a Domestic Intellectual Property Protection Strategy: Extending a 
Predatory Litigation Strategy to the European Community (1995) 11 Santa Clara Computer & High Technology 
Law Journal 2, 400, stating that the lawful import of a product from another member state satisfies the working 
requirement. 
62 Thiamanga Kongolo, Unsettled International Intellectual Property Issues (Kluwer Law International, 2008) 6, 
noting that under TRIPS, “working” has an extensive meaning to include the import of patented products. See 
also Martin Adelman and Sonia Badia, ‘Prospects & Limits of the Patent Protection in the TRIPS Agreement: 
The Case of India’ (1996) 29 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 3, 507 at 517. 
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therefore, has been redefined and diminished to the extent that it no longer serves to guarantee 
the transfer of anything but finished commodities’.63 
 
Under this understanding, a WTO Member must establish a patent system that does not 
separate the place of invention and whether products are imported or locally produced.64 
Therefore, any national measures that seek to eventually discriminate against patents in regard 
to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether the products are imported or 
locally produced will be inconsistent with TRIPS.65 Moreover, the inclusion of two principal 
principles, national treatment and the most favoured nation clause, particularly Article 3(1) of 
TRIPS,66 in hindsight, may operate to limit or eliminate the varying patent policy approaches 
whereby national laws can discriminate against foreign nationals and products involved in trade 
or differentiate between the treatment conferred to products that are locally produced and those 
that are imported.67  
 
In that context, some countries interpret the general non-discrimination principle under Article 
27(1) of TRIPS as an “absolute” provision, which is not subject to the compulsory licensing 
exception in Article 31.68 Also, previous WTO Panel jurisprudence seems to have supported 
the assertion that Article 27(1) is absolute.69 Furthermore, Article 5(A)(1) of the Paris 
Convention clearly specifies that importation by the patentee alone cannot be a sufficient 
ground to forfeit a patent.70 This provision has the same substantive content as Article 27(1) of 
                                                 
63 Halewood (n 18) 247. 
64 id. 
65 Nuno Pires de Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime of Patent Rights (Kluwer Law International, 3rd edn. 2010) 174. 
66 Article 3(1) of TRIPS provides that: ‘Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment 
no less favourable than it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of patents’. See Thomas 
Cottier, Shaheeza Lalani and Michelangelo Temmerman, ‘Use It or Lose It: Assessing the Compatibility of the 
Paris Convention and TRIPS Agreement with Respect to Local Working Requirements (2014) 17 Journal of 
International Economic Law 2, 459. Jerome Reichman, ‘Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property 
Protection under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement’ (1995) 29 The International Lawyer 2, 347-348. 
67 Gail Evans, ‘TRIPS and the Sufficiency of the Free Trade Principles’ (1999) 2 The Journal of World Intellectual 
Property 5, 714, mentioning that both national treatment and most favoured nation principles are instrumental in 
removing private law, such as IP, from its traditional territorial foundation and aligning it with the free trade 
principles of international trade law to ensure that domestic laws do not discriminate against either member states 
or their nationals. 
68 Panel Report in Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products. Complaint by the European 
Communities (WT/DS1 14/R, Mar. 20, 2000) paras 7.88-7.93 (Argument by Switzerland). 
69 ibid. para. 7.91. The Panel says that it is an “acknowledged fact” that Article 27 is not subject to the Article 30 
and 31 exceptions because it is simply ‘understood . . . without the need for any textual provision so providing’. 
70 Article 5A(1) states that ‘Importation by the patentee into the country where the patent has been granted of 
articles manufactured in any of the countries of the Union shall not entail forfeiture of the patent’. See Carvalho 
(n 55) 132, para. 2.13. 
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TRIPS, which recognises that patented products can be imported.71 Some interpret this to mean 
that Article 27(1) of TRIPS forbids the granting of a compulsory licence on the grounds of 
failure to work, and that on this basis Section 84 is inconsistent with TRIPS.72 Thus, the 
inconsistent interpretation of Article 27(1) of TRIPS is responsible for creating unnecessary 
tension between WTO Members, and has greatly restricted access to affordable medicines, 
mainly in developing countries.73  
 
Importantly, one of the stated goals of the TRIPS Agreement was ‘to reduce tensions arising 
from intellectual property protection’, the possible conflict being between such protection and 
essential public health objectives – in particular, access to affordable medicines.74 It is 
however, worth emphasising that the controversy concerning the legitimacy of Members’ 
discretion with regard to the granting of compulsory licences under WTO law only became an 
issue after the conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement.75 Before that point, the notion of Members’ 
right to grant compulsory licences on the condition that the patentees had failed to work their 
patented inventions locally was rarely questioned or rejected.76 
 
Although some scholars have, in the past, argued for the need for the TRIPS Agreement to be 
reviewed in order to clarify the misunderstanding regarding the right of WTO Members to 
grant compulsory licences,77 a unique aspect of the WTO is that there already exists a Dispute 
                                                 
71 Halewood (n 18) 257. 
72 Bonadio (n 53) 720. 
73 Michael Blakeney, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property: A Concise Guide to the TRIPS Agreement 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 1996) 3-6, noting disagreements over pharmaceutical patents between the US and Korea, 
India, Thailand and Brazil from 1987 through 1992. Theresa Beeby Lewis, ‘Comment, Patent Protection for the 
Pharmaceutical Industry: A Survey of Patent Laws of Various Countries’ (1996) 30 Journal of International Law 
4, 859, highlighting recent pharmaceutical patent disputes between the US and Singapore, Costa Rica, China, 
Egypt, Korea and Thailand. 
74 “Preamble of the TRIPS Agreement”, ‘Emphasising the importance of reducing tensions by reaching 
strengthened commitments to resolve disputes on trade-related intellectual property issues through multilateral 
procedures’. Carlos Correa and Duncan Matthews, ‘The Doha Declaration Ten Years on and Its Impact on Access 
to Medicines and the Right to Health’ (Discussion Paper, UNDP, Bureau of Development Policy, December 2011) 
7. 
75 Remarkably, the advent of the TRIPS Agreement has not led many countries to amend their local working 
provisions. In Europe, for example, as recently as 1997 only the Netherlands and Switzerland had changed their 
laws. See Section 48B(1)(a) of the Patents Act 1977 (C. 37. United Kingdom). Bernd Hansen and Fritjoff Hirsch, 
Protecting Inventions in Chemistry: Commentary on Chemical Case Law under the European Patent Convention 
and the German Patent Law (Wiley-Vch: Weinheim, 1997) 406-407. 
76 Brian Mercurio and Mitali Tyagi, ‘Treaty Interpretation in WTO Dispute Settlement: The Outstanding Question 
of the Legality of Local Working Requirements’ (2010) 12 Minnesota Journal of International Law 2, 283. 
77 Richard Marschall, Note, ‘Patents, Antitrust, and the WTO/GATT: Using TRIPS as a Vehicle for Antitrust 
Harmonization’ (1997) 28 Journal of Law and Policy International Business 4, 1190, calling for amendments to 
TRIPS that would limit the broad escape clause permitting developing nations to use compulsory licences. 
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Settlement Understanding (DSU) system.78 This system mandates the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) to resolve conflicting legal matters arising from WTO Agreements, including TRIPS.79 
Since the inception of the WTO, increasing numbers of trade-related disputes have been 
brought before the DSU system.80 However, the DSB has adopted 2 vital reports regarding the 
implications of the TRIPS Agreement on pharmaceutical patents.81 Nonetheless, the issue of 
whether WTO Members’ have the right to grant compulsory licences remains unsettled in the 
DSB system.  
 
The dispute between the US and Brazil82 regarding the consistency of Article 68 of Brazil’s 
Law with TRIPS, was settled by the parties.83 This has deprived us of the true interpretation of 
the consistency of the granting of a compulsory licence provided that the patented invention 
has not been worked locally.84 In view of this, if Ghana - which relies heavily on the 
importation of essential medicines - were to grant a compulsory licence based on the Section 
84 model with a view to mitigating the high costs and shortages resulting from the failure of 
patentees to work their patented medicines locally, as India did in Bayer v Natco, it is inevitable 
that questions regarding the consistency of such a national action with TRIPS will continue to 
arise, given that this is still a controversial and unsettled legal matter under the WTO DSU 
system, as far as the TRIPS Agreement is concerned.  
 
                                                 
78 Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Annex 2, the Legal Texts: The Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 354 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994). For 
additional analysis of the WTO Dispute Resolution Rules. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute 
Settlement System: International Law, International Organizations and Dispute Settlement (Volume 23, Kluwer 
International Law-Martinus Nijhoff, 1997) 117, discussing the new Dispute Settlement System of the 1994 WTO 
Agreement. 
79 “WTO Agreement” (n 6), proclaiming in Article III, Section 3 that one of the functions of the WTO is to 
administer the dispute settlement body. 
80 Since 1995, over 535 disputes have been brought to the WTO, initiated by 50 Members, in relation to 20 WTO 
Agreements. As of Dec. 31, 2017, a panel had been established in respect of 308 disputes. This led to panel reports 
in 235 of these disputes (not all cases in which a panel is established result in a panel report as the parties might 
settle their dispute even after a panel has been established). See WTO Dispute Settlement Activity — some 
figures. <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispustats_e.htm> [Accessed Mar. 29, 2019]. 
81 “Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products” (n 68) and India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical 
and Agricultural Chemical Products. Complaint by the US (WT/DS79/6, Apr. 16, 1999).  
82 Request for Consultations by the United States, Brazil – Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DS199/1, 
G/L/385, IP/D/23, Jun. 8, 2000. 
83 Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil – Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DS199/4, 
G/L/454, IP/D/23/Add.1, Jul. 19, 2001). 
84 Bradly Condon and Tapen Sinha, Global Lessons from the AIDS Pandemic: Economic, Financial, Legal and 
Political Implications (Springer-Verlag, 2008) 40. 
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What seems to compound this controversy further is the idea that the granting of compulsory 
licences by developing countries will threaten the attainment of socio-economic objectives, 
due to the loss of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) opportunities.85 Moreover, it has been 
asserted that any aggressive use of the compulsory licensing instrument may result in 
retaliatory action, high litigation costs and their potential frustration owing to the impact of 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), which have discouraged several developing countries from 
the use of compulsory licences to promote affordable medicines.86 This subject is particularly 
pertinent as Ghana has signed several FTAs that contain potentially restrictive provisions.87   
 
1.3. The Context: Ghana’s Essential Medicines Need 
 
A lack of essential medicines appears to be a global issue, which means that Ghana and other 
developing countries are not immune from this problem.88 One major barrier to access to 
medicines in Ghana is affordability.89 Consequently, a large portion of the population is denied 
access to medicines, as treatments are simply unaffordable for the average Ghanaian.90 
Generally, the average per capita expenditure for medicines in Ghana can be estimated at 
                                                 
85 Donald Harris, ‘TRIPS After Fifteen Years: Success or Failure, as Measured by Compulsory Licensing’ (2011) 
18 Journal of Intellectual Property Law 2, 391-392. 
86 Ho (n 29) 448-449. Alexandra Watson, ‘International IP Rights: Do TRIPS’ Flexibilities Permit Sufficient 
Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Medicines in Developing Countries?’ (2009) 32 Boston College International 
and Comparative Law Review 1, 151-153, stating that Brazil, South Africa, and Thailand have all at some point 
been placed on the 301 Watch-List. 
87 AGOA is contained in the US implementation legislation: Title 1 of The Trade and Development Act of 2000 
P.L. 106-200. 114 Stat. 251 (19 USC 3701). The partnership agreement between the members of the ACP states 
of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part: Cotonou Agreement. O. 
J. L. 317/3. 15.12.2000. <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/documents/devco-cotonou-consol-
europe-aid-2012_en.pdf> [Accessed Feb. 12, 2017]. Ghana-US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. 
<https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/tifa/asset_upload_file126_7726.pdf> [Accessed Mar. 8, 
2017]. Note that para. 4 recognises the importance of fostering an open and predictable environment for 
international trade and investment. This is tied up with para. 11, which provides recognition of the importance of 
providing adequate and effective protection and enforcement of IP rights. Ghana-EU National Indicative 
Programme.<http://eeas.europa.eu/development-cooperation/docs/national-indicative-programme_2014-
2020/2014-2020_national-indicative-programme_ghana_en.pdf> [Accessed Mar. 28, 2017]. Ghana Bilateral 
Trade Agreements with Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and the United Kingdom. 
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/79> [Accessed Feb. 26, 2017]. 
88 Andy Gray and Henri Manasse, ‘Shortages of Medicines: A Complex Global Challenge’ (2012) 90 Bulletin of 
the World Health Organisation 3, 158. See 138th session of the World Health Assembly Executive Board. 
(Provisional agenda item 10.5. EB138/41, Dec. 18, 2015) para. 1. WHA67.22 Resolution on Access to Essential 
Medicines (Agenda item 15.4. Ninth plenary meeting, A67/VR/9. May 24, 2014) 2. 
89 Angella Ofori-Atta and Sammy Ohene (ed), Changing Trends in Mental Health Care and Research in Ghana 
(Sub-Saharan Publishers and University of Ghana, 2014) 30. Kwame Ohene Buabeng, Lloyd Matowe and Jacob 
Plange-Rhule, ‘Unaffordable Drug Prices: The Major Cause of Non-compliance with Hypertension Medication 
in Ghana’ (2004) 4 Journal of Pharmaceutical Science 3, 352, mentioning unaffordability of drug prices. 
90 id. 
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roughly US$ 12 per month, suggesting relatively high expenditure on medicines.91 The average 
price for branded medicines in Ghana is several times higher than the international reference 
price, as the country is procuring medicines at 150 per cent of the international drug reference 
price.92 Overall, the percentage difference in prices observed between brands and generics 
ranges from 21 per cent to 1360 per cent for 17 essential medicines.  
 
Thus, patients have to pay up to 1360 per cent more for a branded medicine than they would 
have to pay for a generic medicine.93 Indeed, the prices of branded medicines in nearly all cases 
are much higher than the prices of generic ones.94 The country also experiences shortages of 
essential medicines both in the public and private sectors.95 This includes generic ones.96 This 
is compounded by the fact that profit margins are kept relatively high for importers.97 There 
are no multinational pharmaceutical companies currently manufacturing medicines locally.98 
However, major multinational firms have offices in Ghana where they market and distribute 
their leading brands.99 Consequently, Ghana has relied heavily on the importation of essential 
medicines, which entails high costs and shortages.100  
 
1.4. Legal Difficulties of Ghana using Compulsory Licensing  
 
Ghana faces legal difficulties in using the compulsory licensing instrument to promote 
affordable medicines. For example, in 2005, Ghana granted a compulsory licence for public 
                                                 
91 Andreas Seiter and Martha Gyansa-Lutterodt, ‘Policy Note: The Pharmaceutical Sector in Ghana’ (November 
2009) 22-23. Available at: <http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s16765e/s16765e.pdf> [Accessed Mar. 
17, 2017].  
92 Saleh (n 3) 104. 
93 ibid. 38. 
94 Medicine Prices in Ghana: A Comparative Study of Public, Private and Mission Sector Medicine Prices (The 
Ministry of Health through the Ghana National Drugs Programme and in collaboration with the WHO and Health 
Action International, 2004) 4. See also Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right 
of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Anand Grover 
(Eleventh session, agenda item 3, Human Rights Council Resolution: A/HRC/11/12, Mar. 31, 2009) 8, para. 19, 
observing that in regard to medicines, a product patent enables a patentee to set high prices. 
95 Saleh (n 3) 102, finding that several facilities continued to report stock outs. 
96 id. 
97 ibid. 109. 
98 Ghana Pharmaceutical Country Profile (Ghana Ministry of Health and the WHO, February 2012) 12. 
<http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/coordination/Ghana_PSCPNarrativeQuestionnaire_03022012.pdf> 
[Accessed Mar. 12, 2017]. 
99 Ghana Pharmaceutical Country Profile (Ghana Ministry of Health and the WHO, February 2009) 10. 
<http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s16765e/s16765e.pdf> [Accessed Apr. 13, 2017]. 
100 id. 
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non-commercial use,101 however, this initiative was later abandoned.102 As already indicated, 
Ghana’s failure to utilise the compulsory licensing instrument to obtain affordable medicines 
is due to the controversy surrounding the WTO Members’ right to grant compulsory licensing 
for pharmaceutical products under the TRIPS Agreement.103 Nevertheless, until TRIPS, access 
to affordable medicines had never been a major issue in Ghana.104 However, the adoption of 
TRIPS changed this dramatically.105  
 
Notably, to meet its obligations under TRIPS, the Ghanaian government, despite the 
availability of a transitional period under TRIPS,106 modified the Patent Law of 1992 in 
2003.107 The changes introduced in the 2003 Patent Act removed key flexibilities that are 
pertinent to the promotion of local manufacture of patented medicines.108 Specifically, the 
Ghanaian Patent Law of 1992 permitted the granting of compulsory licensing in cases of no or 
insufficient local working of a patented invention.109 Local pharmaceutical companies could 
                                                 
101 “Notification of Emergency and Issuance of Government Use Licence by Ghana” (n 8). See Savoie (n 8) 237. 
See also Feldman (n 8) 14. 
102 Cloatre (n 9) 53. 
103 Epstein and Kieff (n 11) 92. See Fauver (n 11) 676. 
104 Note that Ghana in 1962 set up a state pharmaceutical manufacturing corporation, the Ghana Industrial Holding 
Pharmaceuticals Corporation (GIHOC) as part of Ghana’s industrialisation drive, with the specific aim of 
manufacturing essential medicines locally (Ghanaian Enterprises Decree, 1968 (NLCD 207). GIHOC was run by 
Ghanaian management and technical staff and the company was supported by the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organisation (UNIDO), which offered technical expertise in production, quality control, plant 
maintenance and training of technical staff. John Sutton and Bennet Kpentey, An Enterprise Map of Ghana 
(London, published by the International Growth Centre, 2012) 158. Cohen, et al. (n 2) 1, citing the only problems 
were weak or corrupt institutions, contributing to less than effective pharmaceutical purchasing and distribution 
systems. 
105 Correa and Matthews (n 74) 5. Gail Evans, ‘Strategic Patent Licensing for Public Research Organisations: 
Deploying Restriction and Reservation Clauses to Promote Medical R&D in Developing Countries’ (2008) 34 
American Journal of Law & Medicine 2, 179, recounting how India enjoyed the policy “space”, which allowed 
its scientists to develop cost-effective manufacturing processes for molecules already invented and patented in 
other countries. 
106 Subject to the transitional arrangement under Article 65(2) of TRIPS India, being a developing country, was 
allowed 10 years from 1995 to make the transition to a full patent regime. Jerome Reichman, ‘Securing 
Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement after US v India’ (1998) 1 Journal of International Economic Law 4, 
594. Nuno Pires de Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime of Patent Rights (Kluwer Law International, 2002) 295. 
107 Under Section 7 of the 1992 Patent Law, the Ghanaian government had the authority to temporarily exclude 
inventions or discoveries, such as pharmaceuticals from patentability “... in the interests of national security, 
economy, health or any other national concern”. The 2003 Patent Act removed this exception. Arguably, the 
government of Ghana could have excluded specific pharmaceutical products from patentability as a temporary 
means to address urgent public health concerns. Temporary excludability is particularly useful when procedural 
requirements to compulsory licensing cannot be met. See Cohen, et al (n 2). However, as Correa explains, a literal 
interpretation of Article 27.1 does not allow the exclusion of pharmaceuticals. He notes that under TRIPS Article 
27.2 ordre public and Article 8.1 “...pharmaceuticals might conceivably be excluded from patentability, but 
neither appear sufficient to justify this exclusion except in limited circumstances”, such as to prevent commercial 
exploitation. In any case, the option of using temporary excludability appears unviable at the present time. See 
Carlos Correa, Integrating Public Health Concerns into Patent Legislation in Developing Countries (South 
Centre, October 2000) 12. 
108 Cohen, et al (n 2) 4. 
109 PNDC Law 305A of Dec. 30, 1992. Section 45(1). 
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easily obtain pharmaceutical patents in this environment to manufacture affordable medicines 
for distribution. Ghana’s ability to obtain essential medicines, whether such products were on 
or off patent, was not a major issue given that several leading developing countries, such as 
India under its Patent Act, 1970, were technically able to manufacture low-cost generic 
medicines for export to the country.110  
 
Although Ghana has some essential medicines need, and under Section 13(1) of the Patents 
Act 2003 the minister can grant compulsory licences to protect public health, still, access to 
affordable medicines has not been obtained. For example, as highlighted earlier, in 2000, when 
Ghana tried to import affordable medicines from India, the country was threatened with a legal 
challenge by GSK, and this initiative was eventually abandoned.111 Moreover, due to GSK’s 
intervention in 2005, Ghana continued to face shortages of Duovir.112 Therefore, the country 
attempted to utilise the compulsory licensing regime under TRIPS to obtain affordable 
medicines for public non-commercial use.113 While this national measure to obtain affordable 
medicines from India was consistent with the Doha Paragraph 6 Programme, it appears that 
political pressure compelled Ghana to abandon this compulsory licence.  
 
1.5. The Aim of this Work and Research Questions 
 
The aim of this work is to examine the consistency of Section 84, which allows the granting of 
a compulsory licence provided that the patented invention has not been worked in the territory 
of India, with TRIPS. The central question in this work is whether, given the textual correlation 
between Section 84 and Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention, the latter having been 
incorporated into TRIPS by Article 2, Section 84 is consistent with TRIPS, and if so whether 
it would provide a suitable model for Ghana. A follow up question is whether the failure of any 
Member of the WTO to challenge the Indian decision within the DSU system provides ample 
justification concerning the consistency of Section 84 with TRIPS. Related questions in the 
background to this work are whether, in practice, Ghana would be able to withstand any 
potential bilateral pressure, high litigation costs, and the extent to which the implementation of 
                                                 
110 Chapter II (amended) Invention not Patentable. Section 3 lists the subject matter that is deemed non-patentable 
to include: inventions that are “injurious to public health” as well as: ‘any process for the medicinal… curative… 
or other treatment of human beings . . . to render them free of disease or to increase their economic value or that 
of their products.’ 
111 Schoofs (n 6). 
112 Thomas (n 7) 258. 
113 “Notification of Emergency and Issuance of Government Use Licence by Ghana” (n 8). 
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the Section 84 model would threaten the attainment of socio-economic objectives resulting 
from FDI-related economic loss given that Ghana has signed several FTAs that contain 
potentially conflicting provisions.114  
 
  
                                                 
114 See (n 87) on AGOA. 
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1.6. The Hypothesis of the Work 
 
The work is based on the hypothesis that Section 84, which allows the granting of a compulsory 
licence provided that the patented invention has not been worked in the territory of India, is 
consistent with TRIPS, and therefore it could provide a suitable model for Ghana.  
 
1.7. Methodology 
 
In proof of hypothesis, a qualitative research approach was used, as a broad range of legal 
analysis was required.115 The legal analysis constitutes the core of the study, and primarily 
academic literature was extensively reviewed. The analysis used interpretive methods to 
examine relevant sources of law. As the hypothesis cuts across different bodies of law 
(including TRIPS and the Indian Patent law), the spectrum of primary sources used was quite 
broad and included both primary and secondary sources (legal instruments including, but not 
limited to, laws and legislation, judicial decisions, legal literature, legislative reports and 
reports by international institutions).116 This study used an element of comparative legal 
analysis.117 This was based on national law (Indian Patent Act) and international law (TRIPS 
Agreement), drawing mainly on relevant provisions in these two bodies of law that have similar 
substantive structures.  
 
This ensured that the subject was not explored from one legal perspective, but rather through a 
variety of legal lenses to provide a credible contextual interpretation.118 To this end, the 
principles of treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 
which also guide the interpretation of WTO law, were engaged.119 The purpose was to gain a 
deeper understanding of the true interpretation, concerning the consistency of Section 84 with 
                                                 
115 Simeon Yates, Doing Social Science Research, (SAGE Publications, 2004) 139, observing that the use of 
qualitative research methods is often perceived as providing richer data than purely quantitative methods may 
allow.t 
116 David Silverman, Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and Interaction, (SAGE 
Publications, 1993) 89, explaining the importance of documents as a further source of useful data. 
117 Norman Denzin and Yvonne Lincoln, Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research. In: 
THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH, Norman Denzin and Yvonne Lincoln (eds.), 
(SAGE Publications, 2005) 3, noting that comparative analysis method consists of a set of interpretive, material 
practices that make the phenomenon visible. 
118 Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack, ‘Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for 
Novice Researchers’ (2008) 13 The Qualitative Report 4, 545. 
119 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, entered into force Jan. 27, 
1980. 
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TRIPS. Therefore, decisions of the WTO/DSU Panels and Appellate Bodies were drawn upon 
in order to examine whether the common view, which emphasises that the granting of a 
compulsory licence provided that the patented invention has not been worked locally under 
Section 84 is inconsistent with TRIPS, remains the true interpretation of the general position 
of the TRIPS Agreement, as opposed to a rather narrow reading of a small part of the 
Agreement, such as Article 27(1) of TRIPS, without due regard for the text or document as a 
whole.120  
 
As the core research question is whether, given the textual correlation between Section 84 and 
Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention, the latter having been incorporated into TRIPS by Article 
2, Section 84 is consistent with TRIPS, and if so whether it would provide a suitable model for 
Ghana, this supports the use of the case study method in order to test the validity of the 
hypothesis.121 It is argued that the case study method is the most appropriate to study complex 
socio-legal situations where multiple variables exist.122 Accordingly, the decision by the 
Controller and the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB)123 in the Bayer v Natco case 
was reviewed to further aid a deeper interpretative understanding of the contextual and 
operational relationship between Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention, the TRIPS Agreement 
and Section 84, concerning the granting of a compulsory licence provided that the patented 
invention has not been worked in the territory of India.  
 
The case review helped to strengthen, or specifically provide an interpretation that is supportive 
of the argument that the overriding implication of Section 84, and the Bayer v Natco decision, 
if followed, would enable Ghana, and other developing countries, to grant compulsory licences 
for any patent protecting a product solely because that product is not being worked locally. 
What sustains this argument further is the view that the failure of any Member of the WTO to 
challenge the Indian decision within the DSU system provides ample justification concerning 
the consistency of Section 84 with TRIPS. Moreover, while the comparative legal analysis 
                                                 
120 Bonadio (n 53) 724, stating that was contrary to Article 27 of the Vienna Convention, which states that: ‘a 
party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty’. 
121 Robert Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (SAGE Publications, 1984) 23, mentioning that case 
study research method is important to investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of 
evidence are used. 
122 David de Vaus, Research Design in Social Research (ed), (SAGE, 2001) 231. 
123‘The Indian Intellectual Property Appeals Board’ (Order No. 45 of 2013) (M.P. Nos. 74 to 76 of 2012 & 108 
of 2012 in OA/35/2012/PT/MUM, Sept. 14, 2012. <http://www.ipabindia.in/Pdfs/Order-45-2013.pdf> [Accessed 
Mar. 12, 2017]. 
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constitutes the core of this study, it is accompanied by a complementary socio-legal approach. 
The purpose of the socio-legal constituents is that they complement the legal analysis with an 
understanding of the extent to which, and how, legal norms are implemented in line with 
domestic public policy.  
 
As Taubman puts it, ‘the concept of “trade-related aspects” of IP did not mean ignoring the 
wider public policy questions of social welfare and economic development’.124 The socio-legal 
components draw mainly on Section 83 principles, the TRIPS Agreement, its Preamble, 
context, object and purpose, travaux preparatoires and patent law history. Reference to the 
patent law history was necessary to evaluate the policy aspect of patent law and the critical role 
that compulsory licences may play in the promotion of the reasonable requirements of the 
public. In effect, there is considerable opportunity for TRIPS implementation to include the 
attainment of public policy goals through sound policy-making, and not simply to involve the 
passing of legislation to achieve passive, formal compliance with the letter of the law of 
TRIPS.125 This supplemented the legal analysis in a way that better reflects the position, or 
consistency of Section 84 with TRIPS. 
 
This approach provided confirmation that the TRIPS Agreement does not completely forbid 
members from granting compulsory licences on any grounds, or specifically, if the right is 
abused with reference to failure to work patented products or if the process is not applied within 
the territory of protection, as is clearly provided under Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention, 
and also inclusively referenced in TRIPS by virtue of Article 2. This understanding helped to 
address the study’s core research question, and enabled an understanding that is more 
supportive of the interpretation that nothing, in the light of TRIPS, would, in fact, preclude the 
possibility of Ghana, which relies heavily on the importation of essential medicines, from 
implementing a model similar to Section 84, as a practical means to mitigate the high costs and 
shortages resulting from the failure of patentees to work patented medicines locally.  
 
  
                                                 
124 Antony Taubman, Thematic Review: Negotiating Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. In: 
THE MAKING OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT PERSONAL INSIGHTS FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND 
NEGOTIATIONS, Jayashree Watal and Antony Taubman (eds.), (WTO Secretariat, 2015) 23. 
125 ibid. 24. 
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1.8. Research Scope 
1.8.1. Why Ghana? 
 
The thesis focuses on patent law and specifically on compulsory licensing for pharmaceutical 
patents. The main country of study is Ghana but, to a substantial degree, the findings will be 
applicable to transitional and developing countries that compare with Ghana.126 My decision 
to select Ghana as the case for this study was influenced by various factors. First, Ghana hosts 
many generic manufacturers.127 Second, since the amendment of its 1992 patent regime in 
2003, Ghana has experienced strong protection and enforcement in regard to pharmaceutical 
patents. This has taken away its ability to obtain pharmaceutical patents to produce affordable 
medicines locally, and, even though the country has pharmaceutical industrial capacity, the 
lack of patents to embark on the local manufacture of essential medicines means that Ghana 
relies excessively on the importation of essential medicines. These elements make Ghana a 
suitable context to investigate with regard to the impact of stronger patent rights, as required 
under TRIPS, and their relationship with the high costs of essential medicines resulting from 
importation, as Ghana imports approximately 70 per cent of its essential medicines and only 
30 per cent are produced locally.128  
 
1.8.2. Why India? 
 
Empirical accounts suggest that the Indian Patents Act 1970 has had a profound influence on 
the development of the country’s local pharmaceutical industry.129 As of now, India has 
achieved an eminent global position in the pharmaceutical sector and the country is touted as 
the pharmacy of the developing world – supplying affordable medicines for the protection of 
public health around the globe.130 However, evidence suggests that India’s compliance with 
                                                 
126 World Bank classification of countries. <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-
world-bank-country-and-lending-groups> [Accessed Mar. 14, 2017]. 
127 Jonathan Harper and Martha Gyansa-Lutterodt, The Viability of Pharmaceutical Manufacturing in Ghana to 
Address Priority Endemic Diseases in the West Africa Sub-region (Federal Ministry for Economic and 
Corporation and Development of Germany, Trade and Investment Promotion Sectoral Policy, 2007) 42. 
128 ibid. 41. 
129 Evans (n 105) 179, mentioning that a major contributor to the development of a pharmaceutical industry in 
India was the speed with which its scientists were able to develop cost-effective manufacturing processes for 
molecules already invented and patented in other countries - a practice supported by the Indian Patents Act 1970. 
130 Aman Goyal, “Letter to the Editor”, ‘Pharmacy of the World is Ill?’ (2015) 15 Developing World Bioethics 1, 
ii. Suresh Koshy, Note, ‘The Effect of TRIPs on Indian Patent Law: A Pharmaceutical Industry Perspective’ 
(1995) 1 The Boston University Journal of Science & Technology Law 4, 12. 
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TRIPS took away key flexibilities that existed with its Patents Act 1970,131 and ultimately made 
some essential medicines reasonably expensive.132 Similar to Ghana, India’s attempts to utilise 
the TRIPS flexibilities to promote affordable medicines have met legal challenges by some 
pharmaceutical companies.133 Some pharmaceutical companies have attempted to use multiple 
strategies to block or delay the entry of affordable generic medicines into India.134 In addition 
to this, the home governments of major multinational pharmaceutical companies, particularly 
the US, have persistently engaged in efforts to put pressure on India to change its patent law 
and to introduce further barriers to affordable generic medicines.135  
 
Consequently, India, a country that can easily produce generic copies of patented medicines, 
has had to rely on the importation of essential medicines, such as Nexavar.136 In an 
unprecedented response to the lack of affordable Nexavar due to Bayer’s failure to work the 
patented invention on a commercial scale in the country, and the tenacious resistance to its 
usage of the TRIPS flexibilities to promote affordable medicines, the Controller, on 12 March 
2012, invoked Section 84 as the basis for granting a compulsory licence to Natco.137 The 
Controller, together with the IPAB decision in Bayer v Natco, provided an interpretative 
understanding in confirmation of the consistency of Section 84 with TRIPS. Until now, no 
Member of the WTO has attempted to challenge the Indian decision within the DSU system. 
This provides ample justification concerning the consistency of Section 84 with TRIPS, and 
therefore it could provide a suitable model for Ghana. 
                                                 
131 Janice Mueller, ‘The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent System and the Rise 
of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation’ (2007) 68 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 3, 518-519. 
132 Rishi Gupta, ‘TRIPS Compliance: Dealing with the Consequences of Drug Patents in India’ (2004) 26 Houston 
Journal of International Law 3, 606. 
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Report 3, 223. 
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135 See “India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products” (n 68). See also India 
Needs to Resist Pressure from Big Drug Firms and their Backers to Change Patent Laws. Scroll In Online. 12 
April 2016. <http://scroll.in/article/741820/india-needs-to-resist-pressure-from-big-drug-firms-and-their-
backers-to-change-patent-laws> [Accessed Apr. 20, 2016], observing that India’s intellectual property model is 
under attack not because it has failed, but because it has succeeded – in balancing private profits with public 
health. 
136 ‘Report of the National Commission on Macro Economics and Health’ (Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare, Government of India, 2005) 28-34. ‘The World Medicines Situation’ (WHO/EDM/PAR/2004.5, World 
Health Organisation, 2004) 62, Table 7.2. See also Kunnathully Madhavan Gopakumar, ‘Product Patents and 
Access to Medicines in India: A Critical Review of the Implementation of TRIPS Patent Regime’ (2010) 3 The 
Law and Development Review 2, 330. Shubham Chaudhuri, Pinelopi Goldberg and Panle Jia, ‘Estimating the 
Effects of Global Patent Protection in Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study of Quinolones in India’ (2004) 95 American 
Economic Review 5, 1483, estimating that patented products would rise between 100 and 400 per cent. 
137 “Controller’s Order” (n 52). 
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1.9. Limitations 
 
The primary limitation of this study relates to the use of the case study research approach. 
Critics of this method argue that case studies, although providing a profound understanding of 
a single case, lack external validity.138 In the case of this thesis, this means that the arguments 
are not necessarily applicable to other developing countries, since they may exhibit contextual 
factors that are different from India, in particular a lack of political strength to withstand any 
economic implications if compulsory licences were to be granted. Nevertheless, it should be 
emphasised that this study does not strive to make empirical generalisations; rather it aims to 
examine the consistency of Section 84 with TRIPS, and question whether, given the textual 
correlation between Section 84 and Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention, the latter having been 
incorporated into TRIPS under Article 2, TRIPS truly prohibits the granting of compulsory 
licensing provided that the patented invention has not been worked in the territory of India, and 
if so whether Section 84 would provide a suitable model for Ghana. 
 
1.10. Structure of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 1 has sought to present the background of the study and has highlighted Ghana’s need 
for essential medicines and the legal difficulties in using compulsory licensing to obtain an 
affordable supply for distribution. Chapter 2 examines the legal context of the requirement in 
regard to the working of patented inventions and the granting of compulsory licences in India 
pursuant to the Section 84 decision in Bayer v Natco, which attempted to establish the 
consistency of Section 84 with TRIPS.  
 
Chapter 3 draws on applicable sources of law with a view to offering an interpretation regarding 
whether Section 84 is consistent with TRIPS. Chapter 4 aims to examine whether Article 27(1) 
of the TRIPS Agreement would prohibit WTO Members from adopting local working 
requirements. The chapter argues that Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement would not 
prohibit WTO Members from adopting and implementing any local working requirements that 
follow the Indian model in Section 84. 
 
                                                 
138 De Vaus (n 122) 237. Robert Stake, ‘The Case Study Method in Social Inquiry (1978) 7 Educational 
Researcher 2, 7, stating that case study is seen to be a poor basis for generalisation. 
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Chapter 5 assesses the complex conditions and procedural requirements for the granting of 
compulsory licences under Article 31 of TRIPS and the Doha Solution. The chapter argues that 
the conditions under Article 31 of TRIPS are complex while the formal procedural 
requirements developed by the Doha Solution are too burdensome, which further compounds 
the restrictions imposed by TRIPS; therefore, a Section 84 model remains a feasible option that 
can promote affordable medicines. 
 
Chapter 6 evaluates the feasibility of Ghana implementing the Section 84 model as India did 
given concerns and evidence concerning the potential FDI-retributive effects, bilateral 
pressure, high litigation costs and their potential impact on the country attaining its socio-
economic objectives. It will be argued that although there would be no legal obstacle under 
TRIPS, without political support, due to FTAs and high litigation costs the implementation of 
the Section 84 model in Ghana would not be feasible. Chapter 7 draws all of the other chapters 
together in an attempt to affirm the hypothesis regarding the consistency of Section 84 with 
TRIPS and its adoption by Ghana. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Section 84: Working of Patents and the Granting of Compulsory Licences 
 
2.1. Aim of the Chapter 
 
This chapter examines the legal context of the requirement regarding the working of patented 
inventions and the granting of compulsory licences in India pursuant to the Section 84 decision 
in Bayer v Natco, which attempted to establish the consistency of Section 84 with TRIPS. 
 
2.2. Introduction to the Chapter 
 
Section 84 lays down three specific instances upon which an interested party may apply for the 
granting of a compulsory licence at any time after the expiration of three years from the date 
of the granting of a patent. The first is where the reasonable requirements of the public with 
respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied.139 The second is where the patented 
invention is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price,140 and the third is where 
the patented invention is not worked in the territory of India.141 Before granting a compulsory 
licence, the Controller must consider certain major conditions set out in Section 84(7), for 
example, if the patented invention is not being worked in the territory of India on a commercial 
scale to an adequate extent or is not being worked to the fullest extent that is reasonably 
practicable;142 or if the working of the patented invention in the territory of India on a 
commercial scale is being prevented or hindered by the importation from abroad of the patented 
article.143  
 
On 9 March 2012, the Controller granted a compulsory licence to Natco based on Section 84. In 
this light, the Controller considered the relevant provisions of the Paris Convention, the TRIPS 
Agreement and the Indian Patents Act, and decided that the combination of Article 27(1) of 
TRIPS and Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention reinforced an interpretation that failure to 
                                                 
139 Section 84(1)(a). 
140 Section 84(1)(b). 
141 Section 84(1)(c). 
142 Section 84(7)(d). 
143 Section 84(1)(e). 
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manufacture Nexavar in India supported the granting of a compulsory licence to Natco.144 He 
stated that: 
While importation of a patented invention shall not result in the forfeiture of a patent, it 
however follows that a reasonable fetter on the patent rights in the form of compulsory 
licence is very well within the purview of the Paris Convention and the TRIPS 
Agreement, when there is an abuse of patent right.145  
 
Demonstrating the consistency of Section 84 with TRIPS, the Controller found ample 
justification for the compulsory licence in Section 83(b) of the Patent Act, which states that 
‘patents are not granted merely to enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly for importation of the 
patented article’,146 and Section 83(c), which states that ‘the grant of a patent right must 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination 
of technology’.147 Furthermore, Section 83(f) states that patents should not be abused, and that 
patentees should not resort to practices that unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the 
international transfer of technology.148 In confirming the compulsory licence, the Controller 
construed that work in the territory of India implies manufacture in India to a reasonable extent 
such that the Indian patent law principles enumerated in Section 83 can be brought into 
effect.149 ‘In the absence of manufacturing in India, Section 83 will be a dead letter’.150  
 
2.3. Section 84: A Legal Obligation to Work Patents in the Territory of India 
 
Section 84 remains the validating section referenced by a legal obligation on the part of 
patentees to work their patented inventions within the territory of India. Section 84(1)(a), when 
read with Sections 84(4) and 84(7), enumerates the various circumstances where the reasonable 
requirements of the public with respect to a patented medicine shall be deemed not to have 
been satisfied.151 Under Section 84(4), the Controller, if satisfied that the reasonable 
requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied, or 
that the patented invention is not worked in the territory of India, or that the patented invention 
is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price, may grant a licence upon such 
terms as he deems fit.  
                                                 
144 “Controller’s Order” (n 52). 
145 ibid. 41-42. 
146 ibid. 43. 
147 id. 
148 id. 
149 ibid. 43-44. 
150 ibid. 44. 
151 Section 84(7)(a)-(e). 
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For instance, ‘the reasonable requirements of the public shall be deemed not to have been 
satisfied’ if, on account of the refusal to grant a compulsory licence, an existing trade or 
industry or the development or establishment of any new trade or industry in India is 
prejudiced’,152 or ‘the demand for the patented article has not been met to an adequate extent 
or on reasonable terms’,153 or ‘a market for export of the patented article manufactured in India 
is not being supplied or developed’,154 or ‘the establishment or development of commercial 
activities in India is prejudiced’.155 The reasonable requirements of the public shall further be 
deemed not to have been satisfied ‘if, by reason of conditions imposed by the patentee upon 
the grant of licences under the patent… or the establishment or development of any trade or 
industry in India, is prejudiced’,156 or ‘if the patentee imposes a condition upon the grant of 
licences under the patent to provide exclusive grant back, prevention to challenges to the 
validity of the patent or coercive package licensing’.157  
 
Furthermore, the reasonable requirements of the public shall be deemed not to have been 
satisfied if a patented article is not being worked in India on a commercial scale to an adequate 
extent or to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable,158 or if the working of the patented 
medicine on a commercial scale in India is being hindered by the importation of the patented 
article from abroad by the patentee or his agents, or by persons directly or indirectly purchasing 
from the patentee, or by third parties against whom the patentee has not enforced the patent.159 
According to Section 84(1)(b), a compulsory licence can also be obtained to prevent the abuse 
of a patented medicine if the medicine is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable 
price.160 
 
                                                 
152 Section 84(7)(a)(i). 
153 Section 84(7)(a)(ii). 
154 Section 84 (7)(a)(iii). 
155 Section 84 (7)(a)(iv). 
156 Section 84 (7)(b). 
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 Section 84 does not state specifically the possible factors that the Controller must take into 
consideration when determining whether or not a patented drug is reasonably priced.161 Be that 
as it may, a generic manufacturer seeking a compulsory licence under Section 84(1)(b) has the 
burden to prima facie establish that the patented medicine is not reasonably priced,162 for 
instance, by providing evidence of the prices charged by the patentee in India and then 
comparing those prices with the prices charged by the patentee for the same medicine outside 
of India,163 or by comparing those prices with the prices of the medicine’s non-patented 
substitutes available in India.164 Section 84(1)(c) does not define or explain what it means to 
“work a patent”. The courts in India have broadly interpreted the “working of a patent in India” 
to mean that the patented invention is locally manufactured within the territory of India.165  
 
It is noteworthy that while considering whether or not a patent has been worked in India, the 
importation of such a patent is also permissible, provided that the patentee can reasonably 
explain and justify the circumstances that prevented him from manufacturing it locally within 
the country.166 As part of the admissibility requirements, an application for a compulsory 
licence under Section 84 can be filed at any time after the expiration of three years from the 
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date of the granting of the patent,167 after the applicant has made efforts to obtain a licence 
from the patentee on reasonable terms and conditions, where such efforts have not been 
successful within a reasonable period, not ordinarily exceeding six months.168  
 
However, the requirement for a compulsory licence applicant to make initial efforts towards 
obtaining a voluntary licence from a patentee is dispensed with ‘in case of national emergency 
or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in case of public non-commercial use or on 
establishment of a ground of anticompetitive practices adopted by the patentee’.169 The 
obligation to work patented inventions locally is a principle that forms a significant foundation 
of the Indian patent regime.170 Under the general principles applicable to the working of 
patented inventions locally in India, patents are granted to encourage inventions and to ensure 
that the inventions are worked in India on a commercial scale and to the fullest extent that is 
reasonably practicable without undue delay.171  
 
Paragraph (b) of Section 83 maintains that patents are not granted merely to enable patentees 
to enjoy a monopoly for the importation of the patented article. Furthermore, Paragraph (c) 
states that the protection and enforcement of patent rights contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual 
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge, and in a manner conducive to 
social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.172 Importantly, 
Paragraph (d) of Section 83 stipulates that patents granted should not impede the protection of 
public health and nutrition and should act as instruments to promote the public interest, 
especially in sectors of vital importance for the socio-economic and technological development 
of India.  
 
An important consideration is that patents granted should not in any way prohibit Central 
Government from taking measures to protect public health.173 Moreover, Paragraph (f) 
provides that the patent right shall not be abused by the patentee or person deriving title or 
                                                 
167 Section 84(1). 
168 Section 84(6)(iv) read with “Explanation Clause” to Section 84(6)(iv) providing that, “reasonable period” in 
Section 84(6)(iv) ‘shall be construed as a period not ordinarily exceeding a period of six months’. 
169 id. 
170 Shamnad Basheer and Mrinalini Kochupillai, The ‘Compulsory License’ Regime in India: Past, Present and 
Future (Report for the Japanese Patent Office, 2005) 36. 
171 Section 83(a). 
172 Section 83(c). 
173 Section 83(e). 
 38 
interest on patent from the patentee, and that the patentee or person deriving title or interest on 
patent from the patentee shall not resort to practices that unreasonably restrain trade or 
adversely affect the international transfer of technology. Added to this is the general principle 
applicable to the working of patented inventions locally in the territory of India, which is that 
patents are granted to make the benefit of the patented invention available at reasonably 
affordable prices to the public.174 
 
2.4. Utilisation of Section 84: The Compulsory Licensing Decision in Bayer v Natco 
 
Bayer developed Nexavar, and it obtained a patent from the US Patent Office on 13 January 
1999. Bayer subsequently filed a Patent Cooperation Treaty175 application on 12 January 
2001.176 It was granted a patent (No. 215758) as well as regulatory approval for importing and 
marketing Nexavar in India in 2008.177 Finding Nexavar to be exorbitantly priced for the 
average Indian consumer but therapeutically indispensable as a life-extending medicine, Natco 
approached Bayer on 6 December 2010 for a voluntary licence to manufacture and sell the 
medicine in India.178 This move was in compliance with the statutory requirements under 
Section 84(6)(iv), in regard to whether the applicant has made efforts to obtain a licence from 
the patentee on reasonable terms and conditions and such efforts have not been successful 
within a reasonable period, as deemed fit by the Controller. 
 
This prior consultation was in accordance with the procedural requirements established in 
Article 31(b) of TRIPS - that authorisation from the patent right holder should be obtained on 
reasonable commercial terms and conditions.179 However, this attempt by Natco to secure a 
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voluntary licence from Bayer was not successful, as Bayer refused to grant a voluntary licence 
to Natco. Although its negotiations with Bayer were not fruitful, Natco was successful in 
obtaining regulatory approval in April 2011 from the Controller for marketing the generic 
version of Nexavar in the country.180 In order to thwart the launch of the generic version of 
Nexavar in India, Bayer arraigned Natco in a suit for patent infringement, which it filed in the 
High Court of Delhi on 5 June 2011.181  
 
As a counter-attack, Natco not only decided to defend the patent infringement suit,182 but also 
went a step further and filed an application before the Controller on 28 July 2011, seeking a 
compulsory licence to manufacture and market the generic version of Nexavar in India under 
Section 84(1), after the expiration of three years from the date of the granting of the patent 
(Nexavar) to Bayer.183 This application was in accordance with Rule 96 of the Indian Patent 
Rules 2003,184 premised on the grounds that the patentee (Bayer) had failed to satisfy the 
reasonable requirements of the public as provided under Section 84. Bayer opposed this 
application on various grounds. Both parties filed evidence before the Controller for a 
determination of the case. Natco argued that the compulsory licence for Nexavar would have 
a dramatic effect on the price of the medicine by bringing the price that Indian patients paid 
down to approximately £108 for a month’s dose.185 According to Natco, this would represent 
a fraction of Bayer’s price of approximately £3100 for the same dose.186 Under the terms of 
the compulsory licence, Bayer was offered a six per cent royalty from Natco for the total sale 
of Nexavar.187  
 
As stated above, in a ruling delivered on 9 March 2012, the Controller granted Natco a licence 
for the manufacture of affordable generic versions of Nexavar.188 Against this background, 
Bayer filed a petition with the IPAB in the interim to order a stay on the compulsory licence 
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granted by the Controller to Natco.189 The IPAB upheld the decision of the Controller. In 
summary, the IPAB reasoned that Bayer had failed to manufacture Nexavar locally but rather 
it was importing the patented product into India. As such, the patentee (Bayer) had failed to 
satisfy Section 84(1) of the Indian Patent Act pursuant to the reasonable requirements of the 
public. Likewise, the price of the product was so high that it was not reasonably affordable to 
the public.  
 
Although the IPAB’s decision was not different from that of the Controller, it differed 
marginally in some key aspects. The only important divergence was the one per cent increase 
in the royalty rate from six to seven per cent to be paid by Natco to Bayer as a means of ending 
the dispute. In so doing, the IPAB acknowledged that while the UNDP recommended the award 
of a maximum possible royalty of six per cent, it took note of the disparate profit margins of 
Bayer, which were about fourteen per cent, and those of the distributors of Nexavar (about 
thirty per cent). Therefore, placing reliance on Section 90(2) of the Indian Patent Act, the IPAB 
increased the royalty rate in order to allow Bayer to obtain reasonable benefit from its patent - 
Nexavar.190 In an attempt to overturn the Controller’s decision, Bayer unsuccessfully took its 
case both to the High Court and the Supreme Court of India.191   
 
2.5. IPAB’s Interpretation of Section 84: Reasonable Requirements of the Public for 
Patents to be Worked Locally in the Territory of India 
 
As discussed previously, Section 84(1)((a) and (c) maintain that the reasonable requirements 
of the public with respect to a patented invention have not been satisfied if the patented 
invention is not worked in the territory of India. Therefore, the IPAB had to determine whether 
Bayer had met this requirement. To begin with, Bayer argued that working in India did not 
mean direct local manufacture in the territory of India. It stated that it was not realistic for it to 
manufacture the patented invention in India, and that importation was the only option.192 Bayer 
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relied on the fact that Section 90 of the Indian Patent Act, 2002 (now Section 84(7)) did not 
include the phrase “manufacture in India”.193  
 
Bayer claimed that: ‘It would be economically unfeasible for the appellant to set up a local 
manufacturing facility to commercially manufacture Sorafenib Tosylate in every country 
where it has a patent’.194 The IPAB held that the issue of working in India should be judged on 
a case-by-case basis to reflect the procedural requirements set forth in Article 31 of TRIPS. It 
noted that: ‘TRIPS says that the authorisation and other uses must be dealt with on a case-to-
case basis.’ The IPAB understood that the word “worked” could have a flexible meaning based 
on specific facts. Accordingly, it did not rule either way in regard to whether “working in India” 
necessarily meant “local manufacturing” but agreed that in some cases it may be that inventions 
cannot be manufactured in India.  
 
It also concurred that there could be inventions for which the reasonable requirements of the 
public itself were so small in number that setting up a factory for the said purpose was not 
practicable.195 Although the IPAB could not decide whether the notion of working totally 
excluded import or whether “working” was synonymous with “import”, it nevertheless 
concluded that if there were no manufacturing in India, it could be assumed that there would 
be no working because evidence of local working was required to satisfy the legal working 
requirement in the territory of India.196 The IPAB referred to the guiding principles regarding 
the working of patented inventions’ as set out in Section 83.  
 
Among other things, it confirmed that patents are granted to encourage invention and to ensure 
that inventions are worked in India on a commercial scale as early as is reasonably practicable, 
and that they are not a vehicle to give patentees a monopoly in importing patented articles.197 
Moreover, the IPAB maintained that the protection of patent rights must lead to better 
technological innovation, technology transfer and dissemination, and that users and producers 
should benefit from the technology.198 Furthermore, it reiterated that IP protection should 
promote social and economic welfare, and balance of rights and obligations, maintaining that 
                                                 
193 id. 
194 ibid. para. 34. 
195 ibid. para 51. 
196 ibid. para. 52. 
197 ibid. para. 17. 
198 id. 
 42 
the granting of patents should not be detrimental to public health; rather they should act as an 
instrument for the promotion/protection of public health.199  
 
Importantly, the IPAB argued that the granting of a patent should not counter the Central 
Government’s health measures. More importantly, it reasoned that the IP right should not be 
abused by the patentee or anyone claiming under him; nor can the patentee act in such a manner 
that trade or the international transfer of technology is undermined, as patents are granted to 
make the benefit of the patented invention available at reasonably affordable prices to the 
public.200 Moreover, the IPAB referred to Section 83(c), concerning the transfer and 
dissemination of technological knowledge, and Section 84(7)(a)(iv), regarding the 
establishment or development of commercial activities in India, referencing the question, ‘to 
what extent can import of goods be considered actual commercial working of the 
inventions’?201  
 
It maintained that Section 84(7) creates a legal narrative regarding when the reasonable 
requirements of the public shall be deemed not to be satisfied, that is, the grounds under Section 
84(1)(a), specifically Section 84(7)(d): ‘if the patented invention is not being worked in the 
territory of India on a commercial scale to an adequate extent or is not being so worked to the 
fullest extent that is reasonably practicable’.202 In addition, the IPAB agreed that the textual 
understanding of Section 84(7)(e), which refers to the working of an invention in the 
territory of India and importation from abroad of the patented articles, obviously refers to 
dissimilar activities. As a result, any contention concerning the non-viability of local “working” 
had to be proven, not simply stated.  
 
Notably, the IPAB admitted that while the argument that local working requirements could be 
met through importation appeared to be true to an appreciable degree, it questioned why Bayer 
had not met the local working requirements via importation if it had reasonably believed that 
this was a realistic proposition. This followed Natco’s claim that Bayer had a manufacturing 
facility in India, and therefore it could have manufactured the invention there.203 In this case, 
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the IPAB agreed that Bayer had failed to show why it could not “work” Nexavar locally in 
India. Therefore, it was held that Bayer had failed the test of Section 84(1) in this regard.204  
 
In dismissing this claim, the IPAB clarified that there was no evidence to substantiate the 
argument that Bayer had met the local working requirements through importation. It further 
asserted that in order to be able to satisfy the requirements of Section 83(a) of the Indian Patent 
Act, such importation must be on a commercial scale to an adequate extent and sold at a 
reasonably affordable price. This, however, was not the case. Furthermore, the IPAB stated 
that, in Section 83(b), the requirement that patents were not granted merely to enable patentees 
to enjoy a monopoly for the importation of the patented article still defeated Bayer’s argument 
about relying on importation to meet local working requirements, since the foregoing provision 
still states that the patentee must work the patented invention in the territory of India to an 
adequate extent.205  
 
Notably, the IPAB reasoned that, in its language, this ground suggested that where the patented 
invention was not capable of being worked in India, the exercise of compulsory licensing was 
justified.206 In addition, the IPAB noted, as per Section 84(7), specifically Paragraph (a), that: 
‘the reasonable requirements of the public shall be deemed not to have been satisfied; if, by 
reason of the refusal of the patentee to grant a licence or licences on reasonable terms’.207  
Significantly, Bayer could not sustain this argument given that it had refused to grant a licence 
to Natco, and the patentee was still contesting CIPLA’s patent infringement in a separate 
proceeding.208  
 
Similarly, in addressing the issue of non-discrimination in the import rules under TRIPS Article 
27(1), the IPAB correctly noted that the provisions address non-discrimination in the granting 
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of patents based on import, not the issue of allowing the granting of compulsory licences based 
on the absence of local working. This part of the ruling regarding the working of patented 
inventions locally is remarkable for a number of reasons. Firstly, it proves that compulsory 
licensing by reason of failure to work a patented invention locally does not violate the TRIPS 
Agreement, in particular Article 27(1), irrespective of the provision that patents must be 
available and patent rights can be enjoyed without discrimination as to the place of invention, 
the field of technology and whether the products are imported or locally produced.209  
 
To confirm this precedent, the IPAB considered the relevant part of the Paris Convention. It 
reasoned that Article 27(1) of the TRIPS provision meant that the requirement of non-
discrimination applied only to the final step of revocation of a patent, and not to the 
intermediate measure of compulsory licensing.210 This was in reference to Paragraph 20 of the 
IPAB’s decision, which quoted Articles 30 and 31 of TRIPS in respect of limited exceptions 
to patent rights and compulsory licensing.211 Subsequently, while on the one hand the IPAB 
seemed to impose an evidentiary burden on the patentee (Bayer) to demonstrate why it could 
not satisfy the requirements of Section 84(1) to manufacture the patented invention locally, on 
the other hand, the IPAB appeared to agree that the “local working requirements” could be met 
by importation.  
 
Another important issue here is that despite the IPAB appreciating that certain patents are 
workable only by importation, it failed to provide a detailed framework or precise instances 
where this was reasonably applicable, except to say that failure to work a patented invention 
locally still conflicted with the fundamental objectives of the Indian Patent Act. Subsequently, 
it is not clear whether the IPAB appeared to contradict its own admission that in certain cases 
patents may be granted purely for import purposes.212 In fact, the IPAB should have taken into 
consideration the circumstances that made it economically unfeasible to set up a facility in 
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India for the manufacture of Nexavar, as claimed by Bayer.213 Nevertheless, this exclusion 
must be understood, as Bayer failed to provide any evidence before the IPAB in this regard. 
 
In the absence of this clarification, the IPAB’s decision has created uncertainty with respect to 
the extent to which future case can be decided consistently, given that the Indian Patent Act 
does not make clear the evidence deemed reasonable to justify what amounts to a patent that 
can be granted for imports and that deemed necessary to meet the local working requirements 
via direct local manufacturing. Nevertheless, this part of the IPAB’s decision assumes a 
significant implication in the light of the broader orientation of Section 84(1) towards the 
principle of the reasonable requirements of the public and local working. As acknowledged in 
the decision itself, one of the foremost considerations as far as the Indian jurisprudence is 
concerned is that patents are not granted to promote the import monopoly of patentees.214  
 
Additionally, the IPAB used Ayyangar’s Report to explain the impact of failure to satisfy the 
reasonable requirements of the public, particularly when foreign patentees do not work patents 
locally in low-income countries - leaving these countries as losers and depriving their people 
of the know-how, which does not necessarily benefit underdeveloped economies.215 In fact, 
Ayyangar’s Report posited that local realities in low-income countries might cause patent 
regimes to operate differently.216 Significantly, the assertion that the economics of patents in 
low-income countries work differently finds legitimate support in some contemporary 
scholarly analyses of the WTO/TRIPS Agreement, which is viewed as only meeting the 
fundament interest of developed countries, which are the leaders in terms of technological 
innovation and exporters of technology.217  
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Within this context, the IPAB noted that foreign patentees become the beneficiaries of the 
patent system to the detriment of national economies.218 This particular view matches that 
expressed by Ayyangar in his Report, that the government must retain the right to revoke a 
patent219 when it is not worked locally and then licence patents for local manufacturing as a 
base carrier to promote local industry development and access to technology.220 Importantly, 
Ayyangar’s Report suggests that local working requirements will minimise importation 
because imported medicines protected by patents offer limited opportunities for local people 
to access essential medicines at an affordable price.221  
 
To this end, Ayyangar’s Report discusses compulsory licensing as a remedy to redress the 
handicap of foreigners not working patented inventions locally to enable national 
industrialisation to offset the social costs incurred due to the granting of patents to the benefit 
of the national economy.222 Referencing Ayyangar’s Report, the IPAB then concluded that 
when patentees fail to work patented inventions and processes in India to the advantage of the 
public, then compulsory licensing is justified.223 
 
2.6. The IPAB’s Interpretation of Section 84: The Requirement for Patented Inventions 
to be Reasonably Affordable to the Public  
 
Section 84(1)(b) stipulates that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to a 
patented invention have not been satisfied if the patented invention is not available to the public 
at a reasonably affordable price.224 Importantly, the IPAB had to deal primarily with the issue 
of whether the reasonable requirement of the public was being met by the patentee, including 
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whether Nexavar was available at a reasonably affordable price in India. According to Bayer, 
the so-called reasonably affordable price could not be fixed, ignoring the cost burden of the 
patentee (Bayer).225 This was where Bayer tended to argue that the term “reasonably affordable 
price” should be construed not only from the viewpoint of the differential classes of the public 
in relation to the price of any product but also in the light of the market situation of the 
patentee.226  
 
According to the appellant Bayer, the Controller did not take note of their (Bayer’s) 
development costs.227 Rejecting this contention, the IPAB reiterated that the reasonably 
affordable price has to be fixed from the viewpoint of the public since they are the ones 
purchasing the patented invention.228 Similarly, Bayer filed several affidavits showing a 
comparative analysis that the price being charged by the patentee was comparable to what it 
was charging in other developing countries.229 Bayer’s affidavit in this direction also stated 
that the originator’s products were more expensive than generic ones since they also involved 
R&D costs, which are not borne by person’s who merely copy a medicine. Thus, if medicines 
are made available in the market at a reasonably affordable price and not necessarily by the 
patentee, then Section 84(1)(b) will not be relevant; similarly, if someone other than the 
patentee meets the reasonable requirements of the public then Section 84(1)(a) will not be 
applicable.230  
 
This contention is necessary given that CIPLA was selling Nexavar at a very low price and 
Bayer claimed that under this condition, the appellant (Bayer) could not work the invention. 
CIPLA did not have the same cost burden that the appellant (Bayer) had to bear with regard to 
innovation, so it could sell at any price. In these circumstances, Section 84(1)(c) will not be 
applicable either.231 Therefore, according to Bayer, the appellant being the inventor and having 
invested a substantial amount of resources in developing the product (Nexavar), the same 
would form a part of the so-called reasonably affordable price for the said product, and thus 
the price of Nexavar fixed by Bayer constituted a reasonably affordable price.232  
                                                 
225 “IPAB’s Decision” (n 123) 36. 
226 id. 
227 ibid. para. 22. 
228 ibid. para. 40. 
229 ibid. para. 36. 
230 id. 
231 id. 
232 id. 
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Dismissing Bayer’s argument, the IPAB asserted that the main aim of granting a compulsory 
licence related to whether the patented product was available to the public at a price that was 
reasonably affordable. Confirming the legality of the requirement that patented inventions are 
reasonably affordable to the public as a substantive condition for granting compulsory licences, 
the IPAB affirmed that: ‘This leaves us in no doubt that it is the appellant who should make 
the benefit of the patented invention available at a reasonably affordable price to the public and 
it cannot take shelter under the sale by CIPLA’.233 Here, the IPAB relied on Section 83(g), 
which clearly states that patents are granted to make the benefit of the patented invention 
available at a reasonably affordable price to the public.  
 
This shows that the reasonable requirements of the public under Sections 84(1), concerning the 
general principles applicable to the working of patented inventions locally as an independent 
condition for the granting of compulsory licences are legitimate and consistent with the TRIPS 
Agreement. Interpreting the consistency of Section 84 with TRIPS, the IPAB reflected on the 
Doha Declaration and concluded that Paragraph 5(b) is explicitly clear regarding WTO 
Members’ right to grant compulsory licences and their freedom to determine the grounds on 
which to do so.234  
 
Therefore, this reference is more supportive of the interpretation that nothing in the light of 
TRIPS would, in fact, preclude the possibility of other low-income countries that rely heavily 
on the importation of essential medicines from implementing a model similar to Section 84(1) 
as a practical means to mitigate the high costs and shortages resulting from the failure of 
patentees to work patented medicines locally. Specifically, the overriding implication of 
Section 84(1) and the Bayer v Natco decision, if followed, would enable Ghana to issue 
compulsory licences for any patent protecting a product solely because that product is not being 
manufactured locally and thereby satisfying the reasonable requirements of the public. 
 
  
                                                 
233 ibid. para. 29. 
234 ibid. para. 20. 
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2.7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has assessed the legal context of the working of patented inventions and the 
granting of compulsory licences in India pursuant to Section 84. The review of the Section 84 
decision in Bayer v Natco reveals that Section 84, which allows the granting of a compulsory 
licence provided that the patented invention has not been worked in the territory of India, is 
consistent with TRIPS. As seen from IPAB’s interpretation, the main argument for enforcing 
the working of patented inventions in India is the consideration that, in order to promote 
affordable medicines, patents for invention should not be used merely to block the working of 
the invention in the country or to monopolise importation of the patented article by the patent 
owner.  
 
A strict view in line with the reasonable requirement of the public under Section 84 denotes 
that the importation of patented products for sale, even on reasonable terms, will not satisfy the 
general principles applicable to the working of patented inventions locally, a legal prerequisite, 
which actually demands that patentees locate and manufacture, or apply their patented 
processes, locally in India. Therefore, patents should be worked within the territory of the 
country. Notably, the consistency of the Section 84 decision in Bayer v Natco with TRIPS 
remains unchallenged in the WTO DSU system. The failure of the WTO members to challenge 
this decision provides adequate evidence to sustain the hypothesis that Section 84, which 
allows the granting of a compulsory licence provided that the patented invention has not been 
worked in the territory of India, is consistent with TRIPS and therefore would provide a suitable 
model for Ghana. The next chapter draws on applicable sources of law in an attempt to examine 
the consistency of Section 84 with TRIPS. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Consistency of Section 84 of the Indian Patents Act with TRIPS 
 
3.1. Aim of the Chapter  
 
The aim of this chapter is to draw on applicable sources of law with a view to offering an 
interpretation regarding whether Section 84 is consistent with TRIPS. 
 
3.2. Introduction to the Chapter 
 
Section 84 was designed to be TRIPS-compliant.235 Notwithstanding the fact that Section 84 
has a similar drafting structure to Article 5(A)(4) of the Paris Convention, the former being 
referenced in Article 2 of TRIPS, suggesting its consistency with TRIPS, still, there are 
conflicting views regarding whether Section 84 is inconsistent with TRIPS.236 Where a dispute 
or conflict arises as to the correct interpretation of any provisions pursuant to TRIPS, Article 
64(1) of the Agreement confirms that the relevant procedure for resolving that dispute within 
the WTO system is the DSU mechanism.237 Article 3(7) of the DSU provides that the aim of 
the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to any dispute. The DSU 
presents itself as the sole means of reaching a satisfactory legal interpretation, and members 
shall abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.238 In the WTO, the DSB plays this role and 
attempts to clarify any conflicting provisions in accordance with ‘customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law’.239  
 
More specifically, the DSB prefers to take guidance from the context of the whole agreement 
to settle on an acceptable explanation.240 This is because it is not possible to concentrate on a 
paragraph, an article, a section, a chapter or a part of any provision to reach any persuasive 
conclusion that TRIPS completely forbids the granting of compulsory licensing on grounds of 
                                                 
235 The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 17 of 1999. The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 38 of 2002. 
Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15 of 2005. Prabhu Ram, ‘India’s New “TRIPS-Compliant” Patent Regime 
Between Drug Patents and the Right to Health’ (2006) 5 Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 2, 195-
206. 
236 Bonadio (n 53) 720. 
237 The TRIPS Agreement (n 22). 
238 Article 23 of the DSU. 
239 Article 3(2). 
240 Mercurio and Tyagi (n 76) 307. 
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failure to work locally,241 as the text of a treaty must be read as a whole in order to understand 
the point of a single provision.242 In this context, applicable sources of WTO law will help to 
establish the consistency of Section 84 with TRIPS. It is well established in international law 
that the VCLT provides a definitive guide on treaty interpretation.243 Importantly, WTO case 
law accepts that the VCLT is a codification of customary international law.244 That direction 
‘reflects a measure of recognition that the General Agreement is not to be read in clinical 
isolation from public international law’.245 More significantly, it is well settled in WTO case 
law that the principles codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT are relevant in the 
interpretation of WTO law.246   
 
Under Article 31 of the VCLT, a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose.247 Moreover, a relevant part of Article 31 of the VCLT provides that in 
addition to the text, its article and preambles, the context for the purpose of interpretation of a 
treaty shall comprise: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty made between all of the parties 
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; and (b) any instrument made by one or more 
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty, and accepted by the other parties as an 
instrument related to the treaty.248 The interpretation of international law also includes the 
writings of the most “highly qualified publicists”.249 Nevertheless, while the writings of the 
                                                 
241 Champ and Attaran (n 58) 38. 
242 id. 
243 Article 2(1)(A) of the VCLT (n 112). 
244 United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Report of the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS2/AB/R Apr. 29, 1996) 17. 
245 Report of the Appellate Body in United States - Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon 
Steel Flat Products from Germany (WT/DS213/AB/R, Nov. 28, 2002) paras. 61–62. 
246 Report of the Appellate Body in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (WT/DS8/AB/ R, WT/DS10/AB/R, 
WT/DS11/AB/R, Oct. 4, 1996) 10-12, Section D. See also Appellate Body Report, United States - Continued 
Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology (WT/DS350/AB/R, Feb. 4, 2009) paras. 268-273: 
The principles of interpretation that are set out in Articles 31 and 32 are to be followed in a 
holistic fashion. The interpretative exercise is engaged so as to yield an interpretation that is 
harmonious and coherent and fits comfortably in the treaty as a whole so as to render the 
treaty provision legally effective…The purpose of such an exercise is therefore to narrow the 
range of interpretations, not to generate conflicting, competing interpretations. Interpretative 
tools cannot be applied selectively or in isolation from one another. It would be a subversion 
of the interpretative disciplines of the Vienna Convention if application of those disciplines 
yielded contradiction instead of coherence and harmony among, and effect to, all relevant 
treaty provisions. [Emphasis added]. 
247 Article 31(1). 
248 Article 31(2). 
249 Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 33 UNTS 993, 1945 provides that the court 
whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply, 
among other things, the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as a subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law. Note that this provision is given a very restricted interpretation in 
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most “highly qualified publicists” constitute a subsidiary means for the determination of rules 
of law, “subsidiary” does not indicate a lack of importance, and therefore, the writings of the 
most “highly qualified publicists” in WTO law could possibly apply to the interpretation of 
TRIPS provisions.250 Thus, the Paris Convention is important for outlining the legal provisions 
that frame any discussion regarding the consistency of Section 84, which allows the granting 
of a compulsory licence provided that the patented invention has not been worked in the 
territory of India in line with TRIPS.  
 
3.3. Consistency of Section 84 with Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention  
 
As a treaty, the Paris Convention formally recognises the right of its Members to demand as 
an affirmative duty that patentees work their patented inventions locally. Compulsory licences 
under Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention are permitted to solve the problem of failure to 
work or underutilised patents.251 The reason is straightforward: because abuse means the use 
of rights in a way that is contrary to the objectives of the law, the notion of abuse is 
symbiotically linked to the very objectives that the law sets out for patents.252 The TRIPS 
                                                 
International Court of Justice jurisprudence, and only a very small number of scholars have been cited. See Baron 
Descamps, League of Nation. Procès-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Advisory Committee of Jurist, June 16th-
July 24th (The Hague, Van Langenhuysen, 1920) 318-319, stating that the judge render decisions in keeping with 
the dictates of the legal conscience of civilised peoples and for this same purpose make use of the doctrines of 
publicists carrying authority. However, Manley Ottmer Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice 
1920-1942 (New York: MacMillan, 1943) 612, argues that the teachings of publicists are not rules to be applied, 
but sources to be resorted to for finding applicable rules. Manfred Lachs, Teachings and Teaching of International 
Law. 151 Hague Recueil des Cours 161 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1976-III) 169, stating that 
teachers are not legislators, nor lawmakers in international relations and therefore, teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of various nations are only subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. See also 
Michael Peil, ‘Scholarly Writings as a Source of Law: A Survey of the Use of Doctrine by the International Court 
of Justice’ (2012) 1 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 3, 141. 
250 Note that WTO/DSU Panels and Appellate Body have invoked the teachings and writings of highly qualified 
publicist in their reports, it does not seem to follow the ICJ’s practice of being extremely selective. See US - 
Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages (GATT B.I.S.D. 39th Supp. Jun. 19, 1992) 206, 285 citing the 
works of Professor John Jackson and Professor Robert Hudec. Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of 
Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items (WT/DS56/R, Nov. 25, 1997) at n.176, John H. Jackson, at n.184, 
Keith Highet, at n.185, Mojtaba Kazazi. India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products (AB-1997-5, WT/DS50/AB/R, Dec. 19, 1997) at n. 26 Frieder Roessler and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann at 
n. 28, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, at n. 52, Ian Brownlie. EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), Complaint by the United States (WT/DS26/R/USA, Aug. 18, 1997) at n.92, Philippe Sands, 
Armand de Mestral, and Daniel Bodansky. For further analysis see David Palmeter and Petros Mavroidis, ‘The 
WTO Legal System: Sources of Law’ (1998) 92 American Journal of International Law 3, 407-408. 
251 Ford (n 30) 957, citing the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, reprinted 
in International Treaties on Intellectual Property (Michael Leaffer (ed.) 1999) 24, stating in Article 5(A)(3) that 
the problem of misuse also can be addressed by forfeiture of the patent, but only after the compulsory licences 
process has been attempted. 
252 “Refusals to Licence IP Rights” (n 19) 9. Halewood (n 18), stating that as a condition the local working 
requirement has: 
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Agreement also recognises that patent rights shall not be abused.253 The TRIPS Agreement is 
built on principles that are more than a century old, many of which are embodied in the Paris 
Convention. Consequently, almost all of the substantive provisions of the Paris Convention are 
incorporated by reference directly in the TRIPS Agreement.254  
 
Concerning patents, the TRIPS Agreement requires that all WTO Members comply with 
Articles 1 through to 12 and Article 19 of the Paris Convention, in respect of Parts II, III and 
IV of the Agreement.255 Under the Paris Convention, the term “patent” is interpreted broadly 
to encompass all forms of patent laws created within its member nations.256 As a matter of 
principle, the Paris Convention sought to eliminate unequal treatment by any nation’s domestic 
laws towards foreign patent holders.257 Under this scope, it is important to note that the rules 
of international law and its general principles act in relation to, and should be interpreted 
against the background of other rules and principles. As a legal system, the rights and 
obligations under WTO law are not a random collection of norms; rather there are meaningful 
relationships between them.258  
 
Therefore, in applying WTO jurisprudence as a functional international law, it is often 
necessary to determine the precise relationship between two or more rules and principles that 
are both valid and applicable in respect of a situation, such as the consistency of compulsory 
licensing for failure to work under the Paris Convention and TRIPS. Notably, the principle of 
                                                 
The effect of forcing foreign patentees to situate production facilities within the patent 
granting country. Such transfers of technology are desirable from the patent granting 
country’s point of view because they contribute to a variety of public policy goals such as 
employment creation, industrial and technological capacity building, national balance of 
payments, and economic independence. 
253 Article 8(2), suggests that appropriate measures may be needed to prevent the abuse of IPRs by right holders 
or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of 
technology. Article 31 to deal with an anti-competitive behaviour, and Article 40 to control of anti-competitive 
practices in contractual licences. 
254 WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use (WIPO Publication, No. 489 (E), 2n edn. 2004) 
para. 5.683 
255 Article 2(1) of TRIPS. 
256 Defining patent in Article 1(4) as including various kinds of industrial patents recognised by the laws of the 
countries of the Union. Stephen Bent, Richard Schwaab, David Conlin and Donald Jeffery, Intellectual Property 
Rights in Biotechnology Worldwide (Stockton Press, 1987) 400-401, noting that the definition is purposely broad 
to include all types of patents. 
257 Leaffer (n 251) 17. 
258 Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising 
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law (International Law Commission, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/L.702, Jul. 18, 2006) 7, para. 14. See Andre Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of 
Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 225. Arthur Watts, Arnold Pronto and Michael Wood, The International 
Law Commission 1999- 2009: Volume IV: Treaties, Final Draft Article and other Materials (Oxford University 
Press, 2010) 614. 
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legal harmonisation has been generally accepted as a standard such that when several norms 
bear on a single issue they should be interpreted as fully as possible in order to give rise to a 
single set of compatible requirements.259 This is the case where one norm assists in the 
interpretation of another. In the case of a conflict between the hierarchical provisions in 
different treaties, the latter should, to the broadest degree possible, be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the former – for example, the conflicting view of Section 84 and Article 27(1) 
of TRIPS in relation to Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention.  
 
The starting point is Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, which stipulates a requirement that when 
the treaty (TRIPS) is explicitly silent on the applicable law (failure to work locally as abuse of 
patent rights and an independent condition for granting compulsory licences) it is necessary for 
the interpreter to consider other treaty-based rules to arrive at a consistent meaning.260 This is 
a well-founded principle in international treaty interpretation.261 According to Article 30(3) of 
the VCLT, when all of the parties to a treaty are also parties to an earlier treaty on the same 
subject, and the earlier treaty has not been suspended or terminated, then it applies only to the 
extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty.262 In this situation, both 
the Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement deal with patent regimes.  
 
Consequently, it is necessary for the interpreter, in applying any rules developed in another 
part of the WTO system and international law, to clarify all of the ambiguities surrounding any 
controversy resulting from the incompatibility of any treaty provisions, such as Section 84, 
which allows the granting of a compulsory licence provided that the patented invention has not 
been worked in the territory of India. In so doing, it is worth noting that TRIPS also makes 
such a provision for the relationship between the Agreement and the incorporated Paris 
                                                 
259 Henning Grosse Russ-Khan, Overlaps and Conflict Norms in Human Rights: Approaches of European Court 
to Address the Intersections with Intellectual Property Rights. In: RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Christophe Geiger (ed.), (Edward Elgar, 2015) 75. Ian Laird, 
Borzu Sabahi, Frederic Sourgens, Nicholas Birch and Kabir Duggal, International Investment Law and Arbitration 
2002 in Review. In: YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2012-2013, 
Andrea Bjorklund, (ed.), (Oxford University Press, 2014) 196. 
260 Article 31(3) of the VCLT maintains that in treaty interpretation: ‘There shall be taken into account, together 
with the context: (c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’. 
261 “Fragmentation of International Law” (n 258) para. 20(c), stating that if the treaty is silent on the applicable 
law and it is necessary for the interpreter [to] apply [any] presumption [must] to look for rules developed in 
another part of international law to resolve the point. [Emphasis added in brackets]. ibid. para. 21 states that: 
Such other rules are of particular relevance where parties to the treaty under interpretation 
are also parties to the other treaty, where the treaty rule has passed into…or where they 
provide evidence of the common understanding of the parties as to the object and purpose 
of the treaty under interpretation or as to the meaning of a particular term. 
262 ibid. para. 24. 
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Convention. As seen above, Article 2 of TRIPS explicitly imposes those older obligations on 
the future actions of the Members under the TRIPS Agreement.  It stipulates that ‘Nothing in 
Parts I to IV of the Agreement shall derogate from existing obligations that Members may have 
to each other under the Paris Convention’.263 This includes all of the substantive conditions 
and the procedural requirements under the Paris Convention. The Paris Convention contains 
the terms for the regulation of compulsory licences.264  
 
Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention does, however, place limitations on the extent to which 
members should grant compulsory licences to remedy failure to work. In other words, the 
possibility of granting compulsory licences under the Paris Convention is subject to a number 
of substantive conditions as set out in Article 5(A)(4).265 The Paris Convention provides a time 
period within which the patent holder must work the patent to avoid the granting of a 
compulsory licence.266 In other words, the Convention creates time restrictions before an 
application for a compulsory licence can be submitted and creates limitations regarding 
licences when the patentee can justify insufficient application or usage of the patent.267  
 
For example, the patent holder must have sufficient time to work the patent (defined in Article 
5(A)(4) and Section 84 as a period of four years from the date of filing of the patent application 
or three years from the date of the granting of the patent, whichever period expires last), and a 
compulsory licence will not be issued if the patent holder has legitimate reasons for not working 
the patent. However, the Members’ discretion in doing so is not limited in as much as these 
essential conditions are followed.268 The same is true under Section 86(1) of the Indian Patents 
Act, which orders the Controller to allow patentees to provide reasons why a patented invention 
could not be worked in the determination of the granting of a compulsory licence. 
 
                                                 
263 Article 2(2) of TRIPS. 
264 Blakeney (n 73) 89, noting that Article 5A of the Paris Convention was one of the most controversial parts of 
the agreement. 
265 Article 5(A)(4) of the Paris Convention. 
266 Bent, et al (n 249) 401-402, finding that these were the very concepts for which developing nations did not 
want to provide equal treatment for foreign patent holders. Christopher Mayer, Note, ‘The Brazilian 
Pharmaceutical Industry Goes Walking from Impanema to Prosperity: Will the New Intellectual Property Law 
Spur Domestic Investment?’ (1998) 12 Temple International Law and Comparative Law Journal 2, 382, asserting 
the negative role of the national treatment provision in the Paris Convention allowed member nations to implement 
very low levels of IP protection as long as foreigners were treated similarly, thus opening the door for nations like 
India and Brazil to eliminate all domestic patent protection. 
267 Article 5(A)(4) of the Paris Convention. Blakeney (n 73) 89, defining the legitimate reasons as those pertaining 
to legal, economic, or technical hurdles to utilising the patent. 
268 Mercurio and Tyagi (n 76) 282. 
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These key provisions are important, given that the immediate exploitation of a patented 
invention in all countries where patents are granted for the invention is generally impossible.269 
The idea of providing a space of four years was to allow patentees sufficient time to organise 
work or licence another to do so in the granting countries concerned. Nevertheless, the notion 
of legitimacy was contingent on domestic legal provisions rather than anything else. This, 
according to the interpretation of some legal scholars, did not necessarily make it easy to justify 
any failure on the part of the patentee not to manufacture the patented invention locally.270  
 
This is based on the presumption that what constitutes “an abuse” and “failure to work” is a 
matter for the legislation of Members to determine.271 Moreover, the Paris Convention did not 
define what the term “working” meant, and each Member could assign it a meaning that suited 
its national interest.272 Within this spirit, Members have generally interpreted “local working” 
as meaning something that entails manufacturing or organising the industrial use of a patented 
invention in the country that issued the patent.273  
 
Article 5(4) of the Paris Convention reinforces the notion that under international law failure 
to work a patented intention locally remains an example of an abuse of patent rights, and an 
independent condition on which WTO Members have the wider discretion to grant compulsory 
licences.274 If a historical legislative approach is considered then this will reinforce the 
understanding that patentees have always been under a legal obligation to exploit or 
manufacture their patented inventions locally in accordance with the laws of the granting 
country,275 and failure to work has been considered a prima facie abuse of patent rights under 
international law and Members have the freedom to grant compulsory licensing as the remedy 
of first resort.276  
                                                 
269 Samuel Oddi, ‘The International Patent System and Third World Development: Myth or Reality?’ (1987) 1987 
Duke Law Journal 5, 862. See “WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook” (n 254) para. 2.141. 
270 Reichman and Hasenzahl (n 1) 10. Ladas (n 15) 524. 
271 id. 
272 Exclusions from Patentable Subject Matter and Exceptions and Limitations to the Rights (World Intellectual 
Property Organisation Standing Committee on the Law of Patents - Thirteenth Session: SCP/13/3, Feb. 2, 2009) 
174. 
273 “WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook” (n 254) para. 2.135, commenting that as a rule, the working 
requirement may be fulfilled through the working of the patented invention either by the owner of the patent for 
invention or by another entity or person under a licence contract. 
274 Jayashree Watal, Implementing the TRIPS Agreement on Patents: Optimal Legislative Strategies for 
Developing Countries. In: COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, Owen Lippert (ed.), (Fraser Institute, 1999) 111. 
275 Reichman and Hasenzahl (1) 11. 
276 Article 5(A)(3) of the Paris Convention. 
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Therefore, should a patentee fail to manufacture patented inventions or apply the processes 
locally then invocation of compulsory licences would be justified as per that Member State’s 
statutory requirements.277 Arguably, going by this reference, it is asserted that as part of the 
general principles of international law applicable in dealing with the fundamental relationship 
between Members, TRIPS recognises the consistency of certain substantive provisions of the 
Paris Convention (Article 5(A) and Section 84), as the former has patently referenced failure 
to work a patented invention locally as an example of abuse of patent rights for which WTO 
Members’ have the freedom to choose compulsory licences as the essential remedy of first 
resort.278  
 
This fundamental reasoning was confirmed by the Arbitrators in the EC – Bananas case, which 
explicitly held that when TRIPS incorporates other instruments, membership of the 
WTO/TRIPS Agreement does not excuse compliance with one instrument’s obligations at the 
expense of another.279 Therefore, it is essential to consider the scope of the obligation in Article 
27(1) of TRIPS in the wider context of WTO/TRIPS in relation to the provision in Article 5(A) 
of the Paris Convention, incorporated into TRIPS under Article 2, as a non-derogable 
responsibility imposed on each Member to exercise the discretion to take legislative measures 
to provide for the granting of compulsory licences to prevent abuse, for example, failure to 
work. If this is the case, then Section 84 is consistent with TRIPS. 
 
  
                                                 
277 Ladas (n 15) 530. 
278 Article 5(A)(3) of the Paris Convention states that: 
Forfeiture of the patent shall not be provided for except in cases where the grant of 
compulsory licenses would not have been sufficient to prevent the said abuses. No 
proceedings for the forfeiture or revocation of a patent may be instituted before the expiration 
of two years from the grant of the first compulsory license. 
279 Decision of the Arbitrators, EC - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas: Recourse to 
Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU (WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, Mar. 24, 2000) 
para. 149. 
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3.4. Consistency of Section 84 with Article 31: Substantive Conditions and Procedural 
Requirements for the Granting of Compulsory Licences under TRIPS 
 
Like Section 83, Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention only gives failure to work as one example 
of the grounds under which members can grant a compulsory licence. The Members remain 
free to determine other grounds in their domestic regimes.280 Apart from failure to work, 
members may grant compulsory licences to prevent other abuses, for example refusal or 
unreasonable terms for contractual licences or other restrictive measures that hamper industrial 
development.281 Illustrations defined in several Members’ domestic patent regimes include 
failure to supply the national market with sufficient quantities of the patented product or 
demanding excessive prices for such a product.282  
 
Moreover, compulsory licences may also be granted in cases where there is no abuse by the 
patent owner of his rights — for example, for reasons related to the public interest.283 Article 
31 of TRIPS builds on this legal position by recognising that the use of a patented article may 
be allowed under national law without the authorisation of the right holder, and only sets out 
the conditions of such use that shall be respected without limiting the possibility or WTO 
Members’ independence in doing so, in as much as their national law permits. 284 Furthermore, 
TRIPS allows Members to make virtually all decisions regarding the granting of compulsory 
licences, including those concerning compensations or appeals, through administrative 
processes, in as much as the procedure is fair and transparent.285 However, the procedural 
requirements appear to be vague and complex.286  
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Still, unlike the Paris Convention, which mentions “failure to work” as a basis for granting 
compulsory licences subject to the expiration of a period of four years from the date of filing 
of the patent application or three years from the date of the granting of the patent, the TRIPS 
Agreement does not specifically list the grounds that might be used to justify compulsory 
licensing or set any time limitations for that purpose.287 This means that under TRIPS, 
compulsory licences in the public interest can be granted without waiting for the expiration of 
the time limits provided for compulsory licences that relate to failure to work or insufficient 
working.288 It can be deduced from this viewpoint that the TRIPS Agreement places WTO 
Members in an even better legal position with regard to granting compulsory licences, as 
members are left with a very broad scope of action with regard to the grounds on which they 
can grant compulsory licences in as much as the substantive conditions and key procedural 
requirements are met.289  
 
In this connection, India’s use of Section 84 is justified and consistent with TRIPS. Like the 
substantive conditions under TRIPS, the Indian Patents Act conditions the granting of 
compulsory licences. Section 90 sets out detailed terms and conditions regarding compulsory 
licences to be granted under Section 84, which are consistent with those procedural 
requirements enumerated in Article 31 of TRIPS. Under Section 84, the Controller, while 
granting a compulsory licence, is required to consider those conditions.290 For example, Section 
84(6)(iv) is consistent with Article 31(b), which conditions the granting of a compulsory 
licence if the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorisation from the right holder with 
reasonable commercial terms and conditions and such efforts have not been successful within 
a reasonable period of time. 
 
In addition, Article 31(b) of TRIPS, which is consistent with Section 92(3), also specifies that 
efforts to obtain a voluntary licence may be waived in the case of a national emergency or other 
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circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use. In this situation, 
the right holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as is reasonably practicable. In a similar 
vein, a relevant part of Section 92(1)(i) allows any person interested to make an application to 
the Controller for the granting of a compulsory licence any time after the granting of the patent 
if the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary that compulsory licences should be 
granted in situations of national emergency, circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of 
public non-commercial use government use upon an official notification in the gazette. 
 
Additionally, Article 31(c) of TRIPS is a direct reflection of the Section 90(1)(viii) provision, 
which requires that in the case of semi-conductor technology, the licence granted is to work 
the invention for public non-commercial use. Also, Article 31(d) of TRIPS is consistent with 
Section 90(1)(iv), which maintains that such use shall be non-exclusive. Also, Article 31(e) of 
TRIPS is consistent with Section 90(1)(v), which denotes that the right of the licensee is non-
assignable. Likewise, Article 31(f) of TRIPS is consistent with Section 90(1)(vii), which 
demands that the licence is granted with a predominant purpose of supply in the Indian market. 
Furthermore, Article 31(g) of TRIPS is consistent with Section 94(1), which postulates that 
any compulsory licence under Section 84 may be terminated when the circumstances that gave 
rise to the granting thereof no longer exist and such circumstances are unlikely to recur. 
 
More importantly, Article 31(h), which states that the right holder shall be paid adequate 
remuneration in the circumstances of each case, considering the economic value of the 
authorisation, is consistent with Section 90(1)(i), which enjoins the Controller to settle the 
terms and conditions of a licence under Section 84 to secure a reasonable royalty and other 
remuneration for the patentee or another person beneficially entitled to the patent. Lastly, 
Article 31(i) of TRIPS specifies that, ‘the legal validity of any decision relating to the 
authorisation of such use shall be subject to judicial review or other independent review by a 
distinct higher authority in that Member’. Similarly, Article 31(j) of TRIPS requires that ‘any 
decision relating to the remuneration provided in respect of such use shall be subject to judicial 
review or other independent review by a distinct higher authority in that Member’. 
 
In the same vein, Section 117A(2) in part provides that an appeal shall lie to the Appellate 
Board from any decision, order or direction of the Controller or Central Government under 
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Section 84. The decision of the IPAB, although final under the Patents Act,291 is subject to 
judicial review under the Constitution of India.292 Notably, the provisions for challenging a 
compulsory licence order issued by the Controller, both by way of an appeal to the IPAB under 
Section 117A(2), as well as by way of judicial review under the Constitution of India, are 
consistent with Articles 31(i) and 31(j) of the TRIPS Agreement.293  
 
3.5. Consistency of Section 84 with the Objectives of TRIPS 
 
Section 84, which allows the granting of a compulsory licence provided that the patented 
invention has not been worked in the territory of India, is derived from the general principles 
applicable to the working of patented inventions under Section 83. The local working guiding 
principles express the cardinal objectives of the Indian patent system. Among these principles 
is Section 83(c), which is a direct replication of the objectives of TRIPS under Article 7. This 
proves that Section 84 is consistent with TRIPS, as both regimes have similar objectives.  They 
stipulate that: 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to 
the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological 
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a 
balance of rights and obligations. 
 
The focus of the objectives under TRIPS and the Indian patent system become clearer when 
they are viewed in the light of the Preamble to TRIPS, which arguably can be viewed as a 
‘condensed expression of the underlying objectives’ of the entire TRIPS Agreement.294 The 
Preamble contains the overriding values that the protection of IP laws is meant to serve, as it 
recognises ‘the underlying public policy objectives of national systems for the protection of 
intellectual property, including developmental and technological objectives’. Therefore, the 
consistency of any provision with TRIPS should be assessed in the light of Article 7 and of the 
                                                 
291 There is no provision for further appeal against a decision rendered by the IPAB under Section under 117B. 
292 The constitutional validity of a decision rendered by the IPAB can be challenged by invoking the writ 
jurisdiction of the state High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In similar vein, the IPAB’s 
decision can also be challenged before the Supreme Court of India by invoking its writ jurisdiction under Article 
32 of the Constitution of India. See Harshad Pathak, ‘The Jurisdictional Dilemma Surrounding the Intellectual 
Property Appellate Board’ (2015) 20 Journal of Intellectual Property Rights 1, 54, stating that that the exercise 
of judicial review by the state high courts and the Supreme Court, acting under their respective writ jurisdiction, 
is part of the “basic structure” of Constitution of India, and therefore, a tribunal established under ordinary 
legislations, such as the IPAB, cannot exercise its quasi-judicial or appellate functions in a manner so as to exclude 
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Preamble, that is, taking the balance of rights and obligations and social and economic welfare 
into account.295 Therefore, in interpreting the rights and obligations within the Agreement a 
WTO/DSU Panel once recognised that the Preamble text co-exists with TRIPS, and they are 
to be borne in mind when the substantive rules of TRIPS are being examined.296  
 
Thus, the rules for the interpretation of international treaties allow for specific readings of the 
language to be considered for TRIPS interpretation. The WTO confirmed under Paragraph 5(a) 
of the Doha Declaration that in applying the customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object 
and purpose of the Agreement, as expressed. In fact, Article 31 of the VCLT confirms this 
approach in regard to the interpretation of WTO law and TRIPS.  It specifies that: ‘A treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’. Article 31(2) of 
the VCLT provides that the ‘context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall 
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes’. The WTO Appellate 
Body attaches great significance to the Preamble language of TRIPS in its decisions.297 This is 
rooted in the belief that the Preamble is an indication of intention visible in the text of an 
Agreement.  
 
In the US - Shrimp case the Appellate Body noted that: ‘preambular language reflects the 
intentions of negotiators of the WTO Agreement, we believe it must add colour, texture and 
shading to our interpretation of the agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement’.298 
Significantly, the Preamble of the TRIPS Agreement forms part of the “context” as an element 
mentioned in Article 31(2) of the VCLT. In the preamble to TRIPS, Members prefaced the 
Agreement to the terms of IP protection with several points, disclosing the intention that 
Members had with regard to the rights and obligations to be followed. In coming to an 
agreement, the Members, through the TRIPS Preamble, considered the need to promote 
effective and adequate protection of IP rights, as well as developmental and technology transfer 
goals.299 Nevertheless, the so-called developmental aspects of the TRIPS Agreement can be 
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properly served or obtained when patent inventions are worked locally as opposed to being 
imported.  
 
A patentee can achieve this by either manufacturing the product locally or by granting a licence 
to a third party to apply the patented invention or process in that direction. This will contribute 
to job creation, and has implications for economic growth, as importation alone will serve the 
development needs of other countries exporting the patented invention.300 It is worth noting 
that Article 7 replicates the search for a balanced approach to IP protection that considers the 
interests of both producers and users of technological inventions.301 Patent protection is 
expected to contribute not only to the promotion of technological innovation, but also to the 
transfer and dissemination of technology nationally and internationally in a way that benefits 
both its producers and users (balance of rights and obligations) with the overall goal of 
promoting social and economic welfare.302  
 
However, some have attempted to weaken this conceptual balance by arguing that the strongest 
possible legal protection for private rights results in the maximum public good.303 In short, they 
contend that stronger patent protection creates a greater incentive to innovate, which is in the 
public interest, and even argue against the use of TRIPS flexibilities.304 Article 7 of TRIPS was 
primarily designed to establish a definitive confirmation of the intention or purpose of 
Members in entering into the agreement.305 Article 7 should therefore carry greater weight in 
the process of implementation and interpretation of TRIPS.306 In the final report of the UK 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, it was interpreted that IPRs should be regarded 
‘as instruments of public policy which confer economic privileges on individuals or institutions 
solely for the purposes of contributing to the greater public good’ and that the conferred 
privileges should be ‘a means to an end, not an end in itself’.307  
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Such an emphasis is important, because interest groups often lose sight of the basic mission of 
the WTO, which, as stated in the Preamble of the WTO Agreement, is to preserve the basic 
principles and to further the objectives underlying the multilateral trading system to promote 
trade and economic development, not to protect the interests of particular private IPR-holding 
interest groups.308Additionally, the legal effect in the reference to social and economic welfare, 
and to a balance of rights and obligations, could serve to justify exceptions to exclusive rights 
where the right holder has failed to participate in social and economic development. In fact, 
there is a strong case for the obligations in TRIPS to be considered as important as the rights 
provided in the Agreement - an argument that some scholars continue to make with respect to 
exceptions.309 In other words, where the patentee uses his/her rights without performing his 
obligations, particularly failure to work the patented invention locally as a means of satisfying 
the reasonable requirements of the public, then compulsory licences will be justified.310  
 
Thus, without the compulsory licensing mechanism under Article 31 of TRIPS there would be 
no other reasonable instrument consistent with the Agreement that could ensure that patentees 
meet the developmental objectives of TRIPS.311 As the Appellate Body in the EC – Hormones 
case noted: ‘We cannot lightly assume that sovereign states intended to impose upon 
themselves the more onerous, rather than the less burdensome, obligation’.312 Furthermore, 
Paragraph 19 of the Ministerial Declaration in part states explicitly that the work of the TRIPS 
Council shall be guided by the objectives set out in Article 7 of TRIPS and shall take into 
account fully the development dimension.313 Thus, to some extent, Article 7 of TRIPS paves 
the way for India to defend the usage of compulsory licensing to restore the balance of the 
global IP system, given that it is often the users of technologies manufactured abroad that entail 
high costs and shortages.314 This may lead a Panel to take a longer look at how these provisions 
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should be interpreted in the context of the Agreement as a whole, especially with respect to the 
need for “balance”.315 As the TRIPS Resource Book declares:  
Article 7 makes clear that TRIPS negotiators did not mean to abandon a balanced 
perspective on the role of intellectual property in society. TRIPS is not intended only 
to protect the interests of right holders. It is intended to strike a balance that more 
widely promotes social and economic welfare.316 
 
3.6. Consistency of Section 84 with the Principles of TRIPS 
 
Within the framework of Section 84 lies the legislative intent of the Indian patent regime to 
promote the reasonable requirement of the public, which is central to the general principles 
applicable to the working of patented inventions in the territory of India as a principal 
foundation of the Indian patent regime. The general principles applicable to the working of 
patented inventions under Section 83 merely provide the guiding principles for the granting of 
compulsory licensing under Section 84 if the reasonable requirement of the public is not 
satisfied. Importantly, Section 84(7)(e) defines the circumstances in which the law deems the 
reasonable requirement of the public not to have been met. According to this substantive 
provision the reasonable requirement of the public is deemed not to have been met when the 
working of a patented invention in the territory of India on a commercial scale is being 
prevented or hindered by the importation from abroad of the patented article. 
 
Notably, Article 8 of TRIPS also lays out the normative public interest principles of the TRIPS 
Agreement.317 Article 8 of TRIPS echoes the Agreement’s Preamble, which recognises the 
special needs of certain Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic 
implementation of laws in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological 
base.318 In this direction, Article 8(1) of TRIPS is important in limiting the potential scope of 
violation or impairment provisions to patentable subject matter, as it makes clear that a wide 
range of public policy measures should be reasonably expected when Members amend their 
national laws to protect public health.319 This provision allows Members, when formulating or 
amending their patent regimes, to adopt TRIPS consistent measures to accommodate the 
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protection of public health and sectors of vital importance in their socio-economic and 
technological development.  
 
It is significant that Article 8 of TRIPS does not refer to laws and regulations on IPRs at the 
international level but national measures that are required to serve the public interest. Coherent 
with Article 8 of TRIPS, India followed this autonomy and enacted its patent law to 
accommodate several key principles that aimed to promote the public interest. It dubbed these: 
“The reasonable requirement of the public”. Remarkably, given that public health is explicitly 
mentioned in Article 8(1) of TRIPS as one of the exceptions that requires necessary measures 
worth protecting, India included the principle that ‘patents granted do not impede protection of 
public health and nutrition and should act as an instrument to promote the public interest 
especially in sectors of vital importance for the socio-economic and technological development 
of India’.320  
 
In EC — Trademarks and Geographical Indications, in the course of explaining why the TRIPS 
Agreement did not contain a general exceptions provision, the Panel referred to the principles 
of the Agreement set out in Article 8(1): 
These principles reflect the fact that the TRIPS Agreement does not generally 
provide for the grant of positive rights to exploit or use certain subject matter, but 
rather provides for the grant of negative rights to prevent certain acts. This 
fundamental feature of intellectual property protection inherently grants Members 
freedom to pursue legitimate public policy objectives since many measures to attain 
those public policy objectives lie outside the scope of intellectual property rights and 
do not require an exception under the TRIPS Agreement.321 
 
This makes Section 84, which allows the granting of a compulsory licence provided that the 
reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention have not been 
satisfied, consistent with Article 8 of TRIPS, where failure to work any pharmaceutical patents 
in the territory of India affects the commercial or industrial development of the pharmaceutical 
sector, which is of vital importance to India.322 Moreover, within its public policy goal to 
                                                 
320 Section 83(d). 
321 Panel Reports in EC – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and 
Foodstuffs (US), WT/DS174/R, Mar. 15, 2005, para. 7.210, and (Australia), para.7.246. 
322 Resource Book on TRIPS (n 16) 126-127, arguing that Article 8(1) measures adopted by members to address 
public health, and matters of vital socio-economic importance should be presumed to be consistent with TRIPS, 
and that any member seeking to challenge the exercise of discretion should bear the burden of proving 
inconsistency. See also Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Policy Space in WTO Law’ 
(Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law, Research Paper Series No. 08-02, 2008) 
36-38, suggesting the difficulty in reversing the burden of proof as proposed by “The UNCTAD-ICTSD Resource 
Book on TRIPS and Development”. 
 67 
protect public health, the Indian patent regime provided for another principle, which maintains 
that ‘patents granted do not in any way prohibit Central Government in taking measures to 
protect public health’.323 In this context, Section 84 is highly relevant to public health because 
it allows the government to potentially intervene if a patent holder refuses to work a patent 
locally and allow the generic manufacture of essential pharmaceuticals.324  
 
Furthermore, it is significant that Article 8 of TRIPS allows Members, when formulating or 
amending their laws and regulations, to adopt appropriate measures consistent with TRIPS to 
prevent the abuse of IPRs by right holders, or when they have resorted to practices that 
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology.325 In 
the light of this, it is also arguable that Article 8(1) of TRIPS allows the granting of compulsory 
licences on the grounds of lack of local working, or when such failure undermines the 
promotion of the public interest norm for the granting of patent rights, that is, to promote the 
legitimate interest of the public.326 This is significant especially when a failure to work, which 
international patent law under Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention recognises as an abuse of 
patent rights, additionally results in significant consequences for the public interest such as 
high costs and shortages of essential medicines required to protect public health.  
 
Consistent with Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention, Article 8 of TRIPS recognises as a major 
principle the need to prevent abuse of patent rights, and makes the measures required to do so 
a matter of national public policy. Thus, the context, given the textual correlation of Section 
84 with Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention, which is inclusively referenced in Article 2 of 
TRIPS, and carefully following Article 8 of the TRIPS provision, which is consistent with the 
reasonable requirement of the public under Section 83 of the Indian Patents Act, casts serious 
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doubt on any conflicting interpretation that urges us to assume that Section 84 is inconsistent 
with TRIPS. This viewpoint is further strengthened as Article 8(2) of TRIPS only provides 
recognition that appropriate measures may be needed to prevent abuse of patent rights. It does 
not specifically stipulate what constitutes an abuse of IP rights, nor does it define the legal basis 
of what would generally constitute an abuse of patent rights, unlike Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris 
Convention, which provides failure to work as an example.  
 
Furthermore, the Agreement does not provide a definition of the kind of appropriate measure 
deemed reasonable for Members to use to prevent such abuses. This is left to the discretion of 
Members’ interpretation or domestic statutory provisions to determine.327 In fact, it is not 
evident anywhere in TRIPS, nor can it be constructively inferred from any provision in TRIPS, 
that the Agreement prevents Members from granting compulsory licences if a patented 
invention is abused, or if a product is not worked or a process is not used within the territory 
of protection. In this regard, India introduced into its patent regime a consistent principle 
similar to those enumerated under Article 8(2) of TRIPS, which stipulates that the patentee 
should not abuse the patent right or must not resort to practices that unreasonably restrain trade 
or adversely affect the international transfer of technology.328  
 
Recognising that abuse of patent rights, as exemplified by failure to work locally, could lead 
to excessive importation and its attendant effects of high costs and shortages, Section 83(b) 
provides that patents are not granted merely to enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly for the 
importation of the patented article. To mitigate the potential high costs of patented inventions 
that can undermine the public interest, Section 84(1)(b) stipulates that ‘patents are granted to 
make the benefit of the patented invention available at reasonably affordable prices to the 
public’.329 Moreover, where non-working or insufficient working in the territory of India is 
being prevented or hindered by the importation from abroad of the patented article,330 and this 
further results in insufficient supply of appropriate quantities, considerations of public health 
support the granting of a compulsory licence when the situation seriously compromises the 
country’s needs to avoid unreasonably high prices and shortages of essential medicines.331  
                                                 
327 Graeme Austin, ‘The Role of National Courts: Valuing “Domestic Self-Determination” in International 
Intellectual Property Jurisprudence’ (2002) 77 Chicago-Kent Law Review 3, 1193-1194. 
328 Section 83(f). 
329 See also Section 83(g). 
330 Section 84(7)(e). 
331 Exceptions and Limitations to Patent Rights: Compulsory Licenses and/or Government Use (Part I) (Twenty-
First Session of WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, SCP/21/4 REV. Nov. 3, 2014) 3, para. 9. 
 69 
 
Therefore, Article 8 of TRIPS becomes even more important in the light of the ambiguities 
built into Article 27(1) of TRIPS, which only prohibits discrimination based on the place of 
invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced. More 
importantly, there is no reasonable basis to say that WTO Members have the right only to grant 
and enforce exclusive patent rights without the discretion to prevent any abuse of the same. All 
things considered, the granting of compulsory licences to prevent abuse typified by failure to 
work in the exercise of patent rights would not amount to an unjustified detriment to patentees 
or constitute a material breach of Article 27(1) of TRIPS, when as a matter of fact Article 8(2) 
of TRIPS strengthens Members’ discretion to adopt appropriate measures to prevent the abuse 
of patent rights.332 It follows logically that just as Members remain under obligations pursuant 
to Article 27(1) of TRIPS to grant and enforce patent rights, they have inherent discretion to 
prevent abuses that may arise from the exercise of the granted rights. The Doha Declaration 
confirms this deductive reasoning. It has been confirmed that the principles of the TRIPS 
Agreement should be taken into account in its interpretation.333  
 
With Article 27(1) of TRIPS in mind, the members affirmed that each Member has the right to 
grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences 
are granted. According to Reichman, ‘if interpreted properly, Article 8 of TRIPS and its 
accompanying clauses, together with the Doha Declaration, would legitimise the ad hoc 
exceptions required by overriding national needs, such as compulsory licensing for public 
health protection’.334 This argument gains more strength, as notably the provision uses the term 
“public interest”.335 Therefore, if within the fundamental justification of that Member such a 
reasonable measure can prevent the abuse of patent rights, TRIPS will not completely forbid 
that Member from granting a compulsory licence in that direction.336 This confirms the 
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hypothesis that Sections 84, which allows the granting of a compulsory licence provided that 
the patented invention has not been worked in the territory of India, is consistent with TRIPS, 
and therefore it would provide a suitable model for Ghana. 
 
3.7. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has drawn on applicable sources of law and interpreted them and has arrived at 
the conclusion that Section 84 is consistent with TRIPS. The analysis has focused on some key 
provisions under the Paris Convention, the Indian Patent Act and the TRIPS Agreement, which 
share common drafting structures, legislative intents and substantive treatment of key subject 
matters pertaining to the principles applicable to the working of patented inventions and the 
granting of compulsory licences. The analysis has reconciled Section 84, which has a textual 
correlation with Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention, the latter having been incorporated into 
TRIPS under Article 2. Importantly, the analysis has revealed that the Indian patent regime has 
incorporated almost all of the substantive conditions and requirements developed under Article 
31 of TRIPS to be followed when using Section 84.  
 
Moreover, the objective of TRIPS in Article 7, which is also captured in the Preamble, and its 
principles under Article 8 have been reconciled with Section 84 concerning the reasonable 
requirement of the public, which is directly derived from the general principles applicable to 
the working of patented inventions in India. Central to this overarching principle is an 
obligation on the part of patentees to work their patented inventions locally or licence another 
to do so in India in order to achieve the technology transfer obligation of patentees to promote 
social welfare and developmental needs. More importantly, upon careful reading, one can 
easily infer that the reasonable requirement of the public under Section 84 is consistent with 
the principles of TRIPS.  
 
Article 8 of TRIPS allows Members to prevent the abuse of IPRs by right holders or the resort 
to practices that unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of 
technology, protect public health, and promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance 
to their socio-economic and technological development. Therefore, in the implementation of 
public health objectives, one situation of abuse of rights could be, for instance, the practice of 
excessively high import prices of patented pharmaceutical products. This makes India’s 
decision to use Section 84 in granting a compulsory licence to Natco based on the reasonably 
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affordable requirements justified and consistent with TRIPS. The next chapter argues that 
Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement would not prohibit WTO Members from adopting and 
implementing any local working requirements that follow the Indian model in Section 84. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Section 84: Non-Discrimination, Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement and the Local 
Working Requirement 
 
4.1. Aim of the Chapter  
 
This chapter aims to examine whether Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement would prohibit 
Ghana from implementing any local working requirements. The chapter argues that Article 
27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement would not prohibit Ghana and other WTO Members from 
adopting and implementing any local working requirements that follow the Indian model in 
Section 84. 
 
4.2. Introduction to the Chapter 
 
As seen from above, Section 84 of the Indian Patents Act is consistent with TRIPS. 
Nevertheless, Article 27(1) of TRIPS, provides broad subject matter scope for patent 
protection, extending to products and processes in all fields of technology.337 It also provides 
that for example Ghana and other WTO Members shall not “discriminate” with respect to the 
enjoyment of patent rights based on the place of invention, and whether products are imported 
or locally produced.338 The main impact of the non-discrimination clause under Article 27 of 
TRIPS has probably been in the area of compulsory licensing for failure to work.339 However, 
Article 5A of the Paris Convention expressly authorises, on certain conditions, compulsory 
licensing for failure to work patents locally.340 Nevertheless, the TRIPS Agreement does not 
contain such a clear and express authorisation, except that Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention 
is incorporated into TRIPS under Article 2. 
 
The interface between Article 27(1) of TRIPS and Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention 
clearly causes legal complications, in that where the legislation of countries follows Article 
5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention, it is difficult to reconcile with Article 27(1) of the TRIPS 
Agreement.341 The most restrictive interpretation of Article 27(1) of the TRIPS provision is 
                                                 
337 “Resource Book on TRIPS” (n 16) 368. 
338 Donald Harris, ‘The Power of Ideas: The Declaration of Patent Protection and New Approaches to International 
Intellectual Property Lawmaking’ (2016) 16 UC Irvine Law Review 3, 350. 
339 “Resource Book on TRIPS” (n 16) 373. 
340 Article 5(A)(4) of the Paris Convention. 
341 Cottier, et al (n 66) 439. 
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that ‘discrimination means any form of differential treatment’.342 Some scholars implicitly 
endorse an interpretation that Article 27(1) of TRIPS would prohibit the imposition of local 
working,343 thereby rendering Section 84, which allows India the right to grant a compulsory 
licence provided that the patented invention has not been worked in the territory of India, 
inconsistent with TRIPS. 
 
The argument is that Article 27(1) of TRIPS prohibits Ghana and other WTO Members from 
treating patentees in one field of technology unfavourably relative to patentees in all other 
fields of technology.344 It seems that the concept of “non-discrimination” is the one stimulating 
this interpretation and thus creating much tension with regard to its possible negative 
application to Ghana and similarly situated WTO Members.345 What follows is that often the 
right of Ghana and other WTO Members to impose local working has been questioned as 
potentially in conflict with Article 27(1) of TRIPS because such a measure would impair the 
patent rights enjoyable by patentees, particularly holders of pharmaceutical patents.346 
However, some scholars have rejected any strict interpretation of Article 27(1) of TRIPS as 
potentially prohibiting WTO Members completely from the imposition of local working 
requirements.347 
 
Remarkably, the non-discrimination provisions in Article 27(1) are the subject of a WTO Panel 
report in Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products.348  However, it should be 
                                                 
342 Maria Victoria Stout, ‘Crossing the TRIPS Nondiscrimination Line: How CAFTA Pharmaceutical Patent 
Provisions Violate TRIPS Article 27.1’ (2008) 14 Boston University Journal of Science & Technology Law 2, 
180. 
343 Bonadio (n 53) 720, stating the ruling might be a violation of Article 27(1) of TRIPS, which precludes India, 
as a Party to the Agreement, from discriminating between patented products that are imported and those that are 
locally produced. Jonathan Michael Berger, ‘Tripping Over Patents: AIDS, Access to Treatment and the 
Manufacturing of Scarcity’ (2002) 17 Connecticut Journal of International Law 2, 119. Bryan Mercurio, ‘The 
Impact of the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement on the Provision of Health Services in Australia’ 
(2005) 26 Whittier Law Review 4, 1094, observing that ‘the International Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers (IFPMA) felt that the amendments violated the TRIPS Agreement by discriminating against 
pharmaceutical patent holders and dissuading holders from seeking to protect and enforce their rights’. The 
IFPMA has reiterated that the provisions violate “the spirit, if not the letter” of Article 27 of TRIPS, which requires 
members to make patent rights available and enjoyable without discrimination as to the field of technology, and 
Article of TRIPS, which requires that procedures for promoting patents not be “unnecessary complicated or 
costly”. See Daniel Pruzin, ‘Global Pharmaceutical Group Slams Amendments to U.S.-Australia FTA’ (2004) 21 
International Trade Representative 43, 1762. 
344 id. 
345 Beier (n 13) 259-260, finding that majority of patent laws in developed countries permit compulsory licences, 
but stressing that actual grants of such licences remain rare. 
346 Laurence Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual 
Property Law-making’ (2004) 29 Yale Journal of International Law 1, 41. 
347 Watal (n 274) 111. Correa (n 15) 10. Mercurio and Tyagi (n 76) 282. 
348 “Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products” (n 68). 
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noted here that the Panel in that case made clear that “discrimination” in Article 27(1) of TRIPS 
is an unhelpful term that means something other than “differentiation”.349 Since the WTO 
Panel’s rejection of the strict interpretation of Article 27(1), prohibiting any differentiation 
between fields of technology,350 the more accepted view is that “discrimination” must be 
distinguished from differentiation for legitimate reasons.351 It is therefore argued that Article 
27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement would not prohibit Ghana from adopting and implementing any 
local working requirements that follow the Indian model in Section 84. This argument is 
enhanced by the fact that India invoked Section 84 in granting a compulsory licence to Natco 
and to date the inconsistency of this decision with TRIPS, specifically against the non-
discrimination principle under Article 27(1), remains unchallenged within the WTO DSU 
system.  
 
4.3. Non-Discrimination and Article 27(1) of TRIPS 
 
The requirement that patent rights shall be available and enjoyable without discrimination as 
to the field of technology follows from the general rule of patentability contained in the first 
sentence of Article 27(1).352 This second sentence, however, adds an important element - the 
law cannot discriminate in its treatment of different fields, both in terms of availability of rights 
and capacity to enjoy them.353 The TRIPS Agreement does not contain provisions that 
specifically address working requirements. But some scholars have implicitly endorsed the 
“non-discrimination” provision in Article 27(1) as prohibiting the imposition of working 
                                                 
349 Dispute Settlement: World Trade Organisation. 3.14, TRIPS (New York & Geneva, UNCTAD, 
UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.18, 2003) 19, para. 2.6.3. 
350 “Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products” (n 68) para. 7.94, interpreting “discrimination” in 
Article 27(1) of TRIPS to mean “the unjustified imposition of differentially disadvantageous treatment,” not mere 
differentiation (emphasis added). Frederick Abbott, ‘Toward a New Era of Objective Assessment in the Field of 
TRIPS and Variable Geometry for the Preservation of Multilateralism’ (2005) 8 Journal of International 
Economic Law 1, 85. 
351 Carlos Correa, ‘Investment Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements: Implications for the Granting 
of Compulsory Licenses (2004) 26 Michigan Journal of International Law 1, 344, commenting that, it is to be 
noted that differentiation in legal treatment is not the same as discrimination, and that WTO members can adopt 
different rules for particular areas, provided that the differences are adopted for bona fide purposes. Thomas 
Cottier, ‘From Progressive Liberalization to Progressive Regulation in WTO Law’ (2006) 9 Journal of 
International Economic Law 4, 796 see note 43 positing that ‘The general principle of equal treatment . . . requires 
that comparable situations not be treated differently and different situations not be treated alike unless such 
treatment is objectively justified’. Graeme Dinwoodie and Rochelle Dreyfuss, ‘Diversifying Without 
Discriminating: Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPS Agreement’ (2007) 13 Michigan Telecommunication 
and Technology Law Review 2, 452, suggesting that those defending an exclusion as compliant with Article 27 
should be permitted to rebut a showing of disparate treatment by demonstrating a legitimate purpose. 
352 “Resource Book on TRIPS” (n 16) 368. 
353 Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of Article 27 and importantly 
Article 30 permissible exception. 
 75 
requirements;354 therefore, Ghana and other WTO Members must accept importation as 
satisfying the working requirement.355  
 
If literally interpreted, it seems that the local working requirement argument has no basis in the 
TRIPS Agreement, as Article 27(1) of TRIPS has the potential to alter the right of Ghana and 
other WTO Members to invoke compulsory licences for failure to work patents locally.356 A 
strict interpretation along this line would suggest that patentees can satisfy local working 
requirements by importation alone, and that they are not under any legal obligation to produce 
or apply their patented inventions locally in the patent granting country.357 Under this 
interpretation, the TRIPS Agreement, with its principle of non-discrimination, will work to 
repudiate working requirements in Ghana that follow the Indian model in Section 84.358  
 
Accordingly, the so-called “without discrimination” as to the place of invention, the field of 
technology and whether products are imported or locally produced under Article 27(1) will 
seek to diminish compulsory licensing for non-working to the extent that TRIPS no longer 
serves to guarantee the transfer of anything but finished commodities produced from patents 
irrespective of the granting jurisdictions involved.359 Therefore, limiting the rights of a patentee 
who engages in importation rather than locally producing his patented invention might be 
considered an example of discrimination relating to importation within the meaning of Article 
27(1) of TRIPS.  
 
Based on this elementary view, some scholars have interpreted the non-discrimination norm in 
Article 27(1) as requiring patents to be worked for example, in India to be defined as made 
available in the country including through imports, rather than a direct manufacturing of the 
patented products or applying the patented processes thereof in India that grants the patent.360 
                                                 
354 Graeme Dinwoodie and Rochelle Dreyfuss, A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: The Resilience of The 
International Intellectual Property Regime (New York, Oxford University Press, 2012) 43. 
355 Gervais (n 284) 433. Carvalho (n 106) 317. Cottier, et al (n 66) 460. 
356 Graeme Dinwoodie, ‘The Architecture of the International Intellectual Property System’ (2002) 77 Chicago-
Kent Law Review 3, 1004, observing that the institutional effect of TRIPS has surely altered the character of 
international IP relations. 
357 Halewood (n 18) 249. Michael Doane, ‘TRIPS and International Intellectual Property Protection in an Age of 
Advancing Technology’ (1994) 9 American University Journal of International Law and Policy 2, 479. 
358 Gustavo Ghidini, Innovation, Competition and Consumer Welfare in Intellectual Property Law (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2010) 250-251. Carvalho (n 106) 285. 
359 Halewood (n 18) 247. 
360 Adelman and Badia (n 62) 517. 
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Under this view, Ghana would be obliged to establish a “one-size-fits-all” patent regime361 that 
does not treat patents protecting medicines any differently than those protecting other 
inventions.362  
 
Arguably, the reasoning underlining this claim is that Article 27(1) of TRIPS would treat both 
locally manufactured and imported patented products in India the same way. Therefore, local 
working requirements that treat patentees in one field of technology (pharmaceutical patents) 
unfavourably, or unjustifiably disadvantage certain patentees, remain discriminatory relative 
to patentees in all other fields of technology.363 Moreover, critics of patent working 
requirements often point to the fact that local working requirements are rarely enforced, and 
therefore Ghana and other WTO Members have implicitly accepted that importation satisfies 
an obligation to work patented inventions locally.364  
 
Remarkably, the interpretation in the sense that the working of a patent can be satisfied by 
importation is likely to have led many countries to consider importation as equivalent to local 
production for the purposes of working an invention.365 Indeed, over the years, many WTO 
Members have changed their domestic patent legislation by restricting their use of compulsory 
licences on the grounds of failure to work locally.366 These include Canada, which amended its 
domestic law to eliminate differential treatment for inventions made in the country with regard 
to compulsory licences.367  
 
Some courts have also decided that the non-discrimination principle offends local working 
requirements. For example, the European Court of Justice in the Commission v Italy case held 
that the working requirements of a Member State of the European Union (EU) are satisfied by 
the importation of products manufactured in another member state of the EU.368 On this basis, 
some scholars argue that for example, Ghana and other WTO Members have forfeited, or 
severely limited, their ability to invoke the local working requirement mechanism to mitigate 
                                                 
361 Berger (n 343) 200, mentioning food, mechanical devices or software. 
362 Robert Bird, ‘Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC Economies’ (2006) 43 American Business 
Law Journal 2, 346. 
363 Carvalho (n 55) 198. 
364 Richard Reik, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patents’ (1946) 36 American Economic Review 5, 815. 
365 Cottier, et al (n 66) 438. 
366 Halewood (n 18) 245, citing Canada, China, India, Mexico, New Zealand and Thailand. 
367 Reichman and Hasenzahl (n 1) 19. 
368 Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic. - Article 30 of the EEC Treaty - Patent - 
Compulsory licence. - Case C-235/89 (Judgment of the Court of 18 February 1992) para. 27. 
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the abuse of patent rights resulting from the non-working of patented products.369 Notably, 
some complaints have been made alleging violation of the non-discrimination principle under 
Article 27(1) of TRIPS in the WTO DSU system.370 Significantly, this ambiguity came to a 
head in the Canada - Patents Products case.371  
 
4.4. Non-Discrimination and Article 27(1) of TRIPS: Canada - Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products’ Case 
 
On 19 December 1997, the EU and their Member States requested consultations with Canada 
under the DSU372 alleging that some provisions of Canadian patent law violated TRIPS 
obligations.373 The focus of the EU’s complaint was the generic pharmaceutical sector. The EU 
contended, inter alia, that under Canadian law, patent rights were not enjoyable without 
discrimination as to the field of technology within the meaning of Article 27(1) of TRIPS, 
which requires patents to be available and patent rights to be enjoyable without discrimination 
as to the field of technology.374  
 
In this case, the Panel had to consider whether Canada’s regulatory review exception was 
inconsistent with Article 27(1) of TRIPS in the sense of discriminating with respect to the field 
of technology.375 However, it refused to provide a general definition of what “discrimination” 
meant. It argued that: 
In considering how to address these conflicting claims of discrimination, the Panel 
recalled that various claims of discrimination, de jure and de facto, have been the 
                                                 
369 Adam Bierylo, ‘Importing Doesn’t Work: Justifying Local Working Requirements through a Historical, 
Theoretical, and Contractual Perspective’ (2013) 3 Western Journal of Legal Studies 1, 4. 
370 For example, see South Africa — Anti-Dumping Duties on Certain Pharmaceutical Products from India 
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371 “Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products” (n 68). 
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subject of legal rulings under GATT or the WTO.376 These rulings have addressed 
the question whether measures were in conflict with various GATT or WTO 
provisions prohibiting variously defined forms of discrimination. As the Appellate 
Body has repeatedly made clear, each of these rulings has necessarily been based on 
the precise legal text in issue, so that it is not possible to treat them as applications 
of a general concept of discrimination.377 
 
Given the very broad range of issues that might be involved in defining the word 
“discrimination” in Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, the Panel decided that it would be 
better to defer an attempt to define the term at the outset, and instead determine which issues 
had been raised by the record before the Panel, and define the concept of discrimination to the 
extent necessary to resolve those issues.378  
 
Here, the primary TRIPS provisions that deal with discrimination, such as the national 
treatment and most-favoured-nation provisions of Articles 3 and 4, do not use the term 
“discrimination”379 but speak in more precise terms. The ordinary meaning of the word 
“discriminate” is potentially broader than these more specific definitions. It certainly extends 
beyond the concept of differential treatment.380 
 
Importantly, in explaining its understanding of the term “without discrimination” in Article 
27(1) of TRIPS, the Panel advised against using the term “discrimination” whenever “more 
precise standards are available”, given the potentially “infinite complexity” of the term.381 
“Discrimination”, when employed, is a term to be interpreted with caution, and with care, so 
as not to add more precision than the concept contains.382 The Panel pointed out that Article 
27(1) of TRIPS refers to “discrimination” regarding the field of technology, which is a 
pejorative term.383  
 
Discrimination may arise from explicitly different treatment, which is sometimes called “de 
jure discrimination”, but it may also arise from ostensibly identical treatment, which, due to 
                                                 
376 For example, see “Japan — Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages” (n 246); European Communities – Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (WT/DS27/AB/R Nov. 17, 1997); see “EC - Measures Concerning 
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differences in circumstances, produces differentially disadvantageous effects; this is 
sometimes called “de facto discrimination”.384 More importantly, while limited exceptions for 
patent rights were a major issue of contention, reasonableness as a matter of law favours an 
understanding that any interpretation of the term “discrimination”385 pursuant to Article 27(1) 
of TRIPS should require greater attention as discrimination may not be the same as differential 
treatment.386  
 
The fact that Members may not “discriminate” regarding a field of technology does not imply 
that they may not “differentiate” among fields of technology for legitimate purposes.387 In that 
case, the Panel observed that there may be ‘bona fide exceptions to deal with problems that 
exist only in certain areas’.388 Consequently, the Panel seemed to have accepted the 
understanding that discrimination which occurs without justification is fatal;389  or as the Panel 
puts it – ‘without bona fide reasons’, but a compulsory licence that singles out an abuse in the 
exercise of an exclusive patent right, for example non-working, presumably does so for bona 
fide reasons.390 
 
In fact, under a normal meaning of the term “discrimination”, treating different cases 
differently is not discrimination.391 Therefore, this is the settled position of the Panel, as a 
distinction between “discrimination” and “differentiation” was made when it clarified that the 
conduct prohibited by Article 27(1) of TRIPS is “discrimination” as to the field of technology; 
that “discrimination” is not the same as “differentiation”; and, that Ghana and other WTO 
                                                 
384 id. Note that it is widely accepted that Article 27(1) of TRIPS prohibits both de jure discrimination, where 
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Members can adopt different rules for particular product areas, provided that the differences 
are adopted for bona fide purposes.392 
 
In any event, the TRIPS Agreement appears to allow Ghana and other WTO Members to apply 
such differential treatments. Despite requiring that patents be available without discrimination 
based on technology, the TRIPS Agreement differentiates with respect to licences on semi-
conductor technology and with respect to pharmaceutical technologies.393 Moreover, every 
technology is unique regarding its socio-economic implications. It follows that the demand for 
legal protection, and the effects of that protection on both the operation of competition and the 
attainment of other public policy goals may differ according to the technology at issue.394  
 
The need to grant protection and the modalities of such protection may also differ accordingly 
despite the fact that Article 27 of TRIPS requires WTO Members to provide patent protection 
on “without discrimination” basis. WTO Members must be able to adjust the scope of exclusive 
rights in order to accommodate important public interests and confine exclusivity within 
reasonable limits. The discretion afforded to WTO Members to apply differential treatments 
on reasonable grounds is ensured by the fact that neither the TRIPS Agreement nor the Paris 
Convention contains any restriction to that effect. From this standpoint, measures to 
accommodate these differences cannot be considered contrary to Article 27(1) of TRIPS.  
 
Consequently, while Article 27(1) of TRIPS prohibits discrimination as to the field of 
technology, it would not prevent Ghana and other WTO Members from treating different 
situations differently. Differentiation that serves to level the actual conditions of competition 
across all fields of technology is not discriminatory, but rather the opposite. It constitutes a 
necessary response to the diversity of technologies.395 Having made these determinations, the 
Panel found that Canada’s patent legislation neither differentiated nor discriminated, since it 
was, by its terms and application, neutral as to the field of technology.396  
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This conclusion is based on the logic that a clear majority of patent laws are indeed 
“technology-neutral”, and on the face of it, most scholars agree that Article 27(1) of TRIPS 
does not stringently necessitate a single level of patent protection for all technologies or 
industries.397 Therefore, while requiring patent holders to produce their products within a 
particular territory, such as Ghana may create a distinction between imported products and 
locally produced products. For example, some WTO Members have granted differential 
treatment to patents depending on the country of invention. This was the case, for instance, 
under the Canadian regulation on compulsory licences, introduced in 1988 and in force until 
Bill C-91 was passed in February 1993.398  
 
Hence, the so-called discrimination now banned was permissible, such as establishing different 
terms of patent protection according to the field of technology, as provided for under some 
domestic patent law.399 Thus, it is by no means clear that non-discrimination among 
technologies (as per the Panel’s interpretation of Article 27 of TRIPS) is an objective of equal 
importance to the international patent system,400 as the Panel acknowledged that: ‘Article 27 
does not prohibit bona fide exemptions to deal with problems that may exist only in certain 
product areas’.401 This seems to be an analogous approach to that of Article 5(A)(4) of the Paris 
Convention, which refers to “legitimate reasons” for “failure to work” a patented invention; 
therefore, Ghana and other WTO Members may treat different fields of patent protection 
differently if they do so for a legitimate regulatory purpose.402  
 
Moreover, the Panel held that, to the extent that the prohibition of discrimination limits the 
ability to target certain products in dealing with the important national policies referred to in 
Articles 7 and 8(1) of TRIPS, including public health, it may well constitute a deliberate 
limitation rather than a frustration of purpose.403 Importantly, Correa argues that public health 
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is not a “field of technology”, but a problem area that may be addressed with products 
originating in different technological fields, such as medicines.404 If specific rules applicable 
to pharmaceutical or public health patents are necessary to address important public interests, 
this does not constitute “discrimination” against the field of pharmaceutical technology.405  
 
Differentiation targeted at such effects arguably finds explicit support in the Canada – Patents 
Product case.406 WTO Ministers similarly differentiated between fields of technology in the 
Doha Declaration. In adopting Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Doha Declaration, Ministers clearly 
acknowledged that the pharmaceutical sector may be treated differently from other sectors 
regarding the enjoyment of patent protection. Such determination is fully consistent with 
Paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration, which expressly acknowledges the need to support access 
to medicines for all.  
 
Thus, this affirmation was to permit legitimate distinctions between fields of technology. 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration specifically addresses insufficient manufacturing capacity 
in the pharmaceutical sector and finding a solution to this particular problem regarding 
compulsory licensing. Therefore, if the imposition of local working in Ghana can promote local 
manufacturing capacity for the production and distribution of essential medicines, Article 27(1) 
of TRIPS cannot undermine the stated objectives on the basis of non-discrimination; rather it 
is discriminatory where Ghana and other WTO Members enforce the same pharmaceutical 
patents yet, essential medicines are not accessible by all. 
 
More importantly, many of the proposals for tailoring are not aimed at the nominal legal rights 
created by patent law, but rather at the economic effects of these patents, for example, the 
timely availability of essential medicines in Ghana to protect public health and the issue of the 
high costs and shortages of essential medicines. Therefore, placing too much emphasis on the 
fundamental principle of non-discrimination in patent protection could take away key 
flexibilities or, if extended too broadly as an interpretive device, would undermine the efforts 
                                                 
404 Carlos Correa, Implications of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Geneva, 
WHO, Essential Drugs and Medicine Policy, WHO/EDM/PAR/2002.3, 2002) 42. 
405 Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss (n 351) 451. 
406 “Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products” (n 68) paras. 7.57-58, discussing normal exploitation 
under Article 30. 
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of Ghana and other WTO Members in certain circumstances to assess and justify 
discrimination by reference to marketplace effects.407  
 
Significantly, if the Canada – Patents Product case is read more objectively and confined to 
its core holding, it can be understood simply as saying that benefits flowing from non-patent 
law realities (such as public health considerations) cannot be the basis for a claim of guaranteed 
rights. This latter interpretation, which is more favourable than the foregoing view, sits well 
with the overall and net effects of a tailored system, and is consistent with the idea that the 
TRIPS Agreement is aimed primarily at ensuring a minimum obligation, and thus, a key margin 
exists for Ghana and other WTO Members’ discretion in protecting the public interest.408  
 
By this reference, there is good reason to conclude that Article 27(1) of TRIPS will not 
completely prevent Ghana and other WTO Members, for bona fide reasons, from adopting 
rules that differentiate among patents in diverse fields of technology. In the Panel’s view, what 
was important was that in the rights available under national law, that is to say those resulting 
from the basic rights and any permissible exceptions to them, the forms of discrimination 
referred to in Article 27(1) should not be present.409 
 
Significantly, if the view is taken that the imposition of local working by Ghana using the 
Section 84 model would be discriminatory and arbitrary as per Article 27(1) of the TRIPS 
provision, then other cases of remedial differential treatment laws for pharmaceutical patent 
term extension,410 which give pharmaceutical patented products extra years of patent protection 
                                                 
407 Compare, Graeme Dinwoodie and Rochelle Dreyfuss, ‘TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property 
Lawmaking’ (2005) 36 Case Western Journal of International Law 95, 112-113, arguing that adjudicators should 
take into account how changing social practices and new technological opportunities alter the balance of 
protection accorded to innovative works. 
408 id. 
409 “Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products” (n 68) para. 7.90. 
410 The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-417], 98 STAT 1585 (codified at 21 USC 355(b), (j), (l). 
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distortion was that the patent owner loses patent term during the early years of the patent because the product 
cannot be commercially marketed without approval from a regulatory agency. The second distortion occurred 
after the end of the patent term because competitors could not immediately enter the market upon expiration of 
the patent because they were not allowed to begin testing and other activities necessary to receive Food and Drug 
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relative to other fields of technology, would equally be proved inconsistent with TRIPS, given 
that Article 33 of the TRIPS provision provides for a 20-year patent term.411 The Panel also 
considered the applicability of the non-discrimination clause to exceptions regulated by Article 
30 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
4.5. Non-Discrimination under Article 27(1) of TRIPS and the General Exception in 
Article 30  
 
To begin with, the exclusive rights conferred by Article 28(1) of TRIPS empower patent 
owners to prevent others from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing a patented 
article or process without their permission.412 Article 28(2) of TRIPS further provides that 
patent owners shall have the right to assign or transfer the exclusive patent rights, or to enter 
into voluntary licensing arrangements.413 The terms of these licensing agreements are open to 
negotiation among the parties, subject to domestic laws governing abuse and other 
anticompetitive practices.414 The principal limitations on a patentee’s exclusive rights are the 
relatively narrow set of exceptions covered by Article 30,415 and the rather broad possibilities 
for imposing compulsory licences under Article 31.416  
 
The Panel devoted a considerable portion of its decision to interpreting the meaning of the three 
elements of Article 30 of TRIPS; that is, “limited exception”,417 not unreasonably interfering 
with the normal exploitation of the patent,418 and not unreasonably prejudicing the interests of 
the patent holder, taking into account the legitimate interests of third parties.419 Conceding that 
the relevant provision of its patent law contravened the rights of patent holders under Article 
28(1) of TRIPS, Canada argued that it had invoked Article 30 of TRIPS - asserting that it was 
                                                 
Administration approval before patent expiration. For further analysis, see Rebecca Eisenberg, ‘The Shifting 
Functional Balance of Patents and Drug Regulation’ (2001) 20 Health Affairs 5, 121-122. 
411  “Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products” (n 68) para. 7.1. 
412 Article 28(1) of TRIPS. See Section 271(d)(4) of 35 USC 1952. Dawson Chem. Co. v Rohm & Haas Co., 448 
US 176, 215 (1980) in which the judgment recognised the long-settled view that the essence of a patent grant is 
the right to exclude others from profiting by the patented invention. 
413 Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy? (London & 
Sterling, VA, Earthscan (Routledge), 2002) 151, explaining that the patent monopoly by its nature gave its owner 
strong rights over the making of the invention including the terms on which it could be licensed. 
414 Articles 8(2), 28(2), and 40 of TRIPS. 
415 Reichman and Hasenzahl (n 1) 13. 
416 Correa (n 15) 8-9. 
417 “Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products” (n 68) paras. 7.39-49. 
418 ibid. paras. 7.51-59. 
419 ibid. paras. 60-61. 
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providing limited exceptions to the rights of patent holders within the scope of that provision.420 
Nevertheless, the EU disputed that a violation of Article 27(1) of TRIPS could not be justified 
under Article 30.421  
 
Canada then contended that the prohibition in Article 27(1) of TRIPS against discrimination 
on the basis of the field of technology did not apply to allowable limited exceptions.422 The 
Panel initially gave Article 27(1) of TRIPS broad structural effect over Article 30 of TRIPS 
pursuant to the Canadian legal provision, which explicitly required permissible exceptions for 
patent rights consistent with TRIPS.423 The Panel held that Article 27(1) prohibits 
discrimination as to the enjoyment of “patent rights” without qualifying that term.424 The 
exceptions in Article 30 are explicitly described as “exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred 
by a patent” and contain no indication that any exemption from non-discrimination rules is 
intended.425 A discriminatory exception that takes away the enjoyment of a patent right is 
discrimination.426  
 
The Panel held that the ‘acknowledged fact that the Article 31 exception for compulsory 
licences and government use is understood to be subject to the non-discrimination rule of 
Article 27(1) of TRIPS’, without the need for any textual provision so providing, further 
strengthens the case for treating the non-discrimination rules as applicable to Article 30.427 The 
Panel added that limiting an exception to a particular field of technology does not make it 
acceptable under the condition of the “limited exception” imposed by Article 30. They argued 
that: 
It is not true that being able to discriminate against particular patents will make it 
possible to meet Article 30’s requirement that the exception be “limited”. An Article 
30 exception cannot be made “limited” by limiting it to one field of technology, 
because the effects of each exception must be found to be “limited” when measured 
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421 ibid. para. 4.8. 
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against each affected patent. Beyond that, it is not true that Article 27(1) of TRIPS 
requires all Article 30 exceptions to be applied to all products.428  
 
Remarkably, after the Panel had held that Article 30 exceptions are subject to Article 27(1) of 
TRIPS, it did not find a violation of Article 27(1) of TRIPS, since the challenged provision of 
the Canadian law (Section 55.2(1)) was not limited to pharmaceutical products, but was 
applicable to every product that was subject to marketing approval requirements.429 In sum, the 
Panel found that the regulatory review exception of Section 55.2(1) is a “limited exception” 
within the meaning of Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement.430 
 
Article 30 of TRIPS is an exceptionally important provision and a careful analysis of it may 
help to provide an understanding that Section 84 is consistent with TRIPS, and therefore, 
Ghana has the right to adopt such a model to promote affordable medicines. Article 30 of 
TRIPS allows for limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent.431 It is 
important to note that Article 30 of TRIPS was adopted as a compromise solution during the 
TRIPS negotiations when the negotiators were unable to agree on a list of exceptions to patent 
holder rights that might be recognised by Members.432 In determining whether or not Ghana 
and other WTO Members have the right to grant compulsory licences, the titles of Articles 30 
and 31, and their hierarchical positions over Article 27(1), offer some guidance.  
 
Where Article 27(1) of TRIPS sets out the general ground rule that patent rights shall be 
enjoyable without discrimination as to whether products are imported or locally produced, 
Article 30 of TRIPS follows with the title “Exceptions to Patent Rights Conferred”. Hence, 
Ghana’s discretion to limit the exclusive rights of right holders is significantly strengthened by 
Article 30 of TRIPS, which the country to provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights 
conferred by a patent under Article 27(1) of TRIPS. Importantly, the introductory phrase 
“subject to the provisions of Paragraphs 2 and 3” – which provide for non-mandatory 
                                                 
428 id. 
429 ibid. para. 7.99. 
430 ibid. para. 7.50. 
431 Article 30 of TRIPS reads: 
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, 
provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of 
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taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties. 
432 “Dispute Settlement” (n 349) 20. 
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exceptions to patentability – indicates that, where established by national laws, such exceptions 
override the general rules contained in Paragraph 1 of Article 27 of TRIPS.  
 
Additionally, Article 31 of TRIPS bears the title “Other Use Without Authorization of the 
Patent Right Holder”. Notably, the meaning of “other use” is defined in footnote number 7 to 
the TRIPS Agreement as “use other than that allowed under Article 30”. This indicates that the 
two Articles are simultaneous and self-governing, and not subordinated to the interpretation of 
Article 27(1) of TRIPS. More importantly, the Appellate Body made it clear in the Japan - 
Alcoholic Beverages case that: ‘due effect must be given to the distinction between different 
words and expressions therein’.433 Reading these provisions together, Article 30 of TRIPS sets 
out a first tier of “exceptions” related to the “patent rights” referred to in Article 27(1) of 
TRIPS, while Article 31 of TRIPS sets out a second tier of exceptions that are more liberally 
called “other use”. Something that is “other” may be a little different from the main rule 
granting patent rights.434  
 
Accordingly, it is argued that both Articles 30 and 31 of TRIPS express principles other than 
the usual principles contained in Article 27(1) of TRIPS. In the Canada - Patent Products case, 
Canada contended that in order to preclude discrimination, the non-discrimination norm found 
in Article 27(1) of TRIPS was made applicable to the limited exception under specified 
conditions.435 Pointedly, in their report, the Panel agreed with this contention and rejected the 
claim that the limited exception that Canada sought to impose in Section 55(2)(1) raised any 
plausible claim of a discriminatory purpose in the context of Article 27(1) of TRIPS.436 The 
Panel subsequently concluded that: ‘To be sure, such evidence makes it clear that the primary 
reason for passing the measure was its effect on promoting competition in the pharmaceutical 
sector’.437 With this conclusion in mind, it is submitted that nothing in the light of TRIPS 
would, in fact, preclude the possibility of Ghana from adopting and implementing any local 
working requirements that follow the Indian model in Section 84 if such a measure is intended 
to promote affordable medicines. 
 
                                                 
433 “Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages” (n 246) 12-13. 
434 Champ and Attaran (n 58) 386. 
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More significantly, the Panel primarily analysed whether “legitimate interests” is a wider 
concept than “legal interests”, and concluded in the affirmative.438 The report that deals most 
extensively with the scope of Article 30 of TRIPS confirms that the public health interest shall 
not be disregarded.439 Although this dispute occurred between two industrialised countries, 
such public interest considerations must also be given emphasis in the context of TRIPS 
implementation in developing countries.440 This conclusion underpins the fact that Articles 30 
and 31 of TRIPS were not framed in similar terms to Article 27(1). Rather, they were crafted 
to address a unique situation, such as public health issues, which was made applicable, or to 
accommodate compulsory licences under specified conditions.  
 
With this understanding, it is argued that the Panel imagined that there were circumstances in 
which exceptions to patent rights would be justified, distinct from the so-called non-
discrimination provision contemplated by Article 27(1) of TRIPS. Therefore, with specific 
regard to limitations of protection, as set out in Articles 30 and 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
the non-discrimination principle does not apply at all, as TRIPS does not subject these 
provisions to Article 27(1) of the Agreement. Thus, when designing exceptions and 
compulsory licences, Ghana and other WTO Members remain free to discriminate with regard 
to the field of technology, provided that such action is reasonable in the light of other public 
policy goals.441 This viewpoint makes Section 84, which allows the granting of a compulsory 
licence provided that the patented invention has not been worked in the territory of India, 
consistent with TRIPS. 
 
4.6. Consistency of Local Working with TRIPS: The United States v Brazil Dispute 
 
Prior to the inception of the TRIPS Agreement into the international trading system, the 
Brazilian Industrial Property Code442 excluded patents for pharmaceutical products.443 Upon 
joining the WTO, Brazil had to amend its domestic patent regime to make it consistent with 
the TRIPS Agreement.444 Since this amendment, Brazil’s law requires patent holders to 
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manufacture their inventions within four years of grant, or else the patented products shall be 
subject to a compulsory licence or others can subject the products to parallel importing.445 This 
includes failure to work the patented subject matter in Brazil, failure to manufacture or 
incomplete manufacture of the product, and failure to fully use a patented process locally.446  
 
In 1996, the Brazilian government began a national health intervention policy to contain the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic.447 This initiative was highly successful, with the distribution of free 
antiretroviral medicines in its public health system.448 As the costs of this programme grew, 
the government expanded its health budget and increased its production and imports of generic 
medicines. Next, for those medicines that were patented in Brazil, the government attempted 
to negotiate a deal with the patent holders to obtain the medicines at a price that would allow 
it to provide them to its citizens for free.449 When Brazil and the patent holder could not reach 
an acceptable deal, Brazil would take a hard-line approach and threaten to issue a compulsory 
licence unless the medicines in question were considerably discounted.  
 
Furthermore, in 2001, Brazil considered issuing compulsory licences for Nelfinavir and 
Efavirenz, which belonged to Merck,450 after starting the local working of patented medicines, 
which decreased its reliance on importation; this also resulted in the lowering of import costs 
by as much as 83 per cent of the original price.451 Brazil relied on its legislation that had come 
into force in 1997 establishing that, to enjoy exclusive patent rights in the country, the holder 
of a patent on an invention must satisfy a local working requirement. In other words, the patent 
holder must work the patent in Brazil to enjoy full patent protection. If it fails to do this, the 
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law says it shall be subject to the possibility of the government issuing a compulsory licence, 
allowing someone else to use the invention and pay a royalty fee to the patent holder.452 
 
Brazil used the argument that manufacturing generic copies of essential HIV/AIDS medicines 
fell within the spirit of TRIPS, specifically the “national emergency exemption”, which allows 
the government to override patents in urgent health circumstances.453 In response to Brazil’s 
actions, the US, on 30 May 2000, requested consultations with Brazil in respect of the Article 
68 provision.454 The US asserted that the local working requirement can be satisfied by the 
importation of the patented subject-matter – and not local production per se. The US further 
noted that the Brazilian law that explicitly defines “failure to work” as “failure to manufacture 
or incomplete manufacture of the product” or “failure to make full use of the patented process” 
is inconsistent with Brazil’s obligations under Articles 27 and 28 of the TRIPS Agreement, and 
Article III of the GATT 1994.455  
 
On 5 July 2001, the parties announced a mutually satisfactory solution on the matter by issuing 
a joint statement, announcing that the US would withdraw its request to the WTO Panel against 
Brazil.456 This intervention deprived us of the true interpretation of the consistency of local 
working with TRIPS.457 As a matter of law, the withdrawal of this case by the US is an 
important result that can be read as confirming the consistency of local working with TRIPS,458 
and therefore, Ghana has the right to adopt and implement any local working requirements that 
follow the Indian model in Section 84. 
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Firstly, concern about the availability of treatments, as fears of an anthrax epidemic loomed, 
the US Department of Health and Human Services decided to stockpile ciprofloxacin.459 Faced 
with the possibility of compulsory licensing of its Cipro, Bayer agreed to lower the price of 
Ciprofloxacin,460 to avoid the possible grant of a compulsory licence. Secondly, it is significant 
that the US has initiated more WTO DSU complaints than any other member state,461 and the 
way it backed down on this occasion reveals that the country had no case to prove against 
Brazil over the consistency of its local working requirements pursuant to TRIPS.  
 
While some scholars have concluded that the US dropped its complaint because of the negative 
publicity, it appears, on the contrary, that it was in fact a matter of legality,462 or because the 
burden of proof was too heavy.463 Significantly, the arbitrators in the EC – Hormones case 
noted that: 
WTO Members, as sovereign entities, can be presumed to act in conformity with 
their WTO obligations. A Party claiming that a Member has acted inconsistently 
with WTO rules bears the burden of proving that inconsistency.464 
 
4.7. The Approach to Interpreting the Consistency of Local Working with Article 27(1) 
of TRIPS 
 
The TRIPS Agreement, with its principle of non-discrimination, is seen as repudiating local 
working requirements, while the Paris Convention, seen as providing members with the right 
to require local production, is lauded by developing countries seeking to enhance their 
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industrial development.465 To date, attempts to reconcile local working requirements and the 
TRIPS Agreement have resulted in various proposals, for instance to eliminate the references 
to importation and local production in Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement,466 or to 
strengthen local working requirements in national patent laws.467  
 
As emerged above, a major issue in the case brought by the US against Brazil is whether Article 
27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement was intended to prohibit WTO Members from adopting and 
implementing local working requirements, and effectively supersede Article 5(A) of the Paris 
Convention. 468 It is useful, therefore, to provide the correct interpretation as to the consistency 
of local working with TRIPS. In fact, there are legal principles, historical legislative guidance 
and WTO jurisprudence relating to the TRIPS Agreement and the Paris Convention with regard 
to how to reconcile these provisions.  
 
From the beginning of the international negotiations on industrial property protection, working 
requirements were a hotly debated topic, and the international negotiations turned to the 
appropriate remedy or sanction for the non-working of a patent.469 When the Paris Convention 
was signed in 1883, it stipulated in part that the patentee was to remain bound to work his 
patent in conformity with the laws of the country into which he introduced the patented 
objects.470 As for importation, the Paris Convention prohibited forfeiture as the sanction, as 
long as the invention was manufactured in a country of the Paris Union.471  
 
However, the Convention did not address the question of whether importation satisfied local 
working requirements.472 The recognition in the Paris Convention of the existence of local 
working requirements was not without its opponents; even before the Convention was signed 
in 1883, some Members opposed the provision.473 A few Members wanted to broaden the 
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territorial scope of the working that was required. At the Rome Conference in 1886, Belgium 
and Italy proposed that Members of the Paris Union should accept any working requirements 
that the domestic laws of any Member imposed.474  
 
Moreover, during the Madrid Conference in 1890, the US again pursued the proposal.475 Other 
countries advanced their own ideas for reforming the Paris Convention with regard to working 
requirements. For example, France, which at the time did not permit its working requirement 
to be satisfied by importation, proposed that the Convention be amended to allow Members to 
forbid importation.476 Furthermore, Sweden and Norway proposed that compulsory licensing 
be introduced as the remedy for non-working.477 Ultimately, in the Final Protocol to the 1900 
Brussels Revision of the Paris Convention, the Union agreed that a forfeiture for non-working 
could not occur before three years from the filing of a patent application and could occur only 
if a patent owner could not justify the non-working.478  
 
While some Members seemed at that time to be diminishing the application of their working 
requirements, the United Kingdom, for example, tightened its working requirement by 
allowing the revocation of a patent for non-working not only if the ‘patent was not being 
worked in the United Kingdom’,479 but also ‘if the patent was worked . . . exclusively or mainly, 
outside the United Kingdom.480 During the Washington Conference, Germany and the US both 
contended in support of eliminating working requirements;481 however, the idea of a complete 
abolition of the requirement did not enjoy sufficient support among the other Members.482 
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During the Hague Conference in 1925, only three members opposed the abolition of the 
working requirement.483 The resulting Convention text acknowledged Members’ rights to take 
necessary legislative measures to prevent abuses of patent rights, with “failure to work” being 
listed as the only example of such abuses.484 The text also expressed a preference for 
compulsory licensing as opposed to forfeiture, as long as a compulsory licence would suffice 
to prevent abuses of patent rights,485 and the text maintained in the Convention the three-year 
period and justification through legitimate excuse.486 
 
In addition, the Lisbon Conference in 1958 set the period after which a compulsory licence 
may be requested as up to four years from the filing of the patent application or three years 
from the date of the grant of the patent, whichever period expires last.487 The 1958 text also 
specified that the compulsory licence would be non-exclusive and non-transferrable.488 The 
1958 language concerning the local working requirements remains the current language of the 
Convention.  
 
The Stockholm Conference in 1967 extended the applicability of the provisions concerning 
working requirements to utility models but other than this extension introduced no changes to 
the provisions concerning working requirements.489 An early commentary on the Paris 
Convention, as revised at Stockholm in 1967, states that “working” implies local working: 
Normally, working a patent will be understood to mean working it 
industrially, namely by manufacture of the patented product, or industrial 
application of a patented process. Thus, importation of the patented article, or 
of the article manufactured by a patented process, will not normally be 
regarded as working the patent.490 
 
Further to this, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, developing countries pursued a proposal to 
amend the provisions of the Convention with regard to working requirements; the proposal 
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would have allowed stricter local working requirements.491 Their proposal included a provision 
according to which importation would not satisfy the working requirement,492 and a provision 
allowing sanctions other than compulsory licences to be imposed for non-working.493 The 
proposal would also have allowed developing countries to shorten the period for revoking a 
patent for non-working494 and to issue exclusive compulsory licences.495 The parties to the 
Convention opposed the proposal,496 and the disagreement over the proposal was one of the 
reasons why this proposed revision of the Convention was not adopted.497  
 
In relation to this, the US made unsuccessful attempts to eliminate the possibility of a Member 
being able to issue compulsory exclusive licences for failure to work patents from 1979 to 
1985.498 For example, while during the Conference to Revise the Paris Convention in 1984 
developing countries aimed at lowering the international minimum standards of patent 
protection with controversial proposals to strengthen the capacity of Members to impose non-
voluntary licences generally, and even to restrict the ability of affected patentees to remain in 
the market with the designated licensees, the US however was resolved to elevate these same 
standards.499 Such licences, in the US view, would be a totally unacceptable expropriation of 
private property and counterproductive to the legitimate desires of developing countries to 
upgrade their technological capability.500  
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Nevertheless, negotiations broke down, with the entrenched views of developing countries 
blocking any revision, which led to the collapse of the Paris Revision Conference. Instead, the 
Paris Convention remains in its last revised form following the Stockholm amendment of 1967. 
The frustrations endured by the US were instrumental in the decision to remove efforts to 
reform international industrial property regime from the exclusive jurisdiction of WIPO and to 
bring them within the legislative and judicial jurisdiction of the GATT and its successor 
institution, the WTO.501 The foregoing legislative developments show that there have been 
some disagreements in regard to the consistency of local working requirements in international 
law. 
 
4.8. Implementation of Local Working by WTO Members’ and the Negotiation History 
of TRIPS 
 
When the Uruguay Round and TRIPS negotiations began in 1986,502 there was a wide variation 
among Members regarding the nature and scope of patent protection given that the Paris 
Convention established a potentially international mechanism for allowing patents to be 
obtained, and prescribed the basic requirements for registration systems, including the rule of 
national treatment for patent applicants.503 Predominantly, the Paris Convention did not 
prescribe substantive rules for many aspects of patents, such as the scope of protection of the 
subject matter, the criterion for entitlement to protection, or the duration of protection.504  
 
The inadequacies of the foregoing substantive rules in the Paris Convention are not the only 
reason for the diverging perspectives in the literature concerning the continuing legislative 
discretion of WTO Members’ right to impose local working requirements. As emerged from 
the above analysis, the Members’ position differed strongly in regard to the position of local 
working with the international patent regime even before the negotiation of the TRIPS 
Agreement began. However, despite the Members’ differences, it is important to note that the 
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controversy of whether the granting of compulsory licensing to address failure to work is 
inconsistent with international patent law intensified after the inception of the TRIPS 
Agreement.505  
 
Perhaps, the conclusion that local working continues to be permitted by the TRIPS Agreement 
can be confirmed by an examination of the negotiation history of the TRIPS Agreement and 
the travaux preparatoires of the Agreement.506 Primarily, three major opinions were advanced 
in the negotiations with respect to local working. Developing countries wanted local working 
to be a mandatory obligation of any patentee.507 That is, the requirement to work locally was 
not viewed as an exception to patent rights, but rather as an essential condition for their 
conferral.508 The US was almost alone at the other end of the spectrum, in seeking to bar any 
possible obligation or remedy there might be for a patentee’s failure to work locally.509  
 
The EC staked out the middle ground, proposing that local working requirements should be a 
permissible exception to patent rights but not a patentee obligation.510 Significantly, the 
negotiation process was entangled around these opposing views. These respective positions 
were maintained throughout the negotiations, with developing countries and the US sticking to 
their preferred local working rules, and subsequent consensus drafts suggesting that the EC’s 
position would prevail.511 In fact, while differences existed, some agreements were reached 
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and well-documented or written down.512 First, the Brussels Draft included a provision that 
‘Patents shall be available without discrimination as to where the inventions were made’.513 
Thus, the Brussels Draft did include a non-discrimination clause with respect to patented 
inventions.  
 
However, this clause covered only part of the final provision under Article 27(1) of TRIPS. 
The Draft referred only to non-discrimination as to the place of invention but did not expressly 
prohibit discrimination as to the field of technology and as to the place where the protected 
product is produced. The latter should be distinguished from the place of invention, which may 
not be the same as the place of production.514 Notably, the Anell Draft precluded the granting 
of a compulsory licence where the right holder could justify a lack or insufficiency of local 
working by legal, technical or commercial reasons. The grant of a compulsory licence would 
only have been possible to supply the local market.515  
 
Likewise, the Brussels Draft would have prohibited the granting of compulsory licences where 
importation was adequate to supply the local market and where the right holder had a legal, 
technical or economic justification for non-use of the patented invention.516 Neither the Annell 
nor the Brussels Drafts provision was ultimately included in the final TRIPS Agreement;517 
thus, WTO Members generally disagree on the issue of working requirements with some even 
favouring their prohibition.518 None of this shows that the parties will exclude compulsory 
licensing for failure to work.519 If it really were the parties’ intention after such a protracted 
debate to eliminate local working, one would at least expect to find that remarkable consensus 
reflected in clear, unambiguous treaty language, such as the US submitted. But this is not the 
case.520  
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As evidenced in the minutes of the negotiations up to December 1991, nothing indicated that 
the parties were entertaining the complete prohibition of local working requirements.521 
Developing countries continued to emphasise in negotiating group meetings from October 
through to early December 1991 that local working, which could not be eluded by importation, 
was an issue of fundamental importance for achieving a final agreement,522 except remarkably, 
for the final draft, which was not negotiated but instead determined by the GATT Secretariat.523 
Given that the GATT Secretariat determined the final draft, which fell outside the negotiated 
or agreed draft, the actual intentions of the parties at the conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement 
are difficult to appreciate.524  
 
Thus, the wording in the final TRIPS Agreement does not indicate anything about the 
negotiators’ intentions, at least certainly not in the way that a genuine consensus would have 
done.525 Importantly, the consequences for a lack or insufficiency of local working, which were 
included in the Anell526 and Brussels Drafts to the TRIPS Agreement,527 were excluded from 
the final TRIPS Agreement, and the bottom line is that some countries favoured a direct 
prohibition of local working requirements, but the TRIPS Agreement did not incorporate a 
direct prohibition. Instead, it stipulated that patent rights shall be enjoyable without 
“discrimination” as to whether goods are locally produced or imported.528  
 
Therefore, despite the insertion of the so-called “without-discrimination” clause into the TRIPS 
Agreement under Article 27(1), still, the relevant patent laws of some WTO Members 
explicitly provide for the local working requirements where importation cannot serve as a 
means of satisfying an obligation to work patent locally.529 This suggests that the outcome of 
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the lengthy negotiations, and the inclusion into the TRIPS Agreement of the without-
discrimination principle under Article 27(1) did not render local working inconsistent with the 
agreement. This argument gains strength when Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention, which 
allows for the imposition of local working, is boldly incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement 
under Article 2.  
 
Importantly, apart from abuse of patent rights in general and failure to work, which is only 
mentioned by way of example, the Paris Convention does not mention other grounds for the 
granting of compulsory licences. The TRIPS Agreement deals with compulsory licensing under 
Article 31, where the practice is referred to as “use without authorisation of the right holder” 
but left open in regard to the grounds on which Members may pursue the granting of 
compulsory licences, including non-work.  
 
The TRIPS Agreement only conditions the granting of compulsory licences subject to other 
procedural requirements and does not prevent Members completely from invoking any grounds 
which are within the laws of that Member.530 Importantly, India has invoked Section 84, which 
allows the granting of a compulsory licence provided that the patented invention has not been 
worked in the territory of India, in granting a compulsory licence to Natco, and this legal 
measure has not been challenged as to its inconsistency with the so-called “without 
discrimination” norm under Article 27(1) of TRIPS.531 
 
4.9. Section 84 Model: Compatibility of Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention with Article 
27(1) of TRIPS  
 
Notably, any interpretation of the non-discriminatory obligation as meaning that TRIPS would 
completely prohibit Ghana from the implementation of Section 84 or imposition of local 
working would be quite contentious, particularly, when it is not explicitly clear from TRIPS 
that WTO Members intended that Article 27(1) would supplant Article 5(A) of the Paris 
Convention, which allows for the right to grant compulsory licences for failure to work. Thus, 
there is sufficient flexibility for Ghana to implement the Section 84 model to promote 
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affordable medicines. This argument gains strength, as the right of Ghana to implement the 
Section 84 model or WTO Members to impose local working requirements may be justified on 
policy grounds, and this would not amount to discrimination in terms of Article 27(1) of TRIPS 
given that Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention is incorporated into TRIPS under Article 2.532  
 
Put differently, the question of whether India has the right to exercise its discretion to impose 
local working requirements as provided under Section 84 in treating a failure to work locally 
as an abuse of the exclusive rights relative to the TRIPS Agreement depends to a certain extent 
on how Article 27(1) of TRIPS is interpreted. Article 27(1) of TRIPS must not be read alone, 
as there is room for reconciliation in reading Section 84 and Article 5(A) of the Paris 
Convention. Remarkably, the non-discrimination clause provides for a principle that is not 
stated, as such, in national laws, but that should be respected while establishing the rights and 
obligations of patent owners.  
 
In other words, neither the Paris Convention nor national laws contain a provision comparable 
to Article 27(1) of TRIPS. Hence, whether the non-discrimination provision in Article 27(1) of 
TRIPS would suffice to repeal the pre-existing right of Ghana and other WTO Members to 
continue to treat local non-working as an abuse, as some contend,533 or whether this right 
survives as an option that for example, Ghana and other WTO Members retain within the 
framework of their laws and regulations, as others contend,534 remains an open question. 
 
Despite the inconsistent interface between Article 27(1) of TRIPS and Article 5A of the Paris 
Convention, the former being more recent than the latter, it cannot simply be given an 
automatic predominance. This is because there is no obvious evidence from the text of TRIPS 
that Article 27(1) was intended to prohibit working requirements and supersede Article 5(A) 
of the Paris Convention. Therefore, this rule is not absolute because local working requirements 
have been a common feature in patent laws of developed and developing countries in 
                                                 
532 For arguments that working requirements are in compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, see Halewood (n 18) 
282. Champ and Attaran (n 58) 393. 
533 Joseph Straus, Implications of the TRIPS Agreement in the Field of Patent Law. In: FROM GATT TO TRIPS: 
THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, 
Friedrich-Karl Beier and Gerhard Schricker (eds.) (Weinheim, 1996) 100 et seq. Jayashree Watal, Intellectual 
Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries (Alphen, aan den Regin, Kluwer Law International, 2002) 
318. 
534 Correa and Yusuf (n 507) 203. 
 102 
conformity with Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention, and working was only satisfied by local 
production (not by importation).535 
 
Article 5(A)(1) of the Paris Convention provides that ‘Importation by the patentee into the 
country where the patent has been granted of articles manufactured in any of the countries of 
the Union shall not entail forfeiture of the patent’. This provision appears to have a similar 
drafting structure to Article 27(1) of TRIPS, suggesting that patented products can be imported. 
Therefore, if one misreads this as meaning that the essence of compulsory licensing is that it is 
an instrument for forfeiture as opposed to limiting the patent right conferred then reading 
Article 5(A)(1) of the Paris Convention and Article 27(1) of TRIPS may lead to a conflicting 
conclusion, i.e. that Section 84 can be held to be inconsistent with TRIPS.536  
 
However, this is not the correct legal interpretation. In fact, Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris 
Convention, which allows Ghana and other WTO Members the right to grant compulsory 
licences to prevent abuses, for example failure to work, is relevant. This provision suggests 
that the patentee shall remain under the obligation to exploit his patent in accordance with the 
laws of Ghana and other WTO Members in which he introduces the patent.537 Importantly, 
since the interpretation of the requirement for “working” can vary from case to case, mere 
importation into Ghana can only imply that the manufacturer’s patent cannot be revoked; 
however, a compulsory licence can still be granted for failure to work without amounting to 
discrimination.538  
 
This viewpoint suggests that the compulsory licensing regime under Article 5(A) of the Paris 
Convention is compatible with Article 31 of TRIPS in relation to Article 27(1) of TRIPS. The 
starting point with regard to envisioning the compatibility of Article 5(A) of the Paris 
Convention with Article 27(1) pursuant to Article 31 of TRIPS is to understand that Article 
27(1) only imposes a general obligation on Ghana and other WTO Members to make patents 
available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the 
field of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced. This provision does 
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not attempt to define the context in which for example, Ghana and other WTO Members must 
give effect to such an obligation, and this is left for their legislations to determine.  
 
Therefore, Article 27(1) of TRIPS suffers from lack of clarity as to the scope of the general 
obligation imposed on Ghana and other WTO Members to make patents available and patent 
rights enjoyable without discrimination. In contrast, Section 84 and Article 5(A) of the Paris 
Convention provide a more specific right to impose compulsory licences when the patentee has 
failed to work in India. Consequently, judging by the fact that Article 27(1) of TRIPS lacks 
clarity, it is not logical to rely on an unclear provision to determine the consistency of Section 
84, which allows for the granting of a compulsory licence provided that the patented invention 
has not been worked in the territory of India in line with TRIPS.  
 
The standard maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali would help us establish the 
compatibility of Section 84 and Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention with Article 27(1) of 
TRIPS in relation to Article 31 of TRIPS, and hence make Section 83 a suitable model for 
Ghana. The rationale for this principle is that a specific rule has priority over a general rule.539 
This principle is justified by the fact that such a specific rule or provision, being more concrete, 
often takes better account of the particular features of the context in which it is to be applied 
than any applicable general rule.  
 
Using this standard doctrine to establish the compatibility of Articles 5(A) of the Paris 
Convention, and 27(1) and 31 of TRIPS will create a more equitable result or interpretation, 
which will better reflect the intent of the issue - whether or not Section 84 is consistent with 
TRIPS, and hence, its adoption by Ghana. According to the International Law Commission, 
also adopted by the WTO Appellate Body as a principle of treaty interpretation, ‘When a treaty 
is open to two interpretations one of which does and the other does not enable the treaty to have 
appropriate effects, good faith and the objects and purposes of the treaty demand that the former 
interpretation should be adopted’.540  
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It is significant that pursuant to WTO law, the Section 84 provision ordinarily arises with regard 
to the construction of an earlier-enacted specific provision (Article 5(A) of the Paris 
Convention) when a more general provision was later passed (Article 27(1) of TRIPS). The 
sequential overlap seems to occur because the obligation not to discriminate with regard to 
whether patented products are imported or locally produced in TRIPS is a general obligation 
that applies continuously to regulate conduct, while the rights granted under the Paris 
Convention by virtue of Article 5(A) are individual in that they are invoked in the specific 
circumstance of failure to work.  
 
The incorporation of most of the substantive parts of the Paris Convention into the TRIPS 
Agreement suggests that the two treaties are distinct Agreements. Therefore, when faced with 
a situation in which there is likely to be a conflict between the Ghana’s obligation under Article 
27(1) of TRIPS, and its rights to use Article 31 of TRIPS in relation to the inclusive reference 
of the Paris Convention as incorporated into TRIPS by Article 2(2), it seems logical to frame 
the discussion within the scope of the specific provision addressing the issue rather than the 
general one.  
 
The general principles on treaty interpretation under the VCLT are very clear on this.541 It has 
been suggested that whenever two or more norms deal with the same subject matter, priority 
should be given to the norm that is more specific.542 In so doing, it is argued that the standard 
not to discriminate regarding the protection of patent rights, whether the product is locally 
produced or imported, set out in Article 27(1) of TRIPS, is a general obligation and that 
compulsory licensing under Section 84, Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention and Article 31 of 
TRIPS are specific principles.  
 
In this instance, Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention provision, as reflected in Article 31 of 
the TRIPS Agreement, provides the specific legal interpretation that would allow Ghana to 
adopt and implement any local working requirements that follow the Indian model in Section 
84 with sufficient flexibility. Thus, the legitimacy of Section 84, which allows for the granting 
of a compulsory licence provided that the patented invention has not been worked in the 
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542 See “Fragmentation of International Law” (n 258) para. 1(5). 
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territory of India, is enhanced by the fact that Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention, which is 
also a substantial part of TRIPS, uses words such as “failure to work”.  
 
The weight of the foregoing interpretive guidance appears to favour the conclusion that if a 
requirement to work patents in India can be justified under the specific provision of Article 31 
of TRIPS under its patent regime, such as Section 84, then a more moderate claim would be 
that Article 31 of TRIPS, as a specific standard, will supersede the general provision of Article 
27(1) of TRIPS,543 and the same will allow Ghana to implement the Section 84 model to 
promote affordable medicines as India did. 
 
More specifically, if the WTO Members truly intended to limit their own discretion regarding 
the grounds on which compulsory licences were to be granted, this would have been stated 
clearly in the relevant part of the TRIPS Agreement, such as in the case of semi-conductor 
technology, stipulated in Article 31(c).544 It should be noted that there is no comparable non-
discrimination clause in other sections of TRIPS, and in hindsight the obligation under Article 
27(1) is limited only to discrimination based on the three elements indicated in the provision, 
that is, place of the invention, field of technology, and whether products are imported or locally 
produced.545  
 
In fact, pursuant to TRIPS, discriminations based on other factors are not completely 
prohibited.546 Significantly, the Paris Convention does not oblige Ghana and other WTO 
Members to prohibit, in their domestic legislation, the discrimination of patents as to the place 
of invention, the field of technology or whether products are imported or locally produced. As 
long as these sorts of discrimination are applied to both nationals and foreigners, the general 
principle of national treatment is respected.547 Here, the TRIPS Agreement goes a step further 
than the standard set by the Paris Convention; that is, not only must Ghana and other WTO 
                                                 
543 Gervais (n 284) 167. Doane (n 357) 479. 
544 For example, Article 21 of TRIPS prohibits the grant of compulsory licensing for trademarks and this is clearly 
stated in the agreement. ‘….it being understood that the compulsory licensing of trademarks shall not be 
permitted….’. 
545 “Resource Book on TRIPS” (n 16) 368. 
546 For example, under Article 3 of TRIPS, protection must be offered on a national treatment basis, and Article 4 
of TRIPS requires that member states provide protection on a most favoured nation basis. Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss 
(n 351) 448. 
547 id. 
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Members ensure equal treatment of nationals and foreigners, but they must also comply with 
certain minimum standards prohibiting, in general, the abovementioned discriminations.548 
 
The diverging perspectives in the literature on this point are partly due to the fact that the 
definition of the relevant key terms, “failure to work” and “insufficient working”, in the Paris 
Convention is left to Ghana and other WTO Members. Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention, 
which allows Ghana and other WTO Members to prevent abuses resulting from the exclusive 
rights conferred by a patent, does not define those “abuses” beyond “failure to work”, which 
some do not consider abusive.549 Importantly, apart from the abuse of patent rights in general 
and failure to work, which is only mentioned by way of example, the Paris Convention does 
not mention other grounds for the granting of compulsory licences.  
 
The TRIPS Agreement incorporates the Article 5(A) provision and supplements it with 
conditions to be satisfied subject to procedural rules under Article 31. However, TRIPS left 
open in regard to the grounds on which Ghana and other WTO Members may pursue the 
granting of compulsory licences, including non-work. The Agreement does not prevent Ghana 
and other WTO Members completely from invoking any grounds which are within the laws of 
that Member.550  
 
Remarkably, Article 2(1) of TRIPS obligates compliance with local working under Article 
5(A) of the Paris Convention, while Article 2(2) of TRIPS precludes derogation from the 
existing obligations under that agreement,551 and this makes local working consistent with 
TRIPS. Importantly, India has invoked Section 84, which allows the Controller to grant a 
compulsory licence provided that the patented invention has not been worked in the territory 
of India, in granting a compulsory licence to Natco, and this decision has not been challenged 
as to its inconsistency with non-discrimination under Article 27(1) of TRIPS.552 This provides 
Ghana with potentially a sufficient flexibility to adopt and implement the Section 84 model as 
India did, and the same will be consistent with TRIPS. 
 
                                                 
548 “Resource Book on TRIPS” (n 16) 373. 
549 Michael Pflüger, Article 5 Paris Convention. In: CONCISE INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN IP LAW: 
TRIPS, PARIS CONVENTION, EUROPEAN ENFORCEMENT AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY, 
Thomas Cottier and Pierre Veron (eds.), (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2008) 231. 
550 Article 31 of TRIPS. 
551 “Dispute Settlement” (n 349) 19, para. 2.6.1. 
552 Ho (n 29) 416. 
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4.10. Conclusion 
 
As emerged from the above discussions, there is sufficient flexibility for Ghana to adopt and 
implement the Section 84 model, which is consistent with TRIPS to promote affordable 
medicine. In fact, the debate arising from the negotiated language of Article 27(1) of TRIPS is 
the purported implications of its broad non-discrimination clause,553 as the Agreement sets out 
minimum standards and requirements for the protection of patents.554 Specifically, Article 
27(1) of TRIPS imposes an obligation on Ghana and other WTO Members to treat patented 
inventions in all fields of technology on a non-discriminatory basis.555 That is, Article 27(1) of 
TRIPS provision would not allow Ghana to discriminate between products that are imported 
and those that are locally produced.556  
 
A corollary to this argument is that Article 27(1) of TRIPS allows for working, not local 
working, and importation therefore satisfies this requirement.557 The non-discrimination 
principle therefore lies at the centre of the debate regarding the continued legitimacy of the 
working requirements under TRIPS. Consequently, the patent laws of Ghana and other WTO 
Members must meet the standards and requirements in relation to Article 27 of TRIPS, and any 
restriction or permission regarding the unauthorised use of patent rights, as found in the 
relevant patent regime of India such as, Section 84 will be held as inconsistent with the 
requirements of TRIPS.558  
 
Therefore, where local working requirements exist such as, Section 84, any provision that 
sought to limit the granting and enjoyment of patent rights to inventions made within another 
WTO Member State would clearly be contrary to the principle of non-discrimination under 
Article 27(1). One argument that is consistent with the foregoing viewpoint posits that local 
working includes the possibility of being satisfied by importation alone, and therefore, TRIPS 
                                                 
553 Champ and Attaran (n 58) 368. 
554 Reichman (n 66) 347-348, stating that the perhaps the most important basic principle that applies virtually 
across board is that of national treatment of (that is, non-discrimination against) foreign right holders. 
555 Cottier, et al (n 66) 438. 
556 Carvalho (n 106) 285. 
557 Bernard Hoekman, Trade Laws and Institutions: Good Practices and the World Trade Organisation 
(Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1995) 52. Taubman (n 59) 104. Katharina Gamharter, Access to Affordable 
Medicines: Developing Responses under the TRIPS Agreement and EC Law (Vienna, Springer-Verlag, 2004) 27-
28. 
558 Reichman (n 66) 351. 
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prohibits Ghana and other WTO Members from the invocation of compulsory licences or 
something that has the same practical end as a remedy for non-working.559 
 
Notwithstanding the argument that TRIPS incorporated the non-discrimination principle under 
Article 27(1) of TRIPS, and therefore this provision would prohibit for example, Ghana 
completely from the imposition of local working, notably, many WTO Members today 
maintain a patent working requirement in some form in their national patent regimes that is 
consistent with the TRIPS Agreement.560 Importantly, Article 5A of the Paris Convention has 
been incorporated bodily into Article 2 of TRIPS, which allows Ghana and other WTO 
Members to grant compulsory licences on the grounds of failure to work subject to satisfaction 
of Article 5(A)(4) and Article 31 of TRIPS in relation to the procedural requirements 
applicable.  
 
More significantly, India invoked Section 84, which allows the Controller to grant a 
compulsory licence provided that the patented invention has not been worked in the territory 
of India, in granting a compulsory licence to Natco, and this legal measure has not been 
challenged as to its inconsistency with the non-discrimination provision under Article 27(1) of 
TRIPS. Therefore, in terms of reconciling local working requirements and the principle of non-
discrimination, local working in Ghana that would potentially sanction failure by a patentee to 
work a patented invention would not constitute discrimination within the terms of Article 27(1) 
of TRIPS.  
 
Taking the view of the Panel in Canada - Patent Products case, it is concluded that such a local 
working requirement in Ghana can be considered justified differential treatment and there is 
no discrimination where differentiations are justified, i.e. where there are bona fide reasons for 
differentiating, such as, to promote affordable medicines. Therefore, Article 27(1) of TRIPS 
would not prohibit Ghana from adopting and implementing any local working requirements 
that followed the Indian model in Section 84, in as much as all of the conditions and the 
procedural requirements under Article 31 of TRIPS are satisfied. 
                                                 
559 Halewood (n 18) 249. Doane (n 357) 478. 
560 An important exception is Article 68 of the Brazilian patent law, as amended in 1996 which, as noted above, 
was challenged by the USA. Also, the Indonesian patent law, as revised in 2001, provides that the patent holder 
is obliged to make the patented products or use the patented process in Indonesia. He can be exempted from this 
obligation if the making of the product or the use of the process is only suitable to be implemented on a regional 
scale. Article 17 of the Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 13 of Jul. 28, 2016, on Patents. 
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As will be seen in the next chapter, while Article 27(1) of TRIPS would not prohibit Ghana 
from the implementation of Section 84 or imposition of local working requirements, the 
conditions and procedural requirements imposed by Article 31 of TRIPS to be satisfied when 
granting compulsory licensing are complex and burdensome. Moreover, the Doha Paragraph 6 
Programme, which aimed at providing a solution that would have enabled Ghana to grant 
compulsory licences to obtain affordable medicines, has further compounded the restrictions 
imposed by TRIPS; therefore, Section 84 remains a feasible model that can promote affordable 
medicines in Ghana. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Section 84: A Feasible Option for Ghana to Circumvent the Complex Restrictions 
Imposed by Article 31 of TRIPS and the Doha Solution 
 
5.1. Aim of the Chapter 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the procedural complexities Ghana would face in the 
event that it sought to implement the complex substantive conditions under Article 31 of TRIPS 
and the burdensome formal procedural requirements developed by the Doha Paragraph 6 
Programme. The chapter argues that Article 31 and the Doha Paragraph 6 Solution are too 
restrictive and difficult to satisfy, therefore, a Section 84 model remains a feasible option for 
Ghana to use in order to promote affordable medicines. 
 
5.2. Introduction to the Chapter 
 
Ghana has urgent need for essential medicines,561 and while Ghana’s Patents Act, the TRIPS 
Agreement and the Doha Paragraph 6 Programme offer the country sufficient legal basis to 
make effective use compulsory licences to promote affordable medicines,562 this is not the 
case.563 Although, the TRIPS Agreement permits Ghana and other WTO Members to grant of 
compulsory licences, the substantive conditions and key procedural requirements necessary to 
comply with the requirements set out in Article 31 of TRIPS are complicated and unduly 
bureaucratic, and in practice, few WTO Members have actually used the instrument to promote 
affordable medicines.564  
 
In this sense, a WTO Member could grant a compulsory licence only for domestic purposes or 
to a manufacturer locally. This created a precarious situation, because the Members that need 
the essential medicines the most are countries that do not have manufacturing capabilities. 
Accordingly, WTO Members who needed affordable medicines could not use the compulsory 
                                                 
561 Blanca Escribano-Ferrer, Francoise Cluzeau, Derek Cutler, Christiana Akufo and Kalipso Chalkidou, ‘Quality 
of Health Care in Ghana: Mapping of Interventions and the Way Forward’ (2016) 50 Ghana Medical Journal 4, 
238. 
562 Section 13 of Ghana’s Patent Act 2003 allows for the Minister to decide that, even without the consent of the 
owner of the patent, a Government agency or a third person designated by the Minister may exploit the invention.  
563 Evans (n 105) 182-183. See Jillian Clare Cohen, ‘Canada's Initiative to Reform Patent Law for Pharmaceuticals 
to Help the Poor’ (2004) 137 Canadian Pharmaceutical Journal 2, 21–22, citing inadequate know-how and the 
lack of administrative infrastructure. 
564 Evans (n 105) 183. 
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licensing instrument under Article 31 of TRIPS to protect public health.565 Thus, one of the 
practical effects of TRIPS was the increased costs of patented medicines and restrictions on 
obtaining affordable generic versions.566 It was therefore not surprising that the Doha 
Paragraph 6 recognised that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities 
in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory 
licensing under TRIPS Agreement.  
 
In this case, Ghana could face potential difficulties trying to use the comprehensive procedural 
requirements under Article 31 of TRIPS. Therefore, while TRIPS flexibilities exist and are 
unquestionably available to Ghana and other WTO Members the requirements are uncertain in 
application, subject also to unfavourable political pressure, the fear of hostile criticism or even 
retaliatory action from some developed countries, such as, the US and the EU.567 For example, 
the US has openly expressed its discontent when developing country governments have 
brought in measures to prioritise access to affordable medicines in ways that limit the full 
enjoyment of the patent rights of US businesses.568  
 
The US widely criticised actions created legitimate fears that Ghana and other WTO Members 
could be subject to reprisal in the form of sanctions, litigation, and trade restrictions if they 
                                                 
565 Anderson (n 40) 96. 
566 Obijiofor Aginam, John Harrington and Peter Yu (eds.) The Global Governance of HIV/AIDS: Intellectual 
Property and Access to Essential Medicines (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2013) 2, stating that high prices ration 
to life-saving drugs, and these prices are a function of the international intellectual property regime. ibid. 4, 
observing that legal provisions interact with the commercial calculations of drug producers in determining the 
availability of affordable medicines. See Philippe Cullet, ‘Patents and Medicines: The Relationship Between 
TRIPS and Human Right to Health’ (2003) 79 International Health 1, 160. Ellen ‘t Hoen, ‘TRIPS, Pharmaceutical 
Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way From Seattle to Doha’ (2002) 3 Chicago Journal of 
International Law 1, 27. See also Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right 
of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Anand Grover 
(Eleventh session, agenda item 3, Human Rights Council Resolution: A/HRC/11/12, Mar. 31, 2009) 8, para. 19, 
observing that in regard to medicines, a product patent enables a patentee to set high prices. 
567 A Letter Written by EU Commissioner Challenging the Use of Compulsory Licensing (Brussels, 
CAB24/PM/RN/saA(08)694 – D(08)738, Jun. 16, 2008). Available at: <http://test.tacd.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/TACD-IP-2008-Response-from-Comissioner-Mandelson-regarding-compulsory-
licensing.pdf> [Accessed Sept. 16, 2017]. See Evans (n 105) 185, stating that the reality is that while TRIPS 
contains the flexibilities required to allow developing countries to procure medicines, the legislative balance 
between the rights of the patent holder and the right to public health is not capable of being fully realised — at 
least not without developing countries engaging in legal battle and withstanding considerable economic and 
political duress. 
568 The US threatened to respond forcefully in accordance with appropriate trade remedy if South Africa does not 
repeal, suspend, or terminate the amendment of Section 15(c). Available at: 
<http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/stdept-feb51999.html> [Accessed Sept. 13, 2017]. Graham Dutfield, 
‘Delivering Drugs to the Poor: Will the TRIPS Amendment Help?’ (2008) 34 American Journal of Law and 
Medicine 2&3, 115. 
 112 
invoke compulsory licences. For example, as highlighted earlier, in 2000, when Ghana tried to 
import affordable medicines from India, the country was threatened with a legal challenge by 
GSK, and this initiative was eventually abandoned.569 Moreover, as already indicated, due to 
GSK’s intervention, in 2005 Ghana continued to face shortages of Duovir, and the country 
attempted to utilise the compulsory licensing regime under TRIPS to obtain affordable 
medicines for public non-commercial use but later abandoned the initiative.570  
 
In this situation, access to medicines by means of compulsory licensing under Article 31 of 
TRIPS is neither feasible nor sustainable.571 Subsequent work in the TRIPS Council prepared 
the ground for the adoption of two important General Council decisions establishing the 
Paragraph 6 System, which were both adopted in the light of a Chairman’s statement setting 
out several key shared understandings of the Members on how the Paragraph 6 System would 
be interpreted and implemented.572  
 
Nevertheless, the additional flexibilities made available under the Paragraph 6 System were 
optional, not mandatory and to take advantage of them, a number of WTO Members have 
adopted domestic implementing laws or regulations that incorporate the Paragraph 6 System 
into their respective legal frameworks.573 Nevertheless, Ghana is yet to accept the 
amendment.574 Notably, the formal procedural requirements developed under Article 31bis are 
numerous, and many criticise the amendment for imposing too many unnecessary obstacles.575  
                                                 
569 Schoofs (n 5). 
570 “Notification of Emergency and Issuance of Government Use Licence by Ghana” (n 8). 
571 Evans (n 105) 185. 
572 For this purpose, the “Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS” (n 47), waives under 
certain circumstances (i) the obligation on exporting Members to ensure that compulsory licences are only granted 
for the purpose of predominantly supplying the domestic market (Article 31(f)) and (ii) the obligation on 
importing Members to pay adequate remuneration to the right holder if a compulsory licence is granted (Article 
31(h). Given that the waivers contained in the 2003 Decision are of a temporary nature, paragraph 11 of that 
decision called for the TRIPS Council to prepare a permanent amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, based, where 
appropriate, on the 2003 Decision. Agreement on such an amendment was reached on Dec. 6, 2005 when the 
General Council adopted a “Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement” (n 49) in the light of a Chairman’s 
statement along the lines accepted in August 2003 (n 48). 
573 Among the WTO Members with implementing laws or regulations, three categories can be observed, i.e. (i) 
those Members that have implemented the Paragraph 6 System to act exclusively as exporters, (ii) those Members 
that have implemented the Paragraph 6 System to act exclusively as importers, and (iii) those Members that have 
put in place laws or regulations allowing them to act both as exporters or importers under the Paragraph 6 System. 
See Brook Baker, ‘Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines: Analysis of WTO Action Regarding Paragraph 
6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health’ (2004) 14 Indiana International and 
Comparative Law Review 3, 672. 
574 Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement. See the list of WTO Members and dates of acceptance. 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm> [Accessed Feb. 10, 2018]. 
575 Dutfield (n 568) 123. Abbott and Reichman (n 460) 932.  
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Additionally, there is no guidelines or model rules for a legislative and institutional framework 
that could be adopted by Ghana and other WTO Members to use the system effectively.576 
Drafting the required legislation from scratch without guidelines or model rules is a demanding 
process.577 Ghana will be expected to expend significant resources, both from a financial and 
a legal expertise perspective, to create sound public policy and legislation.578 This explains 
why perhaps Ghana has not yet enacted the required legislation to pass compliance with Article 
31bis amendment.579  
 
Therefore, the requirement to implement domestic implementing laws has created a significant 
financial and political burden on Ghana and other WTO Member who export medicines 
because such a legislation must not only meet the requirements imposed by the WTO to 
importing countries, but it must also benefit the exporting country.580 Remarkably, some 
Members have agreed not to use the system as importers and some have stated that they will 
use the system only in national emergencies or other extremely urgent circumstances.581 The 
Doha Paragraph 6 Programme’s inadequacy is evidenced by the eagerness of certain WTO 
Members to use the system.582  
 
In fact, key developed countries have committed themselves not to use the system to import.583 
In that circumstances, if Ghana were to rely on the Doha Paragraph 6 Solution, it would find it 
difficult to find several WTO Members that are willing to supply the country with the needed 
medicines made under Doha Paragraph 6 system. Therefore, in practice, Ghana and other WTO 
                                                 
576 Report on the Workshop on the WTO Decision on Access to Medicines at Affordable Prices for Countries with 
No or Insufficient Manufacturing Capacities (Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
IP/C/W/439, Feb. 23, 2005) paras. 26-28. 
577 Anderson (n 50) 178, observing that it took over nine months for Canada to draft its legislation. Nine months 
is too long for a developing country to wait once it has declared a public health emergency. 
578 Anderson (n 40) 106, noting that developing countries may lack the legal and technical expertise required to 
draft appropriate legislation in compliance with TRIPS. 
579 Michael Westerhaus and Arachu Castro, ‘How Do Intellectual Property Law and International Trade 
Agreements Affect Access to Antiretroviral Therapy?’ (2006) 3 Public Library of Science Medicine 8, 1232. 
580 Jessica Greenbaum, ‘TRIPS and Public Health: Solutions for Ensuring Global Access to Essential AIDS 
Medication in the Wake of the Paragraph 6 Waiver’ (2008) 25 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 
1, 157. 
581 id. 
582 See “WTO, General Council Chairman’s Statement: Minutes of Meeting” (n 48) para. 29, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. 
583 id. 
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Members such as, India with manufacturing capacity may be reluctant to exercise such rights 
given concern about the international trade and political ramifications.  
 
More importantly, the Article 31bis amendment to the compulsory licensing provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement, which is designed to facilitate the manufacture and export of medicines to 
countries like Ghana has been distinguished only by its lack of use.584 Since the 2003 Decision, 
relatively about 14 years now, only one country or two set of countries have used the Doha 
Paragraph 6 Programme.585 In 2007, Canada provided HIV medicines to Rwanda under the 
system.586 While Rwanda filled its original notice of intent with TRIPS in July 2007, its first 
shipment of medicines from the Canadian generic manufacturer (Apotex) was not sent until 
September 2008, almost fifteen months later.587  
 
The result of a such protracted process can lead to even bigger problems than what was sought 
to be addressed, as Rwanda’s ability to receive the necessary medicines was not expeditious.588 
Critics have found that the process is too complicated and costly.589 The UN High Level Panel 
on Access to Medicines report found that the system proved not to be a viable solution for its 
                                                 
584 Evans (n 105) 183. 
585 Notification by Canada under Paragraph 2(C) of the Decision of Aug. 30, 2003 on the Implementation of 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Council for Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, IP/N/10/CAN/1, Oct. 5, 2007). See Rwanda’s Notification, WTO Doc. 
IP/N/RWA/1, 19 July 2007. 
586 On May 14, 2004, Canada passed BILL C-9: 37th Parliament, 3rd Session. An Act to amend the Patent Act 
(R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4) and the Food and Drugs Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. F-27), creating Canada’s Access to Medicines 
Regime (CAMR). Carlos Correa, Implementation of the WTO General Council Decision on Paragraph 6 of the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Geneva, World Health Organisation Essential 
Drugs and Medicines Policy, WHO/EDM/PAR/2004.4, 2004) footnote 13, observing that Canada and Norway 
have adopted legislative changes to implement Decision. The purpose of the legislation is to allow Canadian 
manufacturers to export antiretroviral drugs to countries lacking production capacity. Norway - Section 49 of 
Norway’s Patents Act was Amended by the Act of Dec. 13, 2003 (No. 127). The following paragraph was added: 
‘A compulsory licence shall be issued mainly with a view to supplying the domestic market. The King may by 
regulations prescribe rules that deviate from this’. See Emily Ng and Jillian Clare Kohler ‘Finding Flaws: The 
Limitations of Compulsory Licensing for Improving Access to medicines – An International Comparison’ (2008) 
16 Health Law Journal 1, 148-149, see footnote 22, observing that as of August 2008, the EU, India, China, Korea 
and the Netherlands have joined Canada and Norway and implemented domestic legislation allowing for 
compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals primarily for export. 
587 Jillian Cohen-Kohler, Laura Esmail and Andre Perez Cosio, ‘Canada’s Implementation of the Paragraph 6 
Decision: Is It Sustainable Public Policy? (2007) 3 Globalization and Health 12, 6-7. 
588 Anderson (n 50) 180.  
589 See Cynthia Ho, Access to Medicine in the Global Economy: International Agreements on Patent and Related 
Rights (New York, Oxford University Press, 2011) 217. Apotex Inc. Press Release, Second Shipment of Life-
Saving Aids Drug Leaving for Africa (Sept. 18, 2009). Available at: <https://www.newswire.ca/news-
releases/canadian-made-life-saving-hivaids-drug-heading-to-africa-under-canadas-access-to-medicines-regime-
camr-536649071.html> [Accessed Feb. 10, 2018]. 
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intended purpose.590 In view of this, the Doha Paragraph 6 Programme fails to represent the 
expected effective and expeditious solution that Ghana and other WTO Members expect in 
order to promote affordable medicines.  
 
Judging from this, it will not be prudent for Ghana to rely on such a complex and failed system. 
Therefore, this failure makes the Section 84 model a feasible option to promote affordable 
medicines for public health protection because there would be relatively less complex rules, 
procedures and conditions to satisfy in order to determine the granting of compulsory licensing, 
as in the case of Article 31 of TRIPS and the Doha scheme.  
 
5.3. Complex Conditions and the Procedural Requirements Under Article 31 of TRIPS  
 
As already indicated, Section 84, which allows the granting of a compulsory licence provided 
that the patented invention has not been worked in the territory of India, is consistent with 
TRIPS and therefore would provide a suitable model for Ghana. Acknowledging the 
probability that a patent owner may abuse his/her exclusive rights, for example non-working 
as envisaged by Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention, also incorporated into TRIPS, the 
compulsory licensing instrument, which remains a tool to remedy non-working, was written 
into the Agreement.591  
 
Not only that, the TRIPS Agreement further enhances Ghana and other WTO Members’ right 
to act to prevent patent owners from abusing the right so granted, which could unreasonably 
restrain trade, or hamper the international transfer of technology.592 To deal with that 
possibility, TRIPS provides that Ghana and WTO Members can issue compulsory licences, 
allowing a competitor to produce the product or use the process without the authorisation of its 
owner.593 However, this authorisation can only be given if a number of conditions and 
procedural requirements, set out in detail under Article 31 of TRIPS, are satisfied.594  
 
                                                 
590 Report of the UN Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines: Promoting Innovation and 
Access to Health Technologies (New York, United Nations, September 2016) 23. 
591 Understanding the World Trade Organisation (Geneva, World Trade Organisation, 5th edn., 2015) 42. 
592 Articles 8 and 40 of TRIPS. 
593 TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents: Fact Sheet (Geneva, World Trade Organisation, 2006) 4. 
594 Gervais (287) 165, noting that the fact that the grounds for issuing a compulsory licence was left open means 
that compulsory licensing for failure to work locally is permitted. 
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This is because Article 31 of TRIPS is an exception to the exclusive rights of the patent holder, 
and therefore, use of the provision is restricted by several conditions aimed at protecting the 
rights of the patent holder.595 In the context of public health, the compulsory licensing provision 
is intended to permit Ghana and WTO Members to produce or import generic medicines that 
are more affordable than patented ones.596 Its wording does not include the term “compulsory 
licence”, but refers to “Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder”.597  
 
Article 31 of TRIPS does not expressly state that compulsory licences should be made available 
by WTO Members; it just clarifies that where Ghana’s law for example, allows for other use 
of the subject matter of a patent without the authorisation of the right holder, including use by 
the government or third parties authorised by the government, then Ghana has the right to do 
so.598 Article 31(a) of TRIPS requires that authorisation of such use shall be considered on its 
individual merits. Article 31(b) of TRIPS requires a country applying for a licence to first 
attempt to negotiate a voluntary licence from the patent holder under reasonable commercial 
terms and for a reasonable period of time.  
 
However, in situations of national emergency, other circumstances of extreme urgency, or in 
cases of public non-commercial use, there is no need to try to negotiate for a voluntary 
licence.599 Moreover, in situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency, the right holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as is reasonably practicable. 
In the case of public non-commercial use, where the government or contractor, without making 
a patent search, knows he has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or will be 
used by or for the government, the right holder shall be informed promptly. Additionally, under 
the compulsory licence, adequate remuneration must still be paid to the patent holder taking 
into account the economic value of the authorisation in each case.600  
 
The scope and duration of the use of the compulsory licence is limited to the purpose for which 
it was authorised,601 and authorisation of such use can be terminated if, and when the 
                                                 
595 “TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents Fact Sheet” (n 593) 4. 
596 Correa (n 179) 313–314. 
597 Chapeau of Article 31 of TRIPS. 
598 This means that a country’s domestic legislation may also contain other, additional conditions affecting the 
issuance of compulsory licences. 
599 Article 31(b) of TRIPS. 
600 Article 31(h) of TRIPS. 
601 Article 31(c) of TRPS. 
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circumstances that led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur.602 Furthermore, Article 31(f) 
of TRIPS states that a compulsory licence shall be authorised predominantly for the supply of 
the domestic market of the Member authorising such use. This condition has the practical effect 
of preventing the export of generic medicines to countries like Ghana that do not have sufficient 
pharmaceutical industries to produce the medicines themselves.603  
 
Under Article 31(c) of TRIPS, the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose 
for which it was authorised, and in the case of semi-conductor technology shall only be for 
public non-commercial use or to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative 
process to be anti-competitive. Furthermore, such use shall be non-exclusive;604 nor shall it be 
assignable,605 and, as per Article 31(i), any decision relating to the authorisation of such use 
shall be subject to judicial review or other independent review by a higher authority  
  
5.4. The Right of Ghana and other WTO Members to Determine the Grounds to Grant 
Compulsory Licences 
 
The general purpose of Article 31 of TRIPS is to allow Ghana and other WTO Members to 
grant a compulsory licence.606 The TRIPS Agreement does not expressly refer to the right of 
Members to grant compulsory licences on non-working grounds, but this is implied when 
Article 31 of TRIPS is read along with Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention in relation to 
Article 2(1) of TRIPS. Importantly, other possible grounds can be deduced from other TRIPS 
provisions, such as for instance, Article 8, which allows Ghana and other WTO Members to 
take measures necessary to protect, inter alia, public health and to prevent abuse by right 
holders provided that such measures are consistent with the Agreement.  
 
Furthermore, the TRIPS Agreement neither mentions nor specifically excludes Ghana and 
other WTO Members from the imposition of local working requirements, except to say that 
where the law of a Member allows for it, that Member is free to do so,607 in as much as the 
                                                 
602 Article 31(g) of TRIPS. 
603 Correa (n 179) 321. 
604 Article 31(d) of TRIPS. 
605 Article 31(e) of TRIPS. 
606 Richard Hunter, ‘Compulsory Licensing: A Major Issue in International Business Today?’ (2009) 11 European 
Journal of Social Sciences 3, 372. See Jon Matthews, ‘Renewing Healthy Competition: Compulsory Licenses and 
Why Abuses of the TRIPS Article 31 Standards Are Most Damaging to the United States Healthcare Industry’ 
(2010) 4 The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship and the Law 1, 125. 
607 Chapeau of Article 31 of TRIPS. 
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grounds being invoked are not frivolous.608 In fact, with the single exception of semiconductor 
technology, which shall only be for public non-commercial use or to remedy an anti-
competitive practice,609 Article 31 of TRIPS does not limit the grounds on which Ghana and 
other WTO Members can implement compulsory licences.610 Therefore, in as much as the 
procedural requirements and other substantive conditions are met, the TRIPS Agreement does 
not limit the possibility of Ghana grant compulsory licences on any grounds, such as failure to 
work, and due to public health considerations.611 
 
Remarkably, Article 31 of TRIPS does not specify the grounds on which compulsory licences 
can be issued.612 In other words, the TRIPS Agreement does not limit the grounds on which 
Ghana and other WTO Members can grant compulsory licences, such as non-working, as the 
Agreement leaves open the cases in which such licences can be granted.613 Although some non-
exclusive grounds for granting compulsory licences are expressly mentioned in Article 31 of 
TRIPS - including national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, and public 
non-commercial use by governments or third parties614 - these are only examples to guide WTO 
Members and they do not limit the possibility of Ghana and other WTO Members granting 
compulsory licences on other grounds.615 In fact, Article 31 of TRIPS does not specify whether 
“third parties” authorised by governments should be local or foreign manufacturers, other than 
                                                 
608 Carvalho (n 106) 232, commenting that the grant of a compulsory licence on frivolous grounds, such as the 
individual interest of a competitor, is not a legitimate ground because compulsory licences are exceptions to patent 
rights and, as such, may only be used in exceptional circumstances. 
609 Article 31(c) of TRIPS. 
610 Gervais (n 287) 165. Note that Gervais participated in the negotiation of TRIPS. He explains that Article 31 of 
TRIPS sets specific conditions for the grant but does not list or define the cases where a licence may be granted 
(except for semiconductor technology). He further confirmed that negotiators weighed both options and preferred 
to leave open the cases where compulsory licensing (defined here as use by governments or by third parties 
authorised by governments) may be allowed. 
611 Carlos (n 12) 9, noting that the interpretation of this clause [Article 27(1) of TRIPS] is debatable. Further, 
observing that though Article 27(1) has been understood as prohibiting national laws from imposing an obligation 
to execute locally a patented invention, this interpretation is not unanimous. Citing Article 68(1) of the Brazilian 
Industrial Property Law [Law No. 9.279, of May 14, 1996 as amended by Law 10.196 of Feb. 14, 2001]. It reads: 
The following also shall occasion a compulsory license: I. non-exploitation of the 
object of the patent within the Brazilian territory for failure to manufacture or 
incomplete manufacture of the product, or also failure to make full use of the 
patented process, except cases where this is not economically feasible, when 
importation shall be permitted; or II. commercialization that does not satisfy the 
needs of the market. 
612 Correa (n 179) 311, for a detailed discussion of other use without authorisation of the right-holder. 
613 Abbott, et al (n 425) 196. 
614 Article 31(b), and chapeau of Article 31 of TRIPS 
615 The only case in which members’ freedom to determine grounds for compulsory licences is restricted is on 
semi-conductor technology, which can only be subject to compulsory licenses for public non-commercial use and 
to remedy anti-competitive practices under Article 31(c). 
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to say that any such use shall be authorised predominantly for the supply of the domestic market 
of the Member authorising such use.616 
 
Within this spirit, the TRIPS Agreement also allows Ghana and other WTO Members to make 
virtually all decisions regarding the granting of compulsory licences, including those regarding 
compensation or appeals, through administrative processes, in as much as the process is fair 
and transparent.617 Therefore, Ghana and other WTO Members are left with a very broad scope 
of action in regard to the grounds on which they can grant compulsory licences subject to the 
satisfaction of the conditions and procedural requirements.618 Recalling a few of the conditions 
and procedural requirements, they include the need to authorise such use on its individual 
merits;619 the need to be non-exclusive;620 and the need for a prior request to the patent holder 
on reasonable commercial terms and the obligation to pay adequate compensation.621 
 
The need to request a voluntary licence is not applicable in cases of emergency and public non-
commercial use.622 It is also important to note that TRIPS specifically does not require Ghana 
and other WTO Members to grant injunctive relief to patent holders623 in cases where 
government authorisations of patent use satisfy the Article 31 framework.624 So, reading Article 
31 critically it is obvious that the TRIPS Agreement leaves Ghana and other WTO Members 
with wider discretion as to the granting of compulsory licences, and the determination of the 
grounds on which to do so, including local working. Put differently, the restrictions are not 
strictly legal in nature and Ghana and other WTO Members must only satisfy certain 
substantive conditions in relation to the application of the procedural requirements.  
 
5.5. Difficulties of Ghana and other WTO Members Satisfying the Conditions and the 
Procedural Requirements in Article 31 of TRIPS 
 
Ghana as a WTO Member must comply with the conditions to be met and the procedural 
requirements to be followed when using the exceptions to the patent rights. However, TRIPS 
                                                 
616 Article 31(f) of TRIPS. 
617 Article 31(c), 31(i), 31(j), 31(k) of TRIPS. Love (n 285) 9. 
618 Velasquez and Boulet (n 289) 35. 
619 Article 31(a) of TRIPS. 
620 Article 31 (d) of TRIPS. 
621 Article 31(h) of TRIPS. 
622 Article 31(b) of TRIPS. 
623 Article 44(2) of TRIPS. 
624 Love (n 285) 11. 
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and its exceptions are complex and vague, and have caused much controversy.625 The 
procedural hurdles prior to issuing a compulsory licence are too complicated,626 and although 
the terms of Article 31 of TRIPS appear to be in general permissive and flexible, there is 
substantial inflexibility regarding the legal infrastructure, the financial and technical capacities, 
and the administrative processes as preconditions that Ghana and other WTO Members must 
satisfy.627  
 
Thus, the conditions imposed by Article 31 of TRIPS and the difficult procedures have 
rendered the compulsory licensing instrument essentially useless,628 as Ghana and other WTO 
Members often do not meet the conditions.629 This reflects why, to date, Ghana and other WTO 
Members have made limited use of compulsory licences to address the high costs and shortages 
of essential medicines.630 Ambiguities in the interpretation of TRIPS due to the lack of 
substantive guidelines or definitions also hinder its effective use by increasing the risk of 
litigation.631 For example, the vagueness of Article 30 of TRIPS resulted in the Panel in Canada 
– Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products having to give Article 27(1) of TRIPS broad 
structural effect over Article 30 of TRIPS.632 This can impede the quest for access to medicines 
in Ghana where such a narrow interpretation exists.633  
 
Under Article 31(a) of TRIPS, the purpose of disallowing a blanket authorisation of 
compulsory licences is to ensure that each case is scrutinised individually. This means not 
                                                 
625 Dina Halajian, ‘Inadequacy of TRIPS & the Compulsory License: Why Broad Compulsory Licensing is Not a 
Viable Solution to the Access Medicine Problem’ (2013) 38 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 3, 1191. 
626 Harris (n 85) 390. 
627 Frederick Abbott, WTO TRIPS Agreement and Its Implications for Access to Medicines in Developing 
Countries (UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights Study Paper 2a, 2002) 16. 
628 Anderson (n 40) 96. Vera Zolotaryova, ‘Are We There Yet? Taking “TRIPS” To Brazil and Expanding Access 
to HIVIAIDS Medication’ (2008) 33 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 3, 1102. 
629 Abbott (n 627) 16. 
630 id. 
631 Vishal Gupta, ‘A Mathematical Approach to Benefit-Detriment Analysis as a Solution to Compulsory 
Licensing of Pharmaceuticals under the TRIPS Agreement’ (2005) 13 Cardozo Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 2, 637, stating that though TRIPS sets forth minimum standards, patent protection is not 
equivalent in each member state since each state can independently interpret these standards. Holger Hestermeyer, 
Human Rights and the WTO: The Case of Patents and Access to Medicines (New York, Oxford University Press, 
2007) 247, stating that members may take different views as to the interpretation, but also that a member relying 
on one interpretation risks litigation from another member relying on a different interpretation. 
632 “Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products” (n 68) para. 7.91, the Panel maintained that it is an 
acknowledged fact without the need for any textual provision so providing, further strengthens the case for treating 
the non-discrimination rules as applicable to Article 30. “Resource Book on TRIPS” (n 16) 372. 
633 Hestermeyer (n 631) 235, arguing that the scope of Article 30 exceptions is “notoriously vague,” which could 
have allowed the Canada-Patent Panel to interpret it broadly in light of a right to access to medicines, but it failed 
to do so. 
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granting licences automatically or arbitrarily on the grounds of the type of technology, for 
example.634 A case-by-case basis is a more effective control on the frequency of compulsory 
licensing and benefits the rights holder.635 Specifically, the vagueness of Article 31(b) 
complicates the legitimate determination of any individual compulsory licence, for example, 
requiring such measures to be “necessary” or “compensation” to be adequate.636 Pursuant to 
Article 31(b) of TRIPS, this provision requires that a party pursuing a compulsory licence 
makes a reasonable effort within a reasonable period to negotiate reasonable commercial terms 
and conditions with the patent holder prior to licensing.  
 
“Reasonable” is not defined and this has been described as the key to its flexibility.637 There 
are, however, obstacles to these commercial negotiations. If a patent holder is unwilling to 
permit bargain price access, they may delay the negotiations to buy time and therefore increase 
their profits while still appearing to be conforming with the provision. Sometimes they have 
no intention of accepting licensing but want to avoid a clear refusal. In cases involving urgency, 
Article 31(b) of TRIPS allows Ghana and other WTO Members to avoid this process, to enable 
expediency. Such circumstances include cases of national emergency, although no definition 
is given in the text.638  
 
There have been some discussions as to the possible interpretations of “national emergency” 
with semantic difficulties over the use of “extreme urgency” as opposed to “moderate urgency” 
as meaning urgent enough to invoke the process. What is claimed is that a formal declaration 
of national emergency is probably not required.639 This view is illustrative of the possible 
complications that Ghana and other WTO Members may face in deciding what the criteria 
within the Agreement mean. Violation carries the consequences of huge litigation costs, which 
Ghana and other WTO Members simply cannot afford.640   
                                                 
634 Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd edn., 
2003) 250. 
635 id. 
636 David Degen, Thailand’s Compulsory Licenses and the Increase of Investment Arbitration. In: RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE LIFE SCIENCES, Duncan Matthews, Herbert 
Zech (eds.), (Cheltenham, Elgar Edward, 2017) 436. 
637 “Resource Book on TRIPS” (n 16) 469. 
638 Duncan Matthews, ‘TRIPS Flexibilities and Access to Medicines in Developing Countries: The Problem with 
Technical Assistance and Free Trade Agreements’ (2005) 27 European Intellectual Property Review 11, 421 
639 ibid. 441. 
640 The controversy of South Africa’s Medicine Act 1997 and the subsequent legal action pursued by 
Pharmaceutical Industry is a very real reminder of the potential consequences of alleged violation of TRIPS. When 
South African tried to grant compulsory licensing to promote affordable medicines (The Medicines and Related 
Substances Control Amendment Act No. 90 of 1997, South African Government Gazette No. 18,505, Dec. 12, 
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Article 31(f) of TRIPS is one of the most contentious and disputed clauses in regard to access 
to affordable medicines for Ghana and other WTO Members. Without sufficient manufacturing 
capacity, expertise and financing to set up a feasible pharmaceutical company, Ghana and other 
WTO Members have been unable to satisfy this condition, and this has prevented them from 
seeking help from other WTO Members with a reasonably sufficient manufacturing capacity 
that they are willing to make available for the export of affordable medicines. This provision 
was clearly not devised to meet the fundamental interests of developing countries that compare 
closely with Ghana and reflects developed countries’ fears that to allow the export/import of 
affordable medicines, for example, would result in loss of control over the licensing market, 
and therefore threaten their monopoly.641 
 
In relation to Article 31(g) of TRIPS, which provides for a licence to be terminated if, and 
when the circumstances that led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur, it has been stated 
that the requirement of termination need not apply to HIV/AIDS medicines, as it is difficult to 
accurately predict how long effective treatment will take.642 Article 31(h) of TRIPS is yet 
another ambiguously worded requirement. There is little guidance on what constitutes 
“adequate” and it is subject to many economic factors. While the language of equity was 
advanced and supported by many WTO Members, who saw this particular provision as 
                                                 
1997 [amending the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act No. 101 of 1965, as amended by Acts Nos. 
65/1974, 17/1979, 20/1981 and 94/1991]) some pharmaceutical file a suit challenging the legality of the national 
measure in court (Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of South Africa v President of the Republic of 
South Africa. Case No 4183/98, filed Feb 18, 1998). The US threatened to respond forcefully in accordance with 
appropriate trade remedy if South Africa does not repeal, suspend, or terminate the amendment of Section 15(c). 
Available at: <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/stdept-feb51999.html> [Accessed Sept. 13, 2017]. See Chang-
Fa Lo, Compulsory Licensing: Threats, Use and Recent Trends. In: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN 
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW: SETTING THE FRAMEWORK AND EXPLORING POLICY 
OPTIONS, Bryan Mercurio and Daria Kim (eds.), (New York, Routledge, 2017) 157. Michelle Nerozzi, ‘The 
Battle over Life-Saving Pharmaceuticals: Are Developing Countries Being TRIPped by Developed Countries’ 
(2002) 47 Villanova Law Review 3, 616, noting that the US has threatened to curtail economic aid programs and 
to impose trade sanctions on the governments of South Africa. Grace Avedissian, ‘Global Implications of a 
Potential U.S. Policy Shift Toward Compulsory Licensing of Medical Inventions in a New Era of Super-
Terrorism’ (2002) 18 American University International Law Review 1, 256, stating the US contested South 
Africa’s compulsory licensing law for two years before capitulating to public and interest group pressure. Ford (n 
30) 950. See ‘Time-Line of Disputes over Compulsory Licensing and Parallel Importation in South Africa’ 
(Consumer Project on Technology, Version 1.03, Aug. 5, 1999) showing that the USTR placed South Africa on 
its Special 301 Watch List on May 1, 1998. Available at: <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/sa-timeline.txt> 
[Accessed Sept. 19, 2017]. 
641 Deborah Halbert, Resisting Intellectual Property (London, Routledge Studies in Global Political Economy 
2005) 95, South Africa’s Fight for AIDS medication. 
642 Kumariah Balasubramaniam, Access to Medicines and Public Policy Safeguards under TRIPS. In: TRADING 
IN KNOWLEDGE. DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY, 
Christophe Bellmann, Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz and Graham Dutfield (eds.) (London, Earthscan, 2003) 154. 
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possibly difficult, the idea of “adequate” was the wording the US preferred and was selected 
over “fair and equitable”.643 
 
Calculating adequate remuneration for payment to the patent holder under Article 31(h) of 
TRIPS when a compulsory licence is granted is an obstacle to its successful use,644 and is 
further complicated by the requirement to take the economic value of the authorisation into 
account, as TRIPS does not provide guidance in regard to determining what is “adequate” and 
what is the authorisation’s “value”.645 Commercial market royalty rates are one possible 
benchmark for remuneration, but may be difficult to ascertain or be unreflective of the value of 
the licence for a variety of reasons.646 
 
Moreover, due to the distinctive interest between developing countries that compare closely 
with Ghana and developed countries, defining the specific grounds for compulsory licences 
will always remain unrealistic.647 Even if Ghana is ultimately successful in authorising a 
compulsory licence, delays in authorisation due to the probability of judicial review or other 
independent review may discourage licensees from producing generic versions, as they will 
have to attend hearings that are meant to frustrate the granting of such a licence.648  
 
 
5.6. Doha Declaration: Confirmation of Ghana and other WTO Members Right to Grant 
Compulsory Licences 
 
                                                 
643 Gervais (n 634) 252. 
644 Abbott (n 627) 35, explaining that “adequate” refers to a sufficient amount meeting minimum standards. 
645 Daniel Chow and Edward Lee, International IP: Problems, Cases, and Materials (Detroit, Michigan, Gale 
Cengage, 2006) 452–453, listing possible methods to determining adequate remuneration. For example, Thailand 
considers a royalty rate of 0.5 per cent of the total sales to be compliant but this was rejected by Merck inadequate. 
See Cynthia Ho, ‘A New World Order for Addressing Patent Rights and Public Health’ (2007) 82 Chicago-Kent 
Law Review 3, 1469. 
646 Abbott (n 627) 35, stating that actors such as government subsidisation of research and development and tax 
treatment are relevant. Royalties may be based on wholesale selling prices, net of tax liabilities. 
647 Degen (n 636) 436. 
648 Savoie (n 8) 239. 
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By the end of 1999, data suggest that HIV was spreading at an alarming rate in Ghana649 and 
Africa.650 In 2001, the nations of Africa declared that the HIV/AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria 
epidemics were a complete emergency on the continent, and the African Union offered their 
commitments to strengthen their responses to fighting the diseases.651 Although the reasons for 
the lack of access to essential medicines in Ghana and other developing countries are generally 
manifold,652 concerns were raised about the consequences of TRIPS and access to medicines 
soon after the inception of the TRIPS Agreement into the international trading system.653  
 
Importantly, compulsory licensing, as an instrument of government policy, would have offered 
Ghana and other African countries that are considerably burdened with diseases, a practical 
means to mitigate the high costs and shortages of essential medicines,654 however, they face 
legal difficulties in using the compulsory licensing instrument to promote affordable 
medicines.655 For example, as stated already, in 2000 when Ghana tried to import affordable 
medicines from India, GSK tried to block such a measure.656 
                                                 
649 ‘HIV/AIDS in Ghana: Background, Projections, Impacts, Interventions, and Policy’ (National AIDS/STI 
Control Programme-Disease Control Unit, Ministry of Health, 3rd edn. 2001). ‘Ghana Population and AIDS 
Programme’ (Ghana: Ministry of Health, 1993). See Ghana’s AIDS Commission Act 2002 (Act 613) and the 
setting up of the Ghana AIDS Response Fund with initial seeding money of US$ 25 million provided by the World 
Bank. See Project Performance Assessment Report. Ghana AIDS Response Project (The World Bank, Report 
No.: 39557, Jun. 19, 2007) vii. Country Health System Fact Sheet Ghana’ (WHO, 2006) 1, estimating that in 2000 
there were 350,000 cases of HIV and by 2003 the prevalence rate among adults was 3.1 per cent. See ‘Scaling up 
Towards Universal Access and Working Actively and in Partnership to Combat HIV/AIDS’ (The National 
Strategic Framework 2006-2010 (NSF II), AIDS Commission of Ghana, 2005) 6, recognises that the spread of 
the epidemic remains a challenge to socio-economic development. 
650 AIDS Epidemic Update (Report of the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, 
WHO/CDS/CDR/NCS/2001.2, December 2001) 2, finding that HIV/AIDS killed 2.3 million African people. The 
estimated 3.4 million new HIV infections in Sub-Saharan Africa in the past year mean that 28.1 Africans now 
live with the virus. Without adequate treatment and care most of them will not survive the next decade. 
651 Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Other Related Infectious Diseases. Abuja, African Union, 
2001) 4. 
652‘t Hoen (n 566) 28, citing logistical supply and storage problems, substandard drug quality, inappropriate 
selection of drugs, wasteful prescription and inappropriate use, inadequate production, and prohibitive prices. 
653 Ellen ‘t Hoen, The Revised Drug Strategy: Access to Essential Medicines, Intellectual Property, and the World 
Health Organization. In: ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Gaelle 
Krikorian and Amy Kapczynski (eds.), (New York, Zone Books, 2010) 134, citing the Health Action International, 
the Consumer Project on Technology (CPTech, now Knowledge Ecology International, KEI), Act Up–Paris, the 
Health GAP coalition, Oxfam, and the Access to Medicines campaign of Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF). 
654 Statement by the African Group on TRIPS and Public Health (Informal Session of TRIPS Council for the 
Special Discussion on IP and Access to Medicines (IP/C/W/296, Jun. 20, 2001) para. 30. Available at: 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/paper_develop_w296_e.htm> [Accessed Aug. 28, 2017]. 
655 ibid. para. 8, citing the lawsuit brought by a Pharmaceutical Industry Association and 39 of its affiliate 
pharmaceutical companies against the Government of South Africa regarding provisions of its Medicines and 
Related Substances Control Amendment Act. See Communication from the European Communities and their 
Member States (IP/C/W/280, Jun. 12, 2001) para. 18. 
656 Glaxo Blocks Importation of Generic Combivir into Ghana’ (TAGLine, Volume 7, Issue 9, Treatment Action 
Group, December 2000). <http://i-base.info/htb/4062> [Accessed Mar. 10, 2017]. Bradley Condon, ‘NAFTA, 
WTO, and Global Business Strategy: How AIDS, Trade, and Terrorism Affect our Economic Future’ (Greenwood 
Publishing, 2002) 101. See Anthony So and Cecila Oh, ‘Approaches to Intellectual Property and Innovation that 
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Nevertheless, it was originally envisioned that the compulsory licensing provision contained 
under Article 31 and other safeguard provisions in the TRIPS Agreement could be used by 
WTO Members to facilitate access to essential medicines in a time of public health crisis or 
circumstances of a national emergency by allowing for the production of affordable 
medicines.657 However, this was not the case. When some WTO Members, specifically Brazil 
and South Africa, tried to use compulsory licences to promote affordable medicines, they 
became the subject of lawsuits and political pressure from mainly the US and some 
pharmaceutical companies.658  
 
It was reported at the same time that one-third of the world’s population lacked access to the 
most basic essential drugs,659 while at the same time many of the WTO Members including 
India were scheduled to comply fully with the patent standards under TRIPS by 2005.660 This 
technically meant that those with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity will not be able to 
grant a compulsory licence either for the local production or for the importation of affordable 
generic medicines, and they will depend entirely upon expensive patented versions.661 There 
were concerns about whether Ghana and other African governments would feel free to use, for 
instance, compulsory licensing flexibility to the full, without fearing pressure from the 
pharmaceutical industry and their home governments.662 
 
This led to the extraordinary meeting held by the TRIPS Council on 20 June 2001 on the TRIPS 
Agreement and access to medicines, at the request of the African WTO Members.663 The 
African Group maintained that the flexibilities contained in TRIPS required clarification and 
that the Agreement itself may possibly need an amendment.664 They also claimed that 
                                                 
Meet the Public Health Challenge of AIDS’ (Working Paper prepared for the Third Meeting of the Technical 
Advisory Group of the Global Commission on HIV and the Law, July 2011) 3. 
657 Ng and Kohler (n 586) 145. 
658 For example, see note 640 and the text accompanying. 
659 WHO Medicines Strategy: 2000–2003 Framework for Action in Essential Drugs and Medicines Policy 
(Geneva, Department of Essential Drugs and Medicines Policy, WHO/EDM/2000.1, World Health Organisation, 
2000) 9, finding that irrespective of the fact that the number of people with access to essential drugs grew from 
roughly 2.1 billion in 1977 to 3.8 billion in 1997. 
660 Article 65 of TRIPS. 
661 Carlos Correa, ‘TRIPS Agreement and Access to Drugs in Developing Countries’ (2005) 3 International 
Journal on Human Rights 3, 26. 
662 “Submission by the African Group” (n 39) para. 30. 
663 TRIPS Council’s discussion on “Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines”. Available at: 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/counciljun01_e.htm> [Accessed Sept. 5, 2017]. 
664 See “Statement by the Africa Group on TRIPS and Public Health” (n 654) para. 29. 
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justification for compulsory licensing may need clarification since the TRIPS Agreement does 
not specifically set out the grounds on which Ghana and other WTO Members can grant 
compulsory licences.665  
 
Central to this problem is the failure of some WTO Members that compare closely with Ghana 
with insufficient or no domestic manufacturing capacity to avail themselves of the use of 
compulsory licensing under TRIPS given the restrictions of Article 31(f), which obliges 
production under compulsory licence to be predominantly for the supply of the domestic 
market. This kept Ghana and other WTO Members from manufacturing necessary medicines 
for exportation or importation, further constraining access to life saving essential medicines for 
Ghana and other WTO Members. 
 
As already indicated, in 2001, the WTO took initial steps to counter the legal ambiguity created 
by the TRIPS Agreement in relation to the lack of essential medicines and the right of Ghana 
and other WTO Members to grant compulsory licences, as this had raised anxiety that 
exporting Members may have problems exporting adequate amounts to meet the needs of 
Ghana and other WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity. The Doha 
Declaration did not set out specific solutions, but rather openly accepted the problems with 
public health,666 the concerns about the effect of patents on prices,667 and the uncertainty 
regarding TRIPS and committed to developing remedies.668  
 
In making this declaration, the WTO took the opportunity to encourage its Members to make 
use of the compulsory licensing instrument under Article 31 of TRIPS,669 and further reiterated 
their commitment to leave each Member free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion 
without challenge.670 When considering the local working requirement and compulsory 
licensing the legal force of the Doha Declaration is not to be underestimated,671 as it referred 
to the customary rules approach of public international law in the interpretation of each 
                                                 
665 “The African Group” (n 39) para. 1. 
666 “Doha Declaration” (n 6) para. 1. 
667 id. para. 3. 
668 Anderson (n 40) 97. 
669 “Doha Declaration” (n 6) para. 5(b). 
670 ibid. para. 5(d). 
671 Yu (n 309) 997, making a strong argument that the Doha Declaration was a mere restatement of Article 31(1) 
of the VCLT, which stipulates that ‘a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty . . . in the light of its object and purpose’. 
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provision of TRIPS in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement, as expressed,672 in 
particular, its objectives and principles.673  
 
Importantly, since the WTO Panels and the Appellate Body began their operations, they have 
embraced the provision as part of the customary rules of interpretation as required by the 
DSU.674 Thus, the Doha Declaration established a specific rule of interpretation that gave 
context to the general interpretive provisions of public international law via the Vienna 
Convention, upon which the legal principles of WTO law and its interpretation have been built. 
The panel in Korea – Procurement held that the customary rules of international law apply to 
WTO treaties.675 This reflects a measure of recognition that the general agreements embodied 
under the WTO are not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law.676 
 
According to the canons of treaty interpretation, the interpreter is also required to consider any 
agreement or instrument relating to the treaty that was made between all of the parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty.677 In the EC – Bananas case, the Report of the 
Appellate Body noted that:  
                                                 
672 Gervais (n 284) 120, mentioning that a possible practical impact of the Doha insistence of Articles 7 and 8 may 
serve as a basis for the interpretation of certain provisions of the Agreement. Robert Howse and Makau Mutua, 
Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy: Challenges for the World Trade Organization. In HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN DEVELOPMENT YEARBOOK 1999/2000: THE MILLENNIUM EDITION. Hugo Stokke and 
Anne Tostensen (eds.) (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2001) 63, stating that the Preamble of WTO 
Agreement states a number of objectives of the WTO system that may relate to certain human rights obligations, 
especially elements of social and economic rights.  
673 “Doha Declaration” (n 6) para. 5(a). Yu (n 309) 995, stating that the Doha Declaration strongly reinforced the 
objectives and principles set forth in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement. See “Resource Book on TRIPS” 
(n 16) 126, interpreting that Article 7 objective is particularly important to less-developed countries, which are 
largely users of technologies produced abroad. 
674 See “WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding” (n 76). Article 3(2) of the DSU in part, expressly states that the 
dispute settlement system is intended to clarify the provisions of the WTO Agreement ‘in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law.” See Howse and Makau (672) 64, arguing that Article 
31 of the Vienna Convention, which states the basic rules of treaty interpretation, is a fundamental reference point 
for WTO dispute settlement.  
675 The Panel in Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement (WT/ DS163/R, May 1, 2000) para. 7.96. 
See Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The Role of International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?’ (2001) 95 American 
Journal of International Law 3, 583, footnote 25, stating that with one possible exception, no academic author (or 
WTO decision or document) disputes that WTO rules are part of the wider corpus of public international law. 
676 “US - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline” (n 244) para. 16. See Howse and Mutua (n 672) 
66, stating that human rights norms should always be taken into account when interpreting international trade and 
investment obligations. ibid. 76, trade policies and globalisation affect economic, social and cultural rights, in 
particular, hence, the necessity of safeguarding these rights within the context of the GATT/WTO regime. See 
also Gabrielle Marceau, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights’ (2002) 13 European Journal of 
International Law 4, 780, arguing that the term “rules of international law” seems to refer to all sources of 
international law. Customs, general principles of international law (Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute) or general 
principles of (domestic) law accepted by nations (Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute), including those relating to 
human rights, would have to be taken into account in the interpretation of WTO provisions. 
677Article 31(2) of the VCLT (n 119). 
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We consider that a multilateral interpretation pursuant to Article IX: 2 of the WTO 
Agreement can be likened to a subsequent agreement regarding the interpretation of 
the treaty or the application of its provisions pursuant to Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna 
Convention, as far as the interpretation of the WTO agreements is concerned.678 
 
Pursuant to Article 31(3) of the VCLT, ‘there shall be taken into account, together with the 
context, any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty 
or the application of its provisions’.679 The Declaration is relevant as a legal instrument, as it 
was made by all Members in connection with the conclusion of TRIPS and accepted by the 
wider international community as an instrument related to the Agreement. Based on an 
extension of that logic, one can make a strong argument that the Doha documents should 
constitute a subsequent agreement.680  
 
Thus, with regard to Ghana, the Doha Declaration contains important provisions for the 
interpretation and application of compulsory licensing triggered by non-working under the 
TRIPS Agreement. The Declaration is, at the very least, an instrument that provides the 
relevant context in regard to any reading of the consistency of local working with TRIPS. 
Significantly, the WTO body, that is, the Ministerial Conference that has the exclusive 
authority to issue such interpretations regarding WTO laws delivered the Declaration.681 In the 
Japan - Alcoholic Beverages case, the Appellate Body confirmed that Article IX: 2 of the WTO 
Agreement provides that:  
The Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall have the exclusive 
authority to adopt interpretations of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements ... The fact that such an [exclusive] authority in interpreting the treaty 
has been established so specifically in the WTO Agreement is reason enough to 
                                                 
678 EC – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas’ (Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by Ecuador and Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States (WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, 
WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU/Corr.1, WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA/Corr.1, Nov. 26, 2008) 
para. 383. 
679 Article 31(3)(a) of the VCLT (n 119). See Yu (n 309) 999. 
680 Yusuf (n 317) 15, arguing that the Doha Declaration may be considered to constitute a subsequent agreement 
between the parties to a treaty regarding its interpretation in accordance with Article 31.3(a) of the VLCT. Ruse-
Khan (n 315) 42, finding that formally, the Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health can be considered as a source 
for interpreting TRIPS equivalent to treaty “context” as it amounts to a ‘subsequent agreement between the parties 
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions’ under Article 31.3(a) of the Vienna 
Convention. 
681 Andrew Mitchell and Tania Voon, ‘Patents and Public Health in the WTO, FTAs and Beyond: Tension and 
Conflict in International Law’ (2009) 43 Journal of World Trade 3, 581, commenting on the Doha Declaration on 
TRIPS and Public Health in relation to Article IX(3)&(4) of the WTO Marrakesh Agreement, which stipulates, 
‘In exceptional circumstances, the Ministerial Conference may decide to waive an obligation imposed on a 
Member by this Agreement or any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements….’. By that reference, the authors 
concluded that member states, ‘intended as a binding waiver of certain TRIPS obligations...’ 
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conclude that such authority does not exist by implication or by inadvertence 
elsewhere.682  
 
In relation to public health, through the Doha Declaration, the WTO has tempered the 
conflicting interpretations, in particular the opposing view urged upon us, which has tended to 
indicate that Article 27(1) of TRIPS would prohibit Ghana and other WTO Members from 
granting a compulsory licence provided that the patented invention has not been worked 
locally. Thus, the Doha Declaration has settled this controversy, and has provided the correct 
interpretation. Regarding local production of essential medicines, it is significant that the 
TRIPS Agreement made technology transfer and socio-economic welfare its overriding 
objectives while maintaining a proper balance of rights and obligations.683  
 
Given that the agreements covered by the WTO form a single, integrated legal system,684 the 
objectives and principles of the TRIPS Agreement need to be considered in relation to this 
particular objective.685 More significantly, the TRIPS Agreement allows Ghana and other 
WTO Members to formulate or amend their laws and regulations to adopt measures necessary 
to protect public health and promote the public interest in vital sectors,686 such as the 
pharmaceutical industry,687 and to adopt TRIPS consistent measures, such as compulsory 
licensing under Article 31, to prevent the abuse of patent rights,688 which the Paris Convention 
as incorporated into TRIPS cites as an example of abuse.689  
 
Notably, Paragraph 4 of the Declaration did not repeat the phrase “adopt measures necessary 
to protect public health” as used in Article 8(1) of TRIPS but has the same practical 
                                                 
682 “Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages” (n 246) 44, Section E. 
683 Article 7 of TRIPS. See Correa (n 179) 92. Yu (n 309) 1007, observing that Article 7 can be interpreted in a 
way to restore the balance of the international intellectual property system. 
684 Panel Report - United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act (WT/DS160/R, Jun. 15, 2000) para. 
6.185. 
685 “Resource Book on TRIPS” (n 16) 130, interpreting that ‘The objectives and principles of TRIPS must be 
considered in relation to the objectives of the WTO Agreement, which is reflected in its preamble’. Henning 
Grosse Ruse-Khan, Proportionality and Balancing Within the Objectives for Intellectual Property Protection. In: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, Paul Torremans (ed.), ((Alphen, aan den Regin, 
Kluwer Law International, 2008) 162, analysing the role of a proportional balancing of interests within intellectual 
property protection as part of international economic regulation. 
686 “Resource Book on TRIPS” (n 16) 127, observing that the TRIPS Agreement does not offer any definition of 
the relevant sectors. sectors of vital importance may vary from country to country and region to region. See Correa 
(n 179) 104. 
687 Article 8(1) of TRIPS. 
688 Article 8(2) of TRIPS. 
689 Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention. 
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understanding.690 Offering the correct interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement in relation to 
public health, the WTO Members stressed the need for the TRIPS Agreement to be part of the 
wider national and international action to address the public health problems afflicting Ghana 
and other WTO Members.691 They settled that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not 
prevent Ghana and other WTO Members from taking measures to protect public health and, in 
particular, to promote access to medicines for all.692  
 
Put differently, the WTO agreed that  Ghana and other WTO Members have the right to 
interpret and implement the TRIPS Agreement in a way that supports public health goals such 
as the promotion of affordable medicines.693 In this connection, they reaffirmed the right of 
Ghana and other WTO Members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, 
which provide flexibility694 for the purpose of securing better domestic access to necessary 
medicines for all diseases including HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.695  
 
It is important to note that apart from the compulsory licensing instrument the TRIPS 
Agreement embodies other flexibilities, which can be used to promote affordable medicines. 
For example, in relation to the notion of patentable subject matter under Article 27, three 
criteria for patentability (novelty, inventive step and industrial application) are not defined 
under TRIPS. Each Member is free to interpret their meanings, which can determine what is 
patented in the pharmaceutical sector.  
 
In addition, governments can refuse to grant patents for the following reasons that may relate 
to public health, including inventions whose commercial exploitation needs to be prevented to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health (Article 27(2)); diagnostic, therapeutic and 
surgical methods for treating humans or animals (Article 27(3)(a)). Other flexibilities include 
exhaustion of rights (parallel importation) under Article 6; research and experimental use 
exception (Article 30); regulatory (bolar) exception (Article 30); public, non-commercial use 
                                                 
690 “TRIPS Resource Book” (n 13) 131, stating that the operative language of Paragraph 4 is in the form of 
agreement and this may be interpreted as a “decision” of the members under Article IX. 1 of the WTO Agreement. 
691 “Doha Declaration” (n 6) para. 2. 
692 ibid. para. 4. 
693 id. 
694 id. 
695 ibid. paras. 1, 5(c). See Anderson (n 40) 97. 
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(government use) (Article 31); scope of pharmaceutical test data protection (Article 39(3)); 
competition law (Article 40) and transition periods (Articles 65(2); 65(4); and 66(1)).696  
 
Importantly, the WTO Members recognised that these flexibilities include the right of Ghana 
and each WTO Member to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds 
upon which such licences are granted.697 Additionally, they committed the WTO to creating 
flexibility for the its Members unable to manufacture pharmaceuticals domestically.698 
Paragraph 6 of the Declaration in part reads: ‘We recognize that WTO Members with 
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties 
in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement’. The Members 
then instructed the Council for TRIPS to act promptly to find a solution to the problem faced 
by Ghana and other WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the 
pharmaceutical sector in making effective use of compulsory licensing under TRIPS.699  
 
Although, Paragraph 5(b) of the Doha Declaration confirmed the right of each WTO Member 
to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds on which such licences 
are founded, it is important to distinguish between the granting of a compulsory licence to 
address deficiencies with the patent including a failure to meet the reasonable requirements of 
the public, the inaccessibility of the patented invention at a reasonably affordable price to the 
public, or the non-working of the patented invention locally, and a compulsory licence aimed 
at tackling a national emergency and other circumstances of extreme urgency.  
 
To the extent necessary, the complex conditions and the formal procedural requirements 
developed by the Doha Solution are only relevant to real situations of national emergency and 
other circumstances of extreme urgency but immaterial to the use of a compulsory licence 
aimed at addressing local working shortcomings. Therefore, the Doha Solution is unique in the 
sense that it authorises a WTO Member to issue a compulsory licence for the manufacture and 
export of patented pharmaceutical products to any country with an inadequate or non-existent 
                                                 
696 UNAIDS. Doha+10 TRIPS Flexibilities and Access to Antiretroviral Therapy: Lessons from the Past, 
Opportunities for the Future (UNAIDS Technical Brief, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. 
JC2260E, Nov. 2011) 8-11. See also Ellen ‘t Hoen, Jacquelyn Veraldi, Brigit Toebesc and Hans Hogerzeil, 
‘Medicine Procurement and the Use of Flexibilities in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, 2001–2016’ (2018) 96 Bull World Health Organisation 3, 185. 
697 “Doha Declaration” (n 6) para. 5(b). 
698 ibid. para. 6. 
699 id. 
 132 
manufacturing capacity to meet public non-commercial demand or solve a genuine national 
emergency and other circumstances of extreme urgency. 
 
5.7. 2003 Waiver Decision and the Amendment of Article 31 of TRIPS to Allow Ghana 
and other WTO to Grant Compulsory Licences  
 
Two years later, on 30 August 2003, the WTO General Council announced a solution to the 
problem identified under Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, which was dubbed: “The 
Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health”.700 The solution took the form of an interim waiver for any LDC Member 
or Member that compares closely with Ghana, with insufficient or pharmaceutical 
manufacturing capacity to make use of the Decision to import any pharmaceutical product 
needed to address public health problems.701  
 
In short, this Decision waived the obligations set out in Paragraphs (f) and (h) of Article 31 of 
TRIPS with respect to pharmaceutical products so that Ghana and other WTO Members can 
expeditiously use the compulsory licensing instrument to promote affordable medicines. This 
Decision was adopted via the Chairman’s statement of the Council for TRIPS, which sets out 
several key shared understandings of WTO Members on how the Decision would be interpreted 
and implemented,702 and was designed to appease those who feared that the Decision might be 
abused and used to undermine patent protection.703  
 
Importantly, if Ghana and other WTO Members were to grant a compulsory licence WTO 
Members shall not challenge any of such measures taken in conformity with the provisions of 
the waivers,704 except that the Decision was intended only to be an interim measure and the 
TRIPS Council was mandated to find a more permanent solution.705 In the end, the WTO 
Members focused their efforts on amending the source of the problem, Article 31(f) itself. On 
December 6, 2005, the waiver became the first-ever amendment to TRIPS.706 
 
                                                 
700 “Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration” (n 47). 
701 ibid. paras. 1(a)-(b). 
702 See “WTO Doc. JOB(03)/177” (n 48). 
703 WTO General Council, Minutes of Meeting (WTO Doc. WT/GC/M/82, held on Aug. 25, 26 & 30, 2003) para. 
29. 
704 “Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration” (n 47) para. 10. 
705 ibid. para. 11. 
706 “Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement” (n 49). 
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Designated as Article 31bis, the amendment was formally built into the TRIPS Agreement after 
acceptance of the “Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement” by two thirds of the WTO’s 
members.707 The amendment will be attached to the TRIPS Agreement following Article 31, 
which will make permanent the Decision on patents and public health.708 The amendment took 
effect on 23 January 2017 and replaced the 2003 waiver for Members who have accepted the 
amendment. Members like Ghana who are yet to accept the amendment had until 31 December 
2019 to do so.709 However, for Ghana and other WTO yet to accept the amendment, the waiver 
will continue to apply until they accept the amendment and it takes effect. The permanent 
amendment was intended to give legal certainty that would make is easier for Ghana and other 
WTO Members to use compulsory licences or in the context of Ghana the Section 84 model to 
obtain affordable medicines for distribution.710 
 
5.8. The Doha Declaration and the Right to Health 
  
To start with, the legal difficulties encountered by Ghana and other WTO Members in an 
attempt to obtain affordable medicines regarding the implications of the TRIPS Agreement and 
public health were reflected in the adoption of the Doha Declaration. The Doha Declaration 
recognised the “gravity” of the public health problems afflicting Ghana and other WTO 
Members, especially – but not limited to – those resulting from HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, 
Malaria and other epidemics.711 Importantly, the Declaration reflects the concern regarding the 
implications of the TRIPS Agreement for public health in general, and particularly concerns 
about the resulting effects on the prices of essential medicines that Ghana and other WTO 
Members face.712 A major concern was that while the WHO had introduced essential medicines 
lists and national medicine policy concepts, access to essential medicines was challenging.713  
 
                                                 
707 id.  
708 Abbott and Reichman (n 460) 984. 
709 Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement. Sixth Extension of the Period for the Acceptance by Members of the 
Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement (Ministerial Conference Decision of Nov. 30, 2017, WTO Doc. 
WT/L/1024, Dec. 1, 2017). 
710 Anderson (n 50) 168, stating that the amendment was created to provide flexibility and better access to 
medicines. 
711 “Doha Declaration” (n 6) para. 1. 
712 Correa (n 661) 27-28. 
713 “WHO Medicines Strategy: 2000–2003” (n 659) 1-2, observing at the time that 160 countries had national 
essential drugs lists, while over 100 countries had national drug policies, access to medicines were still 
challenging. 
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The Declaration is significant to Ghana and other WTO Members for several reasons. First, it 
represents the first time that international health and development was discussed at every level 
of WTO governance.714 Second, the Declaration recognises that public health issues can take 
precedence over IP rights, which the TRIPS Agreement recognises as private rights.715 As 
examined already, Paragraph 4 affirms the principle that protecting public health and 
promoting access to medicines is a valid basis for Ghana and other WTO Members to use the 
flexibilities under TRIPS.716 It stipulates that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not 
prevent Ghana and other WTO Members from taking measures to protect public health, and 
affirms that the provisions of the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented 
in a manner supportive of Ghana and other WTO Members’ right to protect public health and, 
in particular, to promote access to medicines for all. 
 
In fact, human rights norms present a major means for Ghana and other WTO Members to 
interpret TRIPS consistent with public health objectives, as the WTO recognises under the 
Doha Declaration that there is a convincing justification that access to medicines should be 
available for all.717 The background to making access to medicines a shared norm backed by 
the law at the international level follows a useful framework underpinning the basic principles 
of the overriding objective of public health protection.718 This concept first emerged in the 
WHO Constitution, which states that ‘The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, 
religion, political belief, economic or social condition’.719  
 
The premise that access to essential medicines is a prerequisite for realising the right to health 
in Ghana and other WTO Members was reiterated in the 1978 Declaration of Alma Ata.720 As 
                                                 
714 Bryan Mercurio, ‘TRIPS, Patents and Access to Life-Saving Drugs in the Developing World’ (2004) 8 
Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review 2, 212. 
715 Preamble to the TRIPS Agreement. See Bryan Mercurio, ‘Resolving the Public Health Crisis in the Developing 
World: Problems and Barriers of Access to Essential Medicines’ (2006) 5 Northwestern Journal of International 
Human Rights 1, para. 8. 
716 ibid. para. 10. 
717 “Doha Declaration” (n 6) para. 4. 
718 Shared Responsibilities for Health: A Coherent Global Framework for Health Financing (Final Report of the 
Centre on Global Health Security Working Group on Health Financing, Chatham House, the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 2014) 7. 
719 Preamble to the Constitution of WHO. Adopted by the International Health Conference, Jun. 19-22, 1946; 
signed on Jul. 22, 1946. Official Records of WHO, No. 2, p. 100, entered force on Apr. 7, 1948. 
720 Health for All: Alma Ata Declaration. Almaty, Kazakhstan, International Conference on Primary Health Care, 
WHO 1978) Declaration I. Available: <http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s21369en/s21369en.pdf> 
[Accessed Feb. 26, 2017]. 
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indicated earlier, per the WHO concept, essential medicines are those that ‘satisfy the priority 
health care needs of the population’ and ‘are intended to be available within the context of 
functioning health systems at all times in adequate amounts, in the appropriate dosage forms, 
with assured quality, and at a price the individual and the community can afford’.721 
Importantly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHRs) provided the inherent 
significance of the right to health into the core obligations which states are bound to respect. 
The UDHRs asserts that everyone, equally, has the inalienable right to ‘a standard of living 
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, 
housing and medical care and necessary social services.722 
 
Therefore, in considering the need for essential medicines in Ghana and other WTO Members, 
the UN Development Group defines “access” in this context as ‘having medicines continuously 
available and affordable at public or private health facilities or medicine outlets that are within 
one hour’s walk from the homes of the population’.723 The WHO’s strategic policy document 
for 2000-2003, which Ghana adopted considered better access to essential medicines a priority 
health issue.724 Significantly, in 2008, Ghana and other WHO Members reaffirmed their 
commitment to promoting access to essential medicines with the adoption of a resolution on 
the “Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property” 
(GSPA-PHI).725  
 
One of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which Ghana and other WTO 
Members have accepted in principle, is to ensure ‘access to safe, effective, quality and 
affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all’.726 Relative to the SDGs and the notion of 
“medicines for all”, it is significant that under Paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration, the WTO 
was supportive of the Members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote 
access to medicines for all. 
 
                                                 
721 See “WHO’s Essential Medicines Concept” (n 6). 
722 Article 25(1) the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (n 32).  
723 “Millennium Development Goal 8” (n 36) 35. 
724 Medicines Strategy: Framework for Action in Essential Drugs and Medicines Policy 2000-2003 (Geneva, 
WHO/EDM/2000, WHO, 2000). 
725 World Health Assembly Resolution WHA61.21 (Eighth Plenary Meeting, Agenda Item 11.6, A61/VR/8, 
WHO, May 24, 2008. 
726 Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN Res. A/RES/70/1, Seventieth 
Session, Agenda Items 15 and 116, Sept. 25, 2015) Goal 3 Targets. 
 136 
Within the UN human rights norms and practices the reasoned position is that access to 
medicines is a human rights subject matter, as several international727 and regional human 
rights instruments, which Ghana remains a signatory to have widely recognised the right to 
health.728 The domains of the right to health norm have been transposed into some national 
constitutional provisions including Ghana.729 As stated already, Article 25(1) of the UDHR 
reads: ‘Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health of himself and of 
his family, including …. medical care’.730 The right to health was later expanded and included 
in Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).731  
 
Consistently, several resolutions and declarations at the international level, including those 
under the UN and its constituent agencies, which Ghana has accepted have placed access to 
medicines as a significant component of the right to health.732 In 2000, the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in General Comment No. 14, upheld the special 
relationship between the right to a standard of living adequate for health and access to 
medicines as a human rights matter.733 This followed several political declarations by the UN 
                                                 
727 Articles 11(1)(f) and 12 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
[GA res. 34/180, 34 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 46) 193, UN Doc. A/34/46; 1249 UNTS 13; 19 ILM 33 (1980)]. 
Article 5 (e) (iv) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination [660 
UNTS 195; G.A. res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966)]. Article 
24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child [GA res. 44/25, annex, 44 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 49) 167, U.N. 
Doc. A/44/49 (1989); 1577 UNTS 3; 28 ILM 1456 (1989)]. 
728 Article 11 of the European Social Charter, European Social Charter (Revised), May 3, 1996, ETS 163, entry 
into force Jul. 1, 1999, Council of Europe. Strasbourg. Article 16 of the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force 
Oct. 21, 1986. Article 10 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, OAS Treaty Series No. 69; 28 ILM 156 (1989). 
729 Under Section 27(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, “Everyone has the right to have 
access to – (a) Health care services, including reproductive health care”. Paragraph (2) of Section 27, imposes an 
obligation on the state to take steps to put in place a legal framework that facilitates access to health care services. 
See Eleanor Kinney and Brian Alexander Clark, ‘Provisions for Health and Health Care in the Constitutions of 
the Countries of the World’ (2004) 37 Cornell International Law Journal 2, 346. According to the South African 
Constitutional Court’s decision in Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 
2) (CCT8/02) [2002] ZACC 15; 2002 (5) SA 721; 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (Jul. 5, 2002) para. 135(3), access to 
health care services includes access to medicines. See also Chapter 5 of the Constitution of Ghana 1992. Article 
41 of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan 1995. Article 50 of the Constitution of Cuba 1992, as amended in 
1978, 1992 and in 2002. For a global view of medicines-related rights in national constitutions, see Katrina 
Perehudof, Brigit Toebes, and Hans Hogerzeil, ‘Essential Medicines in National Constitutions: Progress Since 
2008’ (2016) 18 Health and Human Rights Journal 1, 146, Table 1. 
730 “Universal Declaration on Human Rights” (n 32). 
731 “ICESCRs” (n 32).  
732 World Health Assembly Resolution WHA62.16 (Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 
Innovation and Public Health, Eighth Plenary Meeting, Agenda Item 12.8., A62/VR/8, May 22, 2009. Resolution 
on Access to Health and Needed Medicines in Africa. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. OAU 
Doc. ACHPR/Res.141 (XXXXIIII)08, 24 November 2008). The Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS (UN 
General Assembly Res. GA. Res. S-26/2, Eighth Plenary Meeting, Twenty-Sixth Special Session, Agenda Item 
8, Jun. 27, 2001) Annex. 
733 “General Comment No. 14” (n 33) para. 12. 
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reaffirming734 the obligation on Ghana and other WTO Members to enhance access to 
affordable essential medicines, as defined by the “WHO Action Programme on Essential 
Drugs”.735  
 
In this context, the UN has affirmed that a central principle underpinning the framework of 
access to medicines as a human rights matter includes Ghana’s right to offer a broader 
interpretation of the right to treatment.736 Within this purview, a rights-based approach can help 
mitigate the lack of essential medicines in Ghana, as Article 2(2) of the Covenant imposes on 
WHO Members two immediate obligations: firstly, a duty imposed on Ghana to guarantee that 
the right to health will be exercised without discrimination of any kind; and, secondly, a duty 
on Ghana to take deliberate, concrete and targeted steps, as provided in Article 2(1), towards 
the full realisation of Article 12.737 
 
Importantly, in relation to the need for essential medicines in Ghana and other WTO Members, 
the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted a Resolution in 2001, in which it recognised 
that “access to medication” is a fundamental element for progressively achieving the full 
realisation of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health.738 Among a list of measures, it called on Ghana and other WTO 
Members ‘to refrain from taking measures which would deny or limit equal access for all 
person’s’, clearly with IP in mind.739 In furtherance of this, the Office of the High 
Commissioner prepared a report in 2001 on the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on human 
rights;740 and the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights took this 
up in its Resolution in the same year, pursuant to “Intellectual Property Rights and Human 
Rights”.  
 
                                                 
734 Political Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Prevention and Control of 
non-communicable Diseases (UN General Assembly Res. A/RES/66/2, Third Plenary Meeting, Sixty-Sixth 
Session, Agenda Item 117, Jan. 24, 2012) para. 5. 
735 WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs (WHA Res. WHA31.32, Twelfth Plenary Meeting, May 23, 1978 
(Committee A, Third Report). 
736 Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
including the Right to Development (UNHC Res. A/HRC/RES/12/24, Thirty-Second Meeting, Twelfth Session, 
Agenda Item 3, Oct. 2, 2009) para. 7. 
737 Hans Hogerzeil, ‘Essential Medicines and Human Rights: What Can They Learn From Each Other? (2006) 84 
Bulleting of the World Health Organisation 5, 372. 
738 “Commission on Human Rights Resolution” (n 36). 
739 ibid. para. 3(a). 
740 The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights (UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13, Jun. 27, 2001). 
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The Resolution, adopted by consensus, referred to the actual or potential conflict between the 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement in WTO Members that compare closely with Ghana, 
and international human rights law, pursuant to the realisation of economic, social and cultural 
rights, and reminded Ghana and all WTO Members of the primacy of human rights obligations 
over economic policies and agreements.741 The 2016 Resolution by the UN Human Rights 
Council confirmed the same proposition, stressing the responsibility of Ghana and other WTO 
Members to ensure access for all to affordable, safe, efficacious and quality essential 
medicines.742  
 
Moreover, Article 73 of TRIPS enables Ghana and other WTO Members to pursue any actions 
that they consider necessary for the protection of their essential security interests, and to fulfil 
their obligations under the UN Charter. With this provision in mind, it is submitted that Ghana 
has the right to determine what constitutes its national security interests, and if, public health 
protection in relation to the high costs and shortages of essential medicines pose a fundamental 
threat to the security of its people then the country is free from adopting and implementing the 
Indian model in Section 84 to promote local production of affordable medicines. 
 
Notably, Article 103 of the UN Charter hints that a rule of international law may also be 
superior to other rules by virtue of a treaty provision. It says that: ‘In the event of a conflict 
between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the … Charter and their 
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the … Charter 
shall prevail’. Specifically, the need to protect public health in Ghana and other WTO Members 
is addressed in Article 1(3) of the UN Charter, which provides that one of the purposes of the 
UN is: ‘to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, 
social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights’.743  
 
It is also recognised that the UN Charter enjoys special character owing to the fundamental 
nature of some of its norms, particularly its principles, purposes and universal acceptance.744 
                                                 
741 Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights (UN Human Rights Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights Res. 2001/21, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/2001/21, Aug. 16, 2001) para. 2 & 3. 
742 Promoting the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental 
Health through Enhancing Capacity-Building in Public Health (Human Rights Council, Thirty-Second Session, 
Agenda Item 3, A/HRC/32/L.24/Rev.1, Jun. 30, 2016) para. 2. 
743 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations. 1 UNTS XVI, Oct. 24, 1945. 
744 ibid. Article 2(6). 
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The scope of Article 103 extends not only to the articles of the Charter but also to binding 
decisions made by UN organs. Given the strength of the constitutional character of the UN 
Charter and the established practice of the Members as well as UN organs, the Charter 
obligations may also prevail over any inconsistent international law.745 This view is based on 
the presumption that as far as essential medicines in Ghana is concerned the primacy of a 
human right in international law enjoys a special status given its normative superiority and the 
collective scope of its applicability.746  
 
It is important to note that the SDGs carry a UN mandate,747 which recognises medicines as 
essential commodities for the fulfilment of the right to health in Ghana and other WTO 
Members.748 Therefore, taking this into account, it is significant that Paragraph 2 of the Doha 
Declaration adopted a language in part reflecting the foregoing provision under UN Charter. 
The WTO Members stressed the need for the WTO TRIPS Agreement to be part of the wider 
national and international action to address the gravity of the public health problems afflicting 
                                                 
745 Howse and Mutua (n 672) 65-66, observing that the Text of the GATT does not, however, explicitly list human 
rights as grounds for the exclusion of products. It does, however, contain provisions that permit states to protect 
and promote human rights through trade by taking certain measures against states that violate human rights. The 
pivotal provision in this respect is Article XX which provides a wide array of exceptions under which a WTO 
Member can promote and protect human rights without being in violation of the GATT. 
746 Javid Rehman, International Human Rights Law (Harlow, UK: Pearson, 2nd edn. 2010) 3. 
747 “Sustainable Development Goals” (n 712) Goal 3 Targets. 
748 Experts remain divided about whether human rights norms fit well within the interpretation of WTO rules. The 
following scholars are convinced that the world trade regime has a mutual basis with human rights. See Howse 
and Mutua (n 672) 56, arguing that trade and human rights regimes need not be in conflict, so long as the trade 
regime is applied and evolved in a manner that respects the hierarchy of norms in international law, human rights, 
to the extent they are obligations erga omnes, or have the status of customs, or of general principles, will normally 
prevail over specific, conflicting provisions of treaties such as trade agreements. The WTO laws and processes 
must be interpreted in a way that advances human rights. Thus, human rights and trade are fundamentally linked 
and must be seen as complementary, not oppositional. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International 
Trade law: Defining and Connecting the Two Fields. In: HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
(eds.) Thomas Cottier, Joost Pauwelyn and Elisabeth Burgi (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005) 29, proving 
the consistency of both norm by explaining how the values informing human rights and the general principles of 
international trade regime are similar. Robert Anderson and Hannu Wager, ‘Human Rights, Development and the 
WTO: The Cases of Intellectual Property and Competition Policy’ (2006) 9 Journal of International Economic 
Law 3, 708, arguing that rules of multilateral trading system are a necessary response to the dilemmas of 
globalisation and remain instruments for the advancement of human rights. However, note that the following 
scholars see no potential in the interpretation of both norms in harmony. Tatjana Eres, ‘The Limits of GATT 
Article XX: A Back Door for Human Rights?’ (2004) 35 Georgetown Journal of International Law 597, 631, 
explaining that most unilateral trade restrictive measures designed to promote human rights are grossly ineffective. 
Sarah Cleveland, ‘Human Rights Sanctions and International Trade: A Theory of Compatibility’ (2002) 5 Journal 
of International Economic Law 133, 145, explaining that a directed human rights measure will come up against 
some challenges, as it might be difficult to measure the effectiveness of human rights measures in international 
trade regime. Pengcheng Gao, ‘Rethinking the Relationship Between the WTO and International Human Rights’ 
(2009) 8 Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 3, 401, arguing that despite the value of non-
discrimination underlies both regimes, strictly speaking, the WTO does not incorporate genuinely classic human 
rights, as scholars commonly interpret. Jenny Schultz and Rachel Ball, ‘Trade as a Weapon? The WTO and 
Human Rights-Based Trade Measures’ (2007) 12 Deakin Law Review 1, 71 explaining that trade rules restrict the 
ability of WTO Member States to promote and protect international human rights through trade measures.  
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Ghana and other WTO Members by further affirming the commitment of developed-country 
members to provide incentives to Ghana and other WTO Members’ enterprises and institutions 
to promote and encourage technology transfer to promote essential affordable medicines 
including local manufacture.749 
 
From this viewpoint, if the Section 84 model that is consistent with TRIPS and allows for the 
granting of a compulsory licence provided that the patented invention has not been worked can 
be implemented in a manner supportive of the right to protect public health in Ghana, and in 
particular to promote local manufacture of affordable medicines for all, this will be legal. The 
Doha Declaration provided the same interpretation, which emphasised that the TRIPS 
Agreement does not and should not prevent Ghana and other WTO Members from taking 
measure to protect public health.750 
 
While the Doha Declaration was considered by many as a breakthrough in the efforts to 
improve access to medicines for Ghana and other WTO Members with insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector,751 because it gave an interpretation that 
recognised the primacy of public health over private IP rights and clarified Ghana and other 
WTO Members’ rights to use the TRIPS safeguards.752 Nevertheless, Ghana and other WTO 
                                                 
749 “Doha Declaration” (n 6) para. 7. 
750 ibid. para. 4. 
751 “Decision Removes Final Patent Obstacle to Cheap Drug Imports” (n 47). According to the then WTO 
Director-General, Supachai Panitchpakdi: 
This is a historic agreement for the WTO. The final piece of the jigsaw has fallen into 
place, allowing poorer countries to make full use of the flexibilities in the WTO’s 
intellectual property rules in order to deal with the diseases that ravage their people. 
It proves once and for all that the organization can handle humanitarian as well as 
trade concerns. This particular question has been specially difficult. The fact that 
WTO members have managed to find a compromise in such a complex issue bears 
testimony to their goodwill. This is a historic agreement for the WTO. The final piece 
of the jigsaw has fallen into place, allowing poorer countries to make full use of the 
flexibilities in the WTO’s intellectual property rules in order to deal with the diseases 
that ravage their people. It proves once and for all that the organization can handle 
humanitarian as well as trade concerns. This particular question has been specially 
difficult. The fact that WTO members have managed to find a compromise in such a 
complex issue bears testimony to their goodwill.  
For example, Mike Moore, the then WTO Director-General observed that, ‘The settlement shows that the WTO’s 
Agreements, such as TRIPS, contain the necessary flexibility to meet the health needs of developing countries 
and can be used as a basis for resolving difficult issues concerning access to essential drugs’. See Mike Moore, 
‘Moore Welcomes News of Settlement of South Africa Drug Lawsuit’ (World Trade Organisation, Apr. 19, 2001). 
Available at: <http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm58_e.htm> [Accessed Jun. 11, 2017]. See also 
James Thuo Gathii, Approaches to Assessing Essential Medicines and the TRIPS Agreement. In: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE, Peter Yu (ed.), (Westport Connecticut: Praeger, Volume 4, 2007) 400. 
752 ‘t Hoen (n 566) 28. 
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Members that are in need of affordable medicines the most have not been able to utilise the 
Doha Solution to promote affordable medicine.   
 
5.9. Procedural Restrictions Imposed by the Doha Solution the Use of Compulsory 
Licences 
 
When considering the right of Ghana and other WTO Members to obtain affordable medicines, 
the main purpose of Article 31bis is to waive the domestic supply requirement under Article 
31(f) to enable importing Members to use the Doha system expeditiously.753 Article 31bis 
accomplishes this objective in two ways. First, it would allow Ghana and other WTO Members 
to grant compulsory licences for their own local manufacturers to produce generic medicines, 
and even export some of the medicines to other WTO Members in need.754 Second, it would 
allow WTO Members like Ghana lacking sufficient domestic manufacturing capacity as 
identified in Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration to obtain cheaper generic medicines from 
other WTO Members such as India with adequate manufacturing capacity to export generic 
medicines.755 
 
Still, some serious hurdles remain. Despite several WTO Members adopting the amendment 
or creating domestic laws to comply with it, and even more articulating support for it, to date,756 
only two sets of WTO Members have chosen to make use of Article 31bis.757 The Doha 
Paragraph 6 Programme appears to have placed further restrictions on the extent to which 
Ghana and other WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the 
pharmaceutical sector can make effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS 
Agreement as identified in Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration.758 These include firstly, a 
                                                 
753 “Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement” (n 49) see Chapeau. 
754 “Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration” (n 47) para. 1(a). See Anderson (n 50) 172. 
755 id. para. 2. “Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement” (n 49) para. 1. See Brook Baker, ‘Arthritic Flexibilities for 
Accessing Medicines: Analysis of WTO Action Regarding Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health’ (2004) 14 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 3, 677, stating that 
LDCs will also be permitted to use the August 30 Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement without not necessarily 
a need to immediately adopt legislation permitting compulsory licences. 
756 See the list of members. <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm> [Accessed Sept. 
12, 2017]. 
757 See Ho (n 589) 217.  
758 Anderson (n 40) 173-174. Note on the other hand that while the Doha Solution is overly complex in nature for 
Ghana and other WTO Members to use, evidence also suggests that generally the flexibilities under the TRIPS 
Agreement have been used more frequently by WTO Members than is commonly assumed and have proven 
effective for procuring generic versions of essential medicines, particularly for treating HIV infection. See Ellen 
‘t Hoen, et al (n 696) 190. ibid. at 186, finding that between 2011 and 2016 there were 144 use of TRIPS flexibility 
measures: of which 100 involved compulsory or public non-commercial use licences by 89 countries. Of the 100 
instances of compulsory licensing, 81 were implemented, but 19 were not because: (i) the patent holder offered a 
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condition on importing countries (LDCs excluded) who must notify the TRIPS Council of their 
eligibility and desire to use compulsory licensing under the Article 31bis scheme.759  
 
That is, for a country like Ghana to import patented medicines, they must first be an “eligible 
importing Member”, which is defined as any LDC Member, or a Member that has notified the 
TRIPS Council of its intention to use the system as an importer.760 Secondly, in determining 
the eligibility of a country to import a specific medicine, the importing country must either be 
an LDC or decide in accordance with the Appendix to Article 31bis that the country lacks the 
manufacturing capacity for that specific medicine,761 or make a convincing case that it has 
insufficient or no manufacturing capacity for the product it seeks.762 
 
Moreover, an importing Member that intends to issue a compulsory licence can only do so, 
where a pharmaceutical product under consideration is patented in its territory.763 Additionally, 
importing countries must also notify the TRIPS Council, specifying the name of the products 
and the expected quantities to be imported.764 Furthermore, exporting countries must also issue 
a compulsory licence.765 Also, eligible importing Members shall take reasonable measures to 
prevent trade diversion or the re-exportation of the products that have been imported into their 
territories.766 This also includes an obligation to make available effective legal means to 
prevent the importation into, and sale in, their territories of products produced under the system 
and diverted to their markets.767  
 
Although the Decision adopts a solution, the numerous safeguards ensuring that no abuses and 
trade diversions are possible make the process of implementing a compulsory licence 
disproportionately cumbersome for Ghana and other WTO Members facing a serious health 
crisis.768 Moreover, it contains a requirement on the part of the exporting Member to clearly 
identify products as generic versions under this exception, including distinguishing the 
                                                 
price reduction or donation (6 instances). ibid. 189, finding that there is publicity when there are harsh responses 
from the US and the EU when a country decides to use compulsory licensing. 
759 Article 31bis (n 47) Annex to the TRIPS Agreement, para. 1(b). See also paras. 2 & 2(c). 
760 Ho (n 645) 1492. 
761 Article 31bis (n 42) Annex to the TRIPS Agreement, para. 2(a)(ii). 
762 ibid. para. 2(a)(ii). 
763 ibid. para. 2(a)(iii). 
764 ibid. 2(a)(i). 
765 ibid. 2(b). 
766 ibid. para. 4. 
767 ibid. para. 5. 
768 Thapa (n 48) 473. 
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products through special packaging, colouring, and/or shaping,769 before shipment begins, as 
well as posting on a website the quantities being supplied to each destination and the 
distinguishing features of the generic product.770 At its end, an importing Member must specify 
the names and expected quantities of the product and, if the desired medicine is patented in its 
territory, confirm that it has issued a compulsory licence.771 
 
For example, under this scheme, Ghana might avoid double compensation, as the obligation in 
Article 31(h) is waived in the importing country provided that adequate remuneration was paid 
in the exporting country.772 However, the Decision specifies that the remuneration to be paid 
to the right holder in the country of export must take into account the economic value to the 
importing country of the use that was authorised in the exporting country.773 No clarification 
is provided on the application of this standard,774 and besides, there is little incentive for 
exporting countries to participate in the new compulsory licensing scheme.775  
 
This requirement presents further practical problems for Ghana and other WTO Members. In 
order to facilitate access to essential medicines to those living in developing countries, applying 
an approach that limits the amount of royalties paid to the patentee will help to reduce the costs 
to the generic manufacturer, create transparency and provide an incentive to generic 
manufacturers to produce low-cost generics under a compulsory licence, but this is not what 
the system stipulates.776 Furthermore, if some WTO Members are reluctant to issue compulsory 
licences for the benefit of their own people, it is even less likely that they will use this measure 
to assist WTO Members like Ghana that lacks adequate manufacturing capacity to promote 
affordable medicines.777  
 
Besides, the general instruction for Ghana and other WTO Members to ensure that the products 
so imported under a compulsory licence will be used for public health purposes is 
                                                 
769 Article 31bis (n 47) Annex to the TRIPS Agreement, para. 2(b)(ii) 
770 ibid. para. 2(b)(iii). 
771 ibid. para. 2(a)(i), (iii). 
772 ibid. para. 3. 
773 ibid. para. 2. See “Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration” (n 47) para. 3. 
774 Frederick Abbott and Rudolf Van Puymbroeck, Compulsory Licensing for Public Health: A Guide and Model 
Documents for Implementation of Doha Declaration Paragraph 6 Decision (Washington DC., World Bank, 2005) 
10-11. 
775 Thapa (n 48) 473. 
776 Ng and Kohler (n 586) 161. 
777 Subhasis Saha, ‘Patent Law and TRIPS: Compulsory Licensing of Patents and Pharmaceutical’ (2009) 91 
Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society 5, 364. 
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unreasonable.778 Last but not least, importing countries must take reasonable measures to 
prevent re-exportation of the medicines so that the medicines are in fact used for public health 
purposes.779 The procedural requirements of Article 31bis as outlined above are numerous, and 
the amendment imposes too many unnecessary obstacles for Ghana and other WTO 
Members.780 This is not a viable solution to increase access to medicines to Ghana and several 
other WTO Members.781 The procedures outlined in Article 31bis remain too complex, 
especially for developing countries that compare closely with Ghana to understand,782 as the 
amendment has made permanent a burdensome drug-by-drug, country-by-country decision-
making process’.783  
 
In this context, it is therefore argued that the process of both the exporting and importing 
countries obtaining compulsory licences increases transaction costs and the possibility of 
delay.784 The public notification provision in Article 31bis, which requires the showing of a 
country‘s intent to use a compulsory licensing scheme, is unreasonable and unnecessary.785 
The provision requiring general notification to the TRIPS Council serves no purpose other than 
to publicly broadcast the desire to use compulsory licensing along and erect political barriers 
limiting the usefulness of Article 31bis.786 It is obvious that the conditions established in both 
the text of the Decision and the statement in regard to allowing exports of patented medicines 
are hardly compatible with the idea of an “expeditious solution”, as identified under Paragraph 
6 of the Doha Declaration.787 
 
                                                 
778 Fanni Weitsman, ‘TRIPS, Access to Medicines and the “North-South” Conflict After Doha: The End or the 
Beginning’ (2006) 67 Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law 6, 18-19. 
779 Article 31bis (n 47) Annex to the TRIPS Agreement, para. 3. 
780 Abbott and Reichman (n 460) 932. 
781 James Tsai, Note, ‘Not Tripping over the Pebbles: Focusing on Overlooked TRIPS Article 66 for Technology 
Transfer to Solve Africa’s AIDS Crisis’ (2007) 11 Michigan State University College Journal of Medicine and 
Law 2, 458, citing Medecins San Frontieres concern and arguing that the procedural requirements for both 
importing and exporting countries as overly burdensome and bureaucratic and held that these requirements are a 
main reason why Article 31bis will not increase access to medicines. 
782 Dutfield (n 568) 123. 
783 Members Strike Deal on TRIPS and Public Health: Civil Society Unimpressed (Geneva, Bridges Weekly Trade 
News Digest, 7 December 2005) 3, citing scepticism raised by Doctors without Borders. 
784 Mark Lang, Note, ‘What a Long, Strange “TRIPS” It’s Been: Compulsory Licensing from the Adoption of 
TRIPS to the Agreement on Implementation of the Doha Declaration’ (2004) John Marshall Review of Intellectual 
Property Law 2, 343. 
785 Anderson (n 50) 174. 
786 Abbott and Reichman (n 460) 939. 
787 Medecins Sans Frontieres, Neither Expeditious, Nor A Solution: The WTO August 30th Decision is 
Unworkable: An Illustration through Canada’s Jean Chretien Pledge to Africa (Geneva, Campaign for Access to 
Essential Medicines, 2006). Available at: <https://www.msfaccess.org/content/neither-expeditious-nor-solution-
wto-august-30th-decision-unworkable> [Accessed Sept. 14, 2017]. 
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For example, the long protracted process delayed Rwanda’s ability to receive necessary 
medicines.788 Rwanda submitted its original notice of intent in July 2007, but its first shipment 
of medicines from Canada was not sent until September 2008, almost fifteen months later.789 
When people are dying from diseases that are treatable with medicines, these delays are 
inexcusable.790 For example, in early 2008, Nepal applied for an import-licence under Article 
31bis. Indian drug manufacturer Natco responded and applied for a compulsory licence to 
produce generic versions of two anti-cancer medicines. Natco proposed to manufacturer 45, 
000 doses of the medicine, and subject to Article 31(h), remunerate the patent-holders a five 
percent royalty.791  
 
While the Indian government was considering the matter, at the end of 2008, the initiative was 
indefinitely postponed as one of the patent right holders, Roche, had applied for the right to 
attend the hearing to approve the compulsory licence. When the Indian court permitted Roche 
to attend the hearing, Natco postponed the hearing. Roche then sued Natco for patent 
infringement. Two years later, the compulsory licence application was still pending.792 This 
example shows that the Doha Paragraph 6 Programme has created serious hurdles that can 
delay the Decision being used for its intended purpose and therefore, it will be unreasonable 
for Ghana to rely on such a slow system to promote access to timely medicines.793 For example, 
the Canadian company that exported the medicines to Rwanda is believed to have publicly 
stated that it would not be willing to do so again because the procedure was too cumbersome.794 
Nevertheless, there are suggestions that Canada’s Bill C-9 had some legislative flaws that 
prevented Apotex to speed up manufacturing and shipment of medicines to Rwanda.795 
                                                 
788 Anderson (n 50) 180. 
789 ibid. 180-181. 
790 Ng and Kohler (n 586) 172. 
791 Thapa (n 48) 473. 
792 id. 
793 Ng and Kohler (n 586) 143. Harris (n 85) 390. Anderson (n 40) 104-105. 
794 Apotex Inc. Press Release, CAMR Federal Law Needs to be Fixed if Life-saving Drugs for Children are to be 
Developed (May 14, 2009). Available at: <http://www.apotex.com/global/about/press/20090514.asp> [Accessed 
Sept. 14, 2017. See Ho (n 576) 217.  
795 See Duncan Matthews, ‘From the August 30, 2003 WTO Decision to the December 6, 2005 Agreement on an 
Amendment to TRIPS: Improving Access to Medicines in Developing Countries?’ (2006) 2006 Intellectual 
Property Quarterly 2, 117-118, assessing the complexities and weaknesses in the Canadian Bill C-9. Goldis 
Chami, Samuel Wasswa-Kintu, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Generic Drugs Remains Mired in Quagmires’ (2011) 
183 Canadian Medical Association Journal 11, E705. See also Joel Lexchin, ‘Canada and Access to Medicines 
in Developing Countries: Intellectual Property Rights First’ (2013) 9 Globalization and Health 42, 3, identifying 
the flaws in the legislation that made the act largely unworkable as including: the limited list of pharmaceutical 
products that were eligible for export, limitations on what countries a drug could be exported to, a short duration 
for a compulsory licence authorising the export of a generic, significant administrative roadblocks, a compulsory 
licence could only be issued after advance disclosure to the patent-holder of the name of the proposed recipient 
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The system is so complicated that it will remain virtually unused by Ghana and other WTO 
Members. This means that both Article 31 of TRIPS and the Doha Solution cannot be relied 
upon to ensure access to medicines in Ghana. Consequently, Section 84, which is consistent 
with TRIPS, and allows the granting of a compulsory licence provided that the patented 
invention has not been worked, would provide a feasible option to mitigate the unnecessarily 
complex and burdensome procedure that has been created. 
 
5.10. Conclusion 
 
Section 84, which allows the granting of a compulsory licence provided that the patented 
invention has not been worked in the territory of India, is consistent with Article 5(A) of the 
Paris Convention.  The TRIPS Agreement builds upon the provisions of Article 5(A) of the 
Paris Convention, and incorporates Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention provision under 
Article 2, thereby establishing the consistency of local working with TRIPS on condition that 
a compulsory licence may not be applied for on the grounds of failure to work or insufficient 
working before four years from the date of filing of the patent application or three years from 
the date of granting of the patent, whichever period expires last.  
 
The TRIPS Agreement however does not limit the grounds or underlying reasons that Ghana 
and other WTO Members might be used to justify the granting of compulsory licences; it 
therefore recognises the right of Ghana and each WTO Member to grant compulsory licences 
and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted subject to the 
conditions and procedural requirements under Article 31 of TRIPS. The Doha Declaration 
affirmed this interpretation.796 Even though Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration recognised 
that Ghana and WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the 
pharmaceutical sector face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under 
TRIPS, the so-called “expeditious” solution offered by the Doha mechanism, which later 
culminated with the permanent amendment of Article 31 of TRIPS entails complex procedural 
requirements.  
 
                                                 
country, a fixed “maximum quantity” of the product to be exported in generic form and the fact that a generic 
manufacturer had to file a separate application for every drug, for every amount produced and for every country 
to which it wanted to export a drug. 
796 “Doha Declaration” (n 6) para.5(b). 
 147 
This is evident in the fact that the Doha Solution has only been used once, partly due to the 
cumbersome formal procedures put in place.797 The examples of the administrative hurdles in 
Canada-Rwanda and India-Nepal illustrate the practical obstacles to be faced by Ghana and 
other WTO Members in using the scheme.798 The discussions in this chapter have shown that 
Article 31 of TRIPS allows Ghana and other WTO Members the right to grant compulsory 
licences on any grounds including non-working. However, the conditions and procedural 
requirements that Ghana and other WTO Members must satisfy when granting compulsory 
licences are too complex. Additionally, the procedural requirements developed in the Doha 
mechanism compound the problem by complicating the procedural requirements and adding 
more restrictions.799 
 
Put together, the requirements are too burdensome to follow, as they make it extremely difficult 
for Ghana and other WTO Members to effectively adopt measures to protect public health and, 
in particular, to promote access to affordable medicines pointless.800 Since compulsory 
licensing is infrequently used, TRIPS has not effectively reduced the price of medicines on a 
broad scale, which is essential to increase access to medicines in Ghana and other WTO 
Members.801 The argument therefore is that, in view of the multiple conditions and the complex 
procedural requirements for the granting of compulsory licensing, such a complex and 
                                                 
797 Ho (n 632) 1488, observing that despite the long list of procedural requirements compliance with these 
requirements has not generally been an issue. 
798 Ng and Kohler (n 573) 171. 
799 Roger Kampf, Special Compulsory Licences for Export of Medicines: Key Features of WTO Members’ 
Implementing Legislation (World Trade Organization Economic Research and Statistics Division, Staff Working 
Paper ERSD-2015-07, Jul. 31, 2015) (iv), providing some of the pre-grant conditions many WTO Members 
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elements: the product concerned, including, where available, the generic name that identifies a pharmaceutical 
substance or an active pharmaceutical ingredient (the International Non-Proprietary Name. See the Guidelines on 
the Use of International Nonproprietary Names (INNs) for Pharmaceutical Substances (WHO/PHAM S/NOM 
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in the case of non-WTO Members, to the competent national authority in accordance with para. 2(a) of the 2003 
Decision, the patent status in the importing country and, where applicable, the grant of a compulsory licence there, 
the identity of the purchaser, as well as distinguishing features to be applied to the generic product and the website 
address where the licensee makes relevant information available. In addition, some legislation specifically 
requires the granting authorities to provide the patent owner and, in some cases, also any other interested person, 
with an opportunity to be heard before a compulsory licence is granted. id. citing Botswana; Burundi; China; 
Iceland; Korea; Oman; Samoa; Chinese Taipei. For example, India requires the applicant for a compulsory licence 
to set out the interest in obtaining such a licence and the terms and conditions that are acceptable. See also 
Matthews (n 795) 130, concluding that further uncertainties lie ahead, including the prospect that some WTO 
Members may be prepared to engage in dispute settlement proceedings with respect to perceived or alleged 
breaches of the right and obligations to the amendment of the TRIPS Agreement. 
800 “Doha Declaration” (n 6) para. 4. 
801 Tina Bhatt, Note, ‘Amending TRIPS: A New Hope for Increased Access to Essential Medicines’ (2008) 33 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 2, 600. 
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burdensome system is largely symbolic and is unlikely to lead to any significant outcome in 
terms of promoting access to affordable medicines in Ghana and other WTO Members.802  
 
The conclusion is that Section 84, which is consistent with TRIPS, and allows the granting of 
a compulsory licence provided that the patented invention has not been worked, would provide 
a feasible option for Ghana to mitigate the unnecessarily complex and burdensome procedures 
that have been created. The next chapter questions whether the implementation of Section 84 
model in Ghana will threaten the attainment of socio-economic objectives resulting from the 
loss of inward FDI opportunities, risks of retaliatory action and their potential frustration owing 
to impact of FTAs. 
  
                                                 
802 Gary Sampson, The WTO and Sustainable Development (Hong Kong, United Nations University Press, 1st 
edn., 2005) 159. 
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Chapter Six 
 
6.0. Would Implementation of the Section 84 Model Threatens the Attainment of Socio-
Economic Objectives in Ghana? 
 
6.1. Aim of the Chapter 
 
This chapter examines whether Ghana’s implementation of the Section 84 model to promote 
affordable medicines will threaten the attainment of socio-economic objectives, due to the loss 
of inward FDI opportunities, retaliatory action and their potential frustration owing to the 
impact of FTAs. The chapter argues that no FTA provision will directly prohibit Ghana from 
implementing a Section 84 model to promote affordable medicines. Therefore, if Ghana can 
withstand the potential political pressure and high litigation costs and mitigate the domestic 
capacity issues pertaining to local manufacture for distribution, the attainment of socio-
economic objectives will not be threatened because there are inadequate linkages between 
robust IP rights protection and inward FDI opportunities. 
 
6.2. Introduction to the Chapter 
 
As argued so far, Section 84 is consistent with TRIPS, and nothing in the light of the Agreement 
would, in fact, prevent Ghana from adopting and implementing such a model to obtain 
affordable medicines. Nevertheless, as far as access to affordable medicines in Ghana is 
concerned, an important question to consider is whether the implementation of the Section 84 
model will threaten the attainment of socio-economic objectives due to the loss of inward FDI 
opportunities, retaliatory action and their potential frustration owing to the impact of FTAs. Yu 
has importantly asserted that there is a linkage between IP and investment.803 Notably, some 
studies have fundamentally shown a presumed linkage between stronger IP rights protection 
as an essential foundation for inward FDI opportunities and the attainment of long-term socio-
economic objectives.804  
 
                                                 
803 Peter Yu, ‘The Investment-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights’ (2017) 66 American University 
Law Review 3, 837. 
804 Rod Falvey, Neil Foster and Olga Memedovic, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Technology Transfer 
and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence (Vienna: United Nations Industrial Development Organisation, 
2006) 9. 
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The bottom line is that relatively weak IP rights protection in a developing country like Ghana 
may lower the probability that multinational firms will invest there.805 A study commissioned 
by the UN found overwhelming evidence that appears to confirm that stronger IP rights 
protection encourages FDI and leads to increased innovation and socio-economic growth.806 In 
this context, Ghana and other developing countries are cautious in using compulsory licensing 
to avoid any investment consequences of alienating large pharmaceutical companies from the 
role that they play in their economies.807 Apart from the threat of economic sanctions by key 
developed countries like the US and the EU, the strength of the pharmaceutical industry’s 
response in South Africa, Thailand and Brazil after the use of compulsory licences may have a 
discouraging effect on Ghana and other WTO Members that lack the political strength to 
withstand potential threats of law suits or a withdrawal of investment.808  
 
Moreover, some developed countries also bind developing countries to more extensive patent 
protection through FTAs.809 Abbott emphasised the investment aspects that often push the 
global pharmaceutical industry for stronger patent protection worldwide.810 This is because the 
pharmaceutical industry considers patents an essential inducement in the development of new 
medicines.811 Often these FTAs impose stricter IP standards with a view to limiting the use of 
TRIPS flexibilities.812 Notwithstanding this, developing countries agree to FTAs to appease 
                                                 
805 Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and Technology Transfer 
(Washington, D.C. International Finance Corporation Working Paper Series. Discussion Paper, No. IFD 19, The 
World Bank, 1994) 1. 
806 Falvey, et al (n 804) x. 
807 Harris (n 85) 391-392. 
808 Ho (n 29) 448-449. Watson (n 86) 151-153, stating that Brazil, South Africa, and Thailand have all at some 
point been placed on the 301 Watch-List. 
809 Halajian (n 625) 1214. Margo Bagley, ‘Legal Movements in IP: TRIPS, Unilateral Action, Bilateral 
Agreements, and HIV/AIDS’ (2003) 17 Emory International Law Review 2, 792. Hestermeyer (n 331) 261-272, 
discussing the challenges posed by FTAs and BITs. 
810 Frederick Abbott, The Cycle of Action and Reaction: Developments and Trends in Intellectual Property and 
Health. In: NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES, Pedro 
Roffe, Geoff Tansey and David Vivas-Eugui (eds.) (London: Earthscan, 2006) 36, finding that: 
A patent is essentially a financial instrument that entitles its bearer to achieve greater 
than competitive market rates of return on investment. The Pharma companies are 
market-oriented enterprises that seek to maximize shareholder returns on investment. 
Pharma treats potential intrusion on the security of the patent and related regulatory 
support as a threat to return on investment. Pharma justifies its rent seeking as 
necessary to the funding of research and development for new medicines….The 
Pharma companies demand rules and enforcement that will protect their income 
streams, justifying a high return on investment as necessary to drug development. 
811 Iain Cockburn and Genia Long, ‘The Importance of Patents to Innovation: Updated Cross-industry 
Comparisons with Biopharmaceuticals’ (2015) 25 Expert Opinion on Therapeutic Patents 7, 739. 
812 Susan Sell, ‘TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAS, ACTA, and TTP’ (2011) 18 Journal 
of Intellectual Property Law 2, 488. See Hestermeyer (n 631) 289. Harris (n 85) 393-394. 
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and build a relationship with developed countries, in the hope of gaining benefits in other trade 
areas.813  
 
While policymakers in developed countries were obsessed with the protection of the 
investments made by their exporting IP industries,814 their developing country counterparts 
were likewise preoccupied with international compliance and the acquisition of foreign 
investments.815 According to Yu, ‘Through bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade and 
investment agreements, new norms are being developed to address the investment-related 
aspects of IP rights’.816 He maintains that policymakers on both sides focused so much on 
investments that they ignored a primary justification for IP protection, that is, to provide 
inducements for creativity and innovation. Such a focus is dangerous from a public interest 
standpoint for countries like Ghana.817 He further asserts that, ‘Such a shift could take away 
the traditional limitations, safeguards, and flexibilities that have been built into the international 
IP regime’.818  
 
Ghana has signed FTAs with some developed countries with the objective of taking advantage 
of opportunities offered in key strategic markets, fostering business cooperation and 
technology transfer and encouraging FDI.819 Therefore, in the context of Ghana, the foregoing 
view express by Yu is important given that while a country such as India, with a relatively 
large economy and advanced pharmaceutical industry with the capacity to manufacture 
                                                 
813 Bhatt (n 801) 618. Bagley (n 792) 792-792. 
814 Yu (n 803) 841-842. 
815 Deere (n 450) 242, mentioning that implementation of the TRIPS Agreement in the OAPI (African Intellectual 
Property Organization) countries was shaped by a pro-IP and “compliance-plus”-oriented political environment. 
See also Maskus and Reichman (n 518) 18, expressing concern that many developing countries are “compliance 
oriented”.  
816 Yu (n 803) 831. 
817 Peter Yu, The Non-Multilateral Approach to International Intellectual Property Normsetting. In: 
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH, 
Daniel Gervais (ed.) (Cheltenham: Elgar Edward, 2015) 112, observing that: 
When policymakers and trade negotiators focus on the protection of intellectual 
property investments by their own nationals, they will likely be less interested in 
evaluating the economic efficiency of the intellectual property system and the welfare 
gains that system produces. Instead, they will push for the development of a system 
that protects foreign investors often at the expense of the public interest . . ., the local 
innovative environment and the country’s social-economic conditions. 
818 Peter Yu, ‘Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime’ (2004) 38 Loyola Los 
Angeles Law Review 1, 392–400, examining the growing use of bilateral and regional trade agreements to push 
for higher intellectual property standards. Yu (n 804) 835. Yu (n 217) 863, discussing Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS, 
869-879, examining Article 31bis and the Doha Declaration. 
819 For key FTAs signed by Ghana-US see (n 87). See also Trade Policy Review Report by Ghana (WTO Trade 
Policy Review Body, WT/TPR/G/298, 2014) 8, para.3.10. 
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affordable medicines, could easily implement Section 84 without the fear of losing significant 
FDIs, the opposite conclusion can be drawn about Ghana, a country that relies heavily on FDIs 
for the attainment of its socio-economic objectives.820 For example, investments recorded for 
the fiscal year ending 31 December 2017 hit US$ 6.19 billion with FDI component reaching 
US$ 4.91 billion (i.e. approximately 98.2 per cent of the original target for the country).821 The 
investments recorded have exciting prospects of generating a minimum of 22,570 jobs. Added 
to this, FDIs channelled through the Ghana Free Zones Board, Minerals Commission and the 
Petroleum Commission also reached an unprecedented US$4.98 billion.822 
 
6.3. The Relationship Between TRIPS and FTAs 
 
FTAs are reciprocal preferential trade agreements between two or more partners.823 There has 
been a growing concern about an ongoing shift of IP norm-setting activities from the trade 
regime to the investment regime,824 as many industries and their supportive governments have 
already viewed IP protection through an investment lens.825 Advocates often suggest that FTAs 
remain consequential to the socio-economic needs of developing countries like Ghana826 
except that they mostly include either investment protection clauses or chapters addressing IP 
rights protection.827 The trend in FTAs is indicative of the long history of international IP 
                                                 
820 ibid. 12, para. 6.12. 
821 Investment in the Fourth Quarter. Ghana Investment Promotion Centre. (2017) 13 Quarterly Investment Report 
4, 1. 
822 id. 
823 Preferential trade arrangements in the WTO are unilateral trade preferences. They include a Generalized 
System of Preferences schemes (under which developed countries grant preferential tariffs to imports from 
developing countries), as well as other non-reciprocal preferential schemes granted a waiver by the General 
Council. See <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/rta_pta_e.htm> [Accessed Sept. 12, 2017]. See 
Rorden Wilkinson, Multilateralism and the World Trade Organisation: The Architecture and Extension of 
International Trade Regulation (London and New York: Routledge, 2000) 80. 
824 Rochelle Dreyfuss and Susy Frankel, ‘From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How International Law is 
Reconceptualising Intellectual Property’ (2015) 36 Michigan Journal of International Law 4, 566 observing that 
while TRIPS laid the platform for commodification, much of the current regime shifting is reconceptualising IP 
as an asset and progressively detaching it from its grounding in incentive-based principles. 
825 Yu (n 803) 909. 
826 The European Union Explained: Trade - Free Trade is a Source of Economic Growth (Luxembourg: 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2013) 5, noting that free trade is more important than ever for 
economic growth and job creation. Shujiro Urata, ‘Globalization and the Growth in Free Trade Agreements’ 
(2002) 9 Asia-Pacific Review 1, 25, observing that access to markets and the expansion of export opportunities 
are particularly important for companies from smaller countries. ibid. at 26, nothing that internal factors include 
economic growth from increased efficiency due to greater competition as a result of the markets being opened. 
827 Frederick Abbott, ‘The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public 
Health’ (2005) 99 The American Journal of International Law 2, 349. 
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protection, whose development has primarily been a one-way route towards ever increasing 
levels of protection.828  
 
The pharmaceutical industry stands strongly behind these efforts.829 While the IP chapters of 
these agreements vary in their specific terms, their common objective is to deter developing 
countries from using the TRIPS flexibilities, such as by limiting the grounds on which 
compulsory licences may be granted.830 This confirms Yu’s position that if the IP standards in 
FTAs are set too high, they will erode global competitiveness and jeopardise access to essential 
medicines to countries like Ghana.831 That is, FTAs with dominant economies like the EU and 
the US, if contain restrictive provisions would most likely threaten the implementation of the 
Section 84 model in Ghana.832 
 
The relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and FTAs lies in the general most favoured 
nation treatment, a principle, which was part of the GATT 1947833 and is found in Article I of 
                                                 
828 Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, ‘The International Law Relation Between TRIPS and Subsequent TRIPS-Plus 
Free Trade Agreements: Towards Safeguarding TRIPS Flexibilities?’ (2011) 18 Journal of Intellectual Property 
Law 2, 329. 
829 See Free Trade Agreements - Challenges and Opportunities (PhRMA “Special 301” Submission to USTR, 
2004) Appendix B, observing that FTA negotiations are a “second best” to multilateral agreements, but that 
‘deliberations in the TRIPS Council call into question the current value of the WTO as a venue for improving the 
worldwide protection of intellectual property’. See also PhRMA Statement on 2016 “Special 301 Report 
(Submission to USTR, 2016) 15 & 22 - Section B, finding that PhRMA members encourage USTR and other 
federal agencies to continue to promote and support effective patent enforcement abroad, including in bilateral 
forums. 
830 Article 17.9(7) of the United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement (Jan. 1, 2005, 43 I.L.M. 1248). Article 
16.7(6) of the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (May 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026). Peter Drahos, ‘BITs 
and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property’ (2001) 4 The Journal of World Intellectual Property 6, 791, 804. 
Sell (n 812) 488. Xavier Seuba, Border Measures Concerning Goods Allegedly Infringing Intellectual Property 
Rights: The Seizures of Generic Medicines in Transit (Geneva: ICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable 
Development Working Paper, June 2009) v. 
831 Peter Yu, ‘The RCEP and Trans-Pacific Intellectual Property Norms’ (2017) 50 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 3, 740. 
832 See World Trade Organisation, Regional Trade Agreements Gateway. Available at: 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm> [Accessed Sep. 16, 2017]. Carlos Correa, 
‘Bilateralism in Intellectual Property: Defeating the WTO System for Access to Medicines’ (2004) 36 Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 1, 79, observing that shortly after the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round, the EU and the US continued to use various means to put pressure on developing countries not only to 
implement the TRIPS Agreement, but also to obtain “TRIPS-plus” protection, that is, levels of protection beyond 
the minimum standards required by the TRIPS Agreement. Ruth Okediji, ‘Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum 
Swings in International Intellectual Property Protection’ (2004) 1 University of Ottawa Law & Technology 
Journal 1-2, 140, stating that despite the hope that the TRIPS Agreement would diminish the use of bilateralism 
to secure international protection for IP, post-TRIPS bilateralism remains the dominant policy of the US. Peter 
Drahos, Expanding Intellectual Property’s Empire: The Role of FTAs (Regulatory Institutions Network, Research 
School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 2003) 7, explaining that the US was the principal 
architect of the global regulatory ratchet for IP, with the EU to a lesser extent also making use of it. Keith Maskus, 
‘Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development’ (2000) 32 Case Western Journal of International Law 
3, 493, stating that the main beneficiary of BTAs is the US, with a net inflow of some US$ 5.8 billion per year. 
833 Part 1, Article 1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (GATT 1947), 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
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the GATT 1994.834 This non-discrimination norm underpins a specific requirement that in a 
situation where for example, Ghana extends or grants any “advantage, favour, privilege or 
immunity” to the nationals of another WTO Member then the same concession must be 
accorded to the nationals of other Members “immediately and unconditionally”.835 Although 
some principles contained in the GATT had a bearing on IP measures taken on imports or 
exports, for example Article XX(d) of the GATT 1947, which specifically referred to IP 
rights,836 the most favoured nation principle was not traditionally incorporated into IP rights 
related conventions.837  
 
It was assumed that the Members would not grant IP rights protection to foreign nationals more 
extensively than the protection granted to local nationals.838 As bilateral pressure mounted in 
the late 1980s to standardise IP rights protection, the Uruguay Round negotiators became 
concerned that some countries were indeed granting IP rights privileges to foreign nationals 
more extensively than they were granting rights to their own nationals.839 This focused 
attention on incorporating a most favoured nation principle into TRIPS, so that all Members 
would obtain an equivalent level of protection when more extensive protection was granted to 
foreigners.840 Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that any advantage, favour, privilege 
                                                 
834 Article 1(1) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) 1867 U.N.T.S. 187; 33 I.L.M. 1153 
provides for WTO members to extend most favoured treatment to like products of other WTO members regarding 
tariffs, regulations on exports and imports, internal taxes and charges, and internal regulations. In other words, 
“like” products from all WTO members must be given the same treatment as the most advantageous treatment 
accorded the products of any state. 
835 William Dave, Non-discrimination in the World Trade Organization: The Rules and Exceptions (The Hague, 
Hague Academy of International Law, 2012) 110. 
836 Now Article XX(d) of GATT 1994. Under this provision, measures that would otherwise be inconsistent with 
the General Agreement could be taken (subject to certain conditions) to secure compliance with laws or 
regulations, which constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries or a disguised 
restriction on international trade, relating, among other things, to IP rights. Note that this clause is not applicable 
to international agreements related to the protection of IP that entered into force prior to the entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement, provided that such agreements are notified to the Council for TRIPS and do not constitute an 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against a national of other members. Notifications of Laws and 
Regulations Relating to Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the TRIPS Agreement: Format for One Option (Council for Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, IP/C/9, Mar. 12, 1997) para. 2. See Peter-Tobias Stoll, Jan 
Busche, Katrin Arend (eds.), WTO: Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, (Leiden: Max Planck 
Commentary of World Trade Law, Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) 166. Susy Frankel and Daniel Gervais, Advanced 
Introduction to International Intellectual Property (Cheltenham: Elgar Edwards, 2016) 55. 
837 Note that Article 2(1) of the Paris Convention requires that state parties provide the same legal remedy against 
any infringement of their rights, provided that the conditions and formalities imposed upon nationals are complied 
with. 
838 “Resource Book on TRIPS” (n 16) 63, para. 1.2. 
839 id. 
840 id. See also Guidelines and Objectives Proposed by the European Community for the Negotiations on Trade 
Related Aspects of Substantive Standards of Intellectual Property Rights, Negotiating Group on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (MTN.GNG/NG11/W/26, July 
1988) III.D.6. 
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or immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members.841  
 
According to the Appellate Body in the US – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 
1998, the most favoured nation principle is a cornerstone of the WTO system and must be 
accorded the same significance with respect to IP rights under the TRIPS Agreement that it has 
long been accorded with respect to trade in goods under the GATT.842 Added to the foregoing 
principle is Article 1(1) of TRIPS, which provides that Members may implement more 
extensive protection than that set out by the Agreement, provided that such protection does not 
contravene the provisions of the Agreement.843 The basic assumption by that reference is that 
the TRIPS Agreement only sets the minimum standards for IP protection and, therefore, 
Members are free to implement standards that are more extensive.844  
 
FTAs are however exceptions to the general rule of most favoured nation.845 The legal basis of 
this exception finds its roots under the GATT 1947 in Article XXIV, and it was subsequently 
adopted by the WTO in 1994.846 Accordingly, Article XXIV:4 of the GATT 1947 stipulates 
that: ‘The contracting parties recognise the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the 
development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of 
the countries parties to such agreements’.847 More importantly, a major qualification is found 
in Article XXIV:5 of the GATT, which reiterates that the GATT ‘shall not prevent, as between 
the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area or 
the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a 
free-trade area’.848  
 
                                                 
841 “Resource Book on TRIPS” (n 16) 61. 
842 Report of the Appellate Body in United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 
(WT/DS176/AB/R, Jan. 2, 2002) para. 297. 
843 Peter Drahos, ‘Four Lessons for Developing Countries from the Trade Negotiations Over Access to Medicines’ 
(2007) 28 Liverpool Law Review 1, 14. 
844 Reichman (n 66) 351. 
845 Mohammed El Said, ‘Public Health related TRIPS-plus Provisions in Bilateral Trade Agreements: A Policy 
Guide for Negotiators and Implementers in the Eastern Mediterranean Region’ (Cairo, Egypt: World Health 
Organisation and International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development 2010) 40. 
846 The GATT (1994) (n 834). 
847 Peter Gillies and Gabriel Moens, International Trade & Business Law & Policy (London: Cavendish 
Publishing, 2000) 519, 
848 Report of the Panel in Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and tioducts, Report of the Panel 
(WT/DS34/R, May 31, 19991) para. 104. 
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This creates an exception for FTAs and customs unions for trade in goods. These pertinent 
conditions first provide that Members of the FTAs must substantially remove all barriers to 
trade across all sectors with no partial preferences or exclusion of certain sectors. Secondly, 
trade barriers against non-members of the FTAs should not be more restrictive than before the 
agreement came into effect. Finally, there should be a schedule that ensures that the formation 
of a FTA will be complete within a reasonable amount of time.849 Relative to the relationship 
between TRIPS and FTAs, Article 30 of the VCLT concerning the application of successive 
treaties (TRIPS) related to the same subject matter (IP protection) is relevant to the validity of 
FTAs.  
 
On this basis, it has been argued that any agreement (FTA) created subsequent to the WTO 
treaty (TRIPS) is relevant and can potentially interact with certain obligations and the 
enjoyment of rights attached to the latter.850 The approach to consistent interpretation is 
primarily set out in the general rule of Article 31(1) of the VCLT. Article 31(3)(c) VCLT 
basically covers all relationships between TRIPS and subsequent FTAs. This provision 
provides for the interpreter to aim for as much as possible a coherent and mutually consistent 
interpretation of the different treaty rules in consideration of subsequent agreements between 
the parties.851 This provision would require Ghana to interpret TRIPS and its FTA provisions 
as a single set of compatible treaty obligations, since almost all FTAs have been agreed to 
amongst states that are also Members of the WTO.  
 
From this distinction, it follows that an obligation in any FTA signed by Ghana may conflict 
with an optional TRIPS provision and limit Ghana’s ability to exercise a right or flexibility that 
TRIPS provides, such as the implementation of the Section 84 to promote affordable 
medicines.852 In the relation between the FTA parties, these conflict clauses are lex specialis853 
                                                 
849 Article XXIV(a), (b) &(c) of the GATT. Rafael Leal-Arcas, ‘Proliferation of Regional Trade Agreements: 
Complementing or Supplanting Multilateralism?’ (2011) 11 Chicago Journal of International Law 2, 604. For 
further discussion of Article XXIV of GATT see Mitsuo Matsushita, Legal Aspects of Free Trade Agreements in 
the Context of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994: WTO and East Asia: New Perspectives. In: WTO AND EAST 
ASIA: NEW PERSPECTIVES, Mitsuo Matsushita and Dukgeun Ahn (eds), (London: Cameron May, 2004) ch. 
19, 497-514. 
850 Pauwelyn (n 675) 541 & 544. 
851 Article 31(3)(a) of the VCLT (n 119). 
852 Ruse-Khan (n 828) 328. 
853 Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of 
International Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 412, explaining lex specialis that when two 
norms apply to the same subject matter, that which is more specific should prevail and be given priority over the 
more general rule. 
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to the general rule in Article 1(1) of TRIPS.854 That is, if Ghana were to decide to waive rights 
(by not exercising certain TRIPS flexibilities), then any FTA provision that undermines the use 
of such a flexibility would arguably be deemed valid.855 For example, the US-Australia FTA 
limits the grounds on which compulsory licences may be granted to situations where the grant 
of such licences is necessary in order to remedy a practice determined after judicial or 
administrative process to be anticompetitive, as well as to “cases of public non-commercial 
use”, or of “national emergency, or other circumstances of extreme urgency” if further 
conditions are satisfied.856  
 
However, such a far-reaching provision if applies to any of the FTAs signed by Ghana then 
then such a provision may weaken the country’s right to effectively use implement the Section 
84 model or compulsory licensing as set out in the Doha Declaration, which affirmed that  
Ghana and other WTO Members may use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, 
which provide flexibility for this purpose.857 However, if FTA provisions do safeguard TRIPS 
flexibilities, such a provision will arguably prevail.858 For example, the FTAs concluded by 
Japan contain a clause that says that ‘in the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement 
and the WTO Agreement, the WTO Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the 
inconsistency’.859 In such cases, the application of TRIPS flexibilities would prevail over FTA 
rules.860  
 
6.4. Implementation of Section 84: Assessing the Potential Impediments and Threats  
 
Although India’s use of Section 84 demonstrates that if used, compulsory licensing can be an 
effective tool to provide access to essential medicines, numerous legal and political barriers 
have been erected by developed countries to further minimise, if not eliminate, the use of 
                                                 
854 Article 1(1) of TRIPS in part provides that: 
Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. Members may, but 
shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is 
required by this Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the 
provisions of this Agreement. 
855 Ruse-Khan (n 838) 337 & 352. 
856 Article 17.9.7(b)(i)-(iii) of the US-Australia FTA (n. 813). 
857 “Doha Declaration” (n 6) para. 4. 
858 Ruse-Khan (n 828) 325. 
859 See Article 12 of the Japan-Indonesia Economic Partnership Agreement (Aug. 20, 2007), Article 11 of the 
Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (Apr. 3, 2007), Article 11 of the Japan-Philippines Economic 
Partnership Agreement (Sept. 9, 2006), Article 11 of the Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership Agreement (Dec. 
13, 2005) and Article 9 of the Japan-Vietnam Economic Partnership Agreement (Dec. 12, 2008). 
860 Article 197:1 of the EU-Colombia-Peru Free Trade Agreement (Mar. 24, 2011). 
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TRIPS flexibilities. Retaliatory action, be it a legal challenge, political pressure or economic 
sanctions, could hinder the effectiveness of the implementation of Section 84 in Ghana by 
making such a measure legally, administratively, and politically challenging. More 
importantly, Ghana has since the 1960s, depended heavily on foreign aid and development 
assistance to fund its development programmes in spite of the country’s wealth in natural 
resources - cocoa, gold, timber, oil and gas, bauxite and manganese, among others.861  
 
Therefore, given that the pharmaceutical industry considers patents an essential inducement in 
the development of new medicines, the threat of a lawsuit poses an impediment to the 
implementation of Section 84 in Ghana, as has been evidenced by the case of South Africa.862 
For example, after Thailand issued a compulsory license for Abbott’s HIV medicine, Kaletra, 
Abbott stated that it would not sell certain medicines in Thailand and withdrew seven new 
medicines applications from the country.863 Some pharmaceutical companies also threatened 
to move investments away from Brazil after the country attempted to use compulsory licensing 
on non-working grounds.864  
 
It has been reported that Novartis abandoned plans to set up R&D centres in India, after its 
petition challenging the country’s patent law was thrown out by the High Court in Chennai.865 
In addition to retaliation by pharmaceutical companies, there is a possibility that trade sanctions 
will be imposed by developed countries or the US will place Ghana on the “Special 301 Watch-
List” if Section 84 is implemented.866 For example, following India’s use of Section 84, 
                                                 
861 Sule Jotie, Ghana Beyond Aid - President Akufo-Addo Charts the Path, 61 One Years After Independence 
(Government of Ghana Official Portal, May 2018). Available at: <http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/media-
center/features/4437-ghana-beyond-aid-61-one-years-after-independence> [Accessed May 5, 2018]. Note that 
Ghana received foreign aid to the tune of $1,324 billion in 2016. See Development Aid at a Glance Statistics by 
Region: AFRICA. 2018 Edition (Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (Paris, OECD, Apr. 9, 2018) 7, Table 2.2.7. 
862 Watson (n 86) 152. 
863 Ho (n 29) 444. 
864 Brazil Issues Compulsory Licence for AIDS Drug (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development Report, Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 11, No. 16, May 9, 2007) 1, stating that Merck 
responded by saying that it is “profoundly disappointed” by the outcome, with the US-Brazil Business Council 
calling it “a major step backward” that will discourage investment in Brazil. 
865 Victoria Gill, Novartis withdraws investment from India (London: Chemistry World Published by the Royal 
Society of Chemistry, Oct. 1, 2007). Available at: <https://www.chemistryworld.com/news/novartis-withdraws-
investment-from-india/3003000.article> [Accessed Oct. 12, 2017]. 
866 Watson (n 86) 151-153, examining that Brazil, South Africa, and Thailand have all at some point been placed 
on the 301 Watch-List. 
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evidence suggests that the country has come under intense pressure from the pharmaceutical 
industry, the US and the EU.867  
 
Evidence suggests that on 13 March 2013, during a hearing at the House of Representatives’ 
Committee on Ways and Means’ Subcommittee on “US-India Trade Relations: Opportunities 
and Challenges”,868 it was stated that India had abused compulsory licences, as they are 
intended to be used in national emergencies and situations of extreme urgency.869 The US 
subsequently put India on the “Section 301 Watch List”.870 Although India has defended its 
use of Section 84 as consistent with TRIPS,871 it appears that the country has been unable to 
resist the increasing bilateral pressure.872  
 
Accordingly, the US-India Business Council submission to the US Trade Representative shows 
that the US-India Joint Business Council obtained verbal assurance for the non-use of a 
compulsory licence from the Government of India.873 India remains under the 2017 Special 
                                                 
867 Peter Roderick and Allyson Pollock, ‘India’s Patent Laws under Pressure’ (2012) 380 The Lancet 9846, e2. ‘A 
Timeline of US Attacks on India’s Patent Law & Generic Competition’ (Access Campaign/Medecins sans 
Frontieres).<https://www.msfaccess.org/sites/default/files/MSF_assets/IP/Docs/IP_factsheet_TimelineUSPressu
reIndia_ENG_2014.pdf> [Accessed Jun. 14, 2017]. 
868 Written Testimony of Roy Waldron, Chief Intellectual Property Counsel Pfizer Inc. Before the House 
Committee on Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade Hearing. On U.S.‐India Trade Relations: Opportunities 
and Challenges (Mar. 13, 2013) 4, stating that despite being a member of the WTO and an important global trading 
partner, India has systematically failed to interpret and apply its intellectual property laws in a manner consistent 
with recognised global standards. 
869 ibid. 7. 
870 “The Special 301 Report, 2014”. Available at: 
<https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USTR%202014%20Special%20301%20Report%20to%20Congress%20FIN
AL.pdf> [Accessed Aug. 2, 2017] 37. 
871 Trade Minister “Anand Sharma” Accuses US of Protectionism Ahead of Visit (The Economic Times, 5 March 
2014). Available at: <http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-03-05/news/47895347_1_anand-
sharma-compulsory-licence-intellectual-property-rights> [Accessed Jul. 1, 2017]. Indian Finance Minister (Mr. 
P. Chidambaram) Defends Compulsory Licensing during at the Leadership Summit of the US-India Business 
Council (USIBC) in Washington. See Chidanand Raighattal, Don’t Let Rhetoric Trump Reason, Chidambaram 
tells US (The Times of India, Jul. 12, 2013). Available at: <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-
business/Dont-let-rhetoric-trump-reason-Chidambaram-tells-US/articleshow/21043653.cms> [Accessed Jul. 2, 
2017]. ‘Department of Intellectual Property and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce. Statement on Bilateral 
Mechanism for Discussing IPR Issues with USA’ (Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of 
Commerce & Industry, Oct. 3, 2014). <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=110288> [Accessed 
Aug. 1, 2017]. ‘India Ready to Take on US over Patents at World Trade Organisation’ (The Times of India, Feb. 
25, 2014). Available at: <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/India-ready-to-take-on-US-
over-patents-at-World-TradeOrganization/articleshow/30967967.cms> [Accessed Sept. 1, 2017]. 
872 Patralekha Chattergee, Special Report: India Rocked by Report of Secret Assurance to US Industry on IP 
(Intellectual Property Watch, Mar. 22, 2016). Available at: <http://www.ip-watch.org/2016/03/22/india-rocked-
by-report-of-secret-assurance-to-us-industry-on-ip/> [Accessed Jul. 19, 2017]. 
873 Zeba Siddique, U.S. Industry Body says India Agreed to not Issue ‘Compulsory’ Drug Licences (Reuters, Mar. 
9, 2016). Available at:< http://uk.reuters.com/article/india-patents-usa-idUKKCN0WA18Q> [Accessed Sept. 12, 
2017]. Amit Sengupta, India Assures the US it Will Not Issue Compulsory Licences on Medicines (The Wire, 
Mar. 12, 2016). Available at: <https://thewire.in/24621/india-assures-the-us-it-will-not-issue-compulsory-
licences-on-medicines/> [Accessed Oct. 24, 2017]. 
 160 
301 Report.874 Moreover, in 2014, the EC consistently reiterated its concerns that some 
countries have tended to engage in aggressive policies that seek to appropriate foreign 
technology in sectors considered strategic, e.g. through “forced technology transfer”.875  
 
Subsequently, the EU listed India as one of the high priority countries over a large number of 
locally produced IP rights infringing goods, notably medicines and related products.876 
Moreover, it has been reported that in 2015, Switzerland, which is currently assisting Ghana to 
develop its IP policy,877 put bilateral pressure on Colombia’s Ministry of Health and Social 
Protection to deny the grant of a compulsory licence for Imatinib, a leukaemia medicine owned 
by Novartis.878 Therefore, Ghana must be aware of the risks that powerful governments pose, 
as the risk of retaliation is high where the country has signed some FTAs with some developed 
countries. 
 
6.4.1. Potential Frustration Owing to Impacts of FTAs Signed by Ghana  
 
6.4.1.1. Ghana-US AGOA Initiative and TIFA 
 
Ghana enjoys preferential trade arrangements with special access to the US market under the 
AGOA initiative, whereby over six thousand products from the beneficiary countries enter the 
US market duty-free and quota-free.879 Section 104 of the AGOA inter alia authorises the US 
President to designate an African country as a beneficiary of trade concessions if the President 
determines that such a country has established or is making progress towards establishing 
                                                 
874 Available at: <https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/301/2017%20Special%20301%20Report%20FINAL.PDF> 
[Accessed Feb. 8, 2018] 42. 
875 Trade, Growth and Intellectual Property - Strategy for the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights in Third Countries (Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and 
the European Economic and Social Committee, {SWD(2014) 204 final} 1.7.2014 COM(2014) 389 final) 8, para. 
2.2.5. 
876 Report on the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Third Countries (Commission 
Staff Working Document, Brussels, 1.7.2015 SWD(2015) 132 final, Aug. 1, 2015) 11. 
877 Swiss-Ghanaian Intellectual Property Project, Phase II (SGIP II). (Council for TRIPS, IP/C/W/632/Add.5, Oct. 
6, 2017) para. 2.3.  Available at: 
<https://www.ige.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/recht/entwicklungszusammenarbeit/factsheet_ghana.pdf> [Accessed 
Jul. 28, 2017]. Rebecca Duho, ‘National Intellectual Property Policy Launched’ (Graphic News Online, Jan. 21, 
2016). <http://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/national-intellectual-property-policy-launched.html> 
[Accessed Oct. 20, 2017]. 
878 Ambassador Livia Leu, the Swiss Head of Bilateral Economic Relations and Delegate of the Federal Council 
for Trade Agreements. In a Letter dated 26 May 2015. Available at: 
<https://www.minsalud.gov.co/sites/rid/Lists/BibliotecaDigital/RIDE/VS/MET/patent-of-Imatinib-glive-
closing-arguments.pdf> [Accessed Aug. 19, 2017]. 
879 Sections 111 & 112 Title 1 of the Trade and Development Act 2000. 19 USC 3701. Public Law 106-200. 114 
Stat. 251. See “Trade Policy Review - Ghana” (n 819) 9, para. 3.11. John Rothgeb, US Trade Policy: Balancing 
Economic Dreams and Political Realities (Washington DC. CQ Press, 2001) 243. 
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national treatment and measures to create an environment conducive to domestic and foreign 
investment, and the protection of IP.880  
 
Moreover, Section 111 of the AGOA, which is a direct reflection of Section 506(A) of the GSP 
Act,881 stipulates the strengthening of IP protection for US firms in accordance with Section 
502.5(C) of the Trade Act 1974 as a fundamental requirement for designating countries as 
beneficiaries.882 Where this is the case, it seems that the implementation of Section 84 may, in 
the light of Ghana’s obligations towards the AGOA, erect barriers to US trade and investment 
interests pursuant to Section 104(c) of the AGOA. With this in mind, Drahos contends that the 
preferential trading arrangements as found in the AGOA initiative could effectively operate as 
external or bilateral pressure against the imposition of compulsory licensing.883  
 
The implementation of Section 84 could breach Section 104(c)(i) of the AGOA, which stresses 
the need to create an environment conducive to IP rights protection specifically for US 
corporations.884 In addition, Ghana has a TIFA with the US.885 Paragraph 4 of the Ghana-US-
TIFA recognises the importance of fostering an open and predictable environment for 
international trade and investment.886 Recital 11 recognises the importance of providing 
adequate and effective protection and the enforcement of IP rights. These provisions could 
operate to limit the extent to which Ghana can implement a Section 84 model. 
 
  
                                                 
880 Section 104 (a)(1)(C)(ii) of AGOA. 
881 Title V of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 (Pub. L. 98-573) subject to periodic renewal by Congress (the so-
called Generalised System of Preferences Renewal Act) conditioning GSP; inter alia, on protection of IP rights 
in order to maintain the US’ preferential trading status. This Act clarified the conditions under which unfair trade 
cases under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 can be pursued. See also the Reauthorisation Act of 1996 (19 
USC 2101. Pub. L. 104-188, Title I, subtitle J. 110 STAT 1917), which now requires the President to “take into 
account the extent to which such country is providing adequate and effective protection of intellectual property 
rights”. (Last renewed on Jul. 31, 2013, through Pub. L. 112-40.) For further review of the US GSP. See Amy 
Mason, ‘The Degeneralization of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP): Questioning the Legitimacy of 
the US GSP’ (2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 2-5, 524, criticising the US-GSP as primarily employing negative 
conditionality that falls generally under its overarching economic interests. 
882 AGOA authorises the President to designate a country listed in Section 107 of the AGOA (19 USC 3706) as a 
beneficiary if the President determines that the country meets the eligibility requirements set forth in Section 104 
of the AGOA (19 USC 3703), as well as, the eligibility criteria set forth in Section 502 of the Trade Act, 1974 (19 
USC 2462) 
883 Drahos (n 830) 801. 
884 See Section 104(c)(ii) of AGOA. 
885 “Ghana - US TIFA” (n 87)  
886 ibid. para. 8 recognises that FDI confers positive benefits. 
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6.4.1.2. Ghana-EU-EPA and National Indication Programme  
 
The EU is Ghana’s most important trading partner.887 Ghana’s trade with the EU amounts to 
€5.5 billion.888 The EU is Ghana’s main market for its agri-business products and supplies a 
large part of the equipment that contributes to economic growth.889 The EU also supports 
Ghana’s competitiveness through dedicated institutional development programmes.890 It is 
Ghana’s largest export market, with annual exports worth approximately EUR 3 billion or 42.9 
percent of Ghana’s total exports.891 For example, in 2016 Ghana imported about €113 worth 
of pharmaceutical products from the EU, and this represents a growth of 2.9 per cent from 
2013.892 Ghana is a signatory Member to the EU-EPA.893  
 
The EPA aims at reducing and eventually eradicating poverty, consistent with the objectives 
of sustainable development and the gradual integration of Ghana into the world economy.894 
Under this FTA, Ghana is to benefit from the enhanced duty- and quota-free market access for 
all Ghanaian exports to the EU.895 Under the Global Europe Strategy,896 the EU adopted a 
communication on the revised “Strategy for the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights in Third Countries”.897 In this connection, the EU believes that its ‘BTAs 
                                                 
887 EU-Ghana Indicative Programme 2014-2020 (11th European Development Fun. Ref. Ares(2014)2070433 - 
24/06/2014) 7. Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/nip-ghana-20140619_en.pdf> 
[Accessed Oct. 13, 2017]. 
888 Interim Economic Partnership Agreement between Ghana and the European Union – Factsheet, Feb. 16, 2017. 
Available at: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/february/tradoc_155314.pdf> [Accessed Feb. 1, 2018]. 
889 id.  
890 id. 
891 id. 
892 European Union, Trade in Goods with Ghana (Directorate-General for Trade, European Commission, 
November 2017) 4, Page Units A4 / G2. Available at: 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_122461.pdf> [Accessed Feb. 8, 2018]. 
893 Stepping Stone Economic Partnership Agreement between Ghana, of the one part, and the European 
Community and its Member States, of the other part (OJ L 287/3, 21.10.2016) 3–319. 
894 ibid. Article 2. 
895 ibid. Articles 2 & 12. 
896 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Global Europe: Competing in the World A Contribution 
to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy ({SEC(2006) 1228} {SEC(2006) 1229} {SEC(2006) 
1230}/COM/2006/0567 final/, 4.10.2006) paras. 4.2(ii), FTAs and 3.2(iii), IPRs. 
897 Revised Strategy for the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Third Countries’. 
COM/2014/0389 final. 01.07.2014. See also ‘The EU Strategy for the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights 
in Third Countries’ (O. J. C. 129. 2005/C/129/03. 26.5.2005). Strategy for the Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights in Third Countries (European Commission Directorate General for Trade, TRADE-2004-00480-
00-00-EN-REV-00 (EN)). Available at: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/april/tradoc_122636.pdf> 
[Accessed Sept. 10, 2017]. Evaluation of the Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Strategy in Third Countries 
(European Commission, Final Report, Vol. I – Main Report, November 2010) 17, Figure 2.2, “EQ 6: Intervention 
Logic: Objectives Diagram”. 
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should include stronger provisions for IPRs and competition, including provisions on 
enforcement of IP rights along the lines of the EU Enforcement Directive’.898  
 
Under Article 46 of the EPA, the parties will cooperate to facilitate all of the necessary 
measures on IP. Within this frame, the EU intended to use its so-called “Trade Barriers 
Regulation” more vigorously against countries that contravened IP rights belonging to EU 
companies.899 A 2015 motion passed by the European Parliament ‘Supports the Commission’s 
pledge to give priority to promoting better IPR protection, and enforcement thereof, in the 
WTO and in any other international arenas, thereby opening up new markets for European 
exporters and improving existing market access’.900 At the heart of the Indicative Programme 
lies Article 44 of the EPA, which refers to investment protection and IP. The protection of IP 
is further reflected under Article 68(v) of the EPA, which provides that: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between the Parties where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
trade in goods, services or establishment, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by the Parties of measures 
for the protection of intellectual property.901 
 
Within the EPA lies a National Indicative Programme, under the 10th European Development 
Fund,902 which the EU has established as a further platform for cooperation to administer EU 
aid in favour of Ghana.903 This initiative has been drawn up in accordance with Article 4 of the 
Ghana-EU-EPA pursuant to finance cooperation.904 Under this financial cooperation, the EU 
                                                 
898 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights (O. J. L. 157. 30.4.2004). See Thomas Jaeger, The EU Approach to IP Protection in Partnership 
Agreements (Munich: Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law Research Paper 
No. 10-01, 2010) 28, mentioning that the aim of the EU is apparently to establish coherence between its domestic 
high levels of IP enforcement and the enforcement levels abroad. 
899 Note that the EU Trade Barriers Regulation is found in the Council Regulation ((EC) No 3286/94. O. J. L. 349, 
31.12.1994) 71-78, laying down Community procedures in the field of common commercial policy in order to 
ensure the exercise of the Community’s rights under international trade rules, in particular, those established under 
the auspices of the WTO. See The (Revised Regulation) Council Regulation on Measures to Prohibit the Release 
for Free Circulation, Export, Re-export or entry for a Suspensive Procedure of Counterfeit and Pirated goods 
((EC) No. 3295/94, O. J. L. 341, 30.12.1994) 8-13. 
900 Article 37 of the Resolution on Strategy for the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in 
Third Countries (Motion of the European Parliament, (2014/2206(INI), May 13, 2015). 
901 “Stepping Stone Economic Partnership Agreement between Ghana and the EU” (n 893). 
902 Council Regulation (EU) 2015/322 of 2 March 2015 on the Implementation of the 11th European Development 
Fund (OJ L 58, 3.3.2015) p. 1. 
903 See Ghana-EU National Indicative Programme: 2014-2020 (Decision C(2014)3660 of 12.06.2014, Jun. 19, 
2014). Available at: <http://eeas.europa.eu/development-cooperation/docs/national-indicative-programme_2014-
2020/2014-2020_national-indicative-programme_ghana_en.pdf> [Accessed Jul. 28, 2017]. 
904 Articles 2 & 4 of Annex IV to the Cotonou Agreement and Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–2020 
(Revised in Ouagadougou, Jun. 22, 2010. OJ L 287, 4.11.2010). 
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intends to make available to Ghana for the period 2014 – 2020 an amount of EUR 323 million, 
which is also referred to in Article 3(2)(a) of Annex IV of the ACP-EU EPAs, 2010.905  
 
Moreover, Ghana stands to benefit from the European Investment Bank financial facility in 
accordance with Articles 2(c) and 3 of the 11th EDF multi-annual financial framework906 for 
the period 2014-2020.907 In addition to this, the EU has committed itself to aligning its current 
and future assistance to Ghana with the priorities and objectives identified in the overall 
country strategy, named: “Compact 2012-2022 - Leveraging Partnerships for Shared Growth 
and Development”.908 The “Compact” sets out a four-fold medium to long term strategy to 
contribute to accelerated and inclusive economic growth and sustained poverty reduction, to 
strengthen Ghana’s Lower-Middle-Income Country status in a transition phase, during which 
the country will strive to become less aid dependent by focusing its policies on key 
development priorities, to be supported by the EU.909  
 
Furthermore, Ghana has been selected to participate in a pilot Joint Programming launched 
between 2012-2016 and the country is expected to benefit from a fully-fledged Joint 
Programming for the period 2017-2020.910 This external assistance programming is fully 
coherent with Ghana’s overall development strategy.911 The overall financial package for the 
                                                 
905 ibid. para. 2. 
906 Council Regulation (EU) 2015/323 on the Financial Regulation Applicable to the 11th European Development 
Fund (OJ L 58, 3.3.2015). 
907 “EU-Ghana Indicative Programme” (n 887) para. 6 
908 Compact 2012-2022 - Leveraging Partnerships for Shared Growth and Development (Signed on Jun. 21, 2012). 
Available at: <http://www.epd.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Leveraging-Partnership-for-Shared-Growth-and-
Development-2012-2014.pdf> [Accessed Sept. 19, 2017]. See OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews 
(Denmark, OECD, 2016) 111. 
909 ibid. 9, para. 15. See EU-Ghana: Four Decades of Development Cooperation (2nd Edition) 1, stating that in 
total, it will be an EU support of EUR 1.5 billion provided to Ghana for the period 2013-2016 alone. Available 
at: <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/ghana/documents/more_info/general.pdf> [Accessed Oct. 
12, 2017]. 
910 EU-Ghana Cooperation: EU Joint Programming Phase II  2017-2020 (signed Jun. 21, 2012). See “OECD 
Development Co-operation Peer Reviews” (n 908) 111. Note that including the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom and the EU itself, the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) has expressed its willingness to be included in the EU Joint Programming effort. See ACP-EU Cooperation 
After 2020: Towards A New Partnership? (The Hague: Advisory Council on International Affairs, Report No. 93, 
March 2015) 22, footnote 35, stating that the European Investment Bank plays a role in supporting development 
activities in ACP countries; through a combination of a European Development Fund and the bank’s own funds 
it provides various forms of loans and an investment facility. 
911 Note that Ghana’s socio-economic develop strategy operates under seven (7) thematic areas: International 
Trade, Import-Export Regime; Trade Facilitation Enhancing Production Capacity; Domestic Trade and 
Distribution; Consumer Protection and Fair Trade; and Intellectual Property Rights. See Trade Policy Review -  
Ghana (n 819) 9, para. 4.1-2. Objectives are grouped into four main components: 
(1) Production and Distribution: To ensure that adequate local agro-based industrial 
raw materials, mineral deposits and competitively priced imported inputs are 
available for local manufacturing.  (2) Technology and Innovation: To encourage 
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period of this Joint Co-operation Strategy (2017–2020) is approximately €1.25 billion.912 Out 
of this total contribution, the EU has decided to focus on supporting two of the five goals of 
Ghana’s Long-Term Development Plan as follows: firstly, Goal 1: Build an industrialised, 
inclusive and resilient economy; secondly, Goal 4: Build effective, efficient and dynamic 
institutions.913 
 
Recent evidence suggests that Ghana and the EU are actively engaged in the process of starting 
new negotiations to extend the current EPAs beyond 2020.914 With this in mind, Ghana may 
not have the will to implement Section 84, as it may lose all of these benefits, given that if not 
the letter, then the spirit of the FTAs it has with key development partners could undermine the 
implementation of a Section 84 model in Ghana.  
 
6.4.1.3. Implementing Section 84: Can Ghana Afford to Lose Foreign Development 
Assistance? 
 
An important question worth considering is whether Ghana will have the practical political will 
to implement a Section 84 model, and the risk of being deprived a substantial part of the foreign 
development assistance (FDA), which the country relies heavily upon to fund its key socio-
economic development programmes.915 Nevertheless, from a rhetoric stance, it appears that 
Ghana is prepared to manage the country’s natural resources in a manner that will allow the 
country’s development agenda to be financed without recourse to external development 
                                                 
the adoption and dissemination of modern technology in industry. (3) Incentives and 
Regulations: To create a conducive, transparent and predictable regulatory 
environment to attract the requisite investment into the industrial sector. (4) 
Crosscutting Issues: To encourage greater participation of the under-privileged, 
empowerment of women and a fight against communicable diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS that hamper development in the sector. 
ibid. 10-11, paras. 4.11. 
912 European Partners Working Together in Ghana: Joint Co-operation Strategy 2017-2020 (European Union 
Delegation in Ghana, 2017). Available at: 
<https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/european_partners_working_together_in_ghana_2017-
2020_final_26_09_2017.pdf> [Accessed May 2, 2018] 17 & 34. 
913 ibid. Annex I: Indicative contributions per European Partners in Ghana. Table 3. p. 38. 
914 Recommendation for a Council Decision Authorising the Opening of Negotiations on a Partnership Agreement 
between the European Union and countries of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (Strasbourg, 
COM(2017) 763 final, Dec. 12, 2017). Available: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52017PC0763> [Accessed Fe. 9, 2018]. 
915 “OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews” (n 908) 7, Table 2.2.7, stating that Ghana received foreign 
aid to the tune of $ 1,324 billion in 2016. 
 166 
assistance - an agenda the Ghanaian President refers to as building “Ghana Beyond Aid”.916 
The IMF917 and the EU support the “Ghana Beyond Aid” agenda.918 
 
This agenda aims at weaning the country off any FDAs from its development partners, and to 
be replaced with the use of local and foreign resources on commercial terms through foreign 
trade and investment.919 The agenda is based on the numerous research findings that have 
tended to show that FDAs have had no positive consequences on the development of African 
countries.920 In terms of Ghana, most independent research suggests that FDAs have had 
unintended and unwanted side effects with no significant impact on economic growth of the 
country.921 The issue is that FDA often exerts disproportionate pressure on Ghana to continue 
its dependence on IMF and World Bank initiatives, and this has affected the country’s capacity 
to legitimately utilise the so-called FDAs effectively to promote homegrown policies towards 
sustainable economic growth.922  
 
Addressing the 72nd Session of the UN General Assembly on 21 September 2017, the 
President of the Republic of Ghana, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo stated that, ‘We do not 
want to be a scar on anybody's conscience. We want to build an economy that is not dependent 
on charity and handouts. Long and bitter experience has taught us no matter how generous the 
                                                 
916 Office of the President of Ghana. Sustainable Development Goals Advisory Unit. Accra International 
Conference Centre (Office of the President, Nov. 30, 2017). Available at: > 
http://gh.one.un.org/content/dam/unct/ghana/docs/Speeches/UNCT-GH-Multi-stakeholder-conference-SDGs-
Speech-President-Akufo-Addo-2017.pdf> [Accessed May 3, 2017] 6 under Second. 
917 Ghana: Country Report No. 18/113 (Washington D.C., International Monetary Fund, May 2018) 9, para. 12; 
p. 36, Appendix I. Attachment I, para. 2, p. 38. 
918 “European Partners Working Together in Ghana: Joint Co-operation Strategy 2017-2020” (n 912) 5 & 7. 
919 id. 
920 Kin-Boon Tang and Diya Bundhoo, ‘Foreign Aid and Economic Growth in Developing Countries: Evidence 
from Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2017) 7 Theoretical Economics Letters 5, 1488, finding that aid by itself is not 
effective on the economic performance of the recipient country. Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not 
Working and How There is Another Way for Africa (Penguin; Reprint Edition, 2010) 29. Maurice Phiri, ‘The 
Impact of Aid on the Economic Growth of Developing Countries (LDCs) in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2017) 10 
Gettysburg Economic Review 1/4, 42, finding that a percentage increase in net official development assistances 
reduces real GDP by about 0.03%. Thus, this goes to show that aid was ineffective towards achieving high levels 
of economic growth. 
921 Samuel Adams and Francis Atsu, ‘Aid Dependence and Economic Growth in Ghana’ (2014) 44 Journal of 
Economic Analysis and Policy 2, 233. See also Stephen Brown, ‘Foreign Aid and National Ownership in Mali 
and Ghana’ (2017) 44 Journal of Forum for Development Studies 3, 352. 
922 Nathan Andrews, ‘Foreign Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Ghana’s Development: The Case for 
“Bringing Culture Back In” to the Analysis’ (2010) 2 International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology 5, 
102, reiterating the need for Ghana to own its development - a process that foreign aid can only support, not 
determine. See also Jiyoung Kim, ‘Aid and State Transition in Ghana and South Korea’ (2015) 36 Third World 
Quarterly 7, 1341.  
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charity, we would remain poor’.923 It continues: We are not disclaiming aid, but we do want to 
discard a mind-set of dependency and living on handouts; we want to build a Ghana Beyond 
Aid.924  
 
Moreover, during a roundtable meeting with selected Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of 
leading African and international companies on the 5th Edition of the Africa CEOs forum in 
Switzerland, the President reaffirmed the “Ghana Beyond Aid” agenda by stating that: 
We want to build a Ghana beyond aid; a Ghana which looks to the use of its 
own resources. We want to build an economy that is not dependent on charity 
and handouts, but an economy that will look at the proper management of its 
resources as the way to engineer social and economic growth in our country.925  
 
While this is a long-term initiative, it seems that Ghana is not concerned about losing any FDAs 
now. This is evident as the President informed the French President, Emmanuel Macron while 
on a visit in Ghana that the country does not need aid to develop, and this was a clear rejection 
of FDA.926 Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the country will be prepared to implement a 
Section 84 model. In fact, evidence suggests that the use of TRIPS flexibilities has decreased 
because voluntary licensing had become more common. For example, it has been concluded 
that the use of compulsory licences for essential medicines resulted in prices that were 
generally higher than the prices achieved by countries that obtained the medicines through the 
Global Fund and other international procurement channels.927 This is as a result of Unitaid and 
Medicines Patent Pool activities aimed at negotiating voluntary licences that enabled the 
production and supply of generic medicines and, consequently, countries within the territorial 
scope of Medicines Patent Pool licences might no longer need to invoke TRIPS flexibilities to 
promote affordable medicines.928 
Importantly, Ghana continues to benefit from international financing schemes to secure 
essential medicines. For example, under the Global Fund’s funding model, Ghana was 
                                                 
923 Address Delivered by the President of the Republic of Ghana, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, at the 72nd 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly (New York, Thursday, Sept. 21, 2017). Available at: 
<http://accra.sites.unicnetwork.org/files/2017/09/Ghana-E-Address.pdf> [Accessed May 4, 2018] 3. 
924 ibid. 4. 
925 Shaping the future of Africa. 5th Edition of the Africa CEO Forum (Geneva, Mar. 20, 2017). 
926 Ama Lorenz, Ghana’s President surprised Macron with a Clear Rejection of Development Aid (EURACTIV, 
Germany, 5 Dec. 2017). Available at: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/news/ghanas-
president-surprised-macron-with-a-clear-rejection-of-development-aid/> [Accessed May 4, 2018]. 
927 Reed Beall, Randall Kuhn and Amir Attaran, ‘Compulsory Licensing Often Did Not Produce Lower Prices for 
Antiretrovirals Compared to International Procurement’ (2015) 34 Health Affairs 3, 494. 
928 Medicines Patent Pool. <https://medicinespatentpool.org/> [Assessed Mar. 10, 2019]. 
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allocated a total of US$ 300 million for the 2015-2017 cycle for HIV/AIDS, including US$ 24 
million for Malaria in “incentive funding”, a reserve designed to reward high-impact and well-
performing programmes. Moreover, the Global Fund has earmarked $194 million for Ghana to 
fight HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis between 2018 and 2020. There is also a separate 
$12 million out of the funds to be used to build a resilient and sustainable health delivery system 
in the country. This reinforces the notion that Ghana might not have the practical political will 
to implement the Section 84 model.  
 
6.5. Is There a Risk of Political Pressure Against the Implementation of Section 84 Model 
in Ghana? 
 
The question arises whether the implementation of Section 84 in Ghana would be undermined 
by any potential political pressure emanating from key developed countries. In fact, EU 
Member States are not expected to adopt any aggressive approach against the implementation 
of Section 84 in Ghana. In fact, EC is committed to supporting countries to fully integrate the 
Doha Declaration in their policies and practices.929 This is important as Article 36 of the EPA 
provides that the parties reaffirm their rights and obligations under the WTO Agreements. This 
is supported by Article 68, dubbed the “General Exception Clause”, which stipulates that 
‘nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by the 
Parties of measures that: (b) are necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’. 
Importantly, the EU has adopted a regulation allowing for the granting of compulsory licences; 
this policy response demonstrates an understanding and acknowledgement that compulsory 
licensing is still permissible under TRIPS.930 
 
Moreover, nothing in the light of AGOA or US-Ghana TIFA would directly undermine an 
attempt by Ghana to implement a Section 84 model. Moreover, further examples of clauses 
upholding specific TRIPS flexibilities can be found in US FTAs in relation to the prohibition 
of expropriation.931 Importantly, Paragraph 3 of the US-Ghana TIFA states that: 
                                                 
929 Communication from the EC to the TRIPS Council on the implementation of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPs Agreement and Public health (Ref. 282/03 Rev1, Brussels, Jun. 2, 2003) para. 20. 
930 Regulation on Compulsory Licensing of Patents Relating to the Manufacture of Pharmaceutical Products for 
Export to Countries with Public Health Problems (EC) No 816/2006 (European Parliament and the Council 
(OJEU. L 157/1, May 14, 2006). 
931 Articles 10.6:5 and 10.8:3(b)(i) of United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement (Jun. 15, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 
544), Articles 15.6:5, 15.8:3(b)(i) of the US-Singapore FTA (n 830). Articles 10.7:5 and 10.9:3(b)(i) of the United 
States- Dominican Republic-Central America-Free Trade Agreement (Aug. 5, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514). Note that 
according to Article 6(5) of the US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 2012, the standards on expropriation do 
‘not apply to the issuance of compulsory licenses granted in relation to intellectual property rights in accordance 
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Taking into account the participation of both countries in the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), and noting that this Agreement is without prejudice to 
the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organisation and the agreements, 
understandings, and other instruments relating thereto or concluded under the 
auspices of the WTO.932 
 
Under Section 129(2) of AGOA the US recognises that the HIV/AIDS crisis has reached 
epidemic proportions in sub-Saharan Africa, where more than 21,000,000 men, women, and 
children are infected with HIV, and thus supports the need to prevent and reduce the incidence 
of HIV/AIDS through the establishment of an HIV/AIDS Response Fund.933 For example, the 
US was the largest donor to HIV efforts in 2016, providing $4.9 billion.934 The US recognises 
the importance of access to medicines and public health protection in needy countries,935 and 
the country is committed to strengthening healthcare systems and helping to fight the diseases 
affecting African countries.936 
 
It is important to note that all countries including the US through the UN reaffirmed their 
commitment to end the AIDS epidemic by 2030.937 Since Congress’ recognition that the 
restrictive conditions in FTAs may impede pharmaceutical policies that governments may elect 
to pursue,938 some FTAs concluded by the US have referred to the Doha Declaration and 
                                                 
with the TRIPS Agreement’. Under recent BITs, this type of safeguard clause extends further to cover not only 
compulsory licences, but also ‘the revocation, limitation, or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent 
that such issuance, revocation, limitation, or creation is consistent with the TRIPS Agreement’. Articles 6(5) of 
the United States-Uruguay Bilateral Investment Treaty (Nov. 4, 2005) and the United States-Rwanda Bilateral 
Investment Treaty (Feb. 19, 2008). 
932 See also Article 7, which provides that ‘This Agreement will be without prejudice to the rights of either Party 
under its domestic law or under any other instrument to which either country is a party’. 
933 Section 128. 
934 Donor Government Funding for HIV in Low- and Middle-Income Countries in 2016 (UNAIDS and The Henry 
Kaiser Family Foundation, July 2017) 4. Note that the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) 
is the largest commitment by any nation towards a single disease. Note that since 2003, PEPFAR has spent US$ 
70 billion on programmes globally to combat HIV and AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other opportunistic 
infections. Since its inception in 2003, PEPFAR has received strong bipartisan support in Congress and through 
administrations. Available at: <https://www.pepfar.gov/documents/organization/251737.pdf> [Accessed Oct. 23, 
2017]. 
935 Statement of US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick on TRIPS and Access to Medicines (Aug. 30, 2003). 
At:<https://ustr.gov/archive/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2003/August/Statement_of_US_Trade_Represe
ntative_Robert_B_Zoellick_on_TRIPS_access_to_medicines.html>[Accessed Oct. 23, 2017]. 
936 Section 127(b)(3)(B) of AGOA. 
937 Political Declaration on HIV and AIDS: On the Fast Track to Accelerating the Fight against HIV and to Ending 
the AIDS Epidemic by 2030 (Seventieth session Agenda item 11, 97th plenary meeting. United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution: A/RES/70/266, Jun. 8, 2016) para. 1. 
938 Opposing the Inclusion in Future Free Trade Agreements of Provisions That Would Have the Effect of 
Restricting, Undermining, or Discouraging the Enactment or Implementation of Legislation Authorizing the 
Importation of Prescription Drugs, and for Other Purposes, H.R. 758, 108th Cong. (2004); House Resolution 
Opposes Future FTAs Against Drug Importation (World Trade Online, Sept. 14, 2004). Available at: 
<https://insidetrade.com/> [Accessed Oct. 23, 2017]. See Abbott (n 827) 354. Drahos (n 832) 13. 
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provided that ‘a Party may take measures to protect public health in accordance with … the 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health’.939 Therefore, the US would not adopt 
any aggressive political pressure against Ghana if the country were to implement a Section 84 
model to promote affordable medicines.  
 
In fact, there is already a WTO Panel decision criticising the US for past use of the Section 301 
listings for TRIPS-related matters, and that decision expressly warned that sanctions would be 
likely to be authorised if such violations continued in the future.940 The US government will 
avoid unilateral retaliatory action such as sanctions or political pressure.941 This is significant, 
as on the 10 May  2000 President Clinton signed an Executive Order prohibiting the US 
Government from taking action pursuant to Section 301(b) of the Trade Act of 1974 with 
respect to any law or policy, such as compulsory licensing, as it had done with South Africa.942  
 
The US recognises that it stands to be isolated if the country adopts any aggressive political 
pressure against the implementation of Section 84 in Ghana. During the negotiation of the Doha 
Declaration, the US was isolated,943 which puts it in the diplomatically uncomfortable position 
of being the sole obstacle to a solution to the Doha Paragraph 6 problem.944 The US was 
concerned by the level of isolation from its allies,945 as it did not enjoy broad developed country 
support for its preferred hard-line approach to the Doha Decision.946  
 
                                                 
939 Article 16.10:2(e) of the US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (Nov. 22, 2006), Article 16.10: 2 (e) of 
the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (Apr. 12, 2006), Article 18.g:3 of the United States-Korea 
Free Trade Agreement (Jun. 30, 2007). 
940 Panel Report in United States – Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (WT/DS152/R, Dec. 22, 1999) 
paras. 5.227- 5.228 regarding India’s argument; para. 8.1. See Abbott and Reichman (n 460) 980–981. 
941 Jerome Reichman, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating the Options’ 
(2009) 37 Journal of Law and Medical Ethics 2, 263. 
942 The US Executive Order No. 13155, (May 12, 2000) 65 Federal Register 93, paras. 30521-30523. Section 3 
of this Executive Order also required sub-Saharan African countries to provide adequate and effective intellectual 
property protection as a precondition for increasing access to HIV/AIDS drugs. Section 1(9) maintains, 
“individual countries should have the ability to take measures to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic, provided that 
such measures are consistent with their international obligations” In Feb. 2001, Joseph Papovich, The US Trade 
Representative for Intellectual Property Rights; stated that President Bush was ‘not considering a change in the 
present “flexible policy” on compulsory licensing of drugs by AIDS- stricken countries’. See Graeme Dinwoodie, 
William Hennessey, Shira Perlmutter, and Graeme Austin, International Intellectual Property Law and Policy 
(New York, Matthew Bender: LexisNexis, 1st edn. 2001) 436. 
943 Drahos (n 832) 19, stating that the Doha Declaration was about the weak networking networks that surrounded 
and eventually isolated the US and in the final instance its pharmaceutical industry. 
944 Abbott (n 827) 332. 
945 ibid. 343, stating that the Europeans distanced themselves from the Americans on subject matter the latter 
considered important. 
946 ibid. 354. 
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6.5.1. Unlikely Political Pressure: Consistency of Section 84 with United States Statutory 
Law  
 
While the US Patent law does not contain a general compulsory licensing section, the country 
has numerous statutory provisions that can be invoked to grant compulsory licences to protect 
the public interest.947 These include an authorisation of compulsory licensing for public health 
purposes948 and government use.949 In addition, the US government can issue compulsory 
licences under the antitrust laws to remedy anticompetitive practices.950 For example, 28 USC 
Section 1498 gives the federal government the power to grant a compulsory licence to use or 
produce a patented invention or authorise third parties to use patents for virtually any public 
use in certain situations without negotiation.951  
 
                                                 
947 Title 7 USC Section 2404 (2000) (plant variety protection certificates necessary for the nation’s fiber, food, or 
feed supply (Chapter 57. (Pub. L. 91-557, title II, Section 44, Dec. 24, 1970) 84 Stat. 1547 (amended) Pub. L. 
103-349, Section 13(f), Oct. 6, 1994. 108, Stat. 3143); Title 28 USC Section 1498 (2000) (government use of 
patents. (June 25, 1948, ch. 646. 62 Stat. 941. May 24, 1949 (as amended and last) Pub. L. 105-304, title V, 
Section 503(d), Oct. 28, 1998. 112 Stat. 2917); Title 35 USC Section 203 (2000) (patents developed through the 
use of government research funding under the (The Bayh–Dole Act or Patent and Trademark Law Amendments 
Act (Pub. L. 96-517, Dec. 12, 1980) 94 Stat. 3015); and 42 USC Section 2183 (2000) (atomic energy). 
948 See March-in Rights, Title 35 USC Section 203(a)(2)(2001), allowing the government to license patents for 
inventions funded by the government and invented by a small business or nonprofit organisation in circumstances 
where the patent holder could not reasonably satisfy public health or safety needs. 
949 See Title 28 USC Section 1498(a) (2001), entitling patent holders the right to sue and claim compensation for 
the federal government’s unauthorised use of a patent, or the government's licensing of a patent to third parties 
acting by or for the government. Other grounds on which the government can grant compulsory licences are: For 
“pollution” see Clean Air Act of 1988, Title 42 USC Section 7608 (2001), requiring mandatory licensing of 
patents by the government to ensure compliance with the requirements of the Clean Air Act. For “atomic energy” 
see Atomic Energy Act of 1988, 42 USC Section 2183 (2001), permitting the government to use or licence a 
patent in connection with the production of nuclear materials or atomic energy, if doing so would advance the 
public interest. (Aug. 5, 1954, ch. 658, Section 1. 68 Stat. 674. Pub. L. 93-222 (amended) Pub. L. 96-88, title V, 
Section 509(b), Oct. 17, 1979. 93 Stat. 695) For “national security” see Title 35 USC “Patents “ [Jul. 19, 1952], 
ch. 950, 66 Stat. 803; Pub. L. 97-164 (as amended). Section 181 (2001), granting government agencies the 
authority to withhold patents for inventions that may endanger national security. 
950 See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Title 15 USC Sections 16(b)-(h) (2001) (describing the procedural 
requirements for obtaining consent judgments in antitrust proceedings (Section 16. Pub. L. 93–528, Dec. 21, 
1974. 88 Stat. 1708); see also e.g., United States v. 3D Systems Corp. & DTM Corp., No. CIV.l:01CV01237(GK), 
2001 WL 964343, at 34 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2001) (ordering 3 D Systems Corp. to license 178 of its patents in the 
United States, Canada, and Mexico, to a third party). The US Department of Justice initiated the suit against 3D 
Systems Corp. to prevent a prospective acquisition of DTM Corp. by 3D Systems Corp., which would give the 
merged company a monopoly on rapid prototyping technologies in the US market. See James Love and Michael 
Palmedo, Examples of Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property in the United States. Available at: 
<http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/us-at.html> [Accessed Sept. 27, 2017] ch. 3. 
951 Title 28 USC Part IV, Chapter 91. Pub. L. 114-38. Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 
2006), held that patents are not property protected by the Fifth Amendment therefore the government cannot be 
sued for patent infringement. For further analysis, see Joshua Miller, ‘28 USC Section 1498(A) and the 
Unconstitutional Taking of Patents’ (2011) 13 Yale Journal of Law and Technology 1, 3-4. See also Love (n 285) 
12. 
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The law only mandates that the government to pay reasonable compensation whenever an 
invention covered by a patent is used or manufactured by, or for, the US government.952 
Pursuant to this viewpoint, a US Court confirmed that 28 USC Section 1498 ‘is essentially an 
Act to authorise the eminent domain taking of a patent licence, and to provide just 
compensation for the patentee’.953 Under the theory of “eminent domain”, the government has 
the right to use the patented invention to meet the reasonable requirements of the public by 
paying just compensation to avoid violating the “Takings Clause” of the Constitution.954  
 
Nevertheless, several US case laws teach us that the use of patents by the government does not 
even apply to the so-called “Taking Clause” if the satisfaction of the reasonable requirements 
of the public is at stake.955 In Brunswick Corp. v. US, the Court reasoned that government’s 
use of a patent under 28 USC 1498 was not “in strictest sense’” a “taking in violation of Fifth 
Amendment”, since 28 USC Section 1498 ‘grants government absolute power to take a 
compulsory, non-exclusive licence to a patented invention at will’, and thus ‘the government 
has a statutory right to use a patented device’.956 Importantly, Section 209 of the US patent 
statute specifies that:  
If the Federal Agency finds that the public will be served by the granting of the license, 
or license is a reasonable and necessary incentive to bring the invention to practical 
application; or to promote the invention’s utilization by the public; the Federal Agency 
may grant an exclusive or partially exclusive license on a federally owned invention 
thereof.957  
 
More significantly, while the foregoing provision, which is known as “Licensing Federally 
Owned Inventions” in the above citation, appears to only allow for the granting of compulsory 
licences on federally owned inventions, it at least provides adequate scope on the relevance of 
compulsory licensing as an instrument of government policy or the right of the state, including, 
consistently, the possibility of it being used to advance the protection of the public interest 
                                                 
952 28 USC Section 1498(a) (2000). See Adam Mossoff, ‘Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical 
Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause’ (2007) 87 Boston University Law Review 3, 694. 
953 Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 964, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 424 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
991 (1979). 
954 US Constitution: Amendment V: ‘Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation’. 
955 De Graffenried v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 384 (1998), holding that patents are not secured under the “Takings 
Clause”. See also Zoltek Corp. v. United States (n 951) 1352, rejecting claim that patents are secured under the 
Takings Clause. 
956 Brunswick Corp. v. U.S., 36 Fed. Cl. 204 (1996). 
957 Title 35 USC (n 949) [Emphasis added]. 
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against abusive behaviour accordingly. Noting that relevance of local working requirements in 
the US, Section 204 of the US Patent law stipulates that: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, no patents shall be granted to any 
organisation or to any person to enjoy exclusive right to use or sell any subject 
invention in the US unless such person agrees that any products embodying the subject 
invention or produced through the use of the subject invention will be manufactured 
substantially within the US.958 
 
Moreover, the claim that patents must be manufactured locally in order to satisfy the public 
interest has been central to several pieces of scholarship within the US.959 In particular, 
Vaughan says that:  
Speaking of the position of patents in America … it would be a contravention of 
patents law and economic injustice to the American manufacturer to allow a foreigner 
to take out a patent in this country merely for the purpose of reserving the United 
States as a market for his patented product which is manufactured abroad 
exclusively.960  
 
More importantly, the abovementioned Section 204 provision in the US patent regime is 
TRIPS-compliant. Thus, according to the legislative wisdom of the US, patentees have 
affirmative obligations under its domestic patent system to manufacture the patented invention 
locally. All things considered, it is very difficult to envisage from any contrary argument that 
Section 84 would remain inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement when, in fact, the US has a 
similar provision.  
 
6.5.2. Consistency of the Reasonable Requirements of the Public under Section 84 with 
United States Patent Jurisprudence  
 
Advancing the argument from the preceding discussion, the US, which is often seen as the 
global IP policy leader, has continuously accepted a series of judicial and policy decisions 
demanding that the public interest remains the true basis for the granting of patents. It is 
significant that it was established in the IP Clause of the US Constitution that the primary goal 
of patent law is to advance the public interest and achieve social progress as efficiently as 
possible.961 In fact, several empirical elements support the understanding that granted patents 
must meet the reasonable requirements of the public locally. In particular, it is notable that 
                                                 
958 id. [Emphasis added]. 
959 Mercurio and Tyagi (n 76) 281. 
960 Floyd Vaughan, ‘Suppression and Non-Working of Patents with Special Reference to the Dye and Chemical 
Industries’ (1919) 9 The American Economic Review 4, 700. 
961 Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the US Constitution. 
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Thomas Jefferson, the chief architect of the original US patent system, espoused this view, 
conclusively stating that patents are for “the benefit of the public” and plainly rejecting the 
notion that patentees have natural rights in their patented inventions.962  
 
Another remarkable line of argument consistent with a key US statutory provision stipulates 
that: ‘A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest’.963 Remarkably, the US 
Supreme Court has interpreted the public interest principle under its patent regime by stating 
that the patent system is designed to promote innovation that satisfies the fundamental interests 
of the public.964  
 
In fact, the US Supreme Court recognised that the power of Congress to adopt any patent 
system is not an absolute one but rather is subject to the strict constitutional intent of promoting 
the public interest. It stated that: ‘Congress...may not overreach the restraints imposed by the 
stated constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly system without regard 
to the...advancement or social benefit gained thereby’.965 This reasoning reinforces the idea 
that patentees must at all times work their patented inventions or apply the processes locally 
not for their own profit but rather for the benefit of the public. A subsequent US Supreme Court 
decision found that: 
It is undeniably true that the limited and temporary monopoly granted to inventors was 
never designed for their exclusive profit or advantage; the benefit to the public or 
community at large was another and doubtless the primary object in granting and 
securing that monopoly … The true policy and ends of the patent laws enacted under 
this government are disclosed in that article of the Constitution, the source of all these 
laws, viz., [to promote the progress of science and the useful arts], contemplating and 
necessarily implying their extension, and increasing adaptation to the uses of society 
… By correct induction from these truths, it follows that the inventor who designedly, 
and with the view of applying it indefinitely and exclusively for his own profit, 
withholds his invention from the public comes not within the policy or objects of the 
Constitution or acts of Congress.966 
 
The US, that is often seen as the global IP policy leader has successively, accepted series of 
judicial and policy decisions demanding that public interests remain the true basis for the grant 
                                                 
962 Andrew Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Burgh (eds.) Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson 
Monticello on Aug. 13, 1813. In THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Washington DC, The Thomas 
Jefferson Memorial Association, 1905) 334. 
963 Code of Federal Regulations. Title 37 — Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights. Section 1(56)(a) Duty to 
Disclose Information Material to Patentability. 
964 Graham v John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966) para. 5.  
965 ibid. at paras. 5–6. 
966 Kendall v Winsor, 62 U.S. (1858) 328. 
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of patents; thus, patentees are under an affirmative duty to work the patented inventions or 
apply the processes not for their own profit but rather for the benefit of the public. This is a 
significant legislative tradition of the IP system and none of the developed countries have 
departed from this key norm. This ensures that technological innovations flow to the domestic 
patent granting country’s economy. This, according to the popular view of the containment of 
patent policy, permitting patentees to choose not to work their patented inventions locally 
would be an affront to the public interest.967 Going by this view, it is argued that Ghana and 
other WTO Members have the right to adopt and implement any local working requirements 
that follow the Indian Section 84 model, which is consistent with TRIPS. 
 
6.5.3. Section 84: Recent Developments on Local Working in the United States 
 
The US President, Donald Trump has threatened to impose a 20 percent tariff on all EU 
manufactured light vehicles coming into the US,968 stating that auto imports pose a national 
security threat.969 In other words, the US claims imports of automobiles, including SUVs, vans 
and light trucks, and automotive parts into the US970 threaten to impair national security as 
defined by Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.971 There is ongoing investigation 
pursuant to part 705 of the National Security Industrial Base Regulations.972 Under Section 
                                                 
967 Correa (n 15) 7, noting that patent rights are not absolute and national laws have traditionally identified certain 
situations in which patents are not to be granted including the protection of public interest. 
968 US Launches New Trade Probes into Auto Imports, Macron Calls for WTO Reform (International Centre for 
Trade and Sustainable Development -Bridges, vol. 22, No. 19, May 31, 2018). Available at: 
<https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/us-launches-new-trade-probes-into-auto-imports-macron-
calls-for-wto-reform> [Accessed Aug. 9, 2018]. See Jenny Leonard and Richard Bravo, ‘Trump Tariff Threat on 
European Cars Escalates Global Trade War’ (Bloomberg, Jun. 22, 2018). Available at: 
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-22/trump-threatens-to-impose-20-percent-tariff-on-
european-cars>[Accessed Aug. 4, 2018]. See also Sam Fleming, Shawn Donnan and Jim Brunsden, ‘Trump 
Threatens 20% Tariff on EU Car Imports’ (Financial Times, Jun. 22, 2018). Available 
at:<https://www.ft.com/content/9aba7138-762d-11e8-b326-75a27d27ea5f> [Accessed Aug. 4, 2018]. 
969 Notice of Request for Public Comments and Public Hearing on Section 232 National Security Investigation of 
Imports of Automobiles, including Cars, SUVs, Vans and Light Trucks, and Automotive Parts. Federal Register 
24735, Document No. 2018-11708, vol. 83, No. 104 pp.24735-24737, May 30, 2018. Available at: 
<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2018-05-30/pdf/2018-11708.pdf> [Accessed Aug. 16, 2018].  
970 Note that evidence suggests that Mexico is the top exporter of passenger vehicles and light trucks to the US 
followed by Japan, Canada, Germany, and South Korea. According to the Commerce Department, imports of 
motor vehicles into the US have grown 16 percent over the past 20 years. See Department of Commerce. Office 
of Transportation and Machinery. Automotive Team: Industry Trade Data. Available at: 
<https://www.trade.gov/td/otm/autostats.asp> [Accessed Aug. 12, 2018]. See also Ana Swanson, ‘Trump Initiates 
Trade Inquiry That Could Lead to Tariffs on Foreign Cars’ (The New York Times, May 23, 2018). 
971 Pub.L. 87-792, 76 Stat. 872, enacted Oct. 11, 1962, codified at 19 U.S.C. ch. 7 as amended (19 U.S.C. 1862). 
972 15 CFR Part 705. Effect of Imported Articles on the National Security. U.S.C. Title 19. Section 1862. 
Safeguarding National Security (Federal Register, Doc No: 2018-12120, vol. 83, No. 109, Jun. 6, 2018) paras. 
26204-26205. 
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232, the Secretary of Commerce can conduct comprehensive investigations to determine the 
effects of imported products on US national security.  
 
According to the US, ‘There is evidence suggesting that, for decades, imports from abroad 
have eroded our domestic auto industry’.973 It continued that, ‘The Department of Commerce 
will conduct a thorough, fair, and transparent investigation into whether such imports are 
weakening our internal economy and may impair the national security’.974 To determine the 
effects of imports on national security, the Section 232 investigation will consider criteria under 
Section 705.4 of the National Security Industrial Base Regulations, in particular, whether there 
has been a ‘loss of skills or investment, substantial unemployment, and decrease in government 
revenue’ as well as the ‘impact of foreign competition on specific domestic industries and the 
impact of displacement of any domestic products by excessive imports’.975  
In a related development, President Trump claimed that: 
                                                 
973 See Secretary Ross’s letter to Secretary of Defence, James Mattis informing him of the investigation. U.S. 
Department of Commerce Initiates Section 232 Investigation into Auto Imports (Office of Public Affairs, US 
Department of Commerce, May 23, 2018). Available at: >https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-
releases/2018/05/us-department-commerce-initiates-section-232-investigation-auto-imports> [Accessed Aug. 
18, 2018]. 
974 id. 
975 Section 705.4 criteria for determining effect of imports on the national security are: 
(a) To determine the effect on the national security of the imports of the article under 
investigation, the Department shall consider the quantity of the article in question or other 
circumstances related to its import. With regard for the requirements of national security, the 
Department shall also consider the following: 
(1) Domestic production needed for projected national defence requirements; 
(2) The capacity of domestic industries to meet projected national defence requirements; 
(3) The existing and anticipated availabilities of human resources, products, raw materials, 
production equipment and facilities, and other supplies and services essential to the national 
defence; 
(4) The growth requirements of domestic industries to meet national defence requirements 
and the supplies and services including the investment, exploration and development 
necessary to assure such growth; and 
(5) Any other relevant factors. 
(b) In recognition of the close relation between the strength of our national economy and the 
capacity of the United States to meet national security requirements, the Department shall 
also, with regard for the quantity, availability, character and uses of the imported article under 
investigation, consider the following: 
(1) The impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of any domestic industry 
essential to our national security; 
(2) The displacement of any domestic products causing substantial unemployment, decrease 
in the revenues of government, loss of investment or specialized skills and productive 
capacity, or other serious effects; and 
(3) Any other relevant factors that are causing or will cause a weakening of our national 
economy. 
See Section 232 Investigations Programme Guide: The Effect of Imports on the National Security (Bureau of 
Industry and Security, Office of Technology Evaluation, June 2007). Available at: 
<https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents/section-232-investigations/86-section-232-
booklet/file>[Accessed Aug. 10, 2018]. 
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Based on the Tariffs and Trade Barriers long placed on the U.S. and it great 
companies and workers by the European Union, if these Tariffs and Barriers 
are not soon broken down and removed, we will be placing a 20% Tariff on 
all of their cars coming into the U.S. Build them here!976 
 
At least the President’s assertion that European car manufacturers should “Build them here” is 
very significant to local working requirements. Although this issue is about cars rather than 
essential medicines, it will make Section 84, which allows for the granting of a compulsory 
licence provided that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented 
invention have not been satisfied consistent with TRIPS, where for example, failure to work 
any pharmaceutical patents in the territory of Ghana results in high costs and shortages of 
essential medicines. In this context, the implementation of Section 84 is highly relevant to 
Ghana’s public health because it will allow the government to potentially intervene to promote 
affordable medicines. 
 
6.6. Potential Risks of FDI Retribution Effects 
 
Some scholars argue that stronger IP protection is a major stimulus to inward FDI, technology 
transfer, industrial skills enhancement, access to the international market and ultimately 
economic growth in developing countries.977 A study by Lee and Mansfield found that 
reasonable firms consider IP rights in FDI decisions,978 and therefore countries with strong IP 
regimes stand to benefit from inward FDI.979 Likewise, Javorcik found that weak protection of 
IP rights impacts the composition of FDI inflows, deterring investment in IP right-sensitive-
sectors and encouraging distribution rather than local production.980 That is, relatively weak IP 
                                                 
976 Trump wrote on Twitter, Friday Jun. 22, 2018. Available a: 
<https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1010320166486454272?lang=en> [Accessed Aug. 18, 2018]. See 
also Richard Partington, ‘Trump Threatens Car Tariffs after EU sets up £2.5bn of Levies on US’ (The Guardian, 
Jun. 22, 2018). Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jun/22/bourbon-levis-prices-rise-eu-
enforces-tariffs-us> [Accessed Aug. 18, 2018]. 
977 Michael Wallerstein, Mary Ellen Mogee, and Roberta Schoen, Global Dimensions of Intellectual Property 
Rights in Science and Technology (Washington D.C.: Office of International Affairs, Policy and Global Affairs, 
National Research Council National Academy Press, 1993) 111. Falvey, et al (n 804) x. Foreign Direct Investment 
for Development: Maximising Benefits, Minimising Costs (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 2002) 9, discussing the actual influence of FDI on economic growth and claiming that FDI raises 
total factor productivity in the recipient country. 
978 Jeong-Yeon Lee and Edwin Mansfield, ‘Intellectual Property Protection and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment’ 
(1996) 78 The Review of Economics and Statistics 2, 181-186. 
979 ibid. 185-186. 
980 Beata Smarzynska Javorcik, ‘The Composition of Foreign Direct Investment and Protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights: Evidence from Transition Economies’ (2004) 48 European Economic Review 2004, 40. 
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rights protection in a developing country may lower the probability that multinational firms 
will invest there.981  
 
Simply put, the exposure of a patent to an uncertain legal environment such as, in the case 
Ghana implements a Section 84 model can cause questions to arise concerning whether or not 
the target Ghana’s economy will be a breeding ground for investment protection.982 This 
understanding explains why Ghana and other WTO Members may have unilaterally 
strengthened their IP rights laws and enforcement regimes, and could also explain the universal 
acceptance of the TRIPS Agreement.983 A significant school of thought, along this line of 
thinking holds that the pharmaceutical industry, which finds the security of IP rights lacking 
for example, in Ghana may cancel or reduce planned investments,984 or decline to bring new 
products to the country in question,985 as was threatened in South Africa,986 Thailand987 and 
India.988 In another background example, Egypt’s compulsory licensing for Pfizer’s Viagra is 
believed to have had a ripple effect on FDI to the country.989  
 
Importantly, FDI is welcomed and, indeed, actively sought by Ghana, and evidence suggests 
that Ghana has gained immensely from inward FDI.990 The country’s policy of encouraging 
                                                 
981 Mansfield (n 805) 1. 
982 id. suggesting that MNEs often are interested in the following questions: (1) Is there an adequate legal 
infrastructure in the country? (2) Can the country’s laws protect their technology? (3) Do the relevant government 
agencies in the country enforce the laws and provide prompt and equitable treatment to foreign firms? 
983 Keith Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and 
Technology Transfer (Brussels: prepared for the Conference “Public-Private Initiatives After TRIPS: Designing 
a Global Agenda”, July 1997) 19. 
984 Robert Bird and Daniel Cahoy, ‘The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on Foreign Direct Investment: A 
Collective Bargaining Approach’ (2008) 45 American Business Law Journal 2, 309, citing the Case of Pfizer with 
respect to Viagra in Egypt. Keith Maskus, ‘The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct 
Investment and Technology Transfer’ (1998) 9 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 1, 130-131, 
defending a link between stronger IP protection and FDI. Reichman (n 924) 252-254. 
985 Abbott and Reichman (n 460) 952-953. Kristina Lybecker and Elisabeth Fowler, ‘Compulsory Licensing in 
Canada and Thailand: Comparing Regimes to Ensure Legitimate Use of the WTO Rules’ (2009) 37 Journal of 
Law, Medicine and Ethics 2, 233, asserting that the impact on innovative pharmaceutical companies’ decisions to 
launch new products in Thailand was felt more immediately after the issuance of compulsory licensing. For 
example, in March 2007, Abbott Laboratories responded by electing not to launch any new products in Thailand, 
saying “Thailand has chosen to break patents on numerous medicines, ignoring the patent system.” 
986 Reichman (n 941) 256 
987 id. 
988 Abbott and Reichman (n 460) 959. After the Decision, the Chairman of Novartis announced that the company 
would redirect its research and development program away from India to more receptive environments. See 
Andrew Jack, “Novartis to move Indian R&D”, (FT.com, Aug. 22, 2007 edn.). 
989 Richard Castellano, ‘Note, Patent Law for New Medical Uses of Known Compounds and Pfizer’s Viagra 
Patent’ (2006) 46 IDEA: The Intellectual Property Law Review 2, 289, asserting that the compulsory licensing 
measure led Pfizer to “slam the brakes” on a state of the art production facility in Egypt. 
990 Ghana is ranked 3rd among top five recipient of FDI into Africa. See World Investment Report 
(UNCTAD/WIR/2017). Available at: <http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2017_en.pdf> [Accessed Oct. 
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foreign investment is demonstrated in many ways, particularly by a principal law, the 
Investment Promotion Centre Act 2013, which aimed to create an enhanced, transparent and 
responsive environment for investment into the Ghanaian economy.991 This law provides 
guarantees including prohibition against discrimination and expropriation to FDIs.992 This is in 
line with Ghana government’s vision of creating an industrialised economy that creates jobs, a 
modernised agricultural sector that emphasises value addition and an integrated business 
infrastructure that truly builds up the private sector as the engine of growth.993 
 
Therefore, based on the theory that links robust IP rights protection and inward FDI 
opportunities, it can be suggested that the implementation of a Section 84 model in Ghana 
would, all things being equal, weaken IP rights significantly,994 and eventually Ghana would 
risk losing inward FDI. Nevertheless, while the above standpoints appear to be a common 
philosophical version it is also the case that some scholars may generally find it more difficult 
to endorse the wholesale assumption that robust IP rights protection is a definitive incentive 
for inward FDI and socio-economic growth.  
 
6.6.1. Would Implementation of the Section 84 Threaten Inward FDI Opportunities and 
Socio-Economic Growth in Ghana? 
 
Given that the relationship between IP rights, inward FDI and socio-economic growth remains 
complex and dependent on certain circumstances,995 the question is whether the 
                                                 
29, 2017] 47, finding that FDI inflows to Ghana increased by 9 per cent to $3.5 billion. See also George Owusu-
Antwi, ‘Foreign Direct Investment: A Journey to Economic Growth in Ghana – Empirical Evidence’ (2013) 12 
International Business and Economic Research Journal 5, 573. Samuuel Antwi and Xicang Zhao, ‘Impact of 
Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in Ghana: A Cointegration Analysis’ (2013) 3 International 
Journal of Business and Social Research 1, 64. 
991 Act 865 of 2013. 
992 Part II. Article 28(1): 
(a) no enterprise shall be nationalized or expropriated by Government; and (b) no 
person who owns, whether wholly or in part, the capital of any enterprise shall be 
compelled by law to cede his interest in the capital to any other person. (2) There shall 
not be any acquisition of an enterprise to which this Act applies by the State unless 
the acquisition is in the national interest for a public purpose and under a law which 
makes provision for - (a) payment of fair and adequate compensation. 
993 “Trade Policy Review – Ghana” (n 819) 10, para.4.9. The key development objectives of the Industrial Policy 
are: i. To expand productive employment in the manufacturing sector ii. To expand technological capacity in the 
manufacturing sector iii. To promote agro-based industrial development iv. To promote spatial distribution of 
industries in order to achieve a reduction in poverty and income inequalities. 
994 Bird and Cahoy (n 984) 284. 
995 Keith Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy (Washington D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics, 2000) 169. Primo Braga, Carlos Alberto and Carsten Fink, ‘The Relationship Between 
Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment’ (1998) 9 Duke Journal of Comparative and 
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implementation of Section 84 would truly result in a reduction in FDI incentives and threaten 
socio-economic growth in Ghana. A paper by Abbott and Reichman questions whether such a 
measure would result in a palpable reduction in FDI given the pragmatic nature of most 
companies.996 However, they conclude that this is an unrealistic proposition.997 A 
comprehensive review of the extent of FDI inflow to Ghana, pursuant to the sectorial 
distribution, is needed, to quantify the potential effect on FDI if a Section 84 model were to be 
implemented. A study on the trends and sectorial distribution of FDI inflows into the country 
has revealed that FDI in Ghana continues to be concentrated in the mining and oil and gas 
sectors.998  
 
The inward FDI towards the pharmaceutical sector has been minimal if not non-existent. The 
fact is that Ghana does not derive any benefits from FDI into its pharmaceutical sector.999 
Ghana’s economy is relatively small, and open to primary commodity producers, which have 
not been lucrative enough for investment from the pharmaceutical industry.1000 In other words, 
there is not a single mainstream pharmaceutical company that has a manufacturing plant or 
research facility in Ghana, as they prefer not to build manufacturing plants; rather, they simply 
resort to the importation of essential medicines to Ghana, thereby keeping investments as 
limited as possible even though Ghana has a very strong patent law.  
 
Therefore, a more direct impact on FDI to the pharmaceutical sector cannot be sketched on a 
general presumption that the implementation of Section 84 would affect inward FDI, and hence 
the attainment of socio-economic objectives. In fact, the implementation of Section 84 could 
possibly encourage the generic pharmaceutical industry to invest in the Ghanaian local market. 
Importantly, Mansfield found that US firms may be quite willing to invest considerable 
amounts in sales and distribution outlets and in rudimentary production and assembly facilities 
                                                 
International Law 1, 172, explaining that the net effect of higher levels of IPR protection on FDI is theoretically 
ambiguous. 
996 Abbott and Reichman (n 460) 938-939. 
997 id. 
998 Thomas Akabzaa, and Charles Ayamdoo, ‘Towards a Fair and Equitable Taxation for Sustainable 
Development Financing in Africa: A Study on Trends and Nature of Taxation in Ghana’s Extractive Sector’ 
(Integrated Social Development Centre, 2009) 7, observing that in Ghana mining companies pay the minimum 
rate tax of 3 per cent. Daniel Boakye, Sebastien Dessus, Yusuf Foday and Felix Oppong, Investing the Mineral 
Wealth in Development Assets: Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone (Washington, DC: World Bank, Apr. 2012) 12, 
para. 25, stating that even though Ghana has simplified its tax regime for mining companies they pay 3 per cent 
of the royalty rate and most of these are depleted through tax evasion. 
999 Quarterly Investment Report is available at:<http://www.gipcghana.com/press-and-
media/downloads/reports.html> [Accessed Feb. 6, 2018]. 
1000 id. 
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in countries with weak protection.1001 It is difficult, therefore, to make a case that robust IP 
rights protection would, by itself, lead to a significant surge in FDI, or that the implementation 
of Section 84 would cause a loss in FDI incentives.1002  
 
Notably, the implementation of Section 84 in India and an attempt to impose compulsory 
licensing on the grounds of non-working in Brazil did not appear to come at the price of any 
loss in FDI.1003 Along the same lines, it is contended that the implementation of a Section 84 
model would not substantially reduce FDI to Ghana’s economy. There is little empirical 
evidence to support the responsiveness of stronger IP rights protection and inward FDI 
opportunities and socio-economic growth despite the widespread and growing acceptance 
linking them.1004 Ghana does not need to look far to dismantle this misconception.  
 
The fact that the country continues to have a strong IP regime, yet the pharmaceutical industry 
has failed to invest in the country and even continues to cite commercial reasons as the real 
cause for neglecting innovation in regard to tropical diseases, provides a sufficient presumption 
to argue that a country like Ghana that pursues a systematic policy orientation to enforce robust 
IP standards as a means of attracting FDIs may be misleading itself.1005 Thus, any wholesale 
association of the impact of Section 84 relative to FDI incentives and socio-economic growth 
is controversial and ambiguous.1006  
                                                 
1001 Mansfield (n 805) 17, finding however that their decision to invest in R&D facilities or in facilities to 
manufacture components or complete products may be more likely to go to countries with stronger protection 
systems. 
1002 Sanjaya Lall and Manuel Albaladejo, Indicators of the Relative Importance of IPRs in Developing Countries 
(Geneva, UNCTAD, and International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development Issue Paper No. 3, 2003) 
12. 
1003 Nagesh Kumar, Intellectual Property Rights, Technology, and Economic Development: Experiences of Asian 
Countries (London, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights Study Paper 1b, 2002) 37, finding that despite 
loose IP protection, many foreign pharmaceutical companies, including Abbot Laboratories, Smith Kline, and 
Astra-Zeneca, have set up research and development centres across India. Walter Park, Douglas Lippoldt, 
Technology Transfer and the Economic Implications of the Strengthening of Intellectual Property Rights in 
Developing Countries (Paris: OECD Trade Policy Working Papers, No. 62, TAD/TC/WP(2007)19/FINAL, 2008) 
27, para. 95. 
1004 Maskus (n 983) 19. 
1005 id. observing that a poor country hoping to attract inward FDI would be better advised to improve its overall 
investment climate and business infrastructure than to strengthen its patent regime sharply, an action that would 
have little effect on its own. See Maskus (n 984) 128-129, noting that if stronger IP protection always led to more 
FDI, recent FDI flows to developing economies would have gone largely to sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern 
Europe rather than China, Brazil, and other high-growth, large-market developing economies with weak IPRs. 
See also Abbott (n 827) 325, noting that there is reason to doubt that the pharmaceutical companies are 
underfunded from lack of patent rents from developing countries 
1006 Peter Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle. In: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
IN A TRIPS-PLUS ERA, Daniel Gervais (ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 173–174 & 176–180. 
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As Maskus puts it in the FDI context, IPRs are an important component of the general 
regulatory system, including taxation, investment regulations, production incentives, trade 
policies and competition rules.1007 The joint implementation of an overall pro-competitive 
business environment matters most for FDI.1008 In addition, Frischtak states that a country’s 
overall investment climate is often more influential on decisions regarding FDI than the 
strength of the IP protection it offers.1009 More specifically, what matters ultimately to the firm 
is the likelihood that an investment will raise its expected profits.1010 In this context, Fink and 
Maskus observed that a poor country hoping to attract inward FDI would be better advised to 
improve its overall investment climate and business infrastructure than to strengthen its patent 
regime sharply, an action that would have little effect on its own.1011 
 
6.6.2. Lack of Linkages Between Robust IP Protection, Inward FDI Opportunities and 
Socio-Economic Growth 
 
Maskus, Braga, Alberto and Fink have shown that IP rights protection is more likely to attract 
FDI if two additional conditions are met.1012 Most pronounced is the difference between 
countries at different income and investment attraction levels, meaning that FDI incentives do 
not hinge solely on patent protection of pharmaceuticals but depend on a series of other 
factors.1013 First, the country in question needs to have a robust capability to copy foreign 
patented products and technologies. If domestic competitors are incapable of copying these 
patented products and technologies, the commercial interests of foreign firms’ patent owners 
are unlikely to be threatened, and IP protection will be needless. 1014 
 
                                                 
1007 Maskus (n 984) 129. 
1008 id. 
1009 Claudio Frischtak, Harmonization Versus Differentiation in Intellectual Property Rights Regime. In: 
GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
Mitchel Wallerstein, Mary Ellen Mogee and Roberta Schoen (eds.), (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 
1993) 99–100. 
1010 Maskus (n 983) 13, para. 2c. 
1011 Carsten Fink and Keith Maskus, Why We Study Intellectual Property Rights and What We Have Learned. In: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH, Carsten Fink and Keith Maskus (eds.), (Washington, DC: A co-publication of the World Bank and 
Oxford University Press, 2005) 7. 
1012 Maskus (n 984) 130-131. Braga, et al (n 995) 164. 
1013 id. 
1014 id. 
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Second, the country needs to have a large market to enable foreign firms to capture economies 
of scale. That is, while the robustness or weakness of IP rights protection will affect a firm’s 
evaluation in regard to internalising or externalising its intellectual assets, it is only one of the 
many location advantages that influence such a decision.1015 Therefore, in a country that lacks 
such a market, foreign firms are unlikely to find it beneficial to move their manufacturing 
facilities abroad.1016 This means that while strong IP protection is a main consideration for 
marketing decisions, a decision to relocate production facilities is likely to be based on location 
advantages, market size and growth, local demand patterns, transport costs and distance from 
markets, low wage costs in relation to labour productivity, abundant natural resources, and 
trade protection that could encourage “tariff-jumping” investments’.1017 
 
Simply put, whether or not a country will be able to attract FDI depends on the size of the 
market, and the larger the market, the greater the incentive for private corporations to enter 
through FDI in order to take advantage of the market.1018 What appears to weaken the 
assessment linking the relative inadequacy of stronger patents and FDIs further is the 
confirmation that China continues to attract more FDI than many developed countries even 
though it is indisputable that IP matters in China may not be as strong as those standards 
prevailing in key industrialised countries.1019  
 
Several scholars support the foregoing contention including Maskus.1020 For example, 
Outterson believes that it is poorly reasoned that compulsory licensing will have any impact 
on innovation and this position has prevented the wider use of the compulsory licensing 
mechanism in developing countries.1021 Chon argues that the so-called innovation-driven 
growth created primarily through FDIs and accompanying technology transfer may be an 
                                                 
1015 ibid. 171. See Yu (n 1006) 124, stating that because of China’s multiple location advantages, industrial base 
and its huge market the country continues to attract FDIs despite not having a robust IP regime. 
1016 id. See Paul Heald, ‘Mowing the Playing Field: Addressing Information Distortion and Asymmetry in the 
TRIPS Game’ (2003) 99 Minnesota Law Review 2, 266. 
1017 Maskus (n 983) 123. 
1018 David Wheeler and Ashoka Mody, ‘International Investment Location Decisions: The Case of U.S. Firms’ 
(1992) 33 Journal of International Economic 1&2, 59-60. 
1019 Yu (n 1006) 124, stating that despite China being a major infringer of alleged IP rights this has not deterred 
substantial FDI inflow to the country. See Foreign Direct Investment in Figures (OECD, Apr. 27, 2017). Available 
at: <http://www.oecd.org/corporate/FDI-in-Figures-April-2017.pdf> [Accessed Oct. 13, 2017] 2. 
1020 Maskus (n 984) 129, stating that if stronger IP protection always led to more FDI, recent FDI flows to 
developing economies would have gone largely to African countries and Eastern Europe countries rather than 
China, Brazil, and other high-growth, large-market developing economies with presumably weak IP rights. 
1021 Kevin Outterson, ‘Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International Prescription 
Drug Markets’ (2005) 5 Yale Journal of Health Policy Law and Ethics 1, 230, arguing that if patent rents are 
“supra optimal”, compulsory licensing at marginal costs will not reduce innovation. 
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abstract or perhaps even non-existent benefit for developing countries.1022 Maskus suggests 
that several developing countries with little to offer in the way of comparable economic 
opportunities attract virtually no FDI despite strict patent laws that sometimes afford more 
protection than that of the US.1023 This means that the implementation of Section 84 to promote 
affordable medicines would have little impact on FDI incentives and socio-economic growth 
in Ghana.1024 
 
Moreover, industries differ widely in regard to the extent to which patents are effective,1025 as 
firms in most industries, even in advanced countries, do not find patents to be a particularly 
effective means of appropriating the returns on R&D.1026 Many economists seem to believe 
that patent protection tends to be more important to smaller firms than to larger ones.1027 At the 
same time, the argument concerning patent rights protection is focused almost exclusively on 
large, established firms operating within specific industries,1028 and this is unlikely to be apt 
for promoting the small, incremental and adaptive innovations that are typical in developing 
countries.1029 
 
Empirical evidence affirms that the need for IP rights varies with the level of development. For 
example, many developed countries used weak IP rights protection in their early stages of 
industrialisation to develop local technological bases, increasing protection as they approached 
the leaders.1030 In other words, IP rights should be less strong in the early developmental stages, 
or at the very least balanced with limitations and exceptions to encourage public access for the 
purposes of encouraging downstream innovation and promoting competition.1031 Thus, weak 
                                                 
1022 Margaret Chon, ‘Intellectual Property and the Development Divide’ (2006) 27 Cardozo Law Review 6, 2855. 
1023 Maskus (n 984) 129-130, providing empirical facts in the discussion of the role of IP in encouraging FDIs. 
1024 Hestermeyer (n 631) 242. 
1025 Sean Bottomley, The British Patent System during the Industrial Revolution 1700–1852: From Privilege to 
Property (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 11. 
1026 Wesley Cohen and Richard Levin, Empirical Studies of Innovative Activity and Market Structures. 
In: HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION, Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig (eds.), 
(Amsterdam, Holland: Elsevier, Volume 2, 1989) 1090. Falvey, et al (n 804) 20. 
1027 Edwin Mansfield, ‘Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study’ (1986) 32 Management Science 2, 175. 
Duncan Matthews, John Pickering and John Kirkland, A Strategic Approach to Managing Intellectual Property. 
In: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT IN SMALL FIRMS, Robert 
Blackburn (ed.), (New York: Routledge, 2005) 57. For further discussion of this point, see Edwin Mansfield, 
Anthony Romeo, Mark Schwartz, David Teece, Samuel Wagner and Peter Brach, Technology Transfer, 
Productivity, and Economic Policy (New York: Norton, 1982). 
1028 Falvey, et al (n 804) 17. 
1029 ibid. 18 
1030 Lall and Albaladejo (n 1002) 11. 
1031 id. 
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patents can help local firms to build their technological capabilities by permitting imitation and 
reverse engineering.1032  
 
It has been argued in the same vein that lax IPRs have not deterred FDI in China or Brazil, or 
held back technology licensing in Korea and Taiwan, although IP rights protection in these 
countries is weak relative to key industrialised countries.1033 Similarly, the UNCTAD, in 
conjunction with the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) 
published a report describing the indicators of the relative importance of loose IP protection in 
developing countries like Ghana, and affirmed that weak protection helped spark high growth 
in India’s pharmaceutical industry.1034  
 
6.6.3. Countering Potential FDI-Retributive Effects 
 
Given the economic implications of FDI-related retributive effects, policies that go beyond 
national borders and take into account the degree to which actors in a region are able to connect 
to, and benefit from networks are critical. Concerns regarding FDI-related retributive effects 
and the potential threat of lawsuits by the pharmaceutical industry could be eased if Ghana 
were to work with its neighbours, as it is not expected that a reasonable pharmaceutical 
company would sue or withdraw investments from the entire sub-region.  
 
A key policy consideration is whether regional mechanisms could significantly help Ghana to 
address any potential FDI-retributive related effects and bilateral pressure, harness economies 
of scale and build technical capacity if it were to implement a Section 84 model. More 
importantly, if, through a coordinated approach, Ghana and other countries in the sub-region 
impose a sequence of compulsory licences, one might imagine that the likelihood of any FDI-
retribution would be reduced or eliminated, leaving only the economic advantages gained from 
the granting of such licences.1035  
 
Moreover, while it may be possible for a multinational corporation to withdraw its investments 
within a particular country in protest against the granting of a compulsory licence, as in the 
                                                 
1032 ibid. 10, stating that weak IPRs can help local firms in early stages to build technological capabilities by 
permitting imitation and reverse engineering. This is certainly borne out by the experience of the East Asian 
‘Tigers’ like Korea and Taiwan that developed strong indigenous firms in an array of sophisticated industries.  
1033 ibid. 11. 
1034 id. 
1035 Abbott and Reichman (n 460) 973–974. 
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cases of Abbott in regard to “Kaletra” in Thailand,1036and Pfizer’s Viagra in Egypt,1037 a 
reasonable private corporation would not be expected to leave the entire sub-region if the 
approach were a coordinated one. It is obvious that the WTO will not object to the principle 
behind the adoption of any regional legal infrastructure in order to implement compulsory 
licences for the manufacture and distribution of affordable medicines for public health 
protection. This is because the TRIPS General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 provided 
the need to harness economies of scale for the purposes of enhancing purchasing power for, 
and facilitating the local production of, pharmaceutical products.1038 
 
6.7. Implementation of Section 84: Potential High Litigation Costs  
 
An actual or threatened legal challenge is a threat to the implementation of Section 84 to 
promote affordable medicines. This was evident in 1997, when about forty pharmaceutical 
companies sued the South African government in regard to its intention to use the TRIPS 
flexibilities to promote the manufacture of affordable medicines locally.1039 As already 
examined, on 19 December 1997, the EC alleged that Canada’s legislation is not compatible 
with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, because it does not provide for the full 
protection of patented pharmaceutical inventions for the entire duration of the term of 
protection envisaged by Articles 27(1), 28 and 33 of the TRIPS Agreement.1040 Brazil’s use of 
compulsory licensing was criticised by pharmaceutical companies, which claimed that 
compulsory licensing would negatively affect research into new medicines.1041  
 
                                                 
1036 Stephanie Skees, ‘Thai-ing up the TRIPS Agreement: Are Compulsory Licenses the Answer to Thailand's 
AIDS Epidemic?’ (2007) 17 Pace International Law Review 2, 242, finding that in addition to Aluvia®, Abbott 
pulled applications for Brufen® (ibuprofen), Abbotic® (clarithromycin), Clivarine® (heparin), Humira® 
(adalimumab), Tarka® (trandolapril/verapamil HCL ER), and Wemplar® (paricalcitol). 
1037 Castellano (n 989) 289, asserting that the compulsory licensing measure led Pfizer to “slam the brakes” on a 
state of the art production facility in Egypt. 
1038 “Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration” (n 47) para. 6. 
1039 Aileen McGill, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceuticals: Why A WTO Administrative Body 
Should Determine What Constitutes a Public Health Crisis Under the Doha Declaration’ (2009) 10 Wake Forest 
Intellectual Property Law Journal 1, 88, observing that the Act attempted to allow generic production of patented 
antiretroviral HIV drugs. id. However, public outcry eventually forced the pharmaceutical companies to withdraw 
the suit. The US also placed South Africa on its Special 301 Watch List. See Watson (n 86) 152. 
1040 “Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products” (n 68). 
1041 International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development Report. Brazil Issues Compulsory Licence for 
AIDS Drug (Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 11, No. 16, May 9, 2007) 1, stating that Merck responded 
by saying that it is “profoundly disappointed” by the outcome, with the US-Brazil Business Council calling it “a 
major step backward” that will discourage investment in Brazil. 
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The US followed this by attempting to challenge the compulsory licensing provisions of the 
Brazilian Industrial Property Law in a petition to the WTO/DSB.1042 In 2007, when Thailand 
issued a compulsory licence, including Efavirenz and Kaletra, so as to make treatment 
affordable, and to ensure more reliable supplies, the US threatened trade sanctions against 
Thailand, which is the country’s biggest export market, and in the end, Thailand had to stop 
producing a generic version of the HIV medicine, Didanosine.1043 In this connection, a EU 
Commissioner is alleged to have written a letter stating that, ‘neither the TRIPS Agreement nor 
the Doha Declaration appear to justify a systematic use of compulsory licence wherever 
medicine exceeds certain prices’.1044  
 
Moreover, in 2012, Indian generic manufacturers CIPLA and Natco faced separate patent 
infringement lawsuits in the Delhi High Court by Bayer Pharmaceuticals for its patented cancer 
drug Nexavar.1045 The predictable negative reaction by pharmaceutical companies poses 
obvious worries for countries and instils fear into Ghana and other WTO Members that intend 
to use compulsory licensing to promote affordable medicines.1046 Such challenges could 
potentially delay access to essential medicines in Ghana and add costs to seeking a compulsory 
licence.1047 Based on this scepticism, Reichman argued that a country like Ghana that intends 
implement a Section 84 model must exercise caution because it is reasonable to suggest that 
companies that fear a growing trend of compulsory licences, such as pharmaceutical 
companies, may enter into substantial retribution to protect the long-term gains provided by 
stronger patent standards.1048 Moreover, a study by Abbott and Reichman later confirmed the 
same proposition.1049 It is on this basis that Ghana and other WTO Members lack the will to 
use compulsory licensing.1050 
 
6.7.1. The Case of Ghana v GSK 
                                                 
1042 “Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil” (n 83). See Halajian (n 625) 1216. Chow and Lee (n 645) 
454. 
1043 Josephine Johnston and Angela Wasunna, ‘Patents, Biomedical Research, and Treatments: Examining 
Concerns, Canvassing Solutions’ (2007) 37 Hastings Centre Report 1, S19. 
1044 See (n 554) for EU letter challenging the use of compulsory licensing. 
1045 “Bayer Corp. v. Natco Pharma Ltd” (n 181). 
1046 t’ Hoen (666) 37, stating that the EC policies have closely tracked the pharmaceutical industry’s agenda. See 
Patents versus Patients Five Years after the Doha Declaration (Oxfam Briefing Paper 95, November 2006). 
Available at: <https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/Patents%20vs.%20Patients.pdf> [Accessed 
Oct. 22, 2017] 3. 
1047 Halajian (n 625) 1216. 
1048  Reichman (n 941) 252-254. See also Abbott and Reichman (n 460) 959. 
1049 Abbott and Reichman (n 453) 921-987. 
1050 Fauver (n 11) 676, explaining that compulsory licenses reduce the inventor’s incentive to develop new 
technology and discourages FDIs. 
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In 2000, Ghana attempted to import HIV/AIDS medicines, Duovir – a combination copy of 
Zidovudine+Lamivudine, and a generic version of Combivir from India.1051 However, GSK, 
the patent holder, attempted to block the initiative.1052 In a letter to a pharmaceutical distributor 
in Ghana (Healthcare Pharmacy) and CIPLA an Indian generic medicines manufacturer, GSK 
alleged that sales of generic versions of its patented medicines, Combivir, in Ghana would be 
illegal because they would be violating its patents.1053  
 
Indeed, Ghana had filed legal documents to challenge GSK’s claim, as the country had earlier 
rejected the three patents that the company claimed it owned in Ghana.1054 Significantly, 
officials at the African regional patent authority, the African Regional Industrial Property 
Organisation (ARIPO), which examined the patents in question, explained that they were 
invalid in Ghana or did not apply: ‘Glaxo’s actions are wrong’, said Christopher Kiige, head 
patent examiner of the ARIPO. He went on to say: ‘If [Glaxo officials] went to court they 
would lose’.1055 This is because the said patents were issued at a time when Ghana did not 
provide patent protection for pharmaceuticals, or similarly at that time pharmaceutical 
inventions were not patentable under the previous Patent law of Ghana.1056  
 
Ghana began allowing pharmaceutical product patents on 1 July 1993 following the adoption 
of Patent Law No. 305A in 1992, and any product patents registered before that would not 
apply. Further investigations revealed that these patents were not new, and GSK should not 
have attempted to apply for protection or they should not have been granted a patent in the first 
place in view of the fact that the said patents lacked novelty in the ARIPO system.1057 In a 
similar move, when GSK tried to patent the same formulations, zidovudine+lamivudine 
(Combivir) in India, the application was opposed.1058  
                                                 
1051 Anthony So and Cecila Oh, ‘Approaches to Intellectual Property and Innovation that Meet the Public Health 
Challenge of AIDS’ (Working Paper prepared for the Third Meeting of the Technical Advisory Group of the 
Global Commission on HIV and the Law, July 2011) 3. 
1052 “Glaxo Blocks Importation of Generic Combivir into Ghana” (n 656). See also Condon (n 656) 101. 
1053 Schoofs (n 5). 
1054 id. 
1055 id. citing the then Chief Examiner of the African Regional Industrial Property Organisation. 
1056 Patent Law No. 305A of Dec. 30, 1992. 
1057 Amar Lulla, Director of CIPLA notes that: ‘GlaxoWellcome does not hold the patents in Ghana, as the only 
patent (AP 300) granted after 1 July also just relates to crystalline lamivudine and we’ve written to them saying 
so’. ‘They still haven’t replied, so as of now, the export will continue’. Sanchita Sharma, “Drug Majors Battle for 
Ghanaian AIDS Market” (The Indian Express, Nov. 18, 2000).  
1058 Pre-Grant Representation by Way of Opposition for Patent Application No. 2044/CAL/1997 filed on Oct. 29, 
1997 titled “Pharmaceutical Compositions” Under Section 25(1) of the Patents Act 1970 (39 of 1970) and Rule 
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On 30 March 2006, the Indian Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS and the Manipur 
Network of Positive People filed their opposition to GSK’s patent application for Combivir. 
They claimed that the drug did not qualify as a true innovation or new invention. They 
successfully invoked Section 25(1) of the Indian Patent Act and Rule 55(1) of the Rules 
governing the patent regime, which allows the public to bring evidence for patent rejection to 
the attention of the Controller.1059 
 
They alleged that GSK’s patent under consideration for patent was not an invention under 
Section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act because it was merely a “discovery” of a new form of a 
known substance.1060 Old molecules, which have been slightly modified for a new use, do not 
comply with Section 3(d) of the Indian patent law.1061 Heading for rejection, the company 
(GSK) later withdrew its patent application in India.1062 Nevertheless, Ghana had to abandon 
its plans to import affordable medicines from India to avoid high litigation costs.1063 
 
However, due to GSK’s intervention, Ghana experienced shortages of Duovir, and for public 
health reasons, the then Minister of Health issued a compulsory licence on 26 October 2005 
for the importation into Ghana of generic HIV/AIDS medicines after a declaration of a state of 
emergency consistent with Article 31(b) of TRIPS.1064 The granting of compulsory licensing 
in Ghana is covered under Section 13 of Ghana’s Patents Act 2003 (Act 657). According to the 
Minster, after considering the TRIPS Agreement and Doha Declaration, a compulsory licence 
for importation into Ghana of generic HIV/AIDS medicines was approved.1065  
 
                                                 
55 (1) of the Rules as Amended by the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005 by the Indian Network of People Living 
with HIV/AIDS and the Manipur Network of Positive People on Mar. 30, 2006. 
1059 id. 
1060 id. 
1061 ibid. p. 3, lines 6-17; and p. 7, lines 13-29. 
1062 Note that GSK made a similar attempt to apply for patents in Thailand, which was also withdrawn. “GSK 
Withdraws Combivir Patent Application from India and Thailand” (Geneva, Third World Network, IP Issues No. 
Sept06/03: Sept. 12, 2006). See Poku Adusei, Patenting of Pharmaceuticals and Development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Laws, Institutions, Practices and Politics (Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag, 2013) 150. See also 
Srividhya Ragavan, “Patent and Trade Disparities in Developing Countries” (New York, Oxford University Press, 
2012) 118-119. 
1063 Schoofs (n 5). 
1064 “Notification of Emergency and Issuance of Government Use Licence by Ghana” (n 8). Love (n 8) 16. See 
also Savoie (n 8) 237.  
1065 id. 
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The duration of the government use licence was 3 years, and it was for the importation of 
Combivir from India (CILPA). The licence was for government use, as the medicine was to be 
used within the national HIV/AIDS programme to treat people without commercial 
purpose.1066 According to one study conducted by Correa, the cost of the ARVs dropped by 
almost 50 per cent from $495 to $235 for one year’s treatment per patient in Ghana.1067 
However, the country abandoned this initiative, and consequently was left with no sustainable 
supply of lifesaving medicines for its HIV patients.1068  
 
6.7.2. Unlikely Legal Challenge After the Doha Solution Against the Implementation of 
Section 84 
 
One important purpose of the Doha Declaration was to clear the air of uncertainty that had 
arisen in Ghana and other WTO Members surrounding the use of the TRIPS flexibilities, due 
to a lack of experience and administrative know-how in these countries in regard to the 
regulation of patents.1069 Therefore, after the historic Doha Solution, it is not expected that the 
pharmaceutical industry will adopt an aggressive approach to challenging the legality of a 
model like Section 84. Although, some Indian generic manufacturers including CIPLA and 
Natco have while manufacturing affordable medicines faced patent infringement lawsuits in 
India.1070  
 
More importantly, Yu has raised some critical concerns regarding the possibility of using 
investor-state dispute settlement to address international disputes involving IP investments.1071 
He contends that FTAs ‘norms will reinforce the ability of private investors, such as IP rights 
holders, to sue foreign governments without the support of their home governments’.1072 In 
fact, several high-profile investment cases have arisen where right holders invoke protections 
under treaties to challenge measures by host states that affect their IP rights.1073  
                                                 
1066 id. 
1067 Carlos Correa, Pharmaceutical Innovation, Incremental Patenting and Compulsory Licensing (Geneva: South 
Centre Research Papers 41, 2011) 18, Table 4. 
1068 Cloatre (n 9) 53. 
1069 Drahos (n 832) 17. 
1070 “Bayer Corp. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., C.S. (O.S.) No. 1090/2011” (n 181). See also “Bayer Corp. v CIPLA 
Pharm: Case No. CS (OS) 523/2010” (n 208). 
1071 Yu (n 803) 831. 
1072 id. 
1073 An investment dispute where compliance with IP treaties is challenged concerns the US-based pharmaceutical 
company Eli Lilly and the revocation of two of its patents in Canada. In November 2012, Eli Lilly initiated 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes proceedings (under Chapter 11 of NAFTA The 
North American Free Trade Agreement. 32 ILM 289, 605 (1993)) against Canada, following the invalidation of 
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In the context of Africa, one of such cases is AHS Niger and Menzies Middle East and Africa 
S.A. v Republic of Niger.1074 In this case, the claimants (Menzies Middle East and Africa SA 
(MMEA), a Luxembourg-registered company, and its 75 per cent owned Nigerien subsidiary, 
Aviation Handling Services Niger SA (AHS)), provided airport cargo and ground services at 
Diori Hamani International Airport, in Niamey, Niger, under a concession agreement 
concluded with the government. In December 2010, Nigerien authorities terminated the 
arrangement, seized equipment belonging to the claimants, and requisitioned its airport 
staff.1075  
 
Citing a grant of jurisdiction arising from the parties’ investment agreement with the 
government of Niger, the claimants brought a suit before the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes in March 2011. In addition to claiming an expropriation, 
they raised the issue of infringements of their IP rights in the form of trademark and trade 
names. The claimants alleged that the new personnel employed by the Nigerien authorities 
after the seizure of its equipment had continued to operate airport services using uniforms 
showing their IP-protected trademarks and trade names. The tribunal issued an award in July 
2013, rejecting the IP-related aspects of the claim.1076 
 
                                                 
pharmaceutical patents for its drugs Strattera and Zyprexa by Canadian courts, where the Canadian Courts held 
to be insufficiently supported by evidence in the patent application. Lilly argues, breaches NAFTA’s investment 
chapter since ‘Canada has a positive obligation to ensure Canadian law complies with NAFTA and the PCT, 
consistent with the reasonable investment-backed expectations of the investor.’ See Eli Lilly & Company v Teva 
Canada Limited, 2011 FCA 220, affirming the earlier trial court decision (2010 FC 915) and Eli Lilly Canada v 
Novopharm Limited, 2012 FCA 232, again affirming the earlier trial court decision (2011 FC 1288). Moreover, 
in 2010, 3 Philip Morris (PM) companies filed a request for arbitration under the bilateral investment treaty 
between Uruguay and Switzerland with the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID). See (Philip Morris Brand Sàrl (Switzerland), Philip Morris Products S.A. (Switzerland) and Abal 
Hermanos S.A. (Uruguay) v Oriental Republic of Uruguay, [2009], ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7. The company 
alleges that Uruguay’s limits on the use of trademarks on tobacco packaging ‘have substantially damaged the 
value of the companies’ investments in Uruguay and deprived them of the ability to use their brands and 
trademarks’. See Todd Weiler, ‘Philip Morris vs. Uruguay: An Analysis of Tobacco Control Measures in the 
Context of International Investment Law’ (Report #1 for Physicians for a Smoke Free Canada, Jul. 28, 2010) 26-
27. The Tribunal rejected, inter alia, the argument that Philip Morris’ business of selling tobacco products in 
Uruguay is not an ‘investment’ entitled to arbitration under Article 25 of the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes Convention [1965] 575 UNTS 159. The tribunal argued that for an investment 
to contribute to the host state’s economic development is not a “mandatory legal requirement”, but merely pointing 
to the typical features of an investment. See Philip Morris v Uruguay, Decision on Jurisdiction (Jul. 2, 2013) para. 
204-210. 
1074 AHS Niger and Menzies Middle East and Africa S.A. v Republic of Niger (ICSID Case No ARB/11/ 11). 
(Award Jul. 15, 2013). 
1075 See Henning Grosse Ruse – Khan, ‘Challenging Compliance with International Intellectual Property 
Norms in Investor-State Dispute Settlement’ (2016) 19 Journal of International Economic Law 1, 241-277.  
1076 “AHS Niger and Menzies Middle East and Africa S.A. v Republic of Niger” (n 1074) para.150. 
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It is important to note that, for example, Article 49 of the EU-EPA provides for the initiation 
of arbitration procedure where there is a conflict.1077 It this context, investors can initiate 
proceedings against the Ghanaian government. It therefore follows that large multinational 
corporations are given the right to challenge decisions and ‘laws they don’t like - not in court, 
but in front of industry-friendly arbitration panels that sit outside any court system’.1078  
 
To avoid the challenges posed by investor-state dispute settlement countries such as India, 
Indonesia and South Africa have already started terminating international investment 
agreements.1079 Remarkably, according to the EU it has been negotiating a FTA with India, but 
India has refused to include a substantial IP right chapter.1080 It is unclear at this point whether 
Ghana will have the political will to terminate existing FTAs or refuse to agree to include IP 
chapters in any subsequent FTAs, as India has done. 
 
Nevertheless, for example, since NGOs draw the attention of the public to issues, which 
generates news coverage, and political leaders derive their authority from the public, NGOs 
representing affected groups may play a significant role in resisting pressure to concede the 
TRIPS flexibilities in the event of legal challenge by the pharmaceutical industry.1081 The rise 
in influence of the Africa Group has been enabled by a partnership with NGOs and civil society 
actors who help in framing the contest of principles surrounding IP rights and public health in 
the court of global public opinion.1082  
                                                 
1077 See Ghana-EU-EPA (n 893) Chapter 3, Section I. 
1078 Peter Yu, ‘The Investment-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights’ (2017) 66 American University 
Law Review 3, 832, citing Senator Elizabeth Warren (D–Mass.) in Deirdre Fulton, ‘As Countries Line up to Sign 
Toxic Deal, Warren Leads Call to Reject TPP’ (Common Dreams, Feb. 3, 2016). Available at: 
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[Accessed Feb. 3, 2018]. 
1079 Yu (n 803) 855, see footnote 119, citing Ben Bland and Shawn Donnan, ‘Indonesia to Terminate More than 
60 Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (Financial Times, Mar. 26, 2014), ‘Indonesia is planning to terminate more than 
60 bilateral investment treaties that allow disgruntled foreign investors to bypass local courts and seek 
compensation in international tribunals, amid a growing global backlash against such provisions’. Adam Green, 
‘South Africa: BITs in Pieces’ (Financial Times, Oct. 19, 2012), ‘South Africa has terminated a bilateral 
investment treaty with Belgium and Luxembourg in the first of a series of planned shreddings of post-apartheid-
era agreements which are coming up for renewal’. See David Price, ‘Indonesia’s Bold Strategy on Bilateral 
Investment Treaties: Seeking an Equitable Climate for Investment?’ (2017) 7 Asian Journal of International Law 
1, 124. Nicholas Peacock and Joseph Nihal, Mixed Messages to Investors as India Quietly Terminates Bilateral 
Investment Treaties with 58 Countries (Herbert Smith Freehills, Mar. 16, 2017). Available at: 
<https://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/2017/03/16/mixed-messages-to-investors-as-india-quietly-terminates-bilateral-
investment-treaties-with-58-countries/> [Accessed Feb. 12, 2018]. 
1080 “Report on the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Third Countries” (n 876) 12. 
1081 Abbott (n 827) 356. 
1082 John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000) 575-576. 
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In other words, NGOs and civil society actors have succeeded in reducing the complexities of 
patent law and HIV/AIDS to a simple choice that is readily understood by the mass public.1083 
According to Drahos, at Doha, the then USTR Robert Zoellick faced a choice between 
appearing to be against access to medicines or abandoning the US pharmaceutical industry. 
Neither were especially palatable alternatives. He chose the latter.1084 No individual, country 
or organisation could be seen to be deciding the latter,1085 bearing in mind the public relations 
disaster of the litigation by pharmaceutical multinationals against South Africa.1086 
 
6.8. The Feasibility of Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Capacity to Produce Affordable 
Medicines for Distribution  
 
While nothing in the light of TRIPS or FTAs would directly operate to prevent Ghana from 
implementing a Section 84 model, the question is whether Ghana is capable of embarking on 
any efficient local manufacture of medicines for distribution, like India, which has adequate 
manufacturing capacity.1087 Producing pharmaceuticals is a complex process that requires a 
reliable, high quality supply of raw materials, technical expertise and a stable supply of 
electricity, gas and other utilities, plus sufficient human resource capacity - scientists and 
expertise in pharmaceutical process and regulation.1088  
 
In this context, the question is whether Ghana has the requisite infrastructure, workforce, 
supplies, organisational ability, technical know-how, or access to raw materials that would 
support the local production of patented inventions. That is, an analysis should include the 
economic reasons why local working might not be beneficial to needy people.1089 This would 
assist in weighing up all of the options, particularly in regard to whether importation on a large 
scale would not provide the much needed affordable medicines.1090 There is rich literature, 
                                                 
1083 Drahos (n 832) 19. 
1084 id. 
1085 ibid. 20. 
1086 John Odell and Susan Sell, Reframing the Issue: The WTO Coalition on Intellectual Property and Public 
Health, 2001. In: NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO AND NAFTA, John 
Odell (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 98. 
1087 Warren Kaplan and Richard Laing, Local Production of Pharmaceuticals: Industrial Policy and Access to 
Medicines an Overview of Key Concepts, Issues and Opportunities for Future Research (Washington, D.C.: HNP 
Discussion Paper, World Bank, 2005) 29. 
1088 ibid. 33. 
1089 Cottier, et al (n 66) 453. 
1090 ibid. 453. See Kaplan and Laing (n 1087) 7, observing that domestic supply has been met without heavy local 
investment. 
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much of it emanating from the World Bank, that deals with barriers to business and industrial 
concerns in developing countries.1091  
 
Most of the barriers are well-known, particularly in the context of Africa.1092 The Brazilian 
experience of providing universal access to HIV/AIDS treatment demonstrates that it is not, in 
all cases, economically feasible for a developing country like Ghana with a relatively small 
market size to embark on local manufacture.1093 For Ghana and other WTO Members, technical 
expertise, raw materials, quality standards, and production and laboratory equipment need to 
be imported, with the result that foreign exchange savings may be small or non-existent.1094  
 
Arguably, the larger transitional and developing countries may be able to concentrate on 
producing, assured quality, low cost generics as a matter of health policy.1095 Clearly, local 
pharmaceutical companies in Ghana cannot compete if they produce ineffective or poor quality 
medicines.1096 The World Bank has suggested that local pharmaceutical manufacturing should 
only be encouraged in countries that have inadequate capacity to embark on efficient 
manufacturing.1097  
 
Although governments can play an important role in strengthening local production capacity, 
in terms of state-controlled local production, the WHO considers this to be ill-informed,1098 as 
it may have no impact whatsoever on patient access to much needed medicines.1099  The profit 
                                                 
1091 Sara Bennett, Jonathan Quick and German Velasquez, Public Private Roles in the Pharmaceutical Sector, 
World Health Organisation (Geneva: WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs, WHO DAP 97.12: DAP 
Series No. 5, 1997). 
1092 Kaplan and Laing (n 1087) 12, citing a shortage of skilled labour; a weak financial sector (banking/non-
banking); diminished flows of foreign direct investment; the fact that smaller firms face more problems than larger 
firms with financing, taxes and regulation, inflation, corruption and street crime; economies of scale; legal and 
regulatory systems and enforcement. 
1093 Dirceu Greco and Mariangela Simao, ‘Brazilian Policy of Universal Access to AIDS Treatment: Sustainability 
Challenges and Perspectives’ (2007) 21 AIDS, suppl. 4, 41, finding that in middle-income countries such as Brazil 
there were specific challenges to maintaining universal access to treatment policy, especially considering the need 
to move to more complex ART, which required investment to be made in both public and private Brazilian 
laboratories to increase local production at fair prices not only of the finished drugs but particularly of the active 
principal ingredients. 
1094 Cottier, et al (n 66) 458. 
1095 Kaplan and Laing (n 1087) 25. 
1096 ibid. 30. 
1097 Andreas Seiter, Pharmaceuticals: Local Manufacturing, Joy de Beyer (ed)., (Washington D.C., World Bank, 
HNP Brief #3, March 2005) 2.  
1098 Bennett, et al (n 1091) iv, observing that the government’s role is often best fulfilled by creating a stable 
economic and political environment, an efficient regulatory environment and favourable tax and duty structures. 
1099 Kaplan and Laing (n 1087) 33 
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margins on bulk generic medicines are low, so public production must be as efficient as private 
manufacturing if losses are to be avoided.  
 
As a general matter, it will be difficult for the local Ghanaian producers to compete with foreign 
suppliers operating large-scale efficient production facilities because the capital costs, 
including the cost of borrowing are very high in the African region.1100 Therefore, local 
production may often not be reliable in Ghana and other WTO Members and, even if it is 
reliable, it does not necessarily mean that medicine prices are reduced for the end user.1101  
 
Moreover, the Ghanaian government may be limited in terms of the extent to which it can 
purchase from local producers because of higher prices in the case where a Section 84 model 
is implemented.1102 That is, if Ghana to efficiently adopt the Section 84 model to promote 
affordable medicines, the result may be less access to medicines, since production facilities in 
the country may mean forgoing economies of scale.1103 Consequently, it has been suggested by 
African stakeholders that locally producing medicines already in abundance is not the way 
forward because it makes little economic sense.1104  
 
On this premise, if Ghana does not have the infrastructure required to manufacture patented 
medicines locally, then the implementation of a Section 84 model may be futile, as the country 
will not be able to supply its market through domestic production and will have to import 
medicines anyway.1105 Notably, Ghana has a comparatively strong pharmaceutical industry 
within the sub-region.1106  
 
Ghana hosts many generic manufacturers.1107 Most of the local manufacturing companies are 
certified with Good Manufacturing Practice.1108 Nevertheless, since the implementation of a 
Section 84 model in Ghana is expected to benefit the public, such requirements are not 
                                                 
1100 Frederick Abbott, Trends in Local Production of Medicines and Related Technology Transfer (Paris: Prepared 
for the WHO Department of Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property, 2011) 22, citing the difficulties 
in meeting price competition of products from India and China. 
1101 id. 
1102 ibid. 23. 
1103 Kaplan and Laing (n 1087) 34. 
1104 Abbott (n 1100) 22. 
1105 Kaplan and Laing (n 1087) 10. 
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from Ghanaian Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Firms’ (2014) 8 Global Journal of Business Research 2, 84. 
1107 Harper and Gyansa-Lutterodt (n 127) 42. 
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measured solely in terms of domestic manufacture;1109 they should theoretically factor in the 
channels for supplying medicines to the needy people.1110  
 
6.8.1. Building Capacity for Local Pharmaceutical Manufacturing in Ghana 
 
Although, Ghana has effective distribution channels to deliver medicines to the needy 
people,1111 a major symptom of the constraints that the Ghanaian local industry is facing is the 
significant underutilisation of manufacturing capacity, often by more than 50 per cent.1112 This 
is due to the smallness of the market size, which means that the country is not able to absorb 
its pharmaceutical production capacity.1113 This can lead to high operating costs where local 
companies are unable to generate economies of scale, compared with a large-scale Indian 
manufacturer.1114  
 
Theoretically, Ghana could mitigate the issue of its small market size by deciding to work with 
its neighbours in the sub-region to enhance economies of scale to generate more incentive for 
the local manufacture of essential medicines. Another option available to Ghana is the use of 
south-south initiative to promote collaboration, such as foreign directive investment-driven 
joint ventures as exemplified by the investment made in Uganda by CIPLA.1115 The viability 
of such initiative could be provided by advanced market commitments by the Ghanaian 
government, as well as the promise of a market across the West African sub-region.1116 
 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Implementation Decision in 2003 would help alleviate the problems 
associated with economies of scale resulting from the small size of the market.1117 As already 
                                                 
1109 Taubman (n 59) 104. 
1110 Katharina Gamharter, Access to Affordable Medicines: Developing Responses under the TRIPS Agreement 
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1117 “Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration” (n 47). 
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stated, in as much as the measures conform to the provisions of Article XXIV of the GATT 
1947, as subsequently adopted by the WTO in 1994,1118 the measures waive certain obligations 
in order to enable the Members to harness economies of scale for the purpose of enhancing 
purchasing power for, and facilitating the local production of pharmaceutical products.1119 This 
therefore means that local manufacturers in Ghana may have to look beyond the national 
borders in order to sell their products.1120  
 
Importantly, given that the lack of affordable medicines is a shared concern in the sub-region 
and an area that deserves cooperation, a regional approach would enable similarly situated 
countries to address their constraints jointly by drawing on each other’s expertise and 
experience and by pooling and sharing resources and information.1121 From an economic and 
public health standpoint, a regional approach could provide incentives for establishing or 
developing regional pharmaceutical production and help to expand research capabilities.1122  
 
In addition, higher effective demand for the same medicines due to climatic conditions and 
other geographical reasons will result in lower consumer prices for medicines due to increased 
economies of scale in procurement and distribution.1123 Other important benefits include: the 
lowering or offsetting of the costs associated with adapting medicines to the region due to 
increased economies of scale; stronger local technological capacities or domestic innovation 
resulting from the pooling of adequate resources including financing; and the stimulation of 
human and physical capital.1124  
 
Where there exist insufficient institutional and human resources, Ghana could always mitigate 
this by reaching out to international organisations that continue to provide technical assistance 
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protocol of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to pool resources and cooperate with 
one another and with others for a collective and strategic combat against the health problems of the region. See 
West African Health Organisation was created by Protocol A/P2/7/87, Jul. 9, 1987. See also ECOWAS Regional 
Pharmaceutical Plan (WAHO Essential Medicines and Vaccines programme, WAHO Technical Document No. 
WAHO/TD/RPP/WA/2014.03, 2014) 5. The WAHO continues to mobilise partnerships, financial and technical 
support to countries in the sub-region. See Jude Aidam and Issiaka Sombie, ‘The West African Health 
Organization’s Experience in Improving the Health Research Environment in the ECOWAS Region’ (2016) 14 
Health Research Policy and Systems 30, 11. 
1123 Musungu, Villanueva and Blasetti (n 1121) 37.  
1124 id. 
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to developing countries,1125 for example, WIPO,1126 UNCTAD and ICTSD. 1127 Support for the 
local production of pharmaceuticals has been the subject of intense discussion in international 
and regional forums since the 1970s.1128 The past two decades have seen a stronger emphasis 
on the issues of local production, technology transfer and access to medicines.1129 The WTO 
has also cooperated with other intergovernmental organisations such as the UNCTAD and the 
UNDP, which provide technical advice to countries on local pharmaceutical production and 
related technology transfer.1130  
 
Importantly, in 2016, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a Resolution on enhancing 
capacity-building in public health.1131 The Resolution urges the international community to 
increase investment, by building on existing mechanisms and through partnership, to improve 
health systems in developing countries with the aim of providing sufficient infrastructures, 
management systems and supplies to meet the targets specified in SDGs Goal 3 by 2030.1132 
The Council was convinced that capacity-building is critical in enhancing public health systems 
in developing countries and called upon the international community to continue to promote 
cooperation in regard to strengthening the capacity of developing countries, including through 
financial and technical support and the training of personnel, in particular, to obtain essential 
medicines that are affordable, safe, efficacious and of high quality.1133 
 
                                                 
1125 For example, the South Centre, the ICTSD, the Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO), the International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC), Oxfam and Médicins sans Frontières have active policy research and 
dialogue programmes related to IP and linkages to sustainable development issues. 
1126 Patent-Related Flexibilities in the Multilateral Legal Framework and their Legislative Implementation at the 
National and Regional Levels (Geneva, Fifth Session of the Committee on Development and Intellectual Property, 
CDIP/5/4 Rev. Aug. 18, 2010). 
1127 UNCTAD and ICTSD Programme on Capacity Building for Developing Countries. Available at: 
<http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Intellectual%20Property/IPRs-and-Sustainable-Development.aspx> 
[Accessed Oct. 17, 2017]. 
1128 The subject of local production appeared in WHO as part of the ‘Report of the International Conference on 
Primary Health Care and in Resolution WHA 31.32’ (World Health Organisation, 1978) paras. 74 & 93. 
1129 Pharmaceutical Production and Related Technology Transfer: Landscape Report (World Health Organisation, 
2011) 13, observing that the local production of drugs in developing countries has long been seen as a potential 
way to increase access to medicines and improve public health. 
1130 ibid. 35. 
1131 ‘Promoting the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental 
Health through Enhancing Capacity-Building in Public Health (Human Rights Council, thirty-second session, 
Agenda item 3, A/HRC/32/L.24/Rev.1, Jun. 30, 2016). 
1132 ibid. para. 1. 
1133 ibid. para. 3. 
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In addition, the lengthy intergovernmental negotiations that led to the adoption of the WHO 
Resolution WHA 61.21 on a GSPA-PHI 1134 underscored the important institutional role of the 
WHO in securing a place for local production and technology transfer on the international 
agenda.1135 The GSPA-PHI outlines a new focus on local production as a means of contributing 
to the overall goals of promoting innovation, building capacity and improving access.1136  
 
Against this backdrop, the EU has supported local production and relevant technology transfer 
through its initiative Aid for Poverty-Related Diseases (HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria).1137 The EU conceptualised and launched this initiative with the underlying premise 
of delving deep into the highly complex interface of technology transfer and local production 
in developing countries like Ghana with a view to supporting such local production and the 
related transfer of technology to improve access to medicines.1138  
 
Thus, having regard for its report on an EU Regulation on Aid for Poverty Diseases 
(HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis) in developing countries, it recognised an appropriate 
structural response, which is both comprehensive and coherent and beyond the financial and 
human resources of most developing countries,1139 and called for US$ 7-10 billion per year to 
fight these diseases.1140 With this, the EU intends to provide, where appropriate, technical 
assistance to developing countries to help them address public health issues in accordance with 
the provisions of TRIPS, as clarified in the Doha Declaration, so as to enable them to protect 
public health and promote access to medicines for all.1141  
 
Importantly, the EU has given an indication that it is looking into ways of improving its support 
for developing countries implementing the TRIPS Agreement — including its flexibilities in 
                                                 
1134 WHA Resolution WHA62.16. Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and 
Public Health (Eighth plenary meeting, agenda item 12.8., A62/VR/8, May 22, 2009) Annexes. 
1135 “Pharmaceutical Production and Related Technology Transfer” (n 1129) 35. 
1136 “Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property” (n 725). Element 
3, on building and improving innovative capacity, highlights key areas for investment including capacities related 
to science and technology, local production of pharmaceuticals. Element 4, on transfer of technology, emphasises 
north–south and south– south development cooperation, partnerships and networks to build and improve transfer 
of technology related to health innovation. 
1137 Committee on Development and Cooperation on the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council 
Regulation on Aid for Poverty Diseases (HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis) in developing 
countries (Rapporteur: Anders Wijkman, COM(2002) 109 – C5-0100/2002 – 2002/0051(COD)) A5-0394/2002, 
Nov. 13, 2002). 
1138 id. 
1139 ibid. Recital 6. 
1140 Ibid. Recital 5. 
1141 ibid. Amendment 26, Article 3(f). 
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appropriate cases, such as health emergencies.1142 Under Amendment 20, Article 3, community 
financial support shall be given to specific projects designed to further the objective 
of increasing the affordability of key pharmaceuticals.1143  
 
In this direction, the EU committed itself to providing the necessary technical, scientific and 
normative input in order to prioritise health interventions within the total development co-
operation budget and improve health outcomes related to these three major communicable 
diseases.1144 Importantly, this commitment extends to improving pharmaceutical policies and 
practice, and helping developing countries, at the regional or national levels, to develop quality 
local production of key preventive and therapeutic pharmaceuticals consistent with the Doha 
Declaration.1145  
 
In so doing, the EU stated that it will initiate a programme of action towards the transfer of 
technology and know-how, where possible, for the purpose of local pharmaceutical 
production.1146 Importantly, in 2005, UNCTAD’s Commission on Investment, Technology and 
Related Financial Issues recommended that ‘UNCTAD should ... assess ways in which 
developing countries can develop their domestic productive capability in the supply of essential 
medicines in cooperation with pharmaceutical companies’.1147  
 
UNCTAD continues to develop a “Stakeholders’ Reference Guide to IP and Related Policies”, 
which is intended to provide concise and practical information on ways in which to promote 
local pharmaceutical production and improve access to medicines through a variety of policy 
tools, focusing on the flexibilities provided under TRIPS, and the interfaces between IP, trade 
and investment, medicines regulation and procurement strategies.1148  
 
                                                 
1142 Trade, Growth and Intellectual Property - Strategy for the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights in Third Countries ({SWD(2014) 204 final} 1.7.2014 COM(2014) 389) 9, para. 2.2.7. 
1143 ibid. Amendment 19, Article 2(b). 
1144 ibid. Amendment 21, Article 3(a). 
1145 ibid. Amendment 24, Article 3(c). 
1146 ibid. Amendment 32, Article 4(1), point (da). 
1147 Agreed Recommendations (Ninth Session of the Trade and Development Board Commission on Investment, 
Technology and Related Financial Issues, Agenda items 3, 4, 5 and 9, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, TD/B/COM.2/L.22, 2005), para. 9(c). 
1148 ‘Building Local Pharmaceutical Production/Supply Capacity’ (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, 2002). <http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Intellectual%20Property/Building-local-
pharmaceutical-production--supply-capacity.aspx> [Accessed Apr. 5, 2017]. 
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UNDP is also undertaking analytical work on local production with an emphasis on south–
south cooperation, including a completed study on Brazil (“Technical, economic and legal 
assessment of the Brazilian antiretroviral production capacity”, produced jointly with the 
Ministry of Health/National AIDS Programme and UNAIDS Brazil),1149 and a study on the 
Indian pharmaceutical industry and the impact of recently adopted laws.1150 Overall, many 
different types of organisations have played a facilitating role in the various local production 
and technology transfer initiatives.  
 
In 2016, a UH Human Rights Council Resolution recognised the fundamental importance of 
the transfer of sound technologies to developing countries on favourable terms, including 
concessional and preferential terms, as mutually agreed.1151 This was driven by several NGOs. 
They are involved in technology transfer, training and funding to support local production, 
conducting research, advocacy and analysis, giving policy advice and facilitating networking. 
Active NGOs include Oxfam, Medecins Sans Frontieres, Medeor, Cordaid, ICTSD, InWent, 
OTECI, MSF and Technoserve.1152 Evidence within the WTO system suggests that Ghana has 
benefitted from capacity building initiatives using Article 67 of TRIPS.1153  
 
6.9. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined whether the implementation of Section 84 in Ghana would threaten 
the attainment of socio-economic objectives due to the loss of inward FDI opportunities, 
retaliatory action and their potential frustration owing to the impact of FTAs. Significantly, 
contrary to the common perception that a country like Ghana may potentially face significant 
socio-economic drawbacks in relation to inward FDI opportunities if it were to implement a 
Section 84 model, this chapter has argued that in the context of Ghana this would not be an 
expected outcome.  
                                                 
1149 Francisco Rossi, Technical, Economic and Legal Evaluation of Antiretroviral Production Capacity in Brazil 
(The Bureau for Development Policy, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2008). 
1150 Sudip Chaudhuri, Chan Park and Kunnathully Madhavan Gopakumar, The Indian Pharmaceutical Industry 
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1153 Technical Cooperation Activities: Information from Members of the European Communities – Addendum 
(Report on the Implementation of Article 67 of the TRIPS Agreement, Council for TRIPS. IP/C/W/539/Add.7, 
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It has been shown that the fear that the implementation of Section 84 could lead to a withdrawal 
of investments is a general claim that would not be applicable to Ghana because, where almost 
all of the FDIs go to the oil and gas sector, it cannot be true that the implementation of Section 
84 would threaten inward FDI opportunities and the attainment of socio-economic objectives. 
Notably, treating IP as an investment matter, and subjecting it to treaty arbitration, can have 
undesirable impact on the hard-bargained flexibilities in IP laws and on public health 
safeguards as suggested by Yu.1154 However, it is unlikely Ghana would sign a trade and 
investment agreement with the EU or the US that includes a restrictive provision that tends to 
treat IP as an investment made by investor corporations, allowing private investment disputes 
to be raised against the Ghana whenever there is a threat to their IP. 
 
Moreover, it has been argued that there are inadequate linkages between robust IP rights 
protection and inward FDI opportunities; therefore, Ghana would be able to implement a 
Section 84 model and still attain its socio-economic objectives. This argument is premised on 
the fact that there is not a single mainstream pharmaceutical company that has a manufacturing 
or research facility in the country and the implementation of Section 84 could possibly 
encourage the generic pharmaceutical industry in the local market. Furthermore, it has been 
shown that the FDI retributive effect is not a possibility. Ghana could mitigate any potential 
threat of withdrawal of investment if it was prepared to work with its neighbours to build 
resilience,1155 and where this is the case no reasonable investor would want to withdraw its 
investments from the entire sub-region.  
 
Accordingly, it is worth noting that relying on such a misleading account produces only 
negative results given the difference in market size argument in different countries. 
Policymakers need to understand why FDI does flow to Ghana, because this will help them to 
formulate and execute policies to attract the right investments.1156 Importantly, the chapter 
considered the potential threat of legal challenges by the pharmaceutical industry and the 
                                                 
1154 Yu (n 803) 392–400, examining the growing use of bilateral and regional trade agreements to push for higher 
intellectual property standards. See also Yu (n 217) discussing Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS, 869-879, examining 
Article 31bis and the Doha Declaration. Yu (n 830) 835. 
1155 Drahos (n 832) 19. 
1156 Economic Development in Africa: Rethinking the Role of Foreign Direct Investment (Geneva, New York: 
UNCTAD, UNCTAD/GDS/AFRICA/2005/1, 2005) 2, suggesting that FDI carries costs consequently, 
policymakers must fully evaluate the impact of FDI if it is to become a complementary component of a wider 
package of development measures needed to raise growth and diversify into more dynamic activities. 
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possibility of high litigation costs being incurred. However, it has been shown that it is highly 
unlikely that the pharmaceutical industry would challenge the legality of the implementation 
of Section 84 to promote affordable medicines in the light of the Doha Solution.1157  
 
Additionally, this chapter has assessed potential retaliatory action owing to impacts of FTAs if 
Ghana were to implement Section 84 as India has done. Nevertheless, it has been revealed that 
no FTA provision would operate directly to prevent Ghana from implementing a Section 84 
model and that it is free to do so. Lastly, the analysis has confirmed that following the Doha 
Solution, it is unlikely that developed countries, particularly the US and the EU, would adopt 
any aggressive response such as economic sanctions or bilateral pressure in response to the 
implementation of Section 84.1158 Hence, if Ghana could mitigate its domestic capacity issues 
pertaining to local manufacture for distribution, the country could implement a Section 84 
model. The next chapter draws all of the other chapters together in an attempt to affirm the 
hypothesis regarding the consistency of Section 84 with TRIPS and its adoption by Ghana. 
 
 
  
                                                 
1157 Drahos (n 832) 19, stating that the Doha Declaration isolated the pharmaceutical industry. Odell and Sell (n 
1086) 98, stating that the pharmaceutical industry will be cautious given the public relations disaster of the 
litigation by pharmaceutical multinationals against South Africa. 
1158 id, stating that the Doha Declaration isolated the US. 
 204 
Chapter 7 
 
Reaffirming the Hypothesis: Consistency of Section 84 with TRIPS and its Adoption by 
Ghana 
 
7.1. Aim of the Chapter 
 
This chapter draws all of the other chapters together in an attempt to affirm the hypothesis, 
regarding the consistency of Section 84 with TRIPS and its adoption by Ghana. Moreover, the 
chapter reasserts the international community’s support for Ghana in regard to implementing 
the section 84 model to promote affordable medicines. 
 
7.2. Introduction to the Chapter 
 
As can be seen from the preceding discussion, Section 84, which allows the granting of a 
compulsory licence provided that the patented invention had not been worked in the territory 
of India, is consistent with TRIPS. Notwithstanding this, the substantive part of Article 27(1) 
of TRIPS, which specifically requires that Members’ treatment of patented inventions should 
be on a non-discriminatory basis irrespective of whether they are produced locally or imported, 
is often relied upon as the basis of a conflicting interpretation.1159  
 
Needless to say, this has resulted in various misinterpretations that have tended to completely 
eliminate any reference to the local working of a patent as an independent condition for the 
granting of compulsory licensing, and in its place, the argument has been made that importation 
alone can satisfy the obligation to manufacture a patented invention locally.1160 This 
interpretation would seek to make Section 84 contrary to the obligation enumerated under 
Article 27(1) of TRIPS.1161  
 
Not only that, it would also seek to undermine the substantive provision of Article 5(A)(4) of 
the Paris Convention, which has the same legal construction as Section 84 and in part stipulates 
that a compulsory licence may not be applied for on the grounds of failure to work or 
                                                 
1159 Bonadio (n 53) 720. 
1160 Kur and Levin (n 459) 584. 
1161 Bonadio (n 53) 720, stating the ruling might be a violation of Article 27(1) of TRIPS, which precludes India, 
as a Party to the Agreement, from discriminating between patented products that are imported and those that are 
locally produced. 
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insufficient working before the expiration of a period of four years from the date of the filing 
of the patent application or three years from the date of the granting of the patent, whichever 
period expires last.  
 
In short, the same approach would seek to weaken Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention, 
which provides that Ghana and each WTO Member shall have the right to take legislative 
measures; providing for the granting of compulsory licences to prevent an abuse of exclusive 
patent rights exemplified by failure to work a patented invention locally. Nevertheless, as far 
as Section 84(1)(c) is concerned, which purposely allows the granting of a compulsory licence 
provided that the patented invention has not been worked in the territory of India, Article 2(2) 
of TRIPS remains vital, as the Agreement seeks to impose Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention 
provisions on the TRIPS rules relating to patents by specifically requiring that Members shall 
not derogate from existing obligations that they may have to each other under the Paris 
Convention.  
 
This interpretation gains strength through its confirmation by the Doha Declaration, that TRIPS 
preserves Ghana and other WTO Members’ discretion to grant compulsory licences on any 
grounds, including for pharmaceutical products in as much as their national legislations permit 
subject to certain procedural requirements and substantive conditions only under Article 31 of 
TRIPS. Hence Ghana, and other developing countries, might adopt the Section 84 model 
provided that they have the technical capacity for local manufacturing, there are no major 
conflicting provisions in FTAs, and like India, they are prepared to withstand bilateral pressure 
and bear litigation costs in respect of the pharmaceutical companies. 
 
7.3. Reaffirming the Hypothesis of the Thesis 
 
Throughout this work, attempts have been made to reconcile Section 84 with the TRIPS 
Agreement, as a suitable model for Ghana to promote affordable medicines. Consequently, 
after drawing on applicable sources of law, the preparatory work of the TRIPS Agreement and 
the history behind patent law, and then analysing the issue in strict adherence to the principles 
of treaty interpretation, which also guide the interpretation of WTO law, it has been shown that 
any conflicting claim regarding the inconsistency of Section 84, which specifically allows the 
granting of a compulsory licence provided that the patented invention has not been worked in 
the territory of India, is generally not based on a well-founded interpretation.  
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This is because such an interpretation ignores the entire TRIPS Agreement and rather takes a 
narrow view of one clause (Article 27(1) of TRIPS) without regard to the text or document as 
a whole or its context, object and purpose.1162 As emerged above, the principle of treaty 
interpretation, as set out in the VCLT1163 which has been consistently applied by the 
WTO/DSU Panel and Appellate Body reports as the most fundamental in seeking to clarify the 
provisions of the WTO Agreement in yielding an interpretation that is harmonious and 
coherent and fits comfortably in the treaty as a whole so as to render the treaty provision legally 
effective.1164  
 
This principle gives the broadest possible understanding that where two treaties (Paris 
Convention and TRIPS) treat a common subject-matter (patents) their provisions may point in 
different directions, and if they do, it is the task of legal reasoning to establish meaningful 
relationships between them so as to determine whether they can be applied in a mutually 
supportive way or whether one rule or principle should have priority over the other.1165 As 
reasoned by the International Law Commission, and also adopted by the WTO Appellate Body 
as a principle of treaty interpretation: ‘When a treaty is open to two interpretations one of which 
does and the other does not enable the treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith and the 
objects and purposes of the treaty demand that the former interpretation should be adopted’.1166  
 
It is significant that pursuant to WTO law, Section 84 provision ordinarily arises with regard 
to the construction of an earlier-enacted specific provision (Article 5(A) of the Paris 
Convention) when a more general provision was later passed (Article 27(1) of TRIPS). This 
assumption is founded on the premise that the TRIPS Agreement incorporates the substantive 
provision of Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention, which allows Ghana and other WTO 
Members’ discretion with regard to the granting of compulsory licences to remedy failure to 
work before the expiration of a period of four years from the date of the filing of the patent 
application or three years from the date of the granting of the patent, whichever period expires 
last, via Article 2 of TRIPS, and this cannot be read down.  
                                                 
1162 id. 
1163 “The VCLT” (n 119). 
1164 “United States - Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology (n 239) para. 268. “United 
States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline” (n 244) p. 17. 
1165 id. 
1166 “International Law Commission” (n 529) 219. “Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages” (n 246) 11, footnote 
21. 
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Therefore, Section 84, which allows the granting of a compulsory licence provided that the 
patented invention has not been worked in the territory of India, is consistent with Article 5(A) 
of the Paris Convention, and thus, with TRIPS. This contention lends support to the view that 
local working and importation were never mutually exclusive. Moreover, this reinforces the 
belief that TRIPS would not prevent Ghana and other WTO Members from granting 
compulsory licences if a patented invention is not manufactured or the process is not used 
within the territory of protection.  
 
Consequently, the argument provided in this work contradicts the conflicting interpretation 
concerning the inconsistency of compulsory licensing with TRIPS pursuant to the general 
obligation under Article 27(1), which requires that WTO Members do not discriminate 
irrespective of whether patents are produced locally or imported. As a matter of fact, and in the 
context of Ghana, discrimination may exist where all patentees who import their technologies 
are sanctioned without justification. However, there is no discrimination within the terms of 
Article 27(1) where Ghana justifies differential treatment given that a relevant part of Article 
5(A) of the Paris Convention allows patentees to justify their inaction with regard to failure to 
work a patented invention locally by giving legitimate reasons.1167 
 
Simply stated, while the local working of a patented product would satisfy the substantive 
requirements under Section 84, taking a patent and resorting completely to overseas 
manufacture would violate the general principles applicable to the working of patented 
inventions in the territory of India. Thus, failure to comply with this statutory obligation may 
attract the imposition of a compulsory licence, and this is only subject to the overriding 
condition - before the expiration of a period of four years from the date of the filing of the 
patent application or three years from the date of the granting of the patent, whichever period 
expires last and without any legitimate reasons as referenced by Section 86(1), which is 
consistent with Article 5(A)(4) of the Paris Convention provision. 
 
Additionally, the analysis in this work has helped to provide an understanding that the legal 
obligation to make patents available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to 
whether products are imported or locally produced set out in Articles 27(1) of TRIPS is a 
                                                 
1167 Article 5(A)(4). 
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general provision subject to compulsory licensing permissible under Article 31 of TRIPS 
because the notion of failure to work as defined by Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention 
pertains to failure on the part of patentees to engage in the local manufacture of a patented 
invention, and this is the specific rule. Therefore, discrimination between imported or locally 
manufactured products in Article 27(1) of TRIPS is unaffected when the patented invention is 
not worked locally in accordance with domestic statutory requirements such as Section 84.  
 
In other words, there is no discrimination where the wording of a legislated local working 
requirement captures the general principles applicable to the working of patented inventions 
locally in the territory of protection. Taking the view of the Panel in Canada - Patent Products 
case, it is concluded that such a local working requirement can be considered justified 
differential treatment and there is no discrimination where differentiations are justified, i.e. 
where there are bona fide reasons for differentiating. Hence, Article 27(1) of TRIPS would not 
prohibit Ghana from adopting and implementing any local working requirements that followed 
the Indian model in Section 84, in as much as all of the conditions and the procedural 
requirements under Article 31 of TRIPS are satisfied. 
 
The evidence deduced so far in this analysis shows that compulsory licensing due to failure to 
work has been applied in the past by several Members of the WTO to keep the use of a patent 
within the limits set by the original granting country.1168 The Uruguay Round accounts also 
reveal that during the negotiations of the TRIPS Agreement several developing countries 
defended the right to impose working requirements.1169 The negotiating history of the TRIPS 
Agreement does not support the assumption that those Members withdrew their position on 
                                                 
1168 Ulf Anderfelt, International Patent Legislation and Developing Countries (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1971) 65-66. See Halewood (n 18) 251-252. 
1169 Negotiation Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit 
Goods, Meeting of Negotiation Group of 2, Apr. 4 and 5, 1990 (Note by the Secretariat, MTN.GNG/NG11/20 
(Apr. 24, 1990) para. 34. Negotiation Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including 
Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Existence, Scope and Form of Generally Internationally Accepted and Applied 
Standards/Norms for the Protection of Intellectual Property (Note Prepared by the International Bureau of WIPO, 
MTN.GNG/11/W/24 (May 5, 1988) para. 2. Negotiation Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Meeting of Negotiating Group of May, 11-12, 1989 (Note by the 
Secretariat, MTN.GNG/NG11/12 (Jun. 13, 1989) para. 5. Negotiation Group on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Meeting of Negotiating Group of Jul. 12-14, 
1989 (Note by the Secretariat, MTN.GNG/NG11/14 (Sept. 12, 1989) paras. 75 & 83. Negotiation Group on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Meeting of Negotiating 
Group of Oct. 30 – Nov. 2, 1998 (Note by the Secretariat, MTN.GNG/NG11/17 (Dec. 4, 1989) para. 24. 
Negotiation Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit 
Goods, Meeting of Negotiating Group of 11, Dec. 12 and 14, 1989 (Note by the Secretariat, MTN.GNG/NG11/17 
(Jan. 23, 1990) para. 41. 
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local working, as nothing indicated that the parties were entertaining the complete prohibition 
of local working requirements when they accepted the ambiguous text adopted by Article 27(1) 
of TRIPS.1170  
 
In hindsight, if it really were the WTO Members intention after a lengthy debate to reject local 
working requirements, one would at least expect to find that remarkable consensus echoed in 
clear, unambiguous treaty language, such as the US submitted.1171 But such is not the case. 
Subsequently, national laws of several WTO Members have adopted and continue to 
maintain local working obligations,1172 and this reinforces the legal position that Section 84 is 
entirely consistent with TRIPS and remains a suitable model for the country to promote 
affordable medicines. Thus, pursuant to Section 84 and Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention, 
the granting of a compulsory licence provided that the patented invention has not been worked 
in the territory of India would not constitute unjustified detriment or discrimination in the 
context of Article 27(1) of TRIPS.  
 
This confirms the common proposition that, at least insofar as local working or manufacturing 
goes, Article 5(A) together with Article 31 of TRIPS take precedence over, and derogate from, 
Article 27(1) of TRIPS because both are independent provisions dealing with different subject 
matters. This viewpoint suggests that the compulsory licensing regime under Article 5(A) of 
the Paris Convention is compatible with Article 31 of TRIPS in relation to Article 27(1) of 
TRIPS. The starting point with regard to envisioning the compatibility of Article 5(A) of the 
Paris Convention with Article 27(1) pursuant to Article 31 of TRIPS is to understand that 
Article 27(1) only imposes a general obligation on Ghana and other WTO Members to make 
patents available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, 
the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced.  
 
Importantly, this provision does not attempt to define the context in which Ghana and other 
WTO Members must give effect to such an obligation this is left for Members’ legislations to 
                                                 
1170 Correa (n 518) 241-242. 
1171 Champ and Attaran (n 58) 370. Note that the US sought to bar any possible obligation or remedy there might 
be for a patentee’s failure to work locally.  
1172 Correa (n 518) 241, footnote 69, citing Oxfam, ‘Local Working Requirements and the TRIPS 
Agreement: Using Patent Law as a Means of Ensuring Affordable Access to Essential Medicines, a Case Study 
from the US-Brazil Dispute’ (2001), finding working obligations in the patent laws and regulations of Indonesia 
and Cuba; Ghana, Ireland, South Africa, Sudan and Zimbabwe, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Norway, 
Finland, Iceland, India, Brazil, Israel, Thailand, Pakistan Liberia etc. 
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determine. In fact, there are limitations to compulsory licensing, which are not strictly legal 
but only procedural requirements in nature subject to some substantive conditions that must be 
met as expressed under Article 5(A)(4) of the Paris Convention and Article 31 of TRIPS, as 
opposed to Article 27(1) of TRIPS control. This means that Article 27(1) of TRIPS cannot be 
read subject to Article 31 of TRIPS because as per the latter, in as much as Ghana and other 
WTO Members national laws allow for “Other Use Without Authorization of the Right 
Holder”, which is implicit in the caption of the title of Article 31, TRIPS would not completely 
prohibit Ghana and other WTO Members from granting compulsory licences on any grounds 
or specifically due to failure to work a patented invention in satisfying the laws of the country 
or territory of protection.  
 
However, the terms of Article 31 of TRIPS appear to be in general permissive and flexible, the 
substantive conditions and the difficult procedures are too complex and vague.1173 Although, 
the WTO Members in Doha, attempted to overcome the rigidity in Article 31 of TRIPS that 
rendered the use of compulsory licensing instrument essentially useless, the solution appears 
to have compounded the restrictions imposed by TRIPS.1174 The formal procedural 
requirements developed under the Doha Solution prior to issuing a compulsory licence are too 
complicated.1175 There is substantial inflexibility regarding the legal infrastructure, the 
financial and technical capacities, and the administrative processes as preconditions that Ghana 
and other WTO Members must satisfy.1176 
 
The argument therefore is that, in view of the multiple conditions and the complex procedural 
requirements for the granting of compulsory licensing, such a complex and burdensome system 
is largely symbolic and is unlikely to lead to any significant outcome in terms of promoting 
access to affordable medicines in Ghana.1177 The conclusion is that Section 84, which is 
consistent with TRIPS, and allows the granting of a compulsory licence provided that the 
patented invention has not been worked, would provide a feasible option for Ghana to mitigate 
the unnecessarily complex and burdensome procedures that have been created.  
 
                                                 
1173 Anderson (n 40) 96. Zolotaryova (n 615) 1102. Halajian (n 625) 1191. 
1174 Anderson (n 50) 173-174. 
1175 Harris (n 85) 390. 
1176 Abbott (614) 16. 
1177 Sampson (n 785) 159. 
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More persuasively, the related Doha Declaration under Paragraph 5(b) confirms that Ghana 
and each WTO Member has the wider discretion to grant compulsory licences and the freedom 
to determine the grounds on which such licences are founded. Without limiting any grounds 
per se, it can be argued that lack of local working can be invoked as the basis for granting a 
compulsory licence where the law of Ghana permits, and this will be consistent with TRIPS. 
The Doha Declaration also provides a specific rule of interpretation, which gives context to the 
general interpretive provisions in the WTO law, which is supportive of Ghana’s right to protect 
public health using the flexibilities built into TRIPS. Importantly, the realisation of medicines 
remains a fundamental element of the framework of TRIPS and a well-settled notion under the 
Doha Programme, which resulted in the subsequent amendment to Article 31(f) of TRIPS.  
 
Moreover, the argument of this work is enhanced by the fact that the US failed to prove an 
allegation within the WTO under the DSU system against Brazil that its local working 
requirements remain inconsistent with Articles 27 and 28 of TRIPS. Without limiting the 
generality of the argument, although the settlement of the dispute between the US and Brazil 
may not be the utmost basis for claiming the legality of compulsory licensing under TRIPS, 
the argument is enhanced by the Bayer v Natco’s case, in which the Controller invoked Section 
84 in granting a compulsory licence to Natco, and to date the legitimacy of this decision 
remains unchallenged within the WTO under the DSU system.  
 
This paucity adds weight to the interpretation that Section 84, which specifically allows the 
granting of a compulsory licence provided that the patented invention has not been worked in 
the territory of India, is consistent with TRIPS, and therefore it would provide a suitable model 
for Ghana. This is relevant as the provision of Section 84 follows Section 83, which enumerates 
the “General Principles Applicable to Working of Patented Inventions” in India. This directive 
principle of patent policy incorporates the philosophy of the patent framework under Indian 
law and remains the bedrock on which the compulsory licensing instrument is built. It explicitly 
requires that patents are granted to encourage invention and to ensure that inventions are 
worked in India on a commercial scale and to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable 
without undue delay.1178  
 
                                                 
1178 Section 83(a) of the Indian Patents Act. 
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This substantive provision draws in part, from Article 7 of TRIPS, which aims to encourage 
invention and significantly mirrors Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention, requiring that 
patentees work their patented inventions locally. Moreover, Section 83(b) of the Indian Patent 
Act, which draws, in part, on Article 7 of TRIPS, provides that they (patents) are not granted 
merely to enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly for the importation of the patented article. It 
further provides that the protection and enforcement of patent rights contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to 
the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.1179  
 
The above provision makes Section 84 usage consistent with TRIPS, and complementary 
where, pursuant to the interpretative weight of Article 7 of TRIPS, socio-economic welfare 
situations may be taken into account to reinforce the notion of local working of patents as a 
means to determine the extent to which patentees’ transfer technology or disseminate the same. 
The obligation to transfer technology is consistent with the Preamble to the TRIPS Agreement 
and also remains a well-founded objective of the Agreement. In fact, the Preamble to the TRIPS 
Agreement recognises the inherent legal flexibility of Ghana and other WTO Members when 
it states that the Agreement recognises the underlying public policy objectives of national 
systems for the protection of IP, including developmental and technological objectives.  
 
TRIPS put in place global minimum standards for IP legal regimes but left room for flexibility 
in how for example, the Ghanaian government decides to enact their laws so long as they meet 
the TRIPS minimum standards. Thus, a wide range of policy options exist, as built into TRIPS, 
at the domestic level with regard to how best to pursue public health objectives or implement 
such flexibilities so that the national IP regime responds to Ghana’s individual needs and policy 
objectives. Moreover, as per Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention, failure to work remains 
an abuse of the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent on which Ghana and 
other WTO Members have the right to take legislative measures – specifically, referencing a 
compulsory licensing instrument to prevent such abuse.  
 
Thus, the fact that Article 8 of TRIPS also recognises the need to take appropriate measures 
consistent with the Agreement to prevent the abuse of patent rights by right holders, in order 
                                                 
1179 Section 83(c). 
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to maintain a proper balance between patent protection and public interest, inter alia, public 
health further enhances the value of the hypothesis. Importantly, in regard to matters of public 
health, Section 83(d) states that patents granted must not impede the protection of public health 
and nutrition and should act as instruments to promote the public interest, especially in sectors 
of vital importance for the socio-economic and technological development of India, and that 
patents granted should not in any way prohibit the Central Government in taking measures to 
protect public health.1180 This Section draws from Article 8(1) of TRIPS – its Principles.  
 
Furthermore, Section 83(f), which also draws on Article 8(2) of TRIPS, the second part of the 
Principles, maintains that the patent right must not abused by the patentee or person deriving 
title or interest on patent from the patentee, and that the patentee or a person deriving title or 
interest on patent from the patentee must not resort to practices that unreasonably restrain trade 
or adversely affect the international transfer of technology. This latter part also draws on Article 
40(1) of TRIPS. Significantly, the TRIPS Agreement does not specify what constitutes an 
abuse of patent rights exemplified as failure to work, nor does it provide a definition of the 
kind of appropriate measure deemed reasonable to which members can resort in order to 
remedy such an abuse.  
 
Thus, the appropriate measure referred to in Article 8 of TRIPS constructively denotes 
compulsory licensing, which is consistent with TRIPS by virtue of Article 31. In this 
connection, Article 5(A)(3) of the Paris Convention mentions that forfeiture of a patent shall 
not be provided for except in cases where the granting of compulsory licences would not have 
been sufficient to prevent the said abuse. This means that the right of Ghana and other WTO 
Members to take legislative measures providing for the granting of compulsory licences to 
prevent the abuse of patent rights by the right holders is not restricted by TRIPS, as Article 8 
envisages this allowance. 
 
As shown in the analysis, essentially the compulsory licensing instrument is common in the 
patent regimes of WTO Members and has been used to remedy failure to work in the past. 
Consequently, this settles the established legislative understanding of the principle that 
underlies patent law, which implies that exclusive rights are granted to patentees to work their 
patented inventions locally, and therefore, this account validates Section 84 as consistent with 
                                                 
1180 Section 83(e). 
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TRIPS. Moreover, under Section 92, the Indian government can notify the need for the issue 
of a compulsory licence on the grounds of “circumstances of national emergency”, 
“circumstances of extreme urgency” and “in case of public non-commercial use”. These 
grounds are identical to those mentioned in Article 31(b) of TRIPS, which allows Ghana and 
other WTO Members to issue compulsory licences.  
 
Section 92(3) clarifies that such circumstances can include public health crises, relating to 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, Malaria or other epidemics. This is consistent with Paragraph 5(c) 
of the Doha Declaration, which states that public health crises, including those related to 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, Malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency. Under Section 92A, a compulsory licence shall be 
issued for the export of patented pharmaceutical products to a country having insufficient or 
no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector for the concerned product in order to 
address public health problems. This provision is consistent with the Doha Paragraph 6 
Programme, as implemented via the August 30 Decision of the TRIPS Council. 
 
The usage of Section 84 in India demonstrates that as an instrument of government policy, if 
used, compulsory licensing can be an effective tool to provide access to essential medicines. 
Therefore, this reference is more supportive of the interpretation that nothing in the light of 
TRIPS would, in fact, preclude the possibility of Ghana that relies heavily on the importation 
of essential medicines from implementing a model similar to Section 84 as a practical means 
to mitigate the high costs and shortages resulting from the failure of patentees to work patented 
medicines locally. Specifically, the overriding implication of Section 84, and the Bayer v Natco 
decision, if followed, would enable Ghana to grant compulsory licences for any patent 
protecting a product solely because that product is not being manufactured locally.  
 
More importantly, access to essential medicines has been affirmed as an indicator for the 
fulfilment of the right to health.1181 Put differently, if a compulsory licensing measure could be 
used to provide access to essential medicines to satisfy human rights obligations, such national 
action would be legitimate under WTO law, a notion subsequently confirmed by WTO 
Members through the Doha Declaration. It is significant that a comprehensive declaration that 
                                                 
1181 “Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights” (n 722) para. 1, recognising that access to medicine is one 
of the fundamental elements in achieving progressively the full realisation of the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. 
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carries an authoritative interpretation of the ICESCR1182 also states clearly that: ‘IP is a social 
product ... with a social function and that the private interests of authors should not be unduly 
favoured and the public interest in enjoying broad access to their productions should be given 
due consideration’.1183   
 
Given that essential medicines remain a key component of the human right to health, it is 
therefore of significance that the UN sub-Commission on the Protection and Promotion of 
Human Rights reminded Ghana and other governments of the primacy of human rights 
obligations over economic policies and agreements.1184 Against this background, the human 
right to essential medicines was also advanced in terms of its normative content and its legal 
recognition under the WTO system with a view to making access to medicines a permanent 
goal of states’ policies and programmes.1185 This emphasis should encourage Ghana and other 
WTO Members not to completely abandon their obligations within the international human 
rights treaties and to provide affordable medicines for their people. 
 
In fact, this direction reflects a measure of recognition that TRIPS should not be read in clinical 
isolation from public international law since Ghana and all other WTO Members have 
international obligations outside the IP regime, including human rights – a subject that TRIPS 
does not promote adequately.1186 More significantly, it has been recognised that a treaty must 
be interpreted by taking into account the consequent socio-economic and other changing 
circumstances. Accordingly, the European Court of Human Rights held that human rights 
treaties are: ‘a living instrument which … must be interpreted in the light of present-day 
conditions’.1187 In a similar vein, the Inter-American Court held that: ‘human rights treaties are 
living instruments whose interpretation must go hand in hand with evolving times and current 
living conditions’. It went on to say that such a conclusion is consistent with the ‘general rules 
of treaty interpretation set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’.1188  
                                                 
1182 “The ICESCRs” (n 717). 
1183 Economic and Social Council Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 
17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any 
Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of which he is the Author (Article 15, para. 1(c), of the ICESCR), para. 
35, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006). 
1184 Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2000/7 (U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/Res/2000/7 (Aug. 17, 2000) para. 3. 
1185 ibid. 
1186 “Resource Book on TRIPS” (n 16) 130. 
1187 Tyrer v United Kingdom - 5856/72 [1978] ECHR 2, Apr. 25, 1978, para. 31. 
1188 Case of the Mapiripan Massacre v. Colombia [Merits, Reparations and Costs] Judgment of Sept. 15, 2005. 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Series C No. 134] para. 104: 
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This provides an additional example of the potential use of human rights law by Ghana to 
secure public health outcomes through affordable medicines for public health protection.1189 
Moreover, this confirmation is very convincing as the Members referencing the Doha 
Declaration articulated that the TRIPS Agreement does not, and should not, prevent Ghana and 
other WTO Members from taking measures to protect public health by using, to the full, the 
provisions in the Agreement, which provide flexibility for that purpose. Remarkably, while 
Paragraph 5(b) of the Doha Declaration confirmed that the granting of a compulsory licence is 
well within the right of Ghana and each WTO Member, the implementation of Section 84 may 
not provide the means for Ghana to obtain affordable medicines. This is because while local 
manufacture could promote a reliable supply of medicines at affordable prices, this is only 
possible where economies of scale can be generated to manufacture on a large scale in order to 
reduce unit costs.1190  
 
That is, a large domestic market that allows substantial economies of scale in production is 
relevant, as in the case of India.1191 However, Ghana could mitigate the issue of its small market 
size if it decided to work with its neighbours in the sub-region to enhance economies of scale 
to generate more incentive to manufacture essential medicines for distribution. Moreover, other 
key limitation factors to be considered include whether the implementation of Section 84 would 
threaten the attainment of socio-economic objectives due to the loss of inward FDI 
opportunities, retaliatory action and their potential frustration owing to the impact of FTAs. 
Although, an expanded IP right protection can be derived from the unqualified treatment 
protection provisions found in some international investment agreements or FTAs on which 
investor-state arbitration in the enforcement of IP right remains possible,1192 nevertheless, as 
                                                 
Human rights treaties, is inspired by higher shared values (focusing on protection of 
the human being), they have specific oversight mechanisms, they are applied 
according to the concept of collective guarantees, they embody obligations that are 
essentially objective, and their nature is special vis-à-vis other treaties that regulate 
reciprocal interests among the States Parties. 
1189 Article 73 of TRIPS states that ‘Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed: (b) to prevent a Member from 
taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests; (iii) taken in 
time of…. emergency. See Carvalho (n 55) 464, interpreting that it is up to each member to make its own finding 
of necessity. 
1190 Jean-Marc Guimier, Evan Lee and Michel Grupper, Processes and Issues for Improving Access to Medicines: 
The Evidence Base for Domestic Production and Greater Access to Medicines (The DFID, September 2004) 24. 
1191 Warren Kaplan and Richard Laing, Local Production of Pharmaceuticals: Industrial Policy and Access to 
Medicines: An Overview of Key Concepts, Issues and Opportunities for Future Research (Health, Nutrition and 
Population Discussion Paper, January 2005) 15. 
1192 The NAFTA (n 994), for example, Chapter 11 of the NAFTA provides for investor-state dispute settlement, 
in addition to the possibility of state-state dispute settlement under NAFTA Chapter 20.  
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indicated already, Ghana has not yet signed any of such instruments that might potentially limit 
the country’s right to grant compulsory licences, such as the implementation of Section 84 
model to promote affordable medicines.  
 
Importantly, despite the common perception that a country like Ghana may potentially face 
significant socio-economic shortcomings in relation to inward FDI opportunities if it were to 
implement a Section 84 model, the analysis has shown that in the context of Ghana this would 
not be an expected outcome. Therefore, the fear that the implementation of Section 84 could 
lead to a withdrawal of investments is a general claim that would not be applicable to Ghana 
because, where almost all of the FDIs go to the oil and gas sector, it cannot be true that the 
implementation of Section 84 would threaten inward FDI opportunities and the attainment of 
socio-economic objectives. 
 
This is because there are inadequate linkages between robust IP rights protection and inward 
FDI opportunities in the literature objectively assessing the relationship between the strict 
enforcement of patent rights and socio-economic development; therefore, Ghana would be able 
to implement a Section 84 model and still attain its socio-economic objectives. As seen from 
above, there is not a single mainstream pharmaceutical company that has a manufacturing or 
research facility in the country, let alone cause that investment to be withdrawn. It is also not 
convincing to argue that if Ghana fails to implement Section 84, large pharmaceutical 
companies will invest in the country.  
 
This raises the question, as to why Ghana has not experienced any obvious substantial 
investment from the large pharmaceutical companies into its pharmaceutical manufacturing or 
research-related sector since the country adopted its current regime in 2003. Still, where this 
threat exists, Ghana could work with its neighbours to build stronger resilience against any 
withdrawal of investments by adopting series of compulsory licences in the sub-region, and 
where this is the case no reasonable investor would want to withdraw its investments from the 
entire sub-region.  
 
Furthermore, the analysis considered the potential threat of legal challenges by the 
pharmaceutical industry and the possibility of high litigation costs being incurred, as Ghana’s 
experience with GSK shows. However, it has been shown that it is highly unlikely that the 
pharmaceutical industry would challenge the legality of the implementation of Section 84 to 
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promote affordable medicines in the light of the Doha Solution.1193 Additionally, the analysis 
assessed potential retaliatory action owing to impacts of FTAs if Ghana were to implement 
Section 84 as India has done.  
 
Nevertheless, it has been shown that no FTA provision would operate directly to prevent Ghana 
from implementing a Section 84 model and that it is free to do so. In addition to the possibility 
of a state-to-state dispute, FTAs investment it has been examined that chapters may sometimes 
vest the IP owner as an investor with the right to bring the host state to binding international 
arbitration.1194 In this context, the possibility for an IP right-holder to bring a claim against 
Ghana under the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism for breach of FTA provisions is 
a further element, which should be taken into account while appreciating the extent to which 
the country could implement the Section 84 model.  
 
Nevertheless, the possibility of challenging the implementation of Section 84 on the basis of 
investors’ rights even though has been anticipated in some cases,1195 Ghana has not signed any 
international investment agreements or FTAs that purport to exclude the issuance of 
compulsory licensing consistent with the TRIPS Agreement from the scope of application of 
expropriation provisions. It follows therefore that, a claim based on the violation of the 
treatment of IP rights investments in case Ghana implements the Section 84 model to promote 
affordable medicine will be difficult to pursue against the country.  
 
Furthermore, as revealed, following the Doha Solution, it is unlikely that developed countries, 
particularly the US and the EU, would adopt any aggressive response such as economic 
sanctions or bilateral pressure in response to the implementation of Section 84.1196 More 
importantly, although inter-regional policy collaboration remains so far underexploited, one 
major policy option for Ghana would be to pursue sub-regional economic and political 
coordination and this would create a better policy condition for addressing the challenges of 
implementing the Section 84 model, without the fear of potential bilateral pressure. 
 
                                                 
1193 id. 19, stating that the Doha Declaration isolated the pharmaceutical industry. Odell and Sell (n 1086) 98, 
stating that the pharmaceutical industry will be cautious given the public relations disaster of the litigation by 
pharmaceutical multinationals against South Africa. 
1194 The NAFTA (n 1073), for example, Chapter 11 of the NAFTA provides for investor-state dispute settlement, 
in addition to the possibility of state-state dispute settlement under NAFTA Chapter 20.  
1195 See (n 1073 and 1074). 
1196 Odell and Sell (n 1086) 98, stating that the Doha Declaration isolated the US. 
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It therefore appears that the only problem the country must mitigate is domestic capacity 
pertaining to local manufacture for distribution of affordable medicines. Nevertheless, several 
multilateral organisations provide both direct and indirect support to local production efforts, 
such as policy advice, capacity building, institutional strengthening and analysis. These include 
UNIDO, UNCTAD, the World Bank, UNDP, the WHO, UNICEF and the WIPO.1197 For 
example, the UNCTAD helps countries to evaluate and formulate capacity building and 
technical assistance activities.1198  
 
A trilateral programme under the auspices of the WTO, WHO and WIPO is aimed at 
strengthening their cooperation on the interface between IP and public health as part of 
increasing international efforts to improve the ability of the world’s poor to have access to 
medicines and to ensure the availability of new and more effective medicines.1199 The WIPO, 
in particular, has provided extensive technical cooperation aimed at addressing various issues 
related to policy, capacity-building, skills development and infrastructure based on specific 
needs.1200 These initiatives provide Ghana with the opportunity to seek technical assistance in 
overcoming any institutional and human resource capacity aspects toward the implementation 
of the Section 84 model in the country to promote affordable essential medicines. Nevertheless, 
it is important to stress that while Ghana is  now fully aware of the range of TRIPS flexibilities 
including the right to utilise the compulsory licensing regime under the TRIPS Agreement as 
an instrument of government policy to promote affordable medicines, it is also the case that 
political factors and bilateral diplomatic pressure are more likely to operate to prevent the 
country from implementing a model similar to 84.  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
1197 “Pharmaceutical Production and Related Technology Transfer’ (n 1129) 35, naming UNIDO, UNCTAD, 
World Bank, UNDP, WHO, UNICEF and the WIPO. 
1198 ‘UNCTAD Trade Capacity Building Resource Guide for Developing Countries.’. 
<http://www.tcbresourceguide.org/multilateral_summaries/unctad.html> [Accessed Apr. 12, 2017]. 
1199 ‘Trilateral Cooperation on Intellectual Property and Public Health’. 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/who_wipo_wto_e.htm> [Accessed Apr. 11, 2017]. 
1200 ‘WIPO Director General’s Report’ (Eleventh Session of the CDIP on the Implementation of the Development 
Agenda, May 2013) 14. 
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